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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Initial Exploration 
 
Choice of Subject 
The subject of inquiry in this thesis is the interface between worldview 
and psychotherapy. The selection of this topic came about in the follow-
ing way. As theologian and psychologist, my interest was raised by the 
difference I observed between the way autonomy is appreciated in men-
tal health care on the one hand, and the way it is viewed in Christian 
thinking on the other hand. In mental health care autonomy is a core 
value; in orthodox Christian thought, however, pursuit of autonomy 
seems suspect because laws and norms are considered God given, not 
man made. At some point I understood that the term autonomy not only 
has different, context dependent associations, but that it stands for dif-
ferent concepts. This recognition may well soften the stark opposition 
just sketched. Still, there is considerable overlap in the various uses of 
the term, sufficiently so for me to remain concerned about the compati-
bility of the distinct approaches.    
My interest in the subject intensified when I designed and conducted 
a survey among members of the Dutch Christian Association of Psychia-
trists, Psychologists, and Psychotherapists (CVPPP) (N=68). It was an in-
quiry about their opinion of Christian mental health care, more precisely, 
about the relationship between pastoral care and psychotherapy based 
on Christian values and non-Christian values respectively (Loonstra, 
2006). On the question what was viewed as typical of Christian oriented 
therapy, 74% replied “providing a safe environment for Christian issues,” 
and 85% mentioned “understanding religious aspects,” but only 28% 
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marked the multiple choice answer “a Christian view of autonomy.” Only 
a minority of caregivers, then, indicated awareness of the significance of 
the patient’s autonomy and its relationship to the Christian suspicions 
against the secular concept.  
In the course of time I realized that one should distinguish more levels 
of autonomy: 
- moral autonomy, defined as self-determination, including both 
the moral right and moral obligation to act accordingly; libera-
tion from tutelage and external moral authority (cf. Kant); 
- juridical autonomy, which functions in the therapist–patient rela-
tionship, comprising the right of informed consent and inspec-
tion of one’s own patient file; 
- rational autonomy, in the sense of being capable of rational self-
control, organizing one’s own life without making a mess of it; 
- emotional autonomy, referring to the freedom from emotional 
blockages to understand oneself as an individual with one’s own 
rights and freedoms, making one’s own decisions, defending 
them, and acting accordingly. Cf. Erikson’s (1963) developmental 
stage of autonomy versus shame and doubt.1 
In the psychotherapeutic setting of whatever fashion juridical autonomy 
is presupposed, while the emphasis of the treatment is often on emo-
tional autonomy. Depending on the worldviews of the therapist and the 
patient this focus can be expanded to moral autonomy. 
These distinctions may help to solve the previously felt tension be-
tween psychotherapy and Christianity. The solution seems obvious: both 
secular and Christian psychotherapists support juridical and emotional 
autonomy, but unlike the former the latter deny moral autonomy be-
cause it recognizes the authority of God in moral affairs. Still, this cannot 
be the final answer, for the distinctions do not involve separations. The 
four levels of autonomy have a common denominator that keeps creating 
tension. This common feature can be described as the self-confidence by 
which people stand up for themselves. Rational and emotional autonomy 
seem to be conditional for and inclining toward moral autonomy, and 
 
1
  In addition I came across what can be called motivational autonomy, implying 
that people can make free choices that are not determined by uncontrolled 
causes, a position identified and rejected by Nagel (1986). This position is highly 
philosophical, and therewith departs considerably from the common experience 
of autonomy I focus on here. For this reason I ignore it in the main text. 
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moral autonomy seems to be legally formalized in juridical autonomy. If 
this is true, the levels are interconnected. The self-centered confidence 
expressed in all dimensions seems to be oriented differently than central 
biblical values like loving servitude and subservience. This makes the 
picture complex; worldview issues seem to be at stake. For me the drive 
for further inquiry continued. 
Looking for a way out of this dilemma, my interest was raised by the 
North-American debate on the relationship between psychology and 
Christianity. Initiated well over forty years ago and still continuing, this is 
the only worldwide debate on the topic on an academic level. On the  
advice of my supervisor, I broadened my scope from the relationship 
between psychotherapy and Christianity to the relationship between 
psychotherapy and worldview in general, and intended to employ the 
Christian integration debate in North-America as a case study. This ex-
tension entails the attempt to generalize the findings and evaluations of 
Christian reflections in certain respects to other ultimate convictions. 
The three cases introduced below give an impression of the frictions that 
can arise because of the different views of our human condition that un-
derlie general psychotherapeutic assumptions and characterize diver-
gent ultimate concerns. 
 
Three Cases 
To gain a first impression of the subject of inquiry, three cases are pre-
sented, the first two of which are fictitious, and the third somewhat al-
tered to make it suitable for the present purpose. Explicitly or implicitly, 
these cases entail some kind of connection with religious and/or cultural 
values. 
 
Case 1 
Sarah, a 30-year-old member of a Christian Reformed Church in Canada, feels 
that she has come to a turning point in her life. She has had a higher educa-
tion and has a rather well-paid job in the administration of a trade company 
in the town where her mother lives. She is the only child of a couple that re-
ceived her late in their marriage. After the death of her father she feels re-
sponsible for her mother who has always been infirm and who has recently 
been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. At the same time rural life does not 
satisfy her. She longs for a new start in the city where she can seek a satisfy-
ing job and meet other people of her own age. If she intends to move, the time 
is now. On the other hand, she gets depressed, anxious, and feels guilty with 
the thought of leaving her mother alone. Mother is increasingly dependent on 
her. After months of sleeping poorly and absenteeism from her workplace 
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her practitioner refers her to a psychotherapist. It seems appropriate to see 
strengthening of her sense of autonomy as one of the major treatment goals. 
But how should we value the psychological autonomy when it is compared 
with the moral appeal for family solidarity that an adult daughter should feel 
toward her mother? To make the situation even tenser, members in the con-
gregation continue to praise her for fulfilling this duty. Maybe the mind of 
many will be made up quickly, but the case makes clear that conflicting moral 
values and worldviews in the appropriation of norms are the central prob-
lem. 
 
Case 2 
The second case is an example of a well-known phenomenon in multicultural 
therapy settings. It inescapably discloses the problem of worldview conflicts 
between the therapist and his/her cultural environment on the one side, and 
that of the patient and his life context on the other.  
Ahmed, a Muslim first generation immigrant in the Netherlands of Moroc-
can origin, 61 years old, comes to mental health services with depressive 
complaints after a referral by his family practitioner. With his much younger 
second wife he has two daughters who are unwilling to accept the traditional 
dressing code, and laugh at him when he recommends candidate husbands to 
them. They regularly stay outdoors overnight and, as he sees it, behave like 
whores. He feels humiliated and ashamed. He is suspicious of mental health-
care and therefore unwilling to follow the practitioner’s advice. In the end, 
however, because of severe low backaches from which he wants to be cured 
he gives in to the referral. The professional team discusses his status. Is he to 
be diagnosed as a patient? Or is it an ordinary generation conflict, aggravated 
by the cultural differences people of Moroccan origin encounter in the West-
ern world? A five conversations arrangement is proposed in order to get a 
better picture of Ahmed’s condition. After this series, it appears that the de-
pressive feelings relate to Ahmed’s hurt self-esteem. It seems plausible to as-
sume a neurotic disorder. At the same time, his feelings of paternal superior-
ity are culturally and religiously inspired. Is it wise, in the light of the pa-
tient’s cultural background, to assign a male therapist to him? Is the institu-
tion ready to make this concession? And to what extent are professionals 
willing to move along in the direction of the patient’s worldview? Will they 
show understanding for the patient’s hurt feelings, or are they guided by 
their culturally determined resistance against the patient’s attitude and re-
fuse to voice even the slightest empathy? 
 
Case 3  
Jeff, 24 years old, suffered several episodes of depression. He was raised in a 
Christian family belonging to a Methodist black church in the United States. 
He was aged nine when his mother died. His father remarried and his step-
mother was found to be the absolute ruler of the household, not allowing any 
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complaints. Jeff experienced increasing isolation; his efforts to win her ap-
proval only met with criticism and his mistakes were considered disastrous. 
His problems manifested on the sexual. He went through a period of intense 
masturbation and had a few homosexual contacts. The rare dates he arranged 
yielded tension rather than satisfaction. He often proved impotent. In his 
twenties he had homosexual and heterosexual contacts that filled him with 
excitement and fear; after each attempt he felt intense guilt, which under-
scored his pervading sense of inadequacy. He came to look upon himself with 
contempt. He became slovenly, biting his fingernails, twisting his hair and 
mutilating himself. Three times he prepared to commit suicide but shrunk 
back from it in the end. He tried marihuana, used sleeping pills for insomnia, 
pep pills to overcome his fatigue, and pornography for escape. Eventually, in 
a state of dissociation and neglect he was taken to a practitioner by a welfare 
worker, and next referred to a mental health service (cf. Nuernberger, 1978). 
Here, both rational and emotional autonomy are at stake. We focus on 
the emotional side of the issue – an aspect that deserves priority in psy-
chotherapy – and run into the interface with moral autonomy. How should 
caregivers handle Jeff’s feelings of inadequacy and guilt after a period of ad-
justment and rehab? Undoubtedly the therapeutic relationship of uncon-
ditional acceptance by the therapist should come to function as a new frame 
of reference for gaining self-confidence. And usually therapists will try to as-
sess whether the guilt feelings are real or unwarranted. But this is not the 
whole story. Would there be a kind of relationship between Jeff’s guilt feel-
ings and his Christian upraising? Should therapists explore this possible rela-
tionship and, if present, relativize Christian views of sin and guilt that Jeff in-
herited from his upbringing, in order to reduce the guilt feelings? Or should 
they support this view, invite Jeff to confess his sins to God and assure him of 
God’s forgiveness? Or should they leave the decision about drawing Christian 
faith into the treatment up to Jeff? 
 
Review 
These three examples reveal at least two particular traits of the practice 
of psychotherapy. The first, most obvious trait is the difference of 
worldviews that play a part within one person (case 1) or between the 
patient and the practitioner (cases 2 and possibly 3). In case 1 there is a 
competition on the moral level between the value of personal autonomy 
and freedom, and the value of being responsible for and loyal to the 
mother. The tension on the moral level is accompanied by a tension at 
the emotional level between insecure attachment and the legitimate de-
sire of individuation and separation. In the second case the religious    
and cultural worldview of the patient is opposed to the view of life          
an enlightened secular therapist is likely to hold today. The third case 
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represents a situation in which for the patient a religiously inspired 
worldview is possible but not obvious, and the question is whether this 
should be explored and allowed for. What the cases do not make clear is 
that still other factors play their role in the encounter of worldviews, 
such as the standards of the profession and those of the particular insti-
tution where the patient signs up. 
In our multicultural, pluralistic, Western society such varying, some-
times conflicting and also hidden commitments have been noted repeat-
edly. In the professional codes of conduct for practicing psychologists, 
respect for the patients’ faith is required as a highly esteemed basic atti-
tude. A quotation from the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct by the American Psychological Association (APA, 2010) can 
serve as an example:   
 
Psychologists are aware of and respect cultural, individual, and role differ-
ences, including those based on age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, 
culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and 
socioeconomic status and consider these factors when working with mem-
bers of such groups. Psychologists try to eliminate the effect on their work of 
biases based on those factors. 
 
In addition to respect for the patients’ worldview, a variety of reli-
gious worldviews have been considered in much research and many  
publications on the positive influence of religion and spirituality in psy-
chotherapy, conducted according to the guidelines of APA’s separate 
division for religion and spirituality (Division 36). The introduction to 
these guidelines presents the following programmatic statement (Society 
for the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 2010): 
 
Psychology of Religion promotes the application of psychological research 
methods and interpretive frameworks to diverse forms of religion and spiri- 
tuality; encourages the incorporation of the results of such work into clinical 
and other applied settings; and fosters constructive dialogue and interchange 
between psychological study and practice on the one hand and between reli-
gious perspectives and institutions on the other. The division is strictly non-
sectarian and welcomes the participation of all persons who view religion as 
a significant factor in human functioning. 
 
A second trait, however, indicated by the three cases presented above, 
points to a possible tension for the therapist when trying to respect the 
worldview of the patient. This is a likely possibility in the second case. 
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Ahmed’s authoritarian attitude toward his daughters may give rise to 
feelings of aversion with a therapist who favors moral autonomy. But in 
the cases 1 and 3 this tension may occur as well. The moral responsibility 
for her mother displayed by Sarah may be interpreted as only a sign of 
her insecure attachment to her mother without due consideration of an 
obligation emanating from a religious worldview. And in case 3 the ther-
apist may feel insecure to deal with a possibly religious background of 
Jeff’s guilt feelings. 
What can be said about the apparent difficulty to treat other world-
views than one’s own as equivalent? The answer to this question is not 
part of this inquiry; still, some understanding of this difficulty could be 
helpful to get a grip on the subject matter. The following explanation rec-
ommends itself by its simplicity. We notice that research of religion and 
spirituality and the use of its results in professional settings presuppose 
respect for personal religious and other spiritual convictions, even when 
the truth claims they contain are not adopted. We should realize that this 
respect for people’s beliefs is a matter of worldview, too. By virtue of the 
principle of moral autonomy, this worldview is pluralist, entailing that 
everybody has the moral right to have his/her own worldview. However, 
this pluralist worldview about other worldviews can only function by 
rejecting the absolute claim inherent in these worldviews. For if the abso-
lute claim of one of the other worldviews would be acknowledged as 
valid, it would challenge one’s own pluralist worldview, particularly the 
moral autonomy and freedom it fosters. Consequently, a competition of 
two worldviews may arise as soon as a patient assumes the validity of 
worldview claims that differ from those adhered to by the therapist.  The 
worldview of either party has its absolute claim, denying the other. Ap-
parently, people, including therapists, consider their own worldview as 
superior. This circumstance may explain the tension arising for the thera-
pist in the treatment room when confronted with divergent worldview 
claims. 
A subsequent interesting question is part of our research. Are plural-
ist therapists right? Are our Western standards superior, indeed, or are 
they just as dependent on contingent cultural factors as other world-
views? And what are the consequences if the conclusion turns out to be 
that the customary practice of psychotherapy depends heavily on contin-
gent cultural postulates? 
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1.2 Subject Matter of Inquiry 
 
An Analysis of the Christian Integration Debate 
The cultural presuppositions that contribute to mainstream psychothera-
peutic practice have been challenged in the history of mental health care 
on a limited scale. Such challenges remained confined to movements such 
as Marxism, the so-called anti-psychiatry movement, the Christian inte-
gration movement, feminism, the multicultural counseling movement, 
and postmodernist criticism of modern views and claims in professional 
care. All of these deserve special attention from the angle of cultural criti-
cism, although not all will receive it in this study to the same extent. 
The present study’s main focus will be the Christian integration de-
bate. There are several reasons to focus on this. The first reason is that 
Christian integrationists have been deeply aware of the potential im-
portance of worldview for psychological research and theorizing, and the 
application of psychological insights in professional practice. They have 
felt the tension between some secular presuppositions and their Chris-
tian faith. The second reason is that this awareness has led to a persistent 
debate about the relationships between psychological care and Christian 
worldview, and to a variety of proposals for shaping therapy. Third, the 
Christian integration debate has been conducted in specific training in-
stitutes and professional journals. This created favorable conditions      
for the collection of empirical material and for theoretical reflection, and 
therefore offers a welcome opportunity for analytic inquiry. The fourth 
reason is that, worldwide, Christianity is still a substantial factor in    
society, different from, for example, Marxism that is in decay. The final 
reason is that the outcome of the integration debate has not been very 
satisfying until now. There is a kind of impasse about how to continue. 
Would it be possible to carry the debate any further? 
 
Worldview 
What do we mean by worldview and psychotherapy? Let us have a look 
at worldview first. Worldview is a modern term and has German roots. 
Naugle (2002) mentions that the first to use the German original term for 
worldview (Weltanschauung) in philosophical language was Immanuel 
Kant, who used it only once in his writings. He meant by it the sense    
perception of the world. With Schelling, the meaning shifted from sen-
sory to intellectual perception. His view of Weltanschauung can be sum-
marized as the result of subconscious intellectual activities producing an 
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impression about the existent world and its meaning. Wilhelm Dilthey 
linked the term not only to the intellectual function of the human mind, 
but also to the emotional and volitional or behavioral functions. 
Worldview has to do with mental pictures as well as values. Further, he 
connected worldviews with different stages of historical development. 
For him worldviews are commonly shared experiential views. 
In his Psychology of Worldviews Karl Jaspers (1919) described world-
views as forms of particular interaction with the world, interaction          
in which the character of individual life comes to expression. He related 
them to our constructing a split between subject and object; conse-
quently, our worldviews are more objectively or more subjectively     
oriented. In their most objectivized form, worldviews are like cages 
(German: Gehäuse) by means of which individuals protect themselves 
ideologically and rationally from the frightening infinite possibilities of 
the totality of life. They get the function of self-defense. Although there 
are also more authentic expressions of worldviews – in particular those 
that are more subjectively oriented –,  in one way or another worldviews 
as such are deployed to absorb the blows caused by the confrontation 
with existential boundary situations (German: Grenz-situationen) (cf. 
Thornhill, 2002). This interpretation of worldviews resonates in the con-
ception developed and tested in the research program of experimental 
existential psychology. This approach considers meaning systems as con-
stellations of beliefs that address existential concerns of individuals in 
order to provide existential security (cf. Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 2004). 
Wolters (1989) attributes the rise of the idea to the influence of Ger-
man Idealism and Romanticism in reaction against the rational approach 
of the Enlightenment, which focused on the universal, abstract, eternal, 
and identical. Instead of this, the focus on worldview entailed a new em-
phasis on the particular, concrete, temporal, and unique. Worldview 
tends to carry the association of being personal, time bound, and private. 
It may be collective, though, but even then it is bound to the particular 
perspective of a specific group (e.g., nation, class, or period). However, 
with its subjective flavor, it becomes enmeshed in the problems of his-
torical relativism. 
New elements were introduced by the later Wittgenstein and Fou-
cault. Wittgenstein (1953/1968) emphasized the role of language. Lan-
guage games are sets of linguistic signs and rules that explain each other 
without being controllable from outside. They enable us to structure the 
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world around us that we cannot know directly. By the introduction of 
language as a determinant, the social character of worldviews is empha-
sized, because they are shared by all who use the same language system. 
In this way, Wittgenstein wished to bring an end to the age of the world 
picture in the subject-object sense that has been identified by Jaspers and 
denounced by Heidegger (1950/2002) as Cartesian thought. Foucault 
(1971/1972) added the notion that human discourse puts violence to 
things or, at least, imposes a practice upon them. Thus, a worldview is an 
effort to secure power for oneself or the community of people who affirm 
it. 
The concept of worldview has eagerly been adopted by Dutch and 
English speaking orthodox Protestants. The Dutch neo-Calvinist Abraham 
Kuyper (1898) posited life and thought, including theoretical thought in 
science, as the products of an underlying worldview. Initially, the found-
ing father of Reformational Philosophy, Herman Dooyeweerd, favored 
this approach; later on he began to question this function assigned to 
worldviews. Instead he preferred to turn to deeper spiritual and religious 
factors as the drives for our life and thought and, indeed, also for our 
worldviews: the so-called ground motives (Dooyeweerd, 1953; Klapwijk, 
1989). Naugle (2002, p. 29) argues that any line of demarcation between 
ground motives and the content of basic worldviews is “razor thin.” 
However, as motive and view they belong to different categories, and 
therefore should be distinguished. Yet, they are very close to each other, 
as soon as we recognize that ultimate beliefs are basic for a worldview. 
This is what we observe in the definition quoted below. Ultimate beliefs 
can be taken as a present-day term for religious ground motive. 
A final development is the fragmentation of worldviews. In the work-
place other worldview principles prevail than in the family, and when 
participating in traffic it is another story than when attending a church 
service. Our fractured existence is reflected in postmodern unbelief in 
unity of life, favoring pragmatism. Here we can hardly speak of world-
views anymore; perhaps we should call them world segment views. 
A rather comprehensive and dynamic definition of worldview, in-
cluding the proximity and the different roles of ultimate belief and vision, 
has been presented by Olthuis (1989). It does not yet allow for the notion 
of postmodern fragmentation, however. 
 
A worldview (or vision of life) is a framework or set of fundamental beliefs 
through which we view the world and our calling and future in it. This vision 
need not be fully articulated: it may be so internalized that it goes largely  
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unquestioned; it may not be explicitly developed into a systematic conception 
of life; it may not be theoretically deepened into a philosophy; it may not even 
be codified into a creedal form; it may be greatly refined through cultural-
historical development. Nevertheless, this vision is a channel for the ultimate 
beliefs which give direction and meaning to life. It is the integrative and in-
terpretative framework by which order and disorder are judged; it is the 
standard by which reality is managed and pursued; it is the set of hinges on 
which all our everyday thinking and doing turns. (p. 29) 
 
Salient features of worldviews are combined in this definition. First, 
there is a cluster of characteristics that move around basic convictions 
and existential orientation: beliefs, calling, future, giving direction and 
meaning to life. This cluster has to do with expectations and purposes, 
and also with values. With the help of a worldview we try to make sense 
of our lives, or, dependent on the content of our worldview, we try to find 
the true sense of our lives. 
This leads to a second cluster of indications, about the practical     
function of worldviews. A worldview is directive for our cognitions, judg-
ments, attitudes and behavior; it is an integrative and interpretive frame-
work, judging order and disorder, the set of hinges on which all our    
everyday thinking and doing turns. Here again, values play a part; values 
are conditional for making judgments and choices.  
In line with these practical functions, a worldview has, third, an ulti-
mate function of managing and mastering life: reality is managed and 
pursued, as Olthuis’s definition says. This reminds us of the power factor 
that is emphasized by Foucault. 
A fourth cluster of characterizations indicate the implicit and un-   
self-critical nature worldviews can have: being not fully articulated, being 
internalized, largely unquestioned, being not explicitly developed, and 
not codified.  
A fifth trait of worldviews in Olthuis’s definition is their cultural-     
historical character. They are shared by groups of people who live in a 
culture that is shaped by a common history.  
Worldviews, then, are basic, existential, functional, normative,        
domineering, largely implicit and unquestioned, and shared. Having so 
many and such influential relationships, worldviews can be regarded as          
all-inclusive. As Klapwijk (1989) indicates, they operate as a global            
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pre-understanding (German: Vorverständnis) that all people deploy to 
make sense of their experiences.2 
About the largely implicit character of worldviews there is some dis-
pute, however. Let us have a closer look at this difference. Griffioen 
(2012) argues that worldview implies a consciously taken stance, and 
includes something of a plan of action for reaching a certain goal. He dis-
tinguishes it from world picture (German: Weltbild), the latter denoting a 
representation held unconsciously but yet guiding action. He suggests the 
term embedded worldview to indicate a hybrid and less consciously held 
worldview, like a world picture, and considers it a worldview in decay. In 
contrast, Olthuis (2012) increasingly emphasizes the implicit component 
of worldviews. He appeals to the neuropsychological insight that much 
knowledge is implicit and sub-symbolic, being processed subconsciously 
by the right brain hemisphere, and to the attachment theory which as-
sumes that someone’s early developed attachment style to the primary 
caregiver affects his or her world and life-view (‘working models’) in 
later years. 
This difference of understanding seems to be more than a matter of 
definition. It affects normativity. Griffioen favors the explicit, while Olt-
huis sees the implicit as the standard along which people manage their 
lives. Olthuis’s psychological arguments for the implicit side are convinc-
ing. Moreover, this implicit side of worldviews is important for this in-
quiry. I am interested in the influence of worldview dynamics that may 
remain largely implicit and held unawares, and need to be made explicit 
in order to notice their influence. Therefore I advocate a concept of 
worldview that includes the implicit side. I realize that the envisaged 
explication can only be partial, because we cannot distance ourselves 
fully from the pre-understanding that guides our explicating analysis. 
At the same time, Griffioen’s emphasis on the explicit side of world-
views is relevant, too. In worldviews several levels of functioning can be 
distinguished. There is the internal, and often implicit and sub-conscious 
level in people’s dealing with the world around; there is the internalized 
 
2
  Park, Edmonton, and Mills’s (2010) concept of global meaning seems to come 
close to this conceptualization. They state: “Global meaning refers to individual’s 
core beliefs and goals. Global beliefs are basic internal cognitive structures that 
individuals construct about the nature of the world. These core beliefs guide in-
dividuals throughout the lifespan by informing their ongoing construal of reality, 
including their understanding of themselves, the world, and themselves in rela-
tion to the world” (p. 486). 
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theoretical level of conscious philosophy and views, held and defended 
by the owner of them; and there is the institutional side of worldviews, 
the official accounts and doctrines held by institutions of work or faith in 
which people participate, accounts and doctrines that are partly internal-
ized, and partly adhered to as external guidelines by the members of 
these institutions.  
Before being able to work with the concept of worldview, however, 
we should demarcate it from neurotic distortions of the perception of  
life, especially because we prefer to use its more implicit version. In   
doing so, three distinctive features may suffice. Neurosis has an individu-
alistic bent, while a worldview is usually shared by a group of people; 
neurosis functions to ward off inner conflicts stemming from negative 
self-assessments, while worldview is linked to ultimate value to give 
meaning to life; and neurosis involves a negative emotional state, while 
worldview is emotion-neutral. Therefore, neurotic views should be sub-
ject to psychotherapeutic treatment, but worldviews should be respected 
in therapy. These distinctions are not watertight, I admit, and give rise to 
critical questions. Can’t there be collective neuroses, like mass hysteria? 
Then, do worldviews not serve to ward off unbearable inner conflicts? 
And is not something like defeatism a kind of worldview linked to nega-
tive emotions? I would respond that collective neuroses tend to be tem-
porary; mental protections against negative self-assessments need not be 
neurotic; and if a worldview is loaded with a negative emotional charge, 
then that emotional part could grow into a neurotic distortion. True, the 
demarcation line is not sharp but for our purpose it will do. 
Two main characteristics of worldviews are of special interest for our 
inquiry, namely, their seeming self-evidence and their pervasive influ-
ence. Due to the self-evident appearance of one’s worldview, particulari-
ties in it can easily be overlooked. However, if all aspects of life are     
affected by worldviews, then psychotherapy is, too. And if theorists and 
therapists fail to acknowledge this all-intruding influence, this tends to 
mold psychotherapy in an uncontrolled way. And if worldviews are 
shared mental frameworks, does this not lead to prejudices and exclusion 
of those who do not share the common framework? If nobody feels the 
urge to question his or her own worldview when confronted with a dif-
ferent worldview held by someone else, the automatic reaction will be to 
disqualify that other worldview as inferior. This proclivity needs to be 
faced and resisted. In order to succeed in that, worldviews, as well as 
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their influence upon psychotherapeutic theory and practice, need to be 
made as explicit as possible. 
 
Psychotherapy 
The other term in the title is psychotherapy, and now gets our attention. 
When Sigmund Freud began to employ psychotherapy at the end of the 
19th century, to him psychoanalytical therapy and psychotherapy were 
one and the same thing. As a matter of fact, his colleague Josef Breuer had 
been drawn into this kind of therapy when treating Miss Anna O. for hys-
teria, i.e., somatic malfunctioning apparently caused by mental problems, 
with the help of current hypnotic therapy. She happened to fall sponta-
neously into trance-like states (autohypnosis) during which she was able 
to explain her daytime fantasies and other experiences, and felt relieved 
afterwards. She gave it the appropriate name “talking cure” (Breuer and 
Freud, 1895/1937). Later, Freud (1917/1920) described his psychoana-
lytic therapy as follows: 
 
Analytic therapy attacks the illness closer to its sources (sc. than hypnotic 
therapy; BL), namely in the conflicts out of which the symptoms have 
emerged, it makes use of suggestion to change the solution of these conflicts… 
Analytic treatment places upon the physician, as well as upon the patient, a 
difficult responsibility; the inner resistance of the patient must be abolished. 
The psychic life of the patient is permanently changed by overcoming these 
resistances, it is lifted upon a higher plane of development and remains pro-
tected against new possibilities of disease. The work of overcoming re-
sistance is the fundamental task of the analytic cure. The patient, however, 
must take it on himself to accomplish this, while the physician, with the aid of 
suggestion, makes it possible for him to do so. The suggestion works in the 
nature of an education. We are therefore justified in saying that analytic 
treatment is a sort of after-education. (p. 390) 
 
In this account, two kinds of qualifications are striking. On the one 
hand, Freud describes his psychotherapy in medical terms, using words 
like illness, symptoms, treatment, physician, patient, disease, and cure. 
On the other, however, he characterizes the enterprise as a kind of educa-
tion, which is not a medical but pedagogical category. This ambivalence is 
characteristic for the way psychotherapy is understood from its begin-
nings up to now. Medical care, education, counseling, and support are 
some of the categories to which psychotherapy is linked. This has conse-
quences for the different ways psychotherapy is defined. I distinguish 
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four main approaches, to wit, the medical, the psychological, the cultural 
anthropological, and the interpersonal. 
In the medical variant, words like treatment, patient, symptoms and 
disorder occur, as in the definitions by Wolberg (1977) and Stedman’s 
Medical Dictionary (2006). Wolberg (p. 3) puts it as follows: 
 
Psychotherapy is the treatment, by psychological means, of problems of an 
emotional nature in which a trained person deliberately establishes a pro-
fessional relationship with the patient with the object of (1) removing, mod-
ifying, or retarding existing symptoms, (2) mediating disturbed patterns of 
behavior, and (3) promoting positive personality growth and development. 
 
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (2006) presents the next definition of 
psychotherapy: 
 
treatment of emotional, behavioral, personality, and psychiatric disorders 
based primarily upon verbal or nonverbal communication and interventions 
with the patient, in contrast to treatments utilizing chemical and physical 
measures. 
 
Different from the medical view, the psychological approach dis-
misses these medical terms, but still retains the expert model in the   
relationship between the therapist and the aid demanding individual. A 
well-known example is the definition by Niezel, Bernstein, and Milich 
(1998), who avoid terms like treatment, symptom, disorder, and patient, 
and state:  
 
Psychotherapy consists of a relationship between at least two participants, 
one of whom has special training and expertise in handling psychological 
problems and one of whom is experiencing a problem in adjustment and has 
entered the relationship to alleviate this problem. The psychotherapeutic re-
lationship is a nurturant but purposeful alliance in which varying methods of 
a psychological nature are employed to bring about the changes desired by 
the client. (pp. 240-241) 
 
The third approach sees psychotherapy in line with age-old practices 
in all cultures aiming at recovery from emotional and behavioral difficul-
ties. In this perspective, Frank (1973) suggests the following broad defi-
nition. 
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We shall consider as psychotherapy only those types of influence character-
ized by: 
1. a trained, socially sanctioned healer, whose healing powers are ac-
cepted by the sufferer and by his social group or an important seg-
ment of it 
2. a sufferer who seeks relief from the healer 
3. a circumscribed, more or less structured series of contacts between 
the healer and the sufferer, through which the healer, often with the 
aid of a group, tries to produce certain changes in the sufferer’s emo-
tional state, attitudes, and behavior. All concerned believe these 
changes will help him. Although physical and chemical adjuncts may 
be used, the healing influence is primarily exercised by words, acts, 
and rituals in which the sufferer, healer, and – if there is one – group, 
participate jointly. (pp. 2-3) 
 
The author adds that these features are common not only to what we 
usually consider psychotherapy but also to methods of primitive healing, 
religious conversion, and even brainwashing (cf. for the same approach, 
Orlinsky and Howard, 1995).   
Medical terms are absent here but the expert role of the therapist as a 
socially recognized official is pivotal, though not necessarily described in 
psychological terms. To a considerable degree the treatment success is 
dependent on the expectation that is derived from the healer’s recog-
nized position in a given cultural context.  
A fourth effort of defining psychotherapy avoids not only medical 
terms, but also the unequal relationship of expert and helped person. 
Psychotherapy is described more loosely and broadly as a helping rela-
tionship between two individuals, each with his and/or her own role. In 
her characterization of the aim of psychotherapy Van Deurzen (2002) 
provides an example of this: 
 
The aim of existential counselling and psychotherapy is to clarify, reflect up-
on and understand life. Problems in living are confronted and life’s pos-
sibilities and boundaries are explored. The existential approach does not set 
out to cure people in the tradition of the medical model. Clients are consid-
ered to be not ill but sick of life or clumsy at living. When people are confused 
and lost the last thing they need is to be treated as ill or incompetent. What 
they need is some assistance in surveying the terrain and in deciding on the 
right route so that they can again find their way. (p. 18) 
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In this description neither the expert role of the therapist is reckoned 
essential, nor the focus on mental problems. Unequal expert models are 
even rejected. 
Because of our intention to face the existing practice, it is preferable 
to keep the concept of psychotherapy as broad as possible. This means 
that the only restrictive terms consist of, first, the occurrence of “prob-
lems in living” (Van Deurzen), including mental and behavioral problems; 
second, professionalism, that is, a generally accepted minimal standard of 
competence and professional ethos; third, conversation as the main 
means of handling the problem. For this reason some hesitation may 
arise about the third presentation, that is, Frank’s definition that sub-
sumes our Western interpretation of psychotherapy among a much   
wider umbrella of all kinds of culturally determined practices. This pro-
cedure impedes a distinct view of therapeutic professionalism as it is 
accepted in our cultural context. A psychotherapist is not a primitive 
healer (shaman), or an exorcist. Admittedly, psychotherapy as we know it 
may be part of a prolonged practicing of all kinds of respected healing 
efforts over time but current psychotherapy has its own character. With-
in the genus of healing practices I am interested in the species of profes-
sional psychotherapy. 
 
Connections between Worldview and Psychotherapy:  
Theories and Methods 
Along which lines can worldview and psychotherapy be connected? 
There are three possibilities, as far as I see, all of which may be actual 
routes from worldview to psychotherapy.  
The first route goes via implicit assumptions behind the psychological 
theories and methods founded in them. International associations of psy-
chotherapists set a high value on scientific theory as basic for recognized 
practice. The Strasbourg Declaration on Psychotherapy, published by the 
European Association for Psychotherapy (EAP), states in its 1990 ver-
sion: 
 
1. Psychotherapy is an independent scientific discipline, the practice of which 
amounts to an independent and free profession. 
2. Training in psychotherapy takes place at an advanced, qualified and scien-
tific level. 
. . . 
5. Access to training is through various preliminary qualifications, in partic-
ular in human and social sciences. 
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The conditions this association places upon providing a European Certifi-
cate for Psychotherapy (2009, most recent update) contain the following 
stipulations: 
  
3.1 The method of psychotherapy used (hereafter, modality) must be well de-
fined and distinguishable from other psychotherapy modalities and have a 
clear theoretical basis in human sciences. 
3.2 The theory must be integrated with the practice, be applicable to a broad 
range of problems, and have been demonstrated to be effective. 
 
These texts show a close relationship of psychotherapy with scientific 
theories and methods that are evidence based. 
One of the classical claims of modern science is the pretension of neu-
tral, value-free research with universally valid results. This claim has 
been challenged, however, by the philosophy of science perspective of 
among others Thomas Kuhn (1970; Van den Brink, 2004/2009). His in-
troduction of paradigm shifts as the principle of scientific progress, 
draws attention to the role of unquestioned presuppositions. The basis of 
scientific theories does not consist of evident research data but consists 
of assumptions and worldviews that function as a preliminary frame-
work for interpretation. If this is the case with theorizing in the natural 
sciences, then it is all the more applicable to the human sciences that 
work with less hard data, as Polkinghorne (1983) argues. All observation 
is theory laden, and theories are affected by worldviews (cf. Glas, 1995). 
 
Connections between Worldview and Psychotherapy: 
Therapeutic Relationship 
A second possible route from worldview to psychotherapy is the thera-
peutic relationship. This relationship can be broadly defined as “the feel-
ings and attitudes that counseling participants have toward one another, 
and the manner in which these are expressed” (Gelso and Carter, 1994, p. 
297). It comprises affective, attitudinal, and behavioral aspects, in two 
directions. What interests us here is that the personal worldviews of 
practitioners might have influence on their feelings and attitudes toward 
their clients or patients, on how they weigh the problems, and on the way 
they try to have them changed. A practitioner’s value system may have a 
manipulative impact on a client’s or patient’s behavior, because these 
values remain hidden and are not made explicit. So, the autonomy of 
patients or clients may be violated. This need not be a conscious process: 
therapists may be unaware of it. 
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Already in 1936 Rosenzweig (1936/2002) argued that theories de-
scribing principles of change in psychotherapy explain only a part of the 
positive outcome of treatment, because all existing therapies of his days 
had similar results. This observation has become known as the Dodo Bird 
Verdict, appealing to the memorable words of a dodo bird in Alice in 
Wonderland after a race without clear rules; “Everybody has won, and all 
must have prizes.” Besides the specific factors non-specific or common 
factors are to be assumed. Rosenzweig’s hypotheses have been adopted 
and confirmed by Frank (1973, 1982). The contribution of specific fac-
tors has been established at only 20%, falling far short of the large rate 
attributed to common factors (Luborski et al., 2002). 
One of these common factors is the psychotherapeutic relationship. 
Based on meta-analytic inquiry, Wampold (2001) estimates the thera-
pist’s effect on therapy outcome at more than 70%. The therapist’s effect 
consists of allegiance and skill. Allegiance is the interesting factor in this 
context, because it contributes to the therapeutic relationship. Although 
these conclusions have been criticized for methodical shortcomings 
(Chambless, 2002; Beutler & Harwood, 2002), the percentages make a 
significant portion of common factors in general, and of the therapist’s 
factor in particular, plausible at least. Others (Lambert & Barley, 2001) 
present a result of 30% of the variance in client outcome for common 
factors, including the client–therapist relationship, which is still a sub-
stantial figure. If the therapeutic relationship is so influential, it may be 
assumed that the worldviews that the therapist and the patient hold af-
fect the conversations and that the therapist should be aware of his or 
her own share in this respect. 
This assumption is supported by findings about the effect of the ther-
apist’s unconscious approving and disapproving responses to what the 
patient puts forward, namely, that the patient’s utterances were strongly 
influenced by this implicit approval or disapproval. Statements in catego-
ries disapproved by the therapist fell from 45% of the total number of 
statements in the second hour to 5% in the eighth, while over about the 
same period statements in approved categories rose from 1% to 45% 
(Murray & Jacobson, 1971; Frank, 1973). These influences have been 
measured in – of all places – the person centered humanistic therapy by 
Carl Rogers that pretended to be non-directional. As we may safely as-
sume that unconscious valuations of the client come about in the context 
of personal values that characterize one’s worldview, here the obvious 
influence of the therapist’s worldview is exemplified. 
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Another argument for the worldview content of the therapeutic rela-
tionship is the concept of self-relatedness given prominence by Glas 
(2003, 2006, 2009b, 2012). This insight involves that neither do patients 
coincide with their complaints, nor do therapists coincide with their pro-
fessional role; rather, patients relate to their illness, and therapists to 
their role. In relating to their distress or role respectively, both patients 
and therapists often subconsciously evaluate their parts of the process. 
In this implicit evaluation worldview notions automatically enter the 
scene, because worldviews supply the indispensable frame of reference 
for valuation and evaluation. 
 
Connections between Worldview and Psychotherapy: 
Institutional Structures 
Besides the assumptions behind theories and methods, and the personal 
values the therapist unconsciously imposes on the therapeutic relation-
ship, there is a third perspective on worldview issues influencing the 
process, namely, the institutional structures in which the psychothera-
peutic practice takes place. A range of factors play their part here, such as 
the kind of practice, public or private, and, annex, the possibility of     
reimbursement by insurance companies; then, the composition of the 
treatment team; and furthermore, the ethos of the organization or the 
corporate identity, which answers the question of what kind of care-
givers they want to be. These are no mere opinions and decisions made 
up by the individual therapist, but structures already existing before the 
individual therapist joins the organization. 
A private practice attracting patients that can afford long term treat-
ments financially, may focus on patient centered treatments including all 
life experiences that have shaped the patient’s psychological functioning. 
Here a holistic model is likely to prevail. A public practice, on the other 
hand, being dependent on reimbursement by insurance, tends to prefer 
short-term treatments with the highest rates of measurable improve-
ments of the diagnosed symptoms. Here the economic model ruled by 
efficiency is more likely to dominate the scene. A professional may get 
pulled into different directions because of conflicting interests. These 
directions represent different worldview orientations. Patients are 
viewed from their inner needs or from the economic profit of their com-
plaints. 
The way the treatment team is composed may affect the way patients 
or clients are viewed because the distinct caregivers may be inclined to 
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have their own interpretations of psychological problems. The psychia-
trist may favor a biological interpretation and opt for drug therapy, the 
psychologist may identify a psychotrauma and recommend eye move-
ment desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy. The social-
psychiatric nurse, however, may prefer a systems approach in which the 
social connections of the patient are included in the diagnosis and the 
treatment. Discipline related biases, then, may affect the way patients are 
viewed: neurobiologically, relationally, or socially. The final choice is 
determined not only by negotiation, but also by the expertise that is 
available at the moment. Such a supply oriented approach sometimes 
seems inevitable. 
Finally, the ethos of the organization may be decisive for the chosen 
approach. Is it patient oriented or symptom oriented; holistic and inclu-
sive or fragmentary and distinctive; characterized by benevolence or 
efficiency; focused on participation or on the expert role? All presuppose 
a view of humanity that the organization has incorporated, and the staff 
members have to adopt. 
The different levels of kinds of practice, treatment teams, and organi-
zational ethos may function separately, but may also interfere. The kind 
of practice affects the ethos of experts. The main point is that these fac-
tors are supra-personal. The co-workers have to adapt their personal 
views and integrate the organizational approach of patients or clients in 
order to fit in the system and to participate in the professional practice. 
This is the institutional side of the relationship of worldview and psycho-
therapy. 
 
 
1.3 History of the Christian Integration Debate 
 
In order to deal with the question of how the relationship between 
worldview and psychotherapy takes shape in a Christian context, we now 
turn to what I name the Christian integration debate. I first introduce the 
Christian integration movement by giving some highlights of its history. 
After that I outline the various positions advocated in the debate by a 
concise analysis of the introductory book Psychology & Christianity: Five 
views, edited by Eric Johnson (2010a). On the basis of this outline the 
salient issues at stake can be identified. That helps us to make the con-
cept of worldview more tangible. After that we can focus our inquiry on 
the central question and infer sub-questions and hypotheses. 
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During the first half of the 20th century there is not much evidence of 
conservative Christians thinking distinctively about psychology (Johnson 
& Jones, 2000b). As to the first part of the second half, Worthington 
(1994) mentions two works that he regards as preparatory for the rise of 
interdisciplinary integration of psychology and theology, namely, the 
collected papers of a Lutheran symposium under the direction of the 
well-known psychologist and former president of the American Psycho-
logical Association Paul E. Meehl from 1958, under the title What, Then, Is 
Man?, and the translated book by the Swiss physician and self-taught 
psychotherapist Paul Tournier, To Resist or to Surrender?, from 1964. He 
characterizes these contributions as unsystematic and rudimentary. One 
of the pioneers of the Christian integration movement, Gary R. Collins 
(2000) mentions the name of Clyde M. Narramore with The Psychology of 
Counseling from 1960. He recalls that Narramore, though not a scholar 
writing professional publications, became the first to make psychology 
respectable in the evangelical Christian community. The importance of 
Tournier and Narramore in fostering an evangelical perspective on the 
helping professions is underlined by Johnson and Jones (2000b), and 
Johnson (2010b). 
An important stimulus to the emancipation of a self-confident move-
ment of Christian psychologists is the founding in 1956 of the Christian 
Association for Psychological Studies (CAPS), a platform for Christian 
psychologists to share their concerns. Initiated by conservative Chris-
tians of the Dutch Reformed persuasion, in the early 1970s it had been 
developed into a broad evangelical organization (Serrano, 2006). The 
association would become a major player in the exchange of thoughts. 
Another significant initiative with great impact was the establishment of 
a training center for Christian psychologists at Fuller Theological Semi-
nary in the early 1960s. Over the years it has been the combination of 
training in clinical psychology with training in theology which was char-
acteristic for its curriculum. The goal of the program has been to educate 
psychologists who integrate the Christian faith with psychology in theo-
ry, practice, and research (Vande Kemp, 1984). 
From 1970 onwards the developments progressed quickly. Before 
this time there were only occasional signs of attention for the integration 
issue, with only two initiatives showing a more structural feature,    
namely CAPS and Fuller. But then among evangelicals a radical opposi-
tion against secular psychotherapy emerged, following a secular anti-
psychiatry sentiment. Mowrer (1961), for instance, lashed out at the   
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tendency in current psychotherapy, mostly psychoanalytical, to victimize 
the persons asking for help. He contended that continued wrong-doing 
was at the heart of a gradual impairment of self-respect, and that this 
gradual decline of self-respect might lead to a sudden emotional imbal-
ance or breakdown, comparable to the sudden swing of a seesaw as soon 
as one end outweighs the other. Therefore the balance could only be re-
stored by reinforcing the troubled person’s virtue at the expense of their 
evil deeds. By omitting to make sufferers responsible for their own well-
being, therapy would fail. Inspired by this criticism the evangelical Jay E. 
Adams (1970) rejected current psychotherapy and developed the so-
called nouthetic (warning, admonishing) counseling that was restricted 
to biblical counseling. He assumed that any mental disorder either had a 
physical-medical cause or was the consequence of sin. In the former case 
sufferers should go to the general practitioner, in the latter to the pasto-
ral or nouthetic counselor. 
Many Christian psychologists rejected this approach as doing injustice 
to psychology’s merits. So the question of how to employ psychological 
understandings without denying biblical notions was put forward with a 
new vigor. Publications and conferences were supported by new profes-
sional organizations. After the establishment of an integrated program 
for psychology and theology at Fuller, the Rosemead Graduate School of 
Psychology at Biola University saw the light and enrolled the first Ph.D. 
students in 1970. In later years other evangelical doctoral institutions 
followed: Western Baptist Seminary, Wheaton College, Regent University, 
Seattle Pacific University and Azusa Pacific University. As Johnson & 
McMinn (2003) note, the mission statements of these integrative pro-
grams emphasize the blending of faith with professional training and 
equipping Christian psychologists with unique skills in the provision of 
service to religious communities. 
Another notable development is the foundation of two peer-reviewed 
professional journals, the Journal of Psychology and Theology (JPT), that 
was started in 1973 by the Rosemead Graduate School, and is published 
under its responsibility, and the Journal of Psychology and Christianity 
(JPC), published by the CAPS from 1982 onward, and presented as a con-
tinuation in a new format of The Bulletin - Christian Association for Psy-
chological Studies that appeared in seven volumes from 1975–1981. Both 
journals are meant as a platform for debate. The colophon of the former 
journal’s cover states: 
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The purpose of the Journal of Psychology and Theology is to communicate re-
cent scholarly thinking on the interrelationships of psychological and theo-
logical concepts and to consider the application of these concepts to a variety 
of professional settings. 
 
Its companion journal chooses similar wordings at the same place: 
 
The Journal of Psychology and Christianity is designed to provide current 
scholarly interchange among Christian professionals in the Helping Profes-
sions . . . The Journal of Psychology and Christianity is designed to be a forum 
of discussion and exchange. 
 
From these editors’ mission statements we can conclude that the pur-
poses and pursued functions are formulated quite broadly, be it that the 
front page of JPT characterizes the journal as “an Evangelical Forum for 
the Integration of Psychology and Theology.” Still, neither of the two 
journals intends to tie itself down to specific integration views. The most 
determining unifying conviction seems to be that separating Christian 
theological convictions from psychological insights is an impracticable 
job. 
Finally, the foundation of the American Association of Christian Coun-
selors (AACC), a more conservative peer of CAPS, deserves mentioning. 
Internal debates about homosexuality and male references to God among 
CAPS members led to this initiative in 1991. Since then, the AACC has 
grown out to be the largest evangelical organization for professional 
counselors with more than 25000 members (Johnson & Jones, 2000b; 
Johnson, 2010). 
 
 
1.4 Worldview Topics under Discussion 
 
It Is All about Integration 
Let us now try to sort out the worldview issues that are prominent in the 
Christian integration debate. We undertake this by analyzing the various 
positions argued for in the publication of the second edition by Johnson 
(2010) of Psychology & Christianity: Five Views. The choice of this intro-
ductory volume has several reasons. The design allows for a clear synop-
sis of the various approaches, and it offers a recent account of the actual 
state of affairs, including a fifth view that was not yet included in the first 
edition (Johnson & Jones, 2000a). Leading representatives of each      
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approach present their own view, and after each presentation the repre-
sentatives of the other four views give their comments. This creates a 
lively picture, revealing the issues that are at stake. Then, the book has 
been widely used in psychology classes at colleges in the United States 
with a Christian background. 
At the same time the book gives rise to a question about the use of the 
term integration. Only one of the five views bears the name of Integration 
View, although in the present study the whole debate is labeled Christian 
Integration Debate. From inside and outside much criticism has been 
raised against the term integration, as though two supposedly separate 
bodies of knowledge, psychology and theology, should be fused after-
ward into one system.3 This has not been the intention of the pioneers of 
the Christian integration movement like Collins (1977) and Carter and 
(Bruce) Narramore (1979), however. They looked for the best way to 
integrate their psychological knowledge and their faith into a Christian 
professional view of human existence. The discussions they elicited have 
been crystallizing into at least three of the five positions put forward in 
the present volume, that is, the Integration View, the Christian Psy-
chology View and the Transformational Psychology View. The two re-
maining views are at the opposite ends: the Levels of Explanation View 
borders on the dominant division between scientific and religious knowl-
edge, and the Biblical Counseling View is inspired by the criticism raised 
against secular psychotherapy from secular circles. This does not alter 
the fact that all five approaches formulate their answer to the question of 
how Christians can integrate psychology in their own Christian view of 
human life. Even in the Biblical Counseling position there are some traces 
of the integration drive, because it can accept diagnostic description and 
it adopts the general format of psychotherapy: one-to-one conversations, 
clinics, appointments, fees, licensure, the counseling process, and special-
ized training. These are not borrowed from Scripture, but from the 
treatment practice (Beck, 2003). Moreover, psychological data is not 
rejected completely, especially when the data is used to illustrate and de-
scribe rather than explain (Powlison, 1984, 2010; Welch & Powlison, 
1997). So, the Biblical Counseling View can be seen as an alternative for 
the typical integration position but working within the same coordinate 
 
3
  Cf. Ellens (1980); De Graaff (1980); Van Belle (1998); Roberts (2010a); Evans 
(2012). 
26 WORLDVIEW AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
system, and participating in the debate on the need for possibilities and 
limits of integrating Psychology and Christianity.  
Let us now analyze the five views and the mutual discussions between 
their representatives about integration in order to extract the main top-
ics that dominate the influence of Christian worldview issues on the con-
ceptualization of psychology and psychotherapy.  
 
The Levels of Explanation View   
Myers (2010a) defends the position that psychology and Christian faith 
are two different levels of explaining human mentality and behavior. This 
distinction runs parallel with the distinction between God’s natural reve-
lation and his special revelation in the Bible. Properly speaking, there are 
more levels of explaining human nature, each exploring different aspects 
of its functioning. In an increasing degree of integrative potential a physi-
cal, chemical, biological, psychological, sociological, philosophical, and 
theological level can be distinguished. In general, psychology and Chris-
tian faith fit together nicely. Science is characterized by curiosity and 
humility. Scientists continuously submit their conclusions to the judg-
ment of their fellow researchers and subject them to the force of new 
research findings. This attitude is compatible with a humble faith in God 
and awareness of human fallibility. Further, in general they are mutually 
supportive. For example, people experience life through a self-centered 
filter. Attribution theories and the phenomenon of self-serving bias ac-
count for that. This echoes the religious idea of the fundamental sin of 
self-protective pride. Sometimes, however, discoveries of psychology do 
challenge some traditional Christian understandings. This can be illus-
trated by psychological evidence suggesting that homosexuality is not a 
choice but a condition determined by biological factors. The categorical 
condemnation of homosexuality that has been current in historical Chris-
tianity is unsettled by this and is challenged to be reexamined. But isn’t it 
true that personal values guide theory and research? To be sure, we all 
follow our biases and cultural bent. But as we believe that there is a real 
world out there, we should pursue pure objectivity as an ideal, although 
it may be unattainable. 
In his reply, Jones (2010a) exposes Myers’s ambiguous admission 
that belief guides perception. By suggesting that his approach to psycho-
logical research leans in the value-free direction, Myers underestimates 
the overall influence of assumptions. Value-free facts do not exist. Ac-
cordingly, the ideal should not be to overcome all assumptions but to 
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choose the right assumptions. Watson (2010a) gives a substantiation of 
this comment by defining psychology not only as a science that studies 
behavior and mental processes, as Myers does, but as a science that   
studies the behavior and mental processes of persons. However, every 
understanding of persons is a cultural construct. Hence the definition of 
psychology for Christian psychologists should be: psychology is a science 
that studies the behavior and mental processes of persons as understood 
in Christian texts and traditions of interpretation. Furthermore, Watson 
doubts the supposed humility of secular science. To this, Powlison 
(2010a) adds that persons should not only be interpreted by nature and 
nurture variables, but first and foremost by their final cause: their goal 
and destiny. Coe and Hall (2010a) introduce another point of criticism. 
They argue that by excluding values modern psychology has never been 
able to provide a clear justification, in line with its own scientific stan-
dards, of what is going on in psychotherapy, which inevitably addresses 
issues of values, at least about health and its opposite. 
These discussions reveal three issues concerning worldview. The first 
is epistemological: is it possible and desirable to know humans apart 
from value assumptions derived from pre-scientific understandings such 
as religious understanding? The second issue is about the object of 
knowledge: human nature, and the way in which its definition expresses 
one’s worldview. Here anthropology is at stake. And third, the topic of 
the relationship between psychology and psychotherapy is raised, that is, 
of how psychotherapy should be informed by psychological values. 
 
The Integration View 
Admitting that the term integration can be criticized legitimately, Jones 
(2010b) presents the following working definition of integration: 
 
Integration of Christianity and psychology (or any area of “secular thought”) 
is our living out – in this particular area – of the lordship of Christ over all of 
existence by our giving his special revelation – God’s true Word – its appro-
priate place of authority in determining our fundamental beliefs about and 
practices toward all of reality and toward our academic subject matter in par-
ticular. (p. 102) 
 
Jones favors the term Christianity over Bible or Christian theology, 
because he intends to focus on the personal faith convictions and com-
mitments that shape the psychologist’s scientific and professional work, 
rather than focus on any abstract discipline or body of knowledge,      
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remote from the psychologist and his or her work. The psychologist’s 
faith deals with values and with facts, for God has intervened in our em-
pirical reality. At the same time, psychological inquiry is an indispensable 
source of knowledge, because the Scriptures do not always teach us 
about human nature with precision, cf. the exact meaning of the imago 
Dei (humans being created in the image of God), and the constituent ele-
ments of human nature (body; body and soul; body, soul and spirit). Psy-
chological science should not be conceived, however, in a positivistic 
sense, as happens too often, by accepting only brute facts and scientific 
hypotheses and theories that are derived from these facts. In opposition 
to this concept of science Jones stresses four key points that have 
emerged in contemporary philosophy of science: all data is theory laden; 
scientific theories are underdetermined by facts; science itself is a cul-
tural and human phenomenon; science’s progress is not due to the accu-
mulation of bare facts, but to refinement of theories and theory-laden 
facts, which are themselves embedded in broader conceptual webs. This 
is true of all psychological theories, and should be understood as an   
invitation to a Christian implementation. The integrative approach is 
characterized by being anchored in biblical truth, especially in the under-
standing of persons, by a methodically rigorous conduct of science and, in 
cases of unresolvable tension, by standing for biblical truth, as in ap-
proaching homosexual behavior. As to the practice of psychotherapy, this 
goes far beyond the limits of scientific theory because of the complex 
human relationships psychotherapists have with their clients. 
In his response Myers (2010b) contends that Jones underestimates 
the fallible human character of biblical interpretation. Roberts (2010a) 
calls the concept of integration dualistic, for it binds two things together 
that previously stood apart: psychology on the one hand and Christianity 
on the other. Psychology should start with the wisdom stored in the Bible 
and the Christian tradition. Coe and Hall (2010b) assert that the Integra-
tion View lacks a clear methodology, that it adopts an inadequate model 
for the science of the person, and that these shortcomings render it    
unsuitable to scientifically ground the insights of various forms of psy-
chotherapy. In line with this criticism Powlison (2010b) charges the In-
tegration View with obscurity about the connection between psychologi-
cal science and psychotherapy. It merges incompatible things: describing 
persons and changing them, and it does so by dubiously explaining their 
behavior with the help of secular personality theories. 
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Here too the debate touches upon the same three themes: secular and 
biblical knowledge (epistemology), understanding of persons (anthropol-
ogy), and the relationship of psychological theory and psychotherapeutic 
practice. The discussion makes clear that they all are considered to func-
tion on the worldview level. 
 
The Christian Psychology View 
In the exposition of their Christian Psychology View, Roberts and Watson 
(2010a) refer to the policy of positive psychology to draw on ancient 
wisdom and to stress the inseparability of psychological and moral func-
tioning. They argue that psychic well-being is dependent on metaphysi-
cal, moral and religious commitments. Unfortunately, positive psychol-
ogy fails to differentiate among religious traditions. Roberts and Watson 
admit the charge of parochialism when advocating affiliation with the 
distinct Christian tradition. They wish to develop a psychology that accu-
rately describes the psychological nature of humans as understood ac-
cording to historic Christianity. The Sermon on the Mount, for instance, is 
about character and thus about the form of persons. After retrieving 
Christian Psychology from the age-old tradition, the Christian tradition 
should be operationalized in empirical research designs. This starts with 
the awareness that psychology is essentially a normative discipline. Psy-
chological research into persons-as-they-should-be cannot avoid operat-
ing within the normative framework of a worldview. This research can 
lead to different results. The outcome can be a seemingly valid discon-
firmation of the claims of the tradition. In that case there is a good reason 
for Christian psychologists to suspect their interpretations of Christian 
Psychology and to return to the Bible and the tradition for a better un-
derstanding. Another possible outcome is the evidence of a bias in secu-
lar research against Christian views, for instance, by classifying prayer 
under avoidance behavior and thus interpreting sincere Christian com-
mitments as expressions of anxiety. 
In his reaction Myers (2010c) emphasizes the limited scope of psy-
chological questions. We should not equate psychology with philosophy. 
Jones (2010c) sees as his core disagreement with the authors a different 
taxation of how much we can gather from the Bible and the tradition to 
construct a unitary systematic psychology. According to Coe and Hall 
(2010c), Roberts and Watson fail to thoroughly critique the current em-
pirical model and they, too, confine themselves to quantitative meth-
odologies, without employing less quantifiable experiential sources of 
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knowledge. Powlison’s (2010c) main concern is that Christian Psychol-
ogy fails to support face-to-face ministry. 
Here again the three discussed worldview themes turn up: the 
sources and conditions of knowledge (epistemology), research into per-
sons-as-they-should-be (anthropology), and the relationship between 
psychology and psychotherapy or counseling. 
 
The Transformational Psychology View 
Transformational psychology made its debut in the Christian integration 
movement fairly recently and with an ambitious agenda, indeed. As Coe 
and Hall (2010d) argue, in opposition to the existing tradition of natural-
istic and reductionist science, psychology should transform into a pre-
modern activity, sensitive to spiritual and nonphysical phenomena, as 
well as to the ethical values of health that psychotherapy must work 
with. Psychology should be done within the Christian tradition. The   
emphasis should be on the person of the psychologist, however. The  
spiritual-emotional development of the psychologist is foundational to 
the process of understanding human nature. Christian notions should not 
function as mere theoretical presuppositions but as experienced realities 
that condition and ground our knowledge. The Old Testament sage is a 
biblical prototype for doing psychology and psychotherapy, and his wis-
dom proverbs are indicative for the “natural oughts” or values that are 
discovered by observation and reflection, and not simply derived from 
Scripture or created by human opinions and desires. Scripture should 
function as an authoritative, God-authored interpretation of certain di-
mensions of reality. Doing transformational psychology is a means to the 
goal of love through union with the Holy Spirit, as humans are fundamen-
tally relational in nature, created to the ultimate end of loving God and 
neighbor. From this understanding there is a logical move from theory to 
praxis, from conceptualizing human nature to helping people. The ulti-
mate goal of the psychological undertaking, and of human nature as dis-
covered and experienced by this psychology, and of psychotherapy is one 
and the same: to show love. This goal of showing love entails a relational 
paradigm for doing psychology and psychotherapy, and provides a con-
temporary, scientific view of transformational change and growth.  
In Myers’s (2010d) opinion, Coe and Hall transform psychology into 
religion, denying the agreed-upon meaning of psychology. Jones (2010d) 
criticizes the spiritually individualistic bent of their presentation. In line 
with this, Powlison (2010c) is bothered by the orientation toward the 
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tradition of contemplative spirituality, which tends toward an elite, 
strenuous and privatized spirituality that is impracticable in everyday 
circumstances. Roberts (2010b) reads their paper as a supplement to 
Christian theology, in that it deals with one aspect of the epistemology of 
that kind of psychology, namely with knowledge as acquaintance or ex-
perience, leaving propositional knowledge and understanding out of 
consideration. 
It is clear that Coe and Hall present a coherent system of epistemol-
ogy, anthropology and psychotherapy: experiential knowledge inspired 
by Scripture, in opposition to modern science, leads to a relational view 
of human nature that results in a love-inspired psychotherapeutic rela-
tionship. Apart from Roberts’s broadening of epistemology, the respon-
ses do not add much to this picture. The three themes identified earlier 
are conspicuously present.  
 
The Biblical Counseling View 
Powlison (2010d) sets the tone of his contribution by stating: Christian 
faith is a psychology, Christian ministry is a psychotherapy. Christian 
faith understands psychology and psychotherapy as elaboration of the 
God-centered conviction that the Lord is our maker, our judge, and our 
redeemer. Put differently, through these qualifications the key charac-
teristics of human nature are indicated. Powlison marks six segments in 
the psychological industry: (1) our psychology in the pre-theoretical hu-
man subject, such as being stuck in a traffic jam on the way to an im-
portant appointment; (2) organized knowledge, as practiced through 
science; (3) the competing theories of human personality; (4) psycho-
therapy; (5) professional and institutional arrangements; and (6) a mass 
ethos, the air we breathe, the popular culture or the world. The Christian 
articulation in these segments are: (1) Christian faith; (2) close obser-
vations and systematic descriptions of the Bible, of the own sins and    
sufferings, of other people, of good arts, from literature to music and 
painting, of history and culture studies, and, lastly, the critical processing 
of thoughtful writers in psychology and psychiatry; (3) theology; (4) cure 
of souls; (5) the church; and (6) a counterculture of biblical wisdom. Fi-
nally, he presents a case study about a Christian medical doctor who feels 
depressed, has marital problems and resorts to heavy drinking and por-
nography. 
Myers’s (2010e) comment is identical to that on Christian psychol- 
ogy and transformational psychology: the word psychology is used in a    
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different sense. Jones (2010e) wants to stress more forcefully the inter-
est of scientific and professional psychology to supplement and comple-
ment Christian perspectives. Watson (2010b) holds Powlison liable for 
letting Biblical Counseling downplay the work of science, instead of ar-
ticulating formal, professional methods of inquiry and discernment in the 
very interest of counseling. And he wonders on what grounds Powlison 
takes the unity among biblical counselors for granted, in view of the di-
versity of perspectives that result from the favored interpretive methods. 
Finally, Coe and Hall (2010e) contend that Biblical Counseling fails to ad-
equately critique the modernist approach to science and psychology for 
adopting a methodology that is purely quantitative and descriptive. Coe 
and Hall as well as Jones fault the case study because it lacks specific 
psychological complications. 
Here again, knowledge (epistemology), human nature (anthropology) 
and the psychological support – if and how – of psychotherapy are the 
main topics under discussion. For Powlison, they are decisive for advo-
cating his distinct Biblical Counseling concept and practice. 
 
Conclusion 
My first concluding observation is that the debate on the five views is 
somewhat out of balance, because with Myers the center of gravity is on 
psychological research, but the others focus more on clinical psychology. 
It is important to notice this because different practices have different 
standards. Scientific research and clinical psychology or psychotherapy 
are different practices. Earlier (section 1.2) I identified social structures 
as a constituent factor of the prevailing worldviews. This aspect of the 
issue remains underexposed.  
Three topics proved to dominate the debate; these are the topics        
of epistemology, anthropology, and the relationship between anthro-       
pology/psychology and psychotherapy. Epistemology touches on the 
inevitable research bias, the legitimacy of Christian presuppositions in 
psychological research, and the compatibility of the Bible with scientific  
psychological methodology as an authoritative source of knowledge. 
Anthropological issues relate to the origin, freedom and ultimate goal of 
human nature, and thus include moral values. The relationship between 
psychology and psychotherapy deals with the way in which implicit or 
explicit psychological presuppositions about human nature affect the 
therapeutic practice. 
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Each of these three themes affects worldview concerns. Apparently, 
the most obvious connection of worldview with the identified topics is 
the one with anthropology, which refers to our view of humanity. But 
also epistemology, as the source of specific anthropologies, has a world-
view component of itself. It relates to our view of the sources and charac-
ter of reliable knowledge. Maybe we should admit that psychotherapy 
has no worldview component of its own. The differences in therapeutic 
method can be traced back to differences in anthropology, as can be indi-
cated by identifying a mechanistic, materialistic, culture-dependent, and 
autonomous-relational view of human nature, as the possible anthropo-
logical backgrounds of the four successive conceptions of psychotherapy 
mentioned in section 1.2. 
For most of the five views the three identified topics mark the differ-
ences with secular psychology and psychotherapy, but at the same time 
mutual differences in preconceptions lead to different outcomes among 
the five models. Therefore, in the inquiry into the interplay between 
worldview and psychotherapy within the Christian integration move-
ment these are the issues on which we focus. 
The chapters below, then, concentrate on the worldview issues of 
epistemology, anthropology, and the relationship of anthropology/psy-
chology and psychotherapy. 
We should realize, however, that the debate may be impeded some-
what by the institutional level of worldviews. This level of worldview 
input is underexposed in the debate. Only Powlison (2010d) mentioned it 
as one of the six segments in the psychological industry. Yet, we have 
seen in section 1.2 that the institutional level is one of the relevant fac-
tors in worldview issues determining the direction of treatment. In the 
present debate institutional interests play their hidden part, for the de-
fended positions have the function, be it unintentionally, to legitimize the 
specific practice of training and treatment centers based on the own 
Christian orientation. After all, much money and many jobs are involved 
here. This may be an obstacle for convincing other participants of the 
debate. But this does not prevent an independent, disinterested investi-
gator from analyzing the debate on a conceptual level. 
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1.5 Focus of the Inquiry 
 
Central Question 
After our orientation in the main worldview topics of the discussions 
about the interplay between psychology and Christianity, we return to 
our starting point with respect to the issue of worldview and psycho-
therapy in general, in order to formulate our central question. In section 
1.2 we found that worldviews affect psychotherapy through psychologi-
cal theory and psychotherapeutic method, the therapeutic relationship, 
and the institutional embedment. Because of all these routes of influence, 
which may be mutual on the relationship level, and the permeating na-
ture of worldviews, I assume an intrinsic interaction of worldviews and 
psychotherapy. On this interaction the inquiry is focused. The overarch-
ing central question is twofold and can be formulated as follows: 
What are the mutual relationships between worldviews and psychother-
apy? 
What do these interrelationships imply for conceptions of psychothera-
peutic professionalism? 
For clarity, I note that the former question is particularly descriptive, and 
the latter mainly philosophical. In order of priority, the philosophical 
question precedes issues investigated by psychology of religion and spiri-
tuality. It is about the legitimacy of worldview influences, whether reli-
gious, spiritual, or other, in psychology and psychotherapy, and not about 
how religion and spirituality can be described, explained, and employed 
psychologically, as is dealt with in psychology of religion and spirituality. 
From two sides the legitimacy is challenged. From a specific worldview 
the presuppositions of professional psychotherapy may be questioned; 
conversely, professional psychotherapy may question the input of certain 
worldviews by the client. This kind of questions is not dealt with in psy-
chology of religion and spirituality. There is an interface, however, in the 
reflection on the usefulness of religion and/or spirituality in psychother-
apy. The question of usefulness balances on the edge of empirics, as in-
vestigated by psychology of religion, and normativity, as reflected on by 
philosophy. But it remains that the primary focus is not on how basic 
beliefs operate psychologically and can be utilized in a therapeutic con-
text, but about the compatibility of psychotherapeutic interventions with 
all kinds of worldviews. 
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Sub-questions and Hypotheses 
The Christian integration debate will be analyzed as a case study of     
how worldviews and their influences can be distinguished and should 
function within psychology and psychotherapeutic practice. This choice 
for the Christian integration debate presupposes the expectation that  
this debate has yielded observations and recommendations for the     
relationship between worldviews and psychotherapy. Hence, the first 
sub-question for our inquiry is:  
What do the analyses by participants in the Christian integration de-
bate yield on the interrelationship between worldview and psycho-
therapy?  
The first hypothesis formulates the expected answer to that question. 
 
First hypothesis 
The Christian integration debate demonstrates the dependence of psycho-
therapy on worldviews, and delineates the implications for psychothera-
peutic professionalism. 
 
The second hypothesis is hinted at in sections 1.1 and 1.4. It starts 
from the observation that in spite of analyses the debate did not result in 
unifying conclusions. Several solutions have been proposed that partly 
criticize each other without settling the cause or opening up promising 
new perspectives. We have already seen that the institutional factor un-
intentionally favors a process of entrenchment in the own position. But 
this is not the whole story. Not only in the elaborations but already on 
the basic presuppositional level the participants diverge in their ways. 
Apparently, within the Christian integration movement, different pre-
suppositions play a part and nourish the different options. This leads to 
the second sub-question of our inquiry: 
Why are the positions taken in this debate, or some of them, not capable 
of carrying the discussions any further?  
Answering this question demands a fresh analysis on the basic level of 
the integration of Christian worldview and psychotherapy. We are look-
ing for a suitable tool that helps us to evaluate the present state of affairs. 
A proper candidate for this enterprise might be Reformational Philos-
ophy with its newly developed Normative Practices Model (Glas, 2009b; 
2009c; Jochemsen & Glas, 1997; Jochemsen, 2006a). It is introduced as an 
instrument for distinguishing between practices that differ from each 
other but at the same time have overlapping activities. In our case these 
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practices relate to psychological research and theorizing, psychothera-
peutic treatment, and pastoral care. 
The Normative Practices Model discerns several constitutive factors 
for a practice. These are (1) the qualifying factor, that is, what the      
practice is about – in this every practice has its normative task; (2) the 
founding factors, referring to the indispensable tools, competences and 
knowledge; (3) conditioning factors, like social, juridical, and economic 
ones. By identifying the conditioning factors, the Normative Practices 
Model is able to account for the institutional side of the worldview-
psychotherapy issue. 
In addition to the constitutive side, every practice has a regulative 
side, that is, the dynamics by which and the direction into which it is de-
veloping. The feature of this approach is, that it does not think in terms of 
territories and boundaries, but in terms of objectives and normative pur-
poses. The advantage of this is that it keeps the debate free from spas-
modic quarrels about competence, and at the same time provides clear 
concepts needed to distinguish religious faith, psychological science, 
psychotherapy, and pastoral care from each other. 
The most decisive aspect of the model, in this context, is the qualifying 
factor. Qualifying for science is analytical disclosure of the reality we 
experience, different from faith knowledge we recognize in a religious 
context. Science arrives at rationally justifiable inferences from careful 
and controllable observations. Psychotherapy is another kind of practice, 
qualified by giving help in order to deal with problems in living, usually 
psychological ones. As soon as psychotherapy makes appeals to spiritual-
ity and religion, the interface with pastoral care comes to the fore. Pas-
toral care is a spiritual practice, directed toward growing in devotion to 
higher purposes. The model is supposed to be able to determine in what 
way and to what extent worldviews – in this case Christian worldviews – 
should be related to scientific theories, methods, and psychotherapeutic 
relationships. These provisional insights lead to the following phrasing: 
 
Second hypothesis 
The Christian integration debate arrived at unsolved disagreements that 
can be traced back to (1) epistemic confusion about the practice of psycho-
logical research and theorizing in relation to faith knowledge derived from 
the Bible, and (2) conceptual confusion about the distinctions between the 
psychological, psychotherapeutic, and pastoral practices. 
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Provided that this second hypothesis will be confirmed, the third sub-
question of our investigation is focused on the cause of these confusions, 
and the way to deal with it. Brief and to the point, the question reads: 
How can the debate be reinvigorated in order to make some progress in 
achieving a kind of integration between psychotherapy and Christian-
ity? 
The cause of the confusions should be sought deeper than simply at-
tributing them to the limitations of Christian theorists’ minds. It seems 
plausible to assume an intrinsic characteristic of psychotherapy that is 
refractory toward some Christian notions, so that Christian theorists 
either fully reject psychotherapy (the Biblical Counseling View) or      
instinctively try to push it in a more convenient direction, shifting psy-
chotherapy away from the context in which it belongs. In this second 
approach psychotherapy becomes something other than the practice as 
professionally understood. It is turned into a kind of pastoral care or 
spiritual guidance. If Christian theorists want to preserve psychotherapy 
as a respected practice of proven merit they should resist both strategies. 
Reflection should start from the intrinsic nature of psychotherapy, and 
then consider in what way the employment of Christian notions can do 
justice to both the specific practice and Christian faith. This enterprise is 
only meaningful if we suppose that such a combination or integration is 
possible without hurting either the norms of psychotherapeutic profes-
sionalism or the special character of Christian faith. This leads to the 
formulation of the third hypothesis.  
 
Third hypothesis 
It is possible to integrate psychotherapy and Christian faith, and at the 
same time preserve both psychotherapeutic professionalism and the spe-
cific nature of Christian faith. 
 
The fourth and last hypothesis is about generalizing the findings to 
the realms of other worldviews, both the more religious ones such as 
found in Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism, and more secular ones, as in 
Asian and African cultures. It gives an answer to the fourth sub-question 
of our investigation which reads as follows: 
Can conclusions be drawn with regard to the relationship between psy-
chotherapy and worldview in general? If so, what inferences can be 
made for any ideal interrelationship between them? 
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It is reasonable to assume that the findings can only be generalized to 
those worldviews in which similar frictions as in Christianity show up 
when coming together with psychotherapy. The reason is that sound 
generalizations about one issue can only be made if the other conditions 
mutually more or less correspond. We attempt to make generalizations 
on the issue of worldviews, assuming that their relationship with psy-
chotherapy is similar. The fourth hypothesis is about generalizing the 
interaction between psychotherapy and Christian faith while retaining 
the specific character of each. 
 
Fourth hypothesis 
A new perspective on the integration of psychotherapy and Christian faith 
(see third hypothesis) can be generalized to all those worldviews that are 
subject to tensions similar to those between psychotherapy and Christian 
faith. 
 
 
1.6 Field, Method, and Outline of the Inquiry 
 
The Research Field 
The research field is a body of literature that will be examined in order to 
describe the integration debate, consisting of the two Christian integra-
tion journals from their first appearance until 2012, the Journal of       
Psychology and Theology (1973–) and the Journal of Psychology and Chris-
tianity (1982–), while the latter’s forerunner CAPS Bulletin (1975–1981) 
is included as much as possible.4 There will be some limitations and some 
extensions, though. 
The limitations refer to the articles that will be selected from the men-
tioned journals. This study will be focused on the basic form of psycho-
therapy, that is, individual therapy with adults. Therefore, articles about 
marriage counseling, family therapy, child therapy, and group therapy 
are left aside. It could be countered that especially Christian therapy will 
focus on relationships and systems in which clients and patients partici-
pate, for in a Christian view people are not considered as independent 
 
4
  The opportunity has been offered me kindly to consult The Bulletin of CAPS in the 
library of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, KY. However, 
some issues were lacking, to wit, three issues of 1975, all four issues of 1976, and 
two issues of 1977. It was impossible for me to consult these issues elsewhere. 
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individuals, but as persons-in-relation. In spite of this true observation, 
the incorporation of these forms of therapy will complicate the subject 
matter too much. Of course, the results of this basic analysis may be ap-
plied to other kinds of psychotherapy or counseling.5 Further, we address 
psychology and psychotherapy in general rather than articles on a specif-
ic subject such as alcohol abuse, missionary kids, or Christian integration 
training programs.  
Besides these limitations there are some extensions as well. I will not 
limit myself to articles in the two named journals, but also consult pivotal 
publications referred to there. In addition, for the sake of clarification 
and completeness I will appeal to other publications by the authors of the 
journals’ articles. 
 
Method 
In dealing with the first sub-question of inquiry the method is descrip-
tive. The basis is an overall inventory and scanning of articles that in any 
way deal with worldviews in psychology and psychotherapy. The follow-
ing step was a sorting of these articles by what they put forward about 
epistemology, anthropology, and their relationship with psychotherapy, 
respectively. Then, quantitative analyses were carried out of formal 
characteristics, like the numbers of articles about epistemology, anthro-
pology, and their impact on psychotherapy, respectively, the ratio of  
theoretical and research articles, the expertise of the authors – psycho-
logical, theological, or philosophical – and the distribution over the two 
journals. Thereafter, qualitative investigations of the subject-matter on 
the respective topics were carried out, partly topically, and partly chron-
ologically. Within the topics analyzing becomes chronological as soon as 
developments can be discerned that shed light on the reason why certain 
positions are held. Generally, debates have some progress, so the chron-
ological dimension should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, for the     
sake of clarity, in the analysis the various themes are discussed sep-
arately as much as possible. So, in the topical analyses, the chronological 
approach is incorporated. In the end, it is analyzed to what extent the five 
approaches identified in section 1.4 are reflected in the journals’              
contributions to the debate. 
 
5
  Later on in our analyses the different terminology of psychotherapy and counsel-
ing will be reviewed, cf. section 5.4. 
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As to the second sub-question, about explaining the differences in the 
defended positions and the problems of getting any further, the inquiry is 
mainly philosophical, because of the philosophical, meta-theoretical level 
of the analysis. Additional theological reasoning is indispensable, how-
ever, because in the debate the participants put forward their faith as a 
normative worldview component, and feel the need to warrant Christian 
worldview elements by appealing to biblical and theological notions. 
Answering the third sub-question, about developing new perspectives 
in the integration of worldview and psychotherapy, demands a full-scale 
philosophical argument. Specific theological input is justified by the nor-
mative character of the notion of worldview that is adopted in the debate. 
Here theoretical considerations lead to practical implementations. 
In sum, the study is primarily philosophical in character, with an in-
dispensable descriptive basis, and theological contributions where ap-
propriate. These types of theoretical analysis are intended to result in 
practical directives. 
 
Outline 
The subject matter of this examination consists of writings in the men-
tioned journals on the issues of epistemology, anthropology, and the rela-
tionship of both with psychotherapy. These three themes were distilled 
from our provisional review of the integration debate in section 1.4. In 
three subsequent chapters, that is, the chapters 2, 3, and 4, the various 
positions about these issues are brought forward and the internal de-
bates highlighted. Also, certain questions in the margin will prepare the 
reader for the critical evaluations in the subsequent chapters. 
The chapters 5 and 6 offer these critical reviews. Chapter 5 includes 
an internal critique, that is to say, a critique from the presuppositions 
held by (a part of) the participants in the debate. By this internal critique 
I try to test the first hypothesis and first part of the second one. Chapter 6 
comprises an external critique, that is, a critique starting from an exter-
nal viewpoint that enables us to review the debate from a greater dis-
tance in order to identify the causes of the ambiguities and to formulate 
proposals to eliminate them, and thus demonstrate the plausibility of the 
second part of hypothesis 2. 
In chapter 7 an attempt is made to formulate a general format of  
mental functioning that is sensitive to worldview issues, in order to 
sustantiate hypothesis 3. This outline pretends to offer a handhold to   
therapists to introduce and deal with worldview items in the                 
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psychotherapeutic process, respecting both the status of professional 
psychotherapy and the distinctive features of the overall Christian 
worldview. In chapter 8, the appropriateness of this outline is tested by 
applying it to several kinds of worldviews. It is an effort to examine the 
generalizability of the outcomes, herewith testing the claim of hypothesis 
4. In chapter 9 the usefulness of the design is tested in even more detail, 
by analyzing the three case descriptions from the second sub-section of 
the present chapter with the help of the outline. 
The final chapter summarizes the results, and draws some conclu-
sions. 
  
 
Chapter 2 
Sources of Knowledge 
In the first chapter we envisaged worldview as a multilayered concept, 
including both implicit preferences and more explicit or explicable no-
tions. Logically, the further explanation of worldview content focuses on 
its more explicit and explicable levels. This is what the next three chap-
ters are about. We distinguished three main topics concerning world-
view, namely, epistemology, anthropology, and the relationship between 
anthropology/psychology and psychotherapy. These topics will be inves-
tigated subsequently. We examine them by reviewing the relevant con-
tributions in the two mentioned journals about Christian integration of 
psychology, the Journal of Psychology and Theology (JPT), and the Journal 
of Psychology and Christianity (JPC). The method for the reviewing was 
reported in section 1.6. Other publications will be involved in the anal-
yses if they are referred to in the relevant articles and if further consid-
eration of them happens to be helpful to sharpen the focus. 
In this second chapter we review how the participants of the Chris-
tian integration debate evaluate the epistemology of secular psychology 
and account for their own epistemology. This inquiry will entail four fo-
cal points, namely, the epistemological presuppositions of secular psy-
chology as analyzed in the journals (2.2), the epistemological status of 
authoritative knowledge through faith in the Bible (2.3), the critique 
raised against elevating biblical testimony to the highest level of author-
ity in scientific discourse (2.4), and the development of new methodolog-
ical perspectives (2.5). Before diving into the subject matter though, I  
present some figures to give an impression of the extent and variety of 
the contributions (2.1).  
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The aim of this chapter is twofold: to give an overview of the various 
contributions, and to prepare for the critical evaluations presented in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
2.1 Numbers 
 
The two journals contain 173 articles about epistemology in some rele-
vant way, 106 of these in JPT and 67 in JPC. Of these articles, 94 are about 
epistemology only (JPT 53, JPC 41), the rest share their focus of interest 
with anthropology (JPT 37, JPC 11), psychotherapy (JPT 13, JPC 15), or 
both (JPT 3). Of the 173 articles about epistemology, 11 are empirical 
(JPT 8, JPC 3). Without exception, all of these empirical contributions 
emanate from the research programs realized by J.P. Watson and his 
colleagues (see section 2.5, “Bible and Worldview”). 
These figures do not pretend to be exact, rather they are indicative. I 
focus on articles that specifically account for the methodology of acquir-
ing knowledge and for the role of presuppositional assumptions in what 
is considered to be knowledge. However, in practice the demarcation line 
is not so clear. This may be illustrated by the use of the Bible. As far as 
the role of the Bible is concerned, the boundary between methodological 
accounts of its input – which is what I am looking for – on the one hand, 
and emphatic appeals to Bible texts for justifying one’s concrete position 
on the other, is not sharp. The reason is that methodological justifications 
are repeatedly confined to mere appeals to the Bible. More than once 
some subjective weighing for the purpose of selection was inevitable. 
Who are the contributors? In 118 articles the authors are psychol-     
ogists, including psychiatrists (1), sociologists (1), and philosophers of 
psychology (4) (JPT 74, JPC 44). In 18 contributions the authors are theo-
logians (JPT 15, JPC 3). 6 articles have been written by general philos-
ophers (JPT 3, JPC 3). The remaining 33 articles (JPT 16, JPC 17) were 
written by psychologists and theologians either cooperating, or united in 
one person, or in a combination of these. 
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2.2 Knowledge in Secular Psychology 
 
Analysis of Secular Methodology 
From the start of the Journal of Psychology and Theology, and later on also 
in the Journal of Psychology and Christianity and its forerunner, the an-
tennae were attuned to worldview dependent assumptions in psycho-
logical and psychotherapeutic theorizing. Collins (1973) set the tone. In 
the inaugural issue of JTP he identified three major forces in psychology 
working with overlapping sets of presuppositions: naturalism, determin-
ism, and relativism. Naturalism assumes that God does not exist, and that 
all behavior results from the operation of natural laws. Determinism 
teaches that all behavior is determined by some prior cause or causes, so 
that we can understand, predict, and control what people do. And relativ-
ism holds that there are no absolute standards of right and wrong. Collins 
does not link these presuppositions to the epistemological issue but re-
stricts the application to behaviorism as the allegedly scientific alterna-
tive for psychoanalysis in the 1970s. Epistemological implications are, 
however, also attributed to them, as will become clear in some of the 
subsequent paragraphs. 
An account of secular scientific epistemology was given by Farns-
worth (1974). Referring to the Christian apologist Francis Schaeffer, he 
depicted the evolution of modern thought from the late Middle Ages on-
ward. Schaeffer (1968) observed a growing contrast in Western thinking 
between God and nature: grace is positioned over against nature (late 
Middle Ages), then freedom over against nature (Renaissance), next faith 
over against rationality (Enlightenment), and lastly the non-rational over 
against the rational (modernism). All these dichotomies resemble the 
platonic dualism between the world of ideas and perceived reality. These 
dichotomies should be overcome. 
Another contribution was made by Foster and Ledbetter (1987). They 
noticed that psychology in its secular form limits itself to a methodology 
that emphasizes what can be seen, measured, and quantified, and ignores 
forces that cannot be measured or quantified. They labeled this position 
logical positivism and empiricism and saw these approaches character-
ized by emphasis on observation, measurement, and experimentation in 
the search for knowledge. In a reaction, Vande Kemp (1987) is critical of 
the authors for equating empiricism with logical positivism. Empiricism 
(different from the philosophical assumption of empirism) is just a mat-
ter of methodology, giving priority to the senses over reason. Logical 
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positivism, on the other hand, assumes that only things which can be 
observed, measured, and quantified are required for knowledge. As to 
her own position, she criticized the limitation by positivism to the mech-
anistic or efficient model of causality, and advocated final causality or 
teleology, that is, asking for the purpose and meaning of phenomena and 
states of affairs. Apparently, she rejected a one-sided natural science 
model of psychology, and included a methodology modeled by human or 
social sciences, employing a more qualitative approach instead of mere 
quantitative measurement. 
Similarly, Johnson (1997) characterized the modern epistemology 
that dominates psychology as naturalism, neo-positivism, relativism, 
individualism, and secularity. Naturalism is an ontological position with 
epistemological consequences. It accepts only material entities as real. In 
this context therefore, only causal explanations within the natural order 
of things are appropriate, at the expense of non-natural influences like 
supernatural ones; neo-positivism, or logical positivism, recognizes only 
knowledge that is based on observables and logical inferences; relativism 
denies the existence of absolute or ultimate truth; individualism claims 
the priority of individual interests, rights, views, and values over com-
munal interests etc.; and secularity interprets reality apart from divine 
origin or authority. Johnson recalled that many of the pioneers in psy-
chology and psychiatry have been raised more or less within Christian or 
Jewish families but moved away from their religious orientation toward a 
worldview in which psychology offers supposedly more reliable alterna-
tives to the traditional Judeo-Christian forms of meaning making. He 
thinks of people like Stanley Hall, James, Freud, Skinner, Horney, Piaget 
and Rogers. 
Richardson (2006) observed that the modern scientific ideal of 
knowledge is objectivity, which is obtained via abstraction and objectifi-
cation. Appealing to Taylor (1995), he contended that this approach  
presupposes a detached, punctual observer, and ignores the historical, 
cultural, and social connections that determine people’s identities. The 
empiricism employed by natural science, with its conception of empirical 
theory, controlled experimentation, purely objective description and the 
idea of wholly reliable techniques, has led to a naturalistic view of reality, 
denying the existence and influence of spiritual realities, and thus being 
too restrictive for the social sciences. Slife and Whoolery (2006) went a 
step further; they noticed that even in its weakest form, in which it is 
explicitly restricted to scientific methodology, naturalism implies that 
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God is not required for complete knowledge of the natural and social 
world. So, with naturalism a theistic approach is discarded. On this 
ground Slife and Whoolery contest the often defended assumption that 
experimental methods are philosophically neutral. I note in passing that 
the crux here is the assumption of complete knowledge. It is simply not 
true that naturalism in its weakest form pursues complete knowledge. 
Naturalism in its weakest form sets out only to achieve selective knowl-
edge. 
De Oliveira (2004) discerned two conflicting worldviews in the field 
of secular developmental psychology: mechanicism and organicism (cf. 
also Larzelere, 1980). Mechanicism reduces human functioning to invol-
untary responses and external influences, and is favored by evolutionism 
and behaviorism. Organicism interprets the qualitative change of organ-
isms as an intrinsic feature of human nature, cf. Chomsky on language 
acquisition in children, revealing innate linguistic potentials. In overly 
rough lines De Oliveira identified the epistemology of mechanicism as 
logical empiricism because of the preference for systematic observation, 
while the epistemology of organicism is characterized as rationalism (the 
alternative of empiricism) because of the admission that the observa-
tions constituting the empirical content are never free from reasoned 
inference. Neither of these two developmental worldviews of how 
knowledge comes about depend directly on empirical evidence, for nei-
ther of them are open to falsification, although relative success or stag-
nation in continuing research may attract or fail to attract the support of 
the academic world. They leave room, however, for other, alternative or 
additional vantage points for interpretation. 
 
Appraisal of the Usefulness of Secular Methodology 
Can the epistemology implicated in the methodology of modern psychol-
ogy be adopted by Christian researchers? Initially this question was not 
posed that sharply. Carter and Mohline (1976) equated the truths of psy-
chology as a science with God’s general revelation, not in the sense that it 
reveals something about God himself but about His works in humans. 
This does not alter the fact that the epistemological approaches of psy-
chology and theology are different; in psychology it is empirical, in     
theology historical and socio-cultural. The results of these two methods 
were fused into a theo-psychology with a single perception of human-
ness. A clear concept of integration was not yet developed. Methodology 
as such was not a serious issue either. Pascoe (1980) put it as follows:              
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psychological data should be considered within a Christian frame of ref-
erence. Here, too, the methodological question of how these data are 
obtained remained untouched. Furthermore, much effort was put into 
considering human nature and doing psychotherapy from a Christian 
perspective (e.g., Narramore, 1973a, 1973b, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c; Carter, 
1974a, 1974b, 1975; Wilson, 1974; Oakland, 1974). 
As soon as the issue of the reliability of secular methods was made a 
theme, the opinions began to grow apart. On a limited scale McKeown 
(1981) introduced the subject. He raised a critical voice against incorpo-
rating methodological behaviorism into a Christian theory of psychology 
since this implies separating it from philosophical behaviorism. In his 
view methodology cannot be separated from its philosophical presuppo-
sitions. 
Farnsworth (1982a) turned out to be the first to address the theme in 
a more systematic way. His approach is a rather nuanced one. Primarily, 
he spoke about the data-base of psychology, making it run parallel with 
the data-base of theology. In his presentation, interpreting data leads to 
facts, that is, psychological and theological findings. Secondly, he raised 
the condition that the facts must be reasonably shown to have been   
produced by sound methodological procedures, which is not the case if 
psychological and theological facts do not match. In that case reinterpre-
tation of psychological data in the light of other presuppositions is not 
always the right thing to do but should be substituted by an entirely new 
study, utilizing a more appropriate methodology. In the case of a mis-
match, reanalysis of theological data is opportune, too. Here for the first 
time methodological inferences were drawn from the effort to integrate 
psychology and theology. Evidently, within the integration context 
Farnsworth took the scientific standard seriously. 
In contrast, Foster and Ledbetter (1987) expressed skepticism about 
scientific methodology by contending that Christianity is a religion that 
emphasizes faith and belief in forces that cannot be seen, measured, or 
quantified, and hence has difficulty accepting a methodology that empha-
sizes that which can be seen, measured, and quantified. In her reply, 
Vande Kemp (1987) contested this skepticism, emphasizing the reliable 
nature of reason, senses, intuition, as well as special revelation, to expand 
our knowledge of God’s creation. 
Myers’s contribution to the discussion is the most optimistic one. He 
admitted that scientific objectivity gets tainted by ideology, but within 
the circles of current psychological science self-critical scrutiny does 
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have its proper place (Myers, 1995). In analogy with Churchill’s famous 
statement about democracy, he calls psychological science the worst 
method of learning about behavior and mental processes except for all 
the others (Myers, 1996). According to Johnson (1997) and Narramore 
(1997), evangelical perspectivalists like Myers, who see psychology and 
theology as two disciplines looking at humans from different perspec-
tives or explanatory systems that work on different levels, fail to weigh 
the serious problems inherent in positing the autonomy of reason over 
faith, as is standard in modern psychology. This is clear already from 
secular psychology’s ignorance of humans’ relationship with God, and the 
meaning imposed by Him on human lives. By bracketing their faith be-
liefs while doing science and integrating these beliefs with the already 
developed psychological concepts, perspectivalists downgrade the role of 
faith to a second order process. Instead of this, Johnson advocated the 
priority of faith in theorizing and doing research.1 Integration of what-
ever is truly good within secular psychology should be secondary. Here, 
the Christian Psychology View is born, reflecting the priority of faith in 
psychological research and theorizing. 
Facing the development of the integration movement, McMinn and 
Hall (2000), in their turn, observed the modernist climate in which it 
originated, and evaluated favorably the scientific epistemology that   
ascribes great value to systematic and measurable observations. At the 
same time they recognized the shift to postmodernism, and were sym-
pathetic with its skeptical attitude to objective, value-free science.2 A 
similar positive appreciation as the one advanced by McMinn and Hall 
(2000) can be found with Beck (2003), who acknowledged the possible 
value of theoretical formulations that are built on non-Christian or even 
anti-Christian presuppositions. In spite of their presuppositions, these 
formulations do have the capacity to generate verified and verifiable 
observations of human nature that were never before suggested. He es-
pecially thought of theories by Freud (e.g. about the unconscious; repres-
sion), Jung (extraversion–introversion) or Fromm (receptive, hoarding, 
and exploitative character types) that have been criticized by Christian 
theorists because of their anti-Christian or anti-supernatural biases,     
but nevertheless have been confirmed to a large extent by empirical          
 
1
  Examples, especially from P.J. Watson, will be presented in section 2.5 and 3.2. 
2
  Later on, Hall (2004; 2007b) moved to a more critical stance toward modern 
scientific epistemology. 
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research. We may expect that this more positive account of secular         
psychology results in a more independent position for psychology in 
determining the relationship between theology and psychology as it is 
reflected in the Integration View. 
Dueck and Parsons (2004) struck a conciliatory tone about the use-
fulness of modern and postmodern discourse. They feel at home with 
both. As modernists they accepted a modest foundationalism, as they 
wrongly named it (see note 3). This treats basic beliefs as foundational 
unless one has good reasons for thinking that they have been shown to 
be untenable. For this they referred to the 18th century philosopher 
Thomas Reid, who took one’s perceptions, impressions, and involuntary 
judgments to be real, unless other perceptions, impressions or judgments 
made clear that one was mistaken. He accepted common sense as the 
starting point of knowledge.3  This common sense is built on trust that is 
ultimately grounded in God, who established reality and its knowability 
the way He did (Wolterstorff, 2001). 
As postmodernists Dueck and Parsons followed Wittgenstein in taking 
language as a constituent of language games governed by internal rules 
that help construct our view of life. This constructivist idea of language 
completely contradicts the positivist conception of words as references 
to self-evident realities. Yet, they did not intend to make a choice be-
tween realism and constructivism. By recognizing the strong and weak 
elements of both, they tried to combine them as mutually corrective and 
complementary perspectives. In their peaceful reconciliation of realist 
and constructivist perspectives they paved the road to a more herme-
neutical approach of psychological phenomena in addition to the modern 
rational and realist approach. They did not, however, participate in the 
discussions about secular modernist epistemology as being distinct from 
Christian modernist conceptions (as described above). 
Surveying the discussions thus far, we note the emergence of two 
points of disagreement. First, there is the issue of the acceptability of 
secular methods, about which Myers was the most positive while they 
were fully rejected by some others. The other point is about the accepta-
bility of results of secular psychological research despite anti-Christian 
 
3
  For this reason Greco (2004, p. 148), followed by Dueck and Parsons, called Reid 
an advocate of “a moderate and broad foundationalism.” However, to Reid the 
deepest basis is trust, which is at variance with foundationalism. The same is true 
of basic beliefs. 
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tendencies in the utilized methods. Some did accept certain results while 
disapproving the neglect of the Bible in the methods used, others reject-
ed the results because the methods did not take the Bible into account. 
The debate was continued by further reflection on the concept of nat-
uralism. A journal issue from 2006 dedicated to the subject was very 
critical of secular science. It comes close to the Transformational View of 
the relationship between psychology and Christianity that intends to 
include spiritual knowledge in science. Slife and Whoolery (2006) op-
posed naturalism and theism as differing fundamentally on the question 
of whether or not God is required for complete knowledge of the natural 
and social world. Note that here a holistic knowledge concept is indica-
tive. Naturalism and theism answer the question with No and Yes respec-
tively. Slife and Whoolery distinguished methodological from metaphysi-
cal naturalism. Other terms used were soft and hard naturalism (Nelson, 
2006). Soft naturalism holds: in reality God may be there, but in science 
we investigate only the natural, observable level of reality. Christian  
advocates of secular science appeal to this distinction to justify their po-
sition. Slife and Whoolery rejected this point of view, arguing that epis-
temology always assumes ontology. We cannot put God in brackets 
methodologically without denying that God is currently active in world 
events. Naturalism produces the picture of a law-governed and thus es-
sentially mechanistic and determined order, while theism results in the 
view of a God-inspired and thus divine and obedient order (Nelson, 
2006). In their reply to critical responses, Slife and Melling (2006) op-
posed strong and weak theism, judging weak theism to be an inconsistent 
position, because it allows for the assumption that God is absent from 
and inactive in some portion of the world. This runs counter to the dis-
tinguishing feature of Christianity and other theistic religions, that a lov-
ing God is immanent in world events, including psychological events. 
Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010) repeated this vision, appealing to the 
Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga (2001) who in his critical review of 
methodical naturalism argued that God is always intimately acting in 
nature which depends from moment to moment upon divine activity.4 In 
the same line, Richardson (2006) refused to adopt the current psy-
chological methods of inquiry, for they derive their force partly from a 
 
4
  Against these authors it should be observed, however, that Plantinga (2001, 
2011) does not disqualify methodological naturalism completely, as they do, 
even though he emphasizes its limitations. 
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naturalist ontology and a “disguised ideology” of an individualistic and 
instrumental sort.  
In the same critical vein, Watson (2011) argued for the incommen-
surability of secular and Christian psychology, because the standards of 
the former are not those of the latter. The ultimate standard of secular 
psychology is nature. Empirical observations are evaluated by measuring 
them against contemporary understandings of what nature represents. 
Nothing stands outside nature to judge nature. On the other hand, the 
ultimate standard of Christian psychology is Christ, who stands outside 
nature to judge nature. The two psychologies move within a different 
“ideological surround,” indicating a rather closed worldview or value 
system, and implying that the measures of different ideological sur-
rounds are incompatible, causing biases if employed in the alien ideologi-
cal context. 
On the other side of the scales, Entwistle (2009) criticized spiritualis-
tic metaphysical extremism that fights against naturalistic metaphysical 
extremism by casting suspicion on natural explanations and interven-
tions. Entwistle argued that methodological naturalism only means that 
psychology, as a science, is constrained to studying religious and spiritual 
matters as biological, psychological, and social processes. However, this 
approach from below does not preclude that there are spiritual realities, 
it only means that psychology as a science cannot study spiritual realities 
directly. 
 
Conclusion and Question for Further Discussion 
Participants in the debate noticed that the prevailing paradigm, or world-
view, for scientific research in psychology, namely, naturalism or positiv-
ism, leads to a methodology that is limited to observable phenomena and 
natural influences, and characterized by quantification, abstraction and 
the ambition to achieve objectivity. In this sub-section, I formulate the 
principal question for further discussion, and map the mutually varying 
answers to this question, accompanying each of them with an illustration 
that may be of interest for the practice of psychotherapy. 
The main question that remains after noting the different positions is: 
Can the prevailing scientific methodology, oriented to objectification and 
quantification as it is, rightly be separated from an underlying natural-
istic view on reality?  And if so, how? Three answers are conceivable: Yes, 
without qualification; Yes, if completed and corrected; and No. 
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The first answer says: Yes, it can, and this leads to methodological 
naturalism, which is acceptable, and yields plausible results as judged 
from a Christian point of view. Myers (1996) mentioned two examples. 
First, naturalistic methods have been used to demonstrate the self-
serving bias that parallels the Christian notion of pride as fundamental 
sin. Second, he pointed to the evidence collected by naturalistic methods 
that supports Christian values such as the evidence that material wealth 
does not reliably increase happiness, and that cohabitation and frequent 
premarital sex are associated with increased risk of future divorce. 
The second answer says: Yes, provided that it is completed and cor-
rected by a religious anthropology. We can think of McMinn and Hall 
(2000) who admitted the usefulness of current scientific methodology 
but wanted to add elements that do justice to the Christian view of what 
it is to be human. As an illustration we can refer to Beck’s (2003) appeal 
to the contributions by Freud, Jung and Fromm about personality (see 
above). 
The third reaction dismisses the naturalistic approach to reality by 
secular science, and wants to replace it with a theistic approach. Yet, it 
adopts quantitative research fostered by natural science, but wants to 
incorporate it in a religious worldview. In the survey mentioned above 
Johnson (1997) and Watson (2011) represent this position. This third 
approach is similar to the view represented by the authors who contrib-
uted to the journal issue from 2006 referred to earlier. Johnson appealed 
to the research about locus of control to make his point. Secular research 
with its naturalistic orientation has led to the assumption that there are 
but two locus-of-control orientations, the internal and the external one, 
the former making individuals self-confident and enterprising, the latter 
making them feel uncertain and dependent. Reliance on God was classi-
fied under external locus of control. However, acknowledging reliance on 
God as a distinct religious activity resulted in the opposite conclusion 
that God control is more similar to the active problem focused style char-
acteristic of an internal locus of control (cf. Welton, Adkins, Ingle, &    
Dixon, 1996). Here the answer says: No, research programs should be 
embedded in a religious pre-understanding in order to do justice to the 
subject matter investigated. The quantitative approach can be retained 
but the underlying view should be substituted. 
As an aside, one could ask whether the locus of control example really 
demands a change of paradigm, or only a change of hypothesis. Trust in 
God can be examined as a natural psychological phenomenon, and be 
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thus conceived. The investigation of trust in God does not need a particu-
lar Christian orientation. It is true that a Christian orientation may      
contribute to a specific direction of inquiry and consequently a specific 
direction of theory. 
The different answers reflect the different views of the relationship 
between psychology and Christianity as surveyed in chapter 1, except for 
the Biblical Counseling View, which does not pursue epistemic integra-
tion but rejects psychology as a legitimate research discipline altogether. 
On the third answer to the issue of the validity of secular methodology, 
the Transformational Psychology View seems to join the Christian Psy-
chology View. Meanwhile, the question remains: Can the prevailing scien-
tific methodology that is oriented to objectification and quantification, 
rightly be separated from an underlying naturalistic view on reality or 
not? And if it can, how? 
The answer depends on how dominant worldview presuppositions 
are. Do they determine all research outcomes or do they leave room for 
generally acceptable results? Furthermore, the answer is associated with 
some related issues, such as the relationship between psychology and the 
Bible or theology, and the pretension of science as to the kind of 
knowledge it produces, complete or selective. The first two issues are 
dealt with in the subsequent sections, and together with the last issue 
they are resolved in chapter 6. 
 
 
2.3 The Bible as Primary Source of Knowledge 
 
From the beginning of the Christian integration debate the Bible and 
theology were put forward as the decisive source of knowledge. Within 
this approach the question arose, however, how the relationship between 
the Bible and theology should be seen. In this section we deal with this 
matter. First, we are introduced to the argument about the importance of 
God’s special revelation in His Word, and its theological processing, then 
we go into a philosophical justification of this source of knowledge within 
the framework of scientific psychology. The next section (2.4) will deal 
with the critique that has been leveled against overly simplistic attempts 
to connect authoritative and empirical knowledge. After the discussion of 
this critique, we explore two directions into which a solution has been 
sought (2.5). 
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Bible and Theology 
Rather programmatically, Narramore (1973a) offered a prescriptive 
characterization of the essential attitude for effective integration. Besides 
an attitude of commitment to scientific method and rigorous academic 
study, he demanded respect for the complete inspiration and authority of 
the Scripture, and its acknowledgement as God’s objective, accurate reve-
lation to man. “If we fail to base our work on this we are building on an 
inadequate foundation and will have a psychology essentially no dif-
ferent from the secular psychologist” (p. 16). Collins (1973) has a keener 
eye for the relationship between biblical revelation and our presupposi-
tions. Psychology must be re-examined as far as its underlying presuppo-
sitions are concerned; these should conform to principles revealed in the 
Bible. As a result he expects a significant change in the future methods, 
content, and direction of psychology. 
Farnsworth (1974) distinguished three methods of acquiring knowl-
edge, namely: by rational faith, through experiential inquiry, and through 
exhaustive inquiry. Faith borrows its knowledge from the Bible, while 
experiential inquiry is performed by clinical approaches and existential 
validation within the humanities. By exhaustive inquiry he aims at ex-
perimental approaches and scientific validation. Eight years later he ac-
cepted three categories of data: data from Bible texts, data from human 
experience and data from systematic observation of human and nonhu-
man behavior (Farnsworth 1982a). As we saw in section 2.2, he went on 
to develop a method that produces integrated knowledge, suggesting the 
distinction between data and facts. Through interpretation the data are 
recognized as facts, that is, as psychological and theological findings. 
Human experience (second category mentioned) consists of subjective 
phenomena in general, and of religious experiences in particular. They 
are interpreted by psychological and theological analysis respectively. 
Observed behavior (third category) is interpreted through psychological 
analysis, and Bible texts (first category) are interpreted through theologi-
cal analysis. Accordingly, the disciplines should cooperate to integrate 
data from different origins. Various models of integration can be imag-
ined, in which either the psychological facts or the theological facts pre-
vail, or in which they are complementary, or saying the same thing in a 
different manner. Some years earlier Farnsworth (1980b) had expressed 
his discontent about the continuous mixing of categories; the integration 
is about psychology and theology, not psychology and the Bible. His  
1982 survey makes clear why he cherished this distinction. The Bible is 
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on the level of data, but integration is not about data but facts, that is, 
interpreted data. This interpretation is the task of both psychology and 
theology. 
In a paper about secular and sacred models of psychology and reli-
gion, Carter (1977) presented a preparatory study for the influential 
book he would write together with Narramore about the integration of 
psychology and theology (Carter & Narramore, 1979). He emphasized the 
importance of integration for the psychological view of human nature. 
For the Christian, the soul, including freedom and responsibility, can 
ultimately be recognized only within a biblical framework. Without see-
ing persons in relation to God we cannot know them as they really are 
and as they are fully meant to be, however many sorts of information 
autonomous humans may amass about the human being. So, a biblical 
epistemology is especially of anthropological interest. Years later, both 
authors upheld their view that the Bible is filled with divinely revealed 
truths that are normative in personality theory and psychotherapy. 
There is a mutuality, however, in the way psychology and special revela-
tion interact. Not only should data and theories of psychology be cri-
tiqued, complemented, corroborated and clarified with the help of God’s 
written Word, but, conversely, also psychological data and theories can 
help us to raise questions about our biblical interpretations and to clar-
ify, complement, critique or corroborate our understanding of God’s 
Word (Narramore & Carter, 2000). 
Larzelere (1980) categorized six levels in psychological study: world-
view, general propositions (models and theories), linkage (induction and 
deduction), specific propositions, hypotheses, and data. Criticism by 
Christians against secular assumptions should not be limited to the gen-
eral propositional level but must focus on all levels of scientific inquiry. 
On the data level Christian psychologists differ from their secular col-
leagues by recognizing the Bible as data. They need to identify relevant 
scriptural passages and relevant empirical data and develop generaliza-
tions for more theoretical levels from both kinds of data. Larzelere   
therefore advocates the development of biblical exegesis skills and the 
collaboration with theologians. 
Rather than speaking of the Bible on a data level, Pascoe (1980) con-
nected the Bible with Christian presuppositions. Just as everyone who is 
engaged in scientific research proceeds from definite presuppositions, 
the Christian psychologist should be adequately grounded in a Christian 
way of thinking. He appealed to Dooyeweerd’s concept of the religious 
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ground motive which is behind any scientific activity. The Christian 
ground motive refers to humanity as created, as fallen, and as redeemed 
through Christ. For Dooyeweerd, this conception is not to be considered 
as a theological exercise but rather as a pure biblical reality. So, integra-
tive psychology is about the origin, nature, and purpose of humanity. 
Berry (1980), on the other side, talked about two data bases, the phe-
nomenon of mankind and the Bible, of which the latter enriches the infor-
mation derived from the former. He called the Bible an ageless document, 
able to transcend our limitations determined by culture and character. 
This ahistorical approach to the Bible can be characterized as biblicistic. 
Similarly, but without adopting such an ahistorical view, at least explicit-
ly, Crabb (1981) was worried about the weakening of the Bible as the 
cognitive, rationally meaningful, understandable, and binding revelation 
of God. Every Christian psychologist who believes in a fully authoritative 
Bible, should unequivocally attribute to Scripture the role of final arbiter, 
even about propositional truth. When empirical psychology and the Bible 
contradict, the authority of the Bible must take precedence, Foster and 
Ledbetter (1987) echoed Crabb. Powlison (1984) underlined in a similar 
way the considerable functional control of Scripture over psychology 
because of the extensive overlap of psychology and Scripture; in all it 
teaches about human nature, Scripture is authoritative. In the same 
sense, Petty (1984) characterized psychology as a subdivision of Chris-
tian anthropology. Therefore, Scripture must have the ultimate primacy 
over both the subject and the object, that is, the investigator and the situ-
ations of psychological interest. De Oliveira (2004) affirmed that in the 
Bible God states infallible and authoritative principles, applying to every-
thing one can think of doing. Here he sees a sharp contrast with those 
who argue for a limited scope of the Bible. Biblical principles, however, 
although indispensable and relevant to all spheres of knowledge and 
behavior, are often too general to make scientific inquiry superfluous. 
Like Berry (1980), McMinn and Hall (2000) rated two epistemologies as 
authoritative in integrating psychology and theology, the scientific and 
the biblical one. In the same vein, Beck (2003) advocated a balanced ap-
proach in which biblical and theological work is related to current social 
science research. More precisely, Porter (2004), referring to Methodist 
John Wesley’s quadrilateral, accepted four mutually interacting, though 
hierarchically arranged, sources of knowledge: Scripture, tradition, rea-
son and experience. 
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In line with Farnsworth (1974), Hurley and Berry (1997), presented a 
reflection on the relationship between the Bible and theology. They ar-
gued that Scripture is God’s direct, undistorted revelation, and that crea-
tion is God’s truth distorted by the fall into sin. Therefore, creation must 
be read in the light of Scripture, which is the Word of God and provides a 
trustworthy source of information. For this statement they referred to 
John 17:17 which says: “thy word is truth.” All sciences, however, includ-
ing theology and psychology, are human formulations that must be 
measured by Scripture and by creation. As results of human theorizing, 
theology and psychology are not related hierarchically; neither stands 
above the other. 
This position was contested by Porter (2010), who argued for the   
superiority of theology. He maintained that in cases in which our best 
interpretations of Scripture conflict to some degree with our best  inter-
pretations of psychological research, our well-grounded theological 
claims have the higher authority. The reason for this is that in a scientific 
setting Scripture can speak only through theological interpretation.  
Careful, though fallible, theological interpretation has a derivative auth-
oritative advantage because it is our best interpretation of our highest 
authority, that is, Scripture. He illustrated this with the assumption of an 
imma-terial component of the human person in addition to the brain and 
body (this terminology, implying dualism, is Porter’s own), against the 
reductionist physicalist view held by prevailing neuropsychological re-
search. Earlier, Latini (2009) had already made some remarks in favor of 
the logical precedence of theology. Her argument is that of the more 
comprehensive character of theology, addressing the ultimate questions 
of human existence, over against psychology that deals with the penulti-
mate realm. 
In a reply to Porter, Entwistle and Preston (2010) opposed this claim 
for several reasons. The first reason is that Scripture has come to us 
through a fallible process of transmission by manuscript copies from 
manuscript copies. The second reason is that Scripture contains cryptic 
passages in poems and parables in a foreign language which is far less 
univocal than the technical language used by science. So, in some cases it 
is reasonable to judge that our best theological understanding is not good 
enough to trump our best understanding from other domains. Neverthe-
less, Scripture should have a primary, determinative role in worldview 
formation. The authors contend that many apparent conflicts between 
psychology and theology can be traced to rival worldviews. In those   
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cases Christian theology can correct secular assumptions that are op-
posed to a Christian worldview. To illustrate this they point to the degree 
to which human nature is prone to evil, which is underestimated by hu-
manistic psychology. 
In another reaction, Sandage and Brown (2010) critique the equation 
of God’s Word and what God claims to be the case. We have to reckon 
with the human factor in the Bible in language, style, and theological in-
terests. Moreover, Porter neglects the issue of the contextualization of 
Scripture. Scripture has to be understood as a culturally located divine 
discourse. The initial meaning in the original cultural-historical context 
into which God’s Word came must now be re-contextualized in the con-
temporary context. 
When we survey the objections raised against Porter’s argument 
about the authority of theology in both responses, we may conclude that 
in fact these are no sound objections against his argument about theol-
ogy’s priority, but against a simplistic conception of the authority of the 
Bible itself. With this we anticipate the criticism that will be explicated in 
section 2.4. 
Porter’s (2010) claim is similar to the earlier claim made by Hathaway 
(2005). Christians may wonder whether they are reading Scripture cor-
rectly. But after due re-examination they will not be able to dismiss the 
implication of the text in favor of contingent psychological findings, 
Hathaway asserted. We may be mistaken about our understanding of 
God’s Word, but if we believe we are hearing it correctly we cannot give 
up its truth claims without rejecting our commitment to its legacy as the 
Word of God. He contested the view that the Bible’s scope is limited to 
matters of faith and practice and does not involve propositional revela-
tions of the empirical facts of science. Defenders of this nonscientific 
scope have the task to justify this view from Scripture itself, which will 
not be easy because it demands a modern approach that is foreign to the 
Bible. Furthermore, he argued for the acceptance of a source of knowl-
edge that is out of scientific control and yet functions in a scientific con-
text. For this he appealed to Alvin Plantinga’s externalism (Hathaway, 
2002, 2004). Because of the fundamental character of Plantinga’s philo-
sophical argument for a Christian epistemology, we now turn our atten-
tion to it. 
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Plantinga’s Externalist Epistemology 
The for non-philosophers rather baffling terms internalism and external-
ism do not appear prominently in Plantinga’s (1993a, 1993b; cf. Van 
Woudenberg, 1998a, 1998b) publications about epistemology, but they 
touch the heart of the matter. To get a hold on the problem, we first listen 
to a preliminary analysis. The fundamental epistemic question is: When 
can we truly say that we know something? Which criteria should be met 
before some idea can be awarded the status of knowledge? Translating 
this question to the Christian integration debate, we sense its relevance. 
The present chapter is about the issue whether biblical information can 
be seen and handled as sharing the same epistemic status as is accorded 
to information by empirical research. In general, there are three criteria: 
the subject (S) should believe that the proposition (p) at stake is true (1); 
p should be true (2); and p should carry something more, called warrant, 
for having the status of knowledge (3). What is this “something”? In an-
swering this question the pathways diverge. 
On one point Plantinga (2000, p. 83-85) agreed with his internalist 
(see below) opponents, namely, with respect to the distinction between 
foundational and founded knowledge. The acceptance of this distinction 
can be named foundationalism in general. It implies that every proposi-
tion is either in the foundations of my noetic structure, or believed on the 
evidential basis of other propositions that are in the end based in the 
foundations. Further, a proposition is in the foundations of my knowl-
edge if and only if it is basic for me, and it is basic for me if and only if I 
don’t accept it on the basis of other propositions. 
On the question of the criteria for basicality, however, Plantinga and 
his opponents – a large part of the academic world – go their separate 
ways. According to his opponents, a proposition is properly basic for a 
person S, if and only if it is self-evident for S, or incorrigible for S, or evi-
dent to the senses for S. Not only properly basic propositions deserve  
the status of knowledge, however, but also propositions that are, in a 
shorter or longer chain of regression, founded on these basics. So, which 
beliefs are acceptable for a person as knowledge? Those beliefs that are 
properly basic, that is, self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses, 
and those believed on the evidential basis of propositions that support it 
deductively (by rational conclusion), inductively (based on sense percep-
tion), or abductively (by authoritative testimony from, for instance, a 
witness or an expert). This view Plantinga labeled classical foundational-
ism. The criteria it upholds are of an internalist character, which means 
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that the ‘something’ that has to be added to true belief in order to acquire 
knowledge, that is, the warrant, is internal to the knowing subject. The 
knowing subject must judge by sound reasoning whether he or she 
acknowledges the proposition in question. He/she can only accept the 
proposition as knowledge after having equated it with the criteria. 
What is wrong with these criteria? In answering this question I con-
fine myself to the rendering of warrant and proper function by Van 
Woudenberg (1998b) about perceptual knowledge, disregarding other 
cognitive powers, such as self-knowledge, memory, taking information 
on trust, and reason. Suppose, you are standing before an abyss. How do 
you know you are standing before an abyss? According to the classical 
foundationalist you can only know that on account of a reasoning with as 
a premise the statement “it appears to me that there is an abyss before 
me.” Of the reasoning the following demands are made: that I accept the 
general proposition of how things appear to me, for instance, by observa-
tion (1); that I accept the proposition “before me there is an abyss” on 
account of how things appear to me (2); and that the latter part of the 
reasoning is, indeed, evidence for the proposition in question (3). Plan-
tinga rejects each of these conditions. You need not accept propositions 
about how things appear to you before you can say that there is an abyss 
before you. Not your accepting the proposition “I am moved in this or 
that manner” is important, but your actually being moved in this or that 
manner. Therefore, the second demand is not right either. You do not 
believe there is an abyss before you because you are moved in this or 
that manner. Your way of being moved is no evidence for the contention 
that there is an abyss before you. And for this very reason also the third 
demand is false. 
Apart from analyzing what happens when people gain perceptual 
knowledge, a more general criticism against classical foundationalism 
deserves to be mentioned. Classical foundationalism appears to be self-
referentially inconsistent. That means that it does not meet its own 
standard. It is not basic itself, for it is not self-evident or depending         
on sense perception or authoritative testimony, nor is it founded on 
properly basic propositions (Plantinga, 2000, p. 93). For all those rea-
sons, and more, it falls short. 
What alternative did Plantinga offer? Instead of internalism he ad-  
vocated externalism, which teaches that warrant for true belief is          
not cognitively accessible to the knowing subject from within. It takes  
the viewpoint of the ideal observer who reviews the entire cognitive         
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situation of the knowing subject, including those aspects of which the 
knowing subject is not aware. In Warrant and Proper Function Plantinga 
(1993b, pp. 46-47) explained that a belief has warrant for you only if it 
has been produced in you by cognitive faculties that are functioning as 
they ought, not being subject to cognitive dysfunction (1); only if these 
faculties are working in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for 
your kinds of faculties so that you are not being misled (2); if the design 
plan, that is, what these faculties, like eyes, ears, the cortex, are made for, 
is aimed at the production of true beliefs (3); and if there is a high objec-
tive probability that a belief produced under those conditions will be true 
(4).  Well, Christian knowledge by divine revelation meets these external-
ist criteria. God chose to inform us of the scheme of salvation by way of a 
three-stage cognitive process; by the production of Scripture, by the 
presence and action of the Holy Spirit, and by faith, produced by the Holy 
Spirit. True, this knowledge is not produced by way of the normal func-
tioning of our natural faculties, they are supernatural gifts, but as soon as 
these special faculties work, the believer does not have the power to sus-
pend believing the message received. The beliefs will be an appropriate 
response to what is given to the believer through his or her previous 
belief and current experience, without compromising proper function 
(1). The belief producing process (i.e., revelation) cannot fail to function 
properly because it consists of direct divine activity (2). It operates in an 
appropriate cognitive environment for which the belief producing facul-
ties were designed, namely, the truth about God, according to a design 
plan successfully aimed at the production of true beliefs (3) (Plantinga, 
2000). Perhaps needless to say, the objective probability that such beliefs 
produced under these circumstances are true depends on the truthful-
ness of the God in question (4). Furthermore, the reader can check that 
this externalist account of knowing God is self-referentially consistent. 
What did Plantinga achieve with this argument? The main conclusion 
is that religious knowledge can and ought to be dealt with as proper 
knowledge. He applied this insight to his thoughts about scientific meth-
odology. In his article “Methodical Naturalism?” Plantinga (2001) argued 
that a Christian academic and scientific community ought to pursue   
science in its own manner, starting from and taking for granted what we 
know as Christians. There is a respectable pragmatic argument for Chris-
tians, however, to take part in the game of methodological naturalism. It 
is important that we all, Christians and non-Christians, be able to work at 
the sciences together and cooperatively; therefore in science we should 
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not employ views, commitments and assumptions that only some of us 
accept, as is the case with the Christians’ faith in God’s activities toward 
the world. This public science would involve methodological naturalism. 
However, this purpose of public science does not alter the fact that dif-
ferent groups within the scientific family, such as naturalists and theists, 
have their own metaphysical or religious principles and feel the urge to 
explain the results of scientific research in terms of their own frame of 
reference. Each group could go on to incorporate public science into a 
fuller context including the philosophical or religious principles of that 
group. Christians ought to feel obliged to it, especially in the human   
sciences in which large stretches appeal to the meaning behind the phe-
nomena. So, with his analyses Plantinga argued for a kind of Christian 
science and thus for a Christian psychology that integrates biblical and 
empirical knowledge.  
 
 
2.4 Internal Debates 
 
Having surveyed the various positions taken in the integration debate, 
we now pay more detailed attention to the internal debates that conse-
quently have emerged. 
Some criticism has been raised against the view of Scripture as the 
primary source of knowledge in psychology. The first to be mentioned is 
Rambo (1980). He observed that most integrative authors see psychol-
ogy and theology as merely two different language systems for inter-
preting the human condition and emphasize the dominance of theology. 
He identified the lack of systematic interest in hermeneutics as one of the 
surprising omissions in most of the integration literature. In his opinion, 
the process of Bible interpretation is fraught with many perils. Rambo 
therefore favored a dialectical mode of interaction between psychology 
and theology, in which the strengths, limitations, methods, concepts, as-
sumptions and goals characteristic of both disciplines are respected, and 
in which the two are allowed to interact from positions of strength. Sim-
ilarly, Ellens (1981) depicted Crabb’s (1981) attempt to root truth and 
authority in biblical inerrancy as a rational positivist or foundationalist 
effort that can be compared to the modernist need for self-evident truth 
as the basis for real knowledge. In a later response to Crabb, Guy (1982) 
contested that biblical inerrancy necessarily results in inerrant theologi-
cal formulations. The inevitable errors in conceptualizing the Bible’s 
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truth prevent the Bible from exercising indisputable authority over psy-
chology with respect to knowledge. 
DeVries (1982) opposed Farnsworth’s (1982a) picture of integration 
because of the latter’s starting point in two separate bodies of knowl-
edge, one psychological and the other theological. Farnsworth assigns a 
crucial role to scientific facts, that is, psychologically and theologically 
interpreted data. The modern idea of facts stems largely from logical 
positivism. In this sense, Farnsworth seems to lean heavily on positivistic 
philosophy. In the same context, DeVries blamed him for reducing revel-
ation to a rationally apprehended set of truths rather than considering 
the Word of God in a more communicative way. In his reaction, Farns-
worth (1982b) expressed his disagreement with DeVries’s complete    
disqualification of positivism. A positivistic methodology is a faltering 
tradition, indeed, but it can still be employed fruitfully, for God can reveal 
His truths through all methodologies. Presumably, DeVries would object 
to this account for the very reason that it has an objectifying, non-
communicative concept of truth. 
In a response to Narramore and Carter (2000), Cole (2000) criticized 
them for ignoring the constructed nature of all knowledge. This is a les-
son taught by postmodernism. It does not preclude accepting a real 
world out there, if we face the culturally influenced character of all 
knowledge. True, the Bible has much to say about psychological reality, 
as it does about all of the dimensions of God’s creation, but it does not 
give us a formal system of psychology. In short, Cole contended that it is 
inappropriate to reduce the Bible to a textbook that contains facts about 
the psychological world; the Bible can only be understood as a whole, 
that is, by considering its scope and focus. In a conversation on integra-
tion in a postmodern age (Hall, Gorsuch, Malony, Narramore, & Van 
Leeuwen, 2006), Van Leeuwen raised a somewhat different and yet simi-
lar critique. She thought that all who cherish the term integration are 
affected by the Enlightenment mindset in which the world exists of brute 
facts apart from values. In the same conversation, Malony feels addressed 
by Van Leeuwen’s comment on the Enlightenment distinction between 
positivistic truth on the one hand, and theological and confessional truth 
on the other. 
As we have seen in the previous section, Entwistle and Preston (2010) 
opposed the claim that theology is the primary source of knowledge        
in psychology. They referred to the uncertainties in the transmission   
and interpretation of the Bible text. This does not, however, preclude a      
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decisive role for Scripture in worldview formation. Many apparent con-
flicts between psychology and theology can be traced to rival world-
views. In those cases Christian theology can correct secular assumptions 
that are opposed to a Christian worldview. We have also seen that    
Sandage and Brown (2010) critiqued the equation of God’s Word and 
what God claims to be the case. They point to the contextualization of 
Scripture. Scripture has to be understood as a culturally located divine 
discourse. The initial meaning in the original cultural-historical context 
into which God’s word came must now be re-contextualized in the con-
temporary context. As with DeVries, here the communicative character of 
God’s Word is emphasized. 
As a kind of counterbalance to this position, Jones (2006) underlined 
the cognitive content of special revelation that merits primacy among our 
intellectual commitments. As he conceived it, a tradition that rejects the 
assumption and the authority of such a cognitive content fails to appreci-
ate the core of integration and seems to have departed from essential 
elements of orthodoxy. In a similar attempt to safeguard the reality con-
tent of the biblical texts, Hathaway (2002, 2004, 2005) opted for what he 
called hermeneutical realism to acknowledge the differences between 
the horizons of understanding of the first receivers and the contem-
porary readers on the one hand, and to maintain the truth claims of the 
original texts in the process of understanding, leading to expanded hor-
izons of understanding, on the other. For his reality claim he relied on 
Plantinga’s externalist justification of knowledge in everyday life. Our 
true understandings are not so much constructions but approximations 
of the real world. Contextualization does not preclude having a shared, 
common reality. 
 
 
2.5 Adjusted Pathways 
 
Our next step is to examine the proposals that were made from within 
the integration movement to counter the charges. Two pathways were 
indicated in the investigated literature. They left the nonreflective, naïve 
use of Bible texts at data level behind, but at the same time intended to 
maintain the ultimate significance of the Bible in doing psychology. One 
of them remains close to current research methodology, the other adopts 
a more hermeneutical approach. 
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Bible and Worldview 
One of the first to call attention to a more complex role for Holy Scripture 
in Christianly inspired psychology was Larzelere (1980). He pointed to 
the interrelationships among worldviews, psychological theories, and 
research, although he continued to treat the Bible as data. The data level 
is not the only level, however, on which conflicts between the two dif-
ferent kinds of data (biblical and psychological) should be resolved. To 
modify or reject some model or theory it is not sufficient to state that it is 
inconsistent with the Bible. At all levels of scientific inquiry – worldview, 
theories, reasoning, hypotheses and data – the relevant scientific input 
should be reconsidered in order to achieve some integrated results. In 
the same issue, Pascoe (1980) focused even more emphatically on a 
Christian way of thinking that is at the basis of integrative psychology. He 
appealed to Dooyeweerd’s concept of the Christian ground motive for all 
thinking as the foundation for this kind of psychology, consisting of the 
fundamental reality of humanity as created, as fallen, and as potentially 
redeemed through Christ. This principle implies the views that all truth 
ultimately comes from God (against naturalism), that truth as revealed in 
Christ is necessary and sufficient for viewing and understanding life, that 
we accept and reckon with the reality beyond this world, that humans 
are relational persons, that evil expresses itself in moral conflicts, and 
that there is ultimate meaning and purpose in life. These presup-
positional views can be applied to many psychological issues related to 
polarities like determinism and free will, mechanistic and dynamic struc-
tures, the priority of the whole or the parts of human functioning, and 
moral and amoral behavior. Prater (1982) seemed to be moving in the 
same direction. Citing Emil Brunner, he asserted that the role of Christian 
psychology is to be understood not as constitutive but rather as reg-
ulative, informing and guiding psychological investigation to understand 
the phenomenal nature of humanity. 
A major contribution to this mode of integrating psychology and 
Christian faith was offered by Wolterstorff (1984a, 1984b). Many partici-
pants in the Christian integration debate referred to Wolterstorff’s 
(1984a) concept of control beliefs (cf. Dueck, 1989; Van Leeuwen, 1996; 
Faw, 1998; Cole, 2000). This influence, along with the thorough reflection 
on the matter, justifies a closer look at his analyses and proposals as pre-
sented in his publication about Reason within the Bounds of Religion. 
Wolterstorff (1984a) launched a striking negation of the assumption 
that the Bible could provide us with a foundation for scientific theorizing. 
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Why deny this assumption, cherished by many integrationists? He ex-
plained that this assumption would mean looking for an alternative 
foundationalist account of true knowledge surpassing the secular foun-
dationalist account. Foundationalism judges a theory as belonging to 
genuine science if and only if it is justified by some foundational prop-    
osition and some human being could know without doubt that it is thus 
justified. But when should a proposition be called foundational? If and 
only if some human being could know non-inferentially and with cer-
titude that it is true. In secular science such non-inferential knowledge is 
attributed to repeatable observations only. Can this non-inferential 
knowledge be extended to include biblical propositions? This is what 
Wolterstorff denies, even if the Bible is infallible in the sense that all the 
propositions asserted in it and all the propositions they presuppose are 
true by inerrant divine revelation. The reasons why boil down to the cor-
ruptibility of our copies of the Scripture, and the dubitable status of its 
content for its human authors and its readers and hearers. This is not to 
say that prophets doubted their own message but that doubt about it is 
possible, so that the strict criteria of foundationalism are not met. There-
fore, the Bible does not provide us with a foundation for scientific theo-
rizing. The Bible should function in another way, however. It provides the 
foundation for several kinds of beliefs, to wit, beliefs about data, data-
background beliefs and control beliefs. Obviously, our control beliefs are 
fueled by the other two kinds of belief, but perform a special task. Their 
function is a regulative one in that they lead us to weigh existing theories 
and to devise new ones. This is in total conformity with the way every-
body deals with a theory, measuring it by beliefs as to what constitutes 
an appropriate and plausible sort of theory in whatever case. Founda-
tionalism is an example of this itself. This function of control beliefs does 
not mean, however, that these beliefs fully control the process of theoriz-
ing. There may be true theories emerging from false control beliefs, even 
to such an extent that non-Christians have played a decisive role in the 
progress of scientific theory. 
Wolterstorff not only emphasized what in his view is the proper 
Christian attitude to modern science, he also promoted the development 
of alternative research programs, in which Christian philosophy and the-
ology are at the center. A Christian model ought to be both biblically 
faithful and genuinely psychological by comprising theories which are 
supported by and suggestive of research projects (Wolterstorff, 1984a, 
1984b). He was not optimistic about the actual implementation of the 
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policy he recommended, however. For this he blamed the status modern 
science still has among many Christians. Modern science starts from the 
axioms of Descartes which are as follows. We have to confine ourselves 
to that on which we can gain rational consensus; method is of prime im-
portance; mathematics and mathematical physics are paradigms of ra-
tionality that ought to be adopted in all sciences; the proper method 
starts with certitude (applied less rigorously in our days); and science 
properly conducted will never conflict with the Christian faith (Wolter-
storff, 1984b). The adoption of these axioms prevented Christian aca-
demics from developing particular research programs. 
Others have been acting upon Wolterstorff’s directives. Vande Kemp 
(1987) favored philosophizing of psychology, taking a firm stance in 
Christianly inspired philosophy and theory. She stressed the importance 
of ongoing scientific research, rooted in biblical and theological anthro-
pology (Vande Kemp, 1998). Clinton (1990a, 1990b) felt the urgency to 
develop a comprehensive biblical worldview, a Christian philosophical 
framework for Christian psychologists. 
From a somewhat different perspective, Johnson (1992) attributed a 
range of roles to the Bible with respect to psychology, among which those 
of being foundational and creative (besides the roles of being experien-
tial, contextual, axiological, anthropological, canonical, and dialogical). He 
advocated the development of a Christian psychology. A prerequisite for 
this is that Christian psychologists be immersed in Scripture and the 
Christian tradition, by means of which they are prepared to discover new 
facts and theories and to devise new lines of research. 
Frequent appeals are made to an influential article by Jones (1994), 
who championed a mode of interaction between religion and science in 
which religious belief suggests new modes of thought by shaping new 
perceptions of data and new theories. Van Leeuwen (1996) agreed with 
Wolterstorff that the Bible provides us with certain background assump-
tions or control beliefs by which Christians can both shape and judge 
psychological theories. Scripture cannot be used atomistically, however, 
by way of proof texts. Scripture is a cumulative, God-directed narrative  
in which all persons are players, that is, it presents itself as an indissol-
uble whole. Leffel (2007) and Hackney (2007) favored the use of a     
well-considered methodology for integrating Christian doctrine with 
theory and research in psychology. For this purpose they adopted the             
conceptual framework proposed by the physicist and philosopher Nan-
cey Murphy that does fit in the picture developed by Wolterstorff, but has 
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a pronounced profile. She embedded her approach in the philosophy of      
science by Imre Lakatos. Let us direct our attention to it, limiting our-
selves to the epistemological side of her work. 
According to Lakatos progress in any science is driven by competition 
between different research programs. To Murphy (2005a), even theology 
can be organized from this viewpoint and therefore can be regarded as a 
real science. Following Lakatos, she asserted that research programs try 
to gain support by creating a shield of theories, hypotheses, and data that 
are utilized to confirm, protect and defend a core thesis that is elevated 
above all dispute. Supportive theories and hypotheses may be adapted 
under the pressure of counterevidence, but the central basic assumption 
will be fostered as long as possible. Applying this to psychology, Murphy 
(2005b) characterized psychology as the science that asks questions 
about the ultimate goal of human life and the factors that constitute   
human flourishing. These are theological-ethical questions about the 
ultimate good. Hence, psychological research should start with a core 
assumption that has a theological character, and organize research pro-
grams around it. Murphy (2005b, 2005c) admitted that there is not just 
one theological position that has the potential to start with, there are 
plenty of them. Standing in the tradition of the Radical Reformation, she 
herself opted for the hard core theory of self-renunciation and nonviol-
ence over against the goals promoted by secular psychology and psy-
chotherapy such as adjustment to society or self-enhancement. 
These proposals to integrate psychological theory and research with 
biblical testimony have a common feature in that they combine biblical 
insights in the basic views that contribute to theorizing and research 
issues, whereupon the research is carried out along the lines of regular 
methodology. The way this worldview influence is thought to work dif-
fers between the various proposals. It can be controlling and regulative 
(Wolterstorff) but can also play a more central role and be directive and 
determinative (Johnson, Murphy). 
These theoretical-methodological guidelines were implemented in the 
extensive research program carried out by J.P. Watson and his fellow 
workers. All research articles about epistemology in both journals were 
produced by this group. They observed that humanistic and rational-
emotive self-report measures are biased by negative prejudices about 
Christian values like dependency and community orientation (Watson, 
Morris, Hood, & Folbrecht, 1990); by non-Christian preconceptions about 
self-actualization, self-esteem (Watson, Milliron, Morris, & Hood, 1995a), 
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and perfectionism (Watson, Morris, & Hood, 1994); and by the inability 
to assess the actual locus of control in a religious context (Watson, 
Milliron, Morris, & Hood, 1995b); or by failing to distinguish between 
biblical foundationalism and religious fundamentalism (Watson, Chen, & 
Hood, 2011). They argued for the adoption of a specific ideological sur-
round, so that, in the Christian area a Christian ideological surround (e.g., 
Watson, 2011; Watson, Chen, & Hood, 2011) that sets the scene for the 
development of Christianly adapted self-report scales (e.g., Watson, 
Hood, Morris, & Hall, 1985) can take shape. 
 
Non-Rational Knowledge 
From the beginning the importance of integrating knowledge from the 
Bible and the empirical world not only on the rational level but also on 
the level of personal experience was emphasized; cf. Farnsworth’s (1974, 
1982a) introduction of the notion of embodied integration that many 
authors have adopted since. However, this experiential, embodied inte-
gration did not so much function epistemologically as a way of acquiring 
knowledge; rather it was meant to characterize the personal processing 
which is supposed to be pursued by the integrative endeavor on the  
spiritual level. As far as I can see, however, this changed with DeVries’s 
(1982) critique of Farnsworth’s (1982a) alleged dependence on logical 
positivism by assuming two bodies of facts that should be integrated 
afterwards, the theological and the psychological (cf. section 2.3). Instead 
of this, DeVries distinguished a primary and a secondary sense of integra-
tion, the former being a process of attuning the twofold revelation, crea-
tional and scriptural, with our faith-response, and the latter being the 
attempt to achieve unity and consistency in our scientific knowledge, 
especially between psychology and theology. Here personal, experiential 
integration on a non-rational level takes the lead in searching for truth. 
This kind of integration is spiritual in nature, because it bears witness to 
Christ, the Truth. Psychology and theology draw their truths from their 
relationship to the Truth. The task of secondary integration is not to rec-
oncile conflicting truths, but to seek a type of scientific knowledge which 
is faithful to the Truth. Within the truth conflicts cannot exist; conflicts 
can only be due to the unfaithfulness and imperfection of the human act 
of knowing, that is, at the level of primary integration between revelation 
and life. 
Anderson (1989) took a step further in the direction of connecting 
experience and knowledge. Experience is distinct from empirical and 
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rational cognition in that it is open to unconscious mental processes – 
symbolic representation and intuition – as located in the right brain  
hemisphere. He refers to Michael Polanyi, who argued that scientific 
knowledge is part of a larger structure of knowledge which is discovered 
through intuition as well as experimentation. Symbolic representation 
appeals both to the cognition of the represented experience, and to the 
experienced content that transcends experience, like God. As experience 
of the transcendent, the human experience of God is an encounter with 
the reality of God’s grace and salvation, and a gate to true knowledge. So, 
psychological and theological science can work together in seeking 
knowledge that encompasses cognition and understanding, and in pur-
suing healing of persons as psychological and spiritual beings. There is 
some similarity with the article in which Vande Kemp (1996) explores a 
phenomenology in which contact with the unconscious via dreams or 
intuition is appreciated as a source of knowledge, following incentives by 
Tillich, Laing, and Jung about keeping in touch with the unconscious in 
order to properly deal with existential anxiety. 
Sorenson (1996a) tried to explore new pathways by critiquing the 
then dominant approach. He contrasts “bounded set thinking” and “cen-
tered set thinking” and stresses the importance of the latter. Bounded set 
thinking is typically Western, Reformational, and masculine, with set 
membership being determined by essential characteristics, clear bound-
aries, uniformity of membership, and static concepts. In the alternative 
or, rather, complementary model, not the boundaries but the center of 
the integration enterprise is directive. At the center is personal commit-
ment. Variability outweighs uniformity; properties are more dynamic 
than static; codification of autonomous rules should be avoided; and on-
going relational dependence should be accounted for. It is less culture 
specific and more feminine and ecumenical. Along with a development 
toward centered set thinking Sorenson notes a shift from theoretical 
integration in psychology to applied integration in psychotherapy. 
Sorenson (1996b) continued to characterize the core of the integrative 
enterprise as personal joy and gratitude, borrowing from Melanie Klein’s 
analysis of gratitude and the opposing attitude of envy, as the core virtue 
and vice, respectively, in psychodynamics. Personal integration occurs in 
persons, including therapists; it occurs through contact with persons-in-
relation to both God and fellow humans, through our whole being, and    
it is embedded in the intersubjective community of the church that   
wrestles with the presence of the living God. Here again, personal and 
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shared appropriation of God’s truth is at the heart and at the start of the 
integration process. 
Hall and Porter (2004) distinguished conceptual integration and     
experiential integration. Conceptual integration refers to the bringing to-
gether of explicit concepts from the two separate disciplines of psychol-
ogy and theology; experiential integration applies to implicit relational 
knowledge and spiritual-emotional growth. For this mode of integration 
Hall and Porter appealed to the neuropsychological assumption of a sep-
arate experiential processing level proposed by Epstein (1994), and to 
the subsymbolic and nonverbal symbolic processing levels proposed by 
Bucci (1997). This mode of processing is preconscious, automatic, holis-
tic, non-verbal, rapid, affect-driven, and based on implicit memory. On 
the other hand, the rational system is conscious, deliberate, linear, verbal, 
slow, affect-free, and based on explicit memory. The authors aim at unit-
ing the truths psychology identifies in God’s world and the truths theol-
ogy discerns in God’s Word by having them incarnationally lived out in 
our lives. Here the conceptual and the experiential components come to-
gether. Like DeVries (1982), they contend that experiential integration is 
primary to any unified conceptual integration between psychology and 
theology. The priority of the experiential level is supported by neurobio-
logical findings; the right cortex matures before the left, and contains 
extensive reciprocal connections with limbic and subcortical areas, which 
are responsible for the processing, expression, and regulation of emo-
tional information and nonverbal communication (Hall, 2004). This 
whole integration enterprise was labeled “referential integration,” for it 
is fueled by the referential activity of linking feelings and words. This 
mode of achieving integrated knowledge is the only way to avoid the 
control beliefs of manipulative integration models, in which one of the 
disciplines overrules the other and thus manipulates it (Hall & Porter, 
2004).5 They derive the term ‘manipulative integration model’ from Eck’s 
(1996) ‘manipulative integration paradigm’. It should be noted, in pass-
ing, that the connection of control beliefs with manipulation fails to do 
justice to the role Wolterstorff attributes to control beliefs. 
In a similar way, Hill (2005) appealed to postmodernism that allows 
for sources of knowledge other than the rigid positivistic limitation to 
self-evident and logically derived truths, including socially constructed 
 
5
  Note that in 2010 Porter fell back upon a manipulative integration model, cf. 
section 2.2. 
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knowledge. After the novel approach to cognitive science by Sperry 
(1988), Hill held that mental states surpass physical events, but do not 
violate physical laws. As holistic properties of the brain they are open to 
religious experiences, and operate with downward causality, influencing 
lower levels of human existence. In an earlier stage of his career, Hill 
(1991) had uttered a reverse view of the mutual relationship. There he 
appealed to Evans (1989) by stating that the empiricists only get the job 
half done. The results of empirical research can only be appreciated in 
the light of hermeneutical evaluation. At that time, then, he advocated 
complementary methodological pluralism. 
Dueck and Parsons (2004), by contrast, saw both approaches as dis-
connected; the modernist assumption of a stable, and objective order on 
the one hand, besides the culturally and historically dependent percep-
tions and interpretations within the hermeneutic approach favored by 
postmodernism on the other. They did not grade them as primary and 
secondary but regarded them as two separate lines of thought, without 
being inclined to give preference to one over the other. Both sorts of 
knowledge are culture specific. Dueck (1983) referred to the classical 
sociological analysis by Toennies who distinguishes two forms of social 
existence: community (Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesellschaft). Knowl-
edge in the former is based on faith and religion, in the latter on science 
and public opinion. Following Charles Taylor (1985), Dueck and Parsons 
(2004) called for peaceful coexistence between scientific and hermeneu-
tic psychologies. The common and the unique, the nomothetic and the 
idiographic, psychology and theology, should enter into dialogue with 
each other. This argument is similar to Van Leeuwen’s (1996) advocacy 
for some form of critical realism, rejecting both naïve realism and radical 
anti-realism. More sympathetic toward one of the approaches, Richard-
son (2006) proposed an ontological hermeneutic alternative to scien-
tism’s naturalistic outlook on the world. Appealing to Charles Taylor 
(1995), he pictured the route of knowing via abstraction and objectifi-
cation as a manifestation of a view of the human self as disengaged, dis-
embodied, atomistic, punctual, self-autonomous, self-responsive, and 
finding one’s purpose in oneself. Instead, humans should be interpreted 
as being thrown into the cultural contingency of their familiar life world 
from which they draw their possibilities of self-interpretation (Taylor, 
1989). Still, to Richardson, ontological hermeneutics implies some meas-
ure of dialogue and constructive mutual influence between seemingly in-
commensurable viewpoints, and the abandonment of any monopolistic 
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claim. According to him, as for Taylor and Dueck, this open attitude 
sometimes leads to deeper insights and understanding.  
The position defended by Slife and Whoolery (2006) is more definite. 
They advocated interpretive methods that include divine activity. In this 
way, biases that are inherent in the traditional methods of gaining knowl-
edge can be avoided by a rupture that originates from beyond this world 
(Faulconer), or, by a surplus of meaning grasped intuitively (Gadamer), 
by affectivity (Ricoeur), alterity (Levinas), unveiling (Heidegger), a sur-
prise (Taylor), resulting in the miracle of understanding (Gadamer). 
From this background the authors argue for a fully theistic approach that 
is more phenomena driven than method driven. 
By way of provisional commentary to the presentation thus far, I ob-
serve that under the heading Non-Rational Knowledge different labels 
have been hung, such as postmodern, hermeneutic, constructive, and 
experiential. Sofar they were not yet sharply distinguished from each 
other. They all refer to the importance of the subjective input in creating 
or unveiling meaningful knowledge, and in that sense they overlap, but 
they do not say the same thing. Postmodern refers to the resistance 
against modernism with its universal truth claims generated by logical 
reasoning as the highest arbiter. Hermeneutic focuses on the process of 
understanding by involving our culturally and idiosyncratically devel-
oped framework of pre-understanding and affiliations in the interpreta-
tion of texts and phenomena. Constructive relates to the active endeavor 
performed by the interpreter to make the observed particles a mean-
ingful whole. And experiential highlights the implicit, affective, and intui-
tive aspects of knowledge. 
In all these renderings the preconscious, prepossessed, intuitive, ex-
periential, non-rational mode of cognition that gets hold of meaning in an 
implicit and automatic way is presented as an alternative or complement 
to the conscious and rational mode of cognition that dominates modern 
epistemology. It is coupled with the acceptance of a more permeable 
epistemology that allows for understanding besides causal explanation 
as a part of scientific knowledge. The spokespersons revealed difference 
in emphasis, however, in the evaluation of modernism. Some dismissed 
modern epistemology completely, and saw postmodern epistemology as 
an exclusive alternative, others tried to connect both approaches. Fur-
thermore, those who tried to connect a hermeneutical or experiential 
74 WORLDVIEW AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
approach6 with the systematic, rational and naturalistic, did so in differ-
ent ways. For some these are autonomous methodologies that can gain 
by interaction, for others the naturalistic methodology is subordinated to 
and dependent on a hermeneutical or experiential methodology. The 
latter drew near to the approach elaborated in the previous subsection, 
because primary experiential knowledge shaped by biblical testimony is 
close to the Bible and Worldview position, which sees Bible and world-
view as regulating theorizing and research. The difference is that there 
worldview was taken in its explicit and cognitive sense, while in the pre-
sent exposition the implicit experiential beliefs point to the subconscious 
side of worldview.7 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we reviewed the reflections among Christian psychol-
ogists, theologians, and philosophers on epistemology. Most of them 
dismissed the positivistic and naturalistic criteria held by current mod-
ern science as wrong or one-sided. Some, however, accepted them as the 
legitimate conditions for valid scientific knowledge. Many advocated the 
inclusion of the Bible as a source of psychological data, although reserva-
tions have been raised about this view as well. More nuanced attempts to 
include the Bible in the psychological discourse have been proposed, 
such as employing the Bible on a presuppositional level, or connecting it 
with a non-rational mode of knowledge. The latter group of proposals 
can be differentiated as postmodern, hermeneutic, and experiential. In 
most proposals to include the Bible in psychological discourse, the ques-
tion of the proper nature of scientific knowledge seems to be underex-
posed as may be highlighted by an example in the next paragraph (in 
response to the latter part of 2.3). 
As of yet, the penetrating analyses by Plantinga leave us with a ques-
tion. Can biblical knowledge serve as data alongside empirical data   
within a psychological discourse? The key question is related to the char-
acter of biblical knowledge. Plantinga’s externalist argument is about       
 
6
  For this moment, I confine myself to the similarity between the experiential and 
the hermeneutical approaches, and save a closer examination of the main differ-
ence for chapter 5. 
7
  For worldview as a multifaceted construct see chapter 1. 
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knowledge in general. Often he is speaking of propositional knowledge, 
including perceptual knowledge (“It appears to me that there is an abyss 
before me”). He has argued convincingly that, standing on the edge of an 
abyss, my perceptual belief by no means implies methodologically ob-
tained evidence. However, science seems to deal exclusively with this 
methodological type of evidence. Can a warrant of knowledge in general 
be applied to specific scientific knowledge without further consideration? 
This question becomes acute with respect to employing biblical knowl-
edge in scientific discourse. Is biblical knowledge to be seen as properly 
basic knowledge in the controllable, generally accessible sense required 
by the prevailing scientific standard? Or should biblical knowledge rather 
be characterized as everyday knowledge, experienced by the eye of faith? 
If so, can this kind of knowledge be integrated into one system of knowl-
edge together with information acquired by systematic empirical obser-
vation? It seems likely that scientific knowledge demands other criteria 
than everyday knowledge or religious knowledge. What if we should 
employ internalist criteria to scientific knowledge for the sake of general 
accessibility, and externalist criteria to everyday knowledge and reli-
gious knowledge? Then Plantinga’s account would be lacking as soon as 
we try to apply religious knowledge to psychological science. 
Some alternatives have been proposed, indeed, one of which is offered 
by Wolterstorff. Instead of Plantinga’s externalist foundationalism as 
basic for scientific knowledge, including existential beliefs in proposi-
tions derived from sacred texts, Wolterstorff rejects foundationalism, and 
views specific kinds of basic convictions merely as the background to 
scientific research programs and theorizing. They do not function as 
foundation but as control beliefs to influence the direction of research 
and theory development. Basic beliefs, or worldview issues, do not fuel 
the content of psychology but affect the direction of its practice. The  
other alternative is the recourse to experiential knowledge as the pri-
mary source of scientific knowledge, therewith renouncing the conven-
tional scientific practice as it has been developing over the past centuries. 
This issue can be linked with the other open question about the epis-
temological quality of methodological naturalism (at the end of 2.2). Both 
topics will be dealt with later, in chapter 6. For now, we turn our atten-
tion to the anthropology that results from the epistemologies argued for 
by the contributors to the debate. 
  
Chapter 3 
Being Human 
Having investigated the journals under scrutiny on the sources of knowl-
edge in the previous chapter, we now focus on the main field these 
sources are used for, that is, for anthropology as our second topic of in-
terest. In the next chapter about the relationship between psychology 
and psychotherapy, the third topic, we shall discover the importance of 
the way humans are viewed, and end up with some questions that ask for 
further assessment. 
In the relevant journals many reflections on being human refer to bib-
lical basics about human nature. They are about the image and likeness 
of God in which man and woman have been created, about body and soul, 
about our moral destination, about free will, sin, and renewal of our sin-
ful nature. These subjects are interconnected and overlap each other, 
inasmuch the image of God is associated with soul, morality, and free will. 
We will give them separate attention, because all of them elicit their own 
debates. Moreover, on the distinct subjects differences and similarities 
with secular theories are identified. In spite of the differences raised be-
tween the biblical picture and secular theories about human nature, 
many papers try to show interfaces and similarities, in line with the a 
priori epistemological assumption of concord between God’s general and 
special revelation. In presenting the various contributions I aim at the 
core of their content (section 3.2). 
Besides the biblical sources and secular psychologies about being 
human, we will pay attention to philosophers who have been consulted 
and employed by participants in the debate. They have been appre-   
ciated for their Christian, Jewish, or generally theistic perspectives and 
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conceptions concerning humanity, usually in conformity with biblical 
notions but not limited to them (section 3.3). 
But first we turn to some quantitative data (3.1). 
 
 
3.1  Numbers 
 
In total, I counted 211 articles about anthropology in some relevant way 
in the two journals: 136 of them in JPT, 75 in JPC. Of these articles, 113 
were about anthropology only (JPT 77, JPC 36), the rest share their focus 
of interest with epistemology (JPT 37, JPC 11), psychotherapy (JPT 19, 
JPC 28), or both (JPT 3). Of the 211 articles about anthropology, 34 are 
empirical (JPT 21, JPC 13). 10 of these have already been counted in the 
numbers of epistemology articles (section 2.1), because of their dual 
epistemological and anthropological focus. 
The reader should not conceive of the figures as exact but as indica-
tive. I focus on those articles that raise the theme of the need to distin-
guish worldview influences in psychology, and the compatibility of     
psychological anthropology with a Christian worldview. However, in 
practice the delimitation from religion-psychological issues – about how 
religious and spiritual phenomena can be explained psychologically – is 
not sharp,1 and more than once the selection process requires some sub-
jective weighing. 
Who are the contributors? In 131 articles the authors are psychol-     
ogists, including psychiatrists (2), and philosophers of psychology (3) 
(JPT 80, JPC 51). In 28 contributions the authors are theologians, includ-
ing philosophers of theology (3) (JPT 22, JPC 6). 7 articles were written 
by general philosophers only (JPT 4; JPC 3). The rest, 45 articles (JPT 30, 
JPC 15), were by psychologists and theologians both, either cooperating, 
or united in one person, or in a combination of these alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
  For the difference between them, see section 1.5. 
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3.2  Biblical Basics 
 
Imago Dei 
The predominant biblical notion to which authors appealed is the notion 
of our being created after the image and likeness of God, as it is found in 
the book of Genesis 1:26-27. The first to explore this concept is Koteskey. 
He described developmental maturing as “becoming more like God” (Ko-
teskey, 1973, p. 35). He saw our striving for cognitive consistency as an 
indication of our being made in the image of God, since God is a con-
sistent, unchanging, thinking, reasoning, and reasonable God (Koteskey, 
1979a). He noted that behaviorism (conditioning) and psychoanalysis 
(drives) emphasize the animal-like aspects of human nature while hu-
manistic and cognitive psychology emphasize the God-like aspects. A 
Christian theory of personality should consider both, just as the notion of 
being created after God’s image indicates both the similarities and the 
differences between God and humanity (Koteskey, 1979b). As to emo-
tions, he distinguished their animal-like physiological aspects and the 
God-like cognitive aspects. Furthermore, he counted several positive and 
negative emotions (like anger) as expressions of the image of God in hu-
mans (Koteskey, 1980).2 Apparently, by his biblical representation Ko-
teskey intended to correct one-sided secular approaches. He also seemed 
eager to show how much psychology can be derived from the Bible. 
Carter, too, related psychological maturity to the image of God in hu-
mans, although he did not limit his view of maturing to creation. Psycho-
logical maturity is grounded in the image of God in humans as created 
but fallen in sin. So, according to biblical standards, maturing needs the 
additional operation of a renewed image by the power of God (Carter, 
1974a), because as a consequence of sin God’s image in humans has be-
come marred and even distorted, though not lost (Carter, 1977). Here, 
the biblical perspective adds a spiritual dimension to psychological ma-
turity, a dimension that will return in the reflection on psychotherapy. 
 
2
  In one of the few articles about emotions, Bassett and Hill (1998) adhered to the 
well-known ACE-model of emotions: arousal followed by cognitive interpretation 
leads to an emotional reaction. They argued that any emotion, from anger to 
love, has the capacity to be experienced in a manner that is pleasing or displeas-
ing to God. The crucial decision is made at the stage of the cognitive interpreta-
tion. Here a moral dimension was added to the evaluation of emotions. 
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Unlike Koteskey, Pascoe (1980) interpreted humanity’s being created 
in the image of God in a personalist sense as being capable to commune 
with God and other humans, that is, as being social. He contrasted this 
personalism with the reductionist mechanicism of some secular person-
ality views. This track has been followed by Vanderploeg (1981a, 1981b) 
who exploited the relational character of human nature, originating in 
the imago Dei, to found the therapeutic relationship. He delineated the 
shift in theological interpretation of the concept from Calvin to that of 
Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. Calvin sketched the imago Dei as the posi-
tion of dominion over creation, exercised in a state of pure righteousness 
and holiness; Barth and Brunner saw it as a relational quality. This new 
interpretation was gathered mainly from the way Genesis 1:27 speaks in 
the same breath of both the creation of humans after God’s image, and 
their creation as male and female. 
In the same way, Benner (1983) defined the core of the imago Dei as 
our social nature, also appealing for this to Barth and Brunner. He saw 
humanity’s relational need both for God and for others as fundamental to 
human nature. This truth had been largely ignored by Freud, but empha-
sized by object relations theorists like Fairbairn and Kernberg, although 
the use of the term ‘object’ reminds us of the mechanistic flavor of their 
psychoanalytic background.3 For object relation theorists the relation-
ship with the primary caregiver, usually the mother, is of crucial im-
portance to humans’ development. In a later stage, transitional objects 
that represent the mother, like a cuddly toy, can compensate for her 
temporary absence. In a later article, Benner (1989) added a specific trait 
to relationality as the core meaning of being created in the image of God. 
He connected it with what he called our natural spirituality, defined as 
the quest for self-transcendence and surrender. 
Like Vanderploeg, White (1984) considered the relational redefinition 
of the imago Dei as an important step in the attempt to integrate psy-
chology and theology. This need and desire for relationships is the aspect 
of the imago Dei which survived the fall into sin and has affinity with the 
conceptualization of internal object relations. Referring to Hoekema 
(1986), Jensma (1993) mentioned important theologians in history and 
 
3
  For a right understanding of Fairbairn and Kernberg it should be borne in mind 
that for them object relations are internal representations. So, maybe the dis-
tance between them and Benner’s relationality is even greater than the latter 
admits. 
80 WORLDVIEW AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
their explanations of the term: Irenaeus saw its distinctive characteristic 
in rationality and freedom, Thomas Aquinas in intellect and reason, John 
Calvin in true knowledge, holiness, and love of God and other people, and 
Barth and Brunner in our relational nature. Referring to White (1984), he 
regarded the relational aspect of the imago Dei as most central to the 
intersection of theology and psychodynamic psychology. Anderson 
(1989) continued the same line of thought but expanded the meaning by 
adding a teleological (goal oriented) notion, at the same time integrating 
the cognitive aspect. He defined God’s image and likeness as a capacity 
for relationship with the self, others and God in a knowing way, and an 
openness to a future which provides hope and meaning to life; or, to put 
it briefly, “wholeness through relatedness” (p. 379). 
It is clear that this emphasis on relationality toward neighbors and 
God may affect the character and content of the therapeutic contact (see 
chapter 4). It might be questioned, however, whether this emphasis is 
specifically Christian, and whether this interpretation of the imago Dei is 
in accordance with the understanding of traditional Christian theology 
(cf. section 5.4). 
Lawrence (1989) explored another direction. He dealt with the imago 
Dei in the context of what he calls the new paradigm in psychotherapy, 
that is, constructivism, holding that our knowledge is no exact represen-
tation of the outer world, but an interpretative construction of that world 
from within, with the help of language as a symbolic expression that both 
coordinates and creates reality. There is some biblical evidence, however, 
of humanity being called to order and structure their observations and 
experiences; cf. Adam being called to name the animals (Genesis 2), 
which should be interpreted in the light of the Old Testament purport of 
naming as determining someone’s or something’s character. The field of 
family therapy in the first place does reflect the prevailing influence of 
the constructivist paradigm, the family members constructing their own 
views of what is going on, and of everybody’s role in it. Although mental 
constructions may lose sight of external reality, and distort the idea of 
God being involved in his creation, Lawrence sees a connection between 
this constructivist activity and the imago Dei. This connection lies in the 
calling of humankind to dominate and order God’s creation. Although not 
being a creator ex nihilo, like God, the human being has received the posi-
tion of a creator by the mandate to rule over creation and cultivate it. In 
the same vein the constructivist interpretation of the imago Dei implies 
the faculty of using language, shared by God and humanity only. These 
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considerations seem to be meant to legitimize a prevailing kind of     
(family) therapy as sound for Christians. 
The relational interpretation of the imago Dei continued to be the 
prevailing one.4 Olthuis (2006, cf. 1994a, 1994b) turned out to be an elo-
quent advocate of this view. Since God is love, being made in God’s image 
means that our original nature is love. This emphasis on the intrinsic 
relationality of human selfhood exposes the shortcomings of the long 
standing assumptions that independence, autonomy, and self-reliance 
are the primary goals of human development. The presently emerging 
focus on the relational-communal nature of being human can only be 
applauded. He noticed, however, that in the present relational focus the 
emphasis is still too often on the individuals and their complex intra-
psychic selves that need others as self-objects; insufficient attention is 
given to the dynamics between two related subjects. 
Watson (2007) expanded the theological foundation of our relational 
nature by connecting the imago Dei with the Trinity. The divine Trinity of 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit consists of mutual relationships without mu-
tual domination. In psychotherapy the struggle to attain a similar rela-
tionship is going on, “relationship without the motive of power over the 
other; relationship without resistance or compulsive repetition of past 
painful patterns; freedom within the bonds of love” (p. 72). In the same 
year, Miner (2007) added a referral to the attachment theory. He asserts 
that humanity is created for relationship with God, and that this reality is 
the source of our attachment to God. This attachment is not a one way 
motion from humans to God, as most theories about religious attachment 
assume, but a matter of intersubjectivity. God’s attachment activities 
toward humans originate in His Trinitarian being, which consists of di-
vine relationships and includes affections, as was advocated by the Trini-
tarian theology proposed by Colin Gunton (1985). 5 At least five empirical 
 
4
  In their Integrative Psychotherapy, McMinn and Campbell (2007) distinguished a 
structural, functional, and relational interpretation of the imago Dei, referring to 
the managing of creation, the rational or moral nature, and loving relationships 
with God and one another, respectively. In their therapeutic application they do 
not favor one of the three interpretations, however, but try to combine them. 
5
  Some years earlier, Evans (2005) already made a connection between the imago 
Dei and the internal Trinitarian relationships between the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit. This connection with the Trinity has been rejected, however, by 
Van de Brink and Van der Kooi (2012). 
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studies are about attachment to God, relating it for example to implicit 
spiritual functioning, and religious coping. 
Distinct from this relational tendency, in Myers (1996) we find a remi-
niscence of the cognitive interpretation of the imago Dei. He drew a par-
allel between our awesome cognitive capacities and our liability to err on 
the one hand, and our being made in the image of God as finite creatures 
on the other. Similarly, but more broadly, Puffer (2007) characterized 
being created in God’s image as having innate qualities like love, mercy, 
compassion, forgiveness, truthfulness, and kindness, emerging from the 
exercise of human intellect, will, and emotion. This connects to the more 
classical interpretation of the imago Dei, which does focus on human 
faculties instead of personal relationship, and leaves room for a more 
cognitive approach of mental problems. 
 
Body, Soul, and Spirit 
In the quest of a genuinely Christian anthropology the importance of the 
soul has also been drawing attention. There was a common complaint 
about what psychology has done with the soul. Vande Kemp (1982b, p. 
206) made herself the spokesperson for “Christian psychologists [who] 
are gravely concerned because psychology has chosen to banish the im-
mortal soul from its realm.” In other words, psychology, heavily influ-
enced by the experimental movement, has ended up with “psychology 
without a soul” (Vande Kemp, 1982a, p. 105). She viewed this develop-
ment as one source of the tension between psychology and Christian 
theology. Therefore, Christian psychologists have been looking for a fit-
ting place of the human soul in their psychologies and psychotherapies. 
The first to touch on the subject was Jackson (1975). He surveyed the 
biblical idea of soul and came to the conclusion that it underscores the 
wholeness of human beings, their personalities, that is, the vitality of 
their existence through their functioning. As he notes, in this respect the 
biblical view is consistent with the views of modern psychologies. Jack-
son rejected what he called the common theological interpretation of the 
soul as a non-physical and separate metaphysical complement of being 
human, labeled the Platonic view. In a reaction, Schoen (1975) objected 
to the identification of the dualism in traditional theology with Platonism. 
To Plato the material body, like the total material world, is unreal. Only 
the world of ideas to which the soul belongs is real. Our dichotomy    
looks more like the dualistic version of Descartes. From this reaction I 
conclude that Schoen, like Jackson, rejected conventional theology that               
 CHAPTER 3. BEING HUMAN 83 
 
dualistically speaks of an immortal soul in a mortal body. This means that 
they challenged the easy appeal to Christian theology that VandeKemp 
seemed to make. 
The main issue concerning the soul for Vande Kemp was not the 
choice between monism and dualism, but between dichotomy and      
trichotomy. In the history of Christian theological anthropology there has 
always been the debate between the supporters of a dual structure of 
human nature consisting of body and soul, and the advocates of a triple 
structure consisting of body, soul, and spirit, of who Franz Delitzsch with 
his System of Biblical Psychology (original German edition in 1855) was 
an influential representative (Vande Kemp, 1982a). Vande Kemp favored 
a moderate trichotomy inasmuch it offers the opportunity to distinguish 
between the psychological and the spiritual. It would be dangerous to 
diagnose a psychopathology as a spiritual problem,6 albeit that the other 
way round spiritual growth enables the person to pursue psychological 
wholeness. The psyche should be approached on its own terms, anyway. 
Reflecting not on the difference between soul and spirit but on the 
distinction between body and spirit, Olthuis (1994a) described the spirit 
as the perspective from which we see human existence as intentional, 
centered, and directional.  Spirit can be identified with the I. Body, on the 
other hand, is defined as humans’ differentiated, multifunctional, posi-
tioned existence. 
Boyd (1995) went deeper into the subject. From the Bible he inferred 
that soul and spirit are synonymous, though not completely so. Soul em-
phasizes the earthly, carnal, and uniquely individual aspect of the inner 
person, while spirit stresses the susceptibility to a relationship with God. 
Secular therapists treat the soul as the primary focus of their work, even 
though they mostly avoid the term. By neglecting the soul, theological 
anthropology would be overly spiritual, and underestimate psychological 
issues. The author saw body and soul in close unity, leaving room for two 
approaches. The soul can be defined as the inner person or as the whole 
person. Conform to these approaches, everyone can be called a body-
soul, or a soul, respectively. 
In a special issue about self and soul, Duvall (1998) rejected some 
philosophical forms of body–soul dualism, such as those pictured by Pla-
to and Descartes, but deemed not all forms of dualism problematic. Some 
 
6
  In fact, that is the way the Biblical Counseling View deals with psychological prob-
lems; cf. chapter 1. 
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duality is expressed in the Bible, although the unity dominates. Soul can 
mean living being, all aspects of human personality, including thought, 
emotion and volition, the whole person, and the self, but sometimes it 
designates an entity distinguished from the body, cf. Matthew 10:28. 
There is much similarity between soul and self, although the terms imply 
distinct perspectives, soul being the more ontological and objective term, 
and self emphasizing the more experiential and subjective side. In the 
same issue, Moreland (1998) stated that soul as a major focus of psycho-
logical theorizing has been replaced by self. He argued that this shift is 
due to the denial of the substantial character of the soul. In his view, only 
the assumption of a substantial soul can make sense of the functions at-
tributed to the self, such as consciousness, intentionality, sameness 
(identity) through change, and libertarian freedom.7 These functions 
cannot be described in physical categories. Therefore, substance dualism 
(body–soul) is preferable to physicalism (reduction to the material 
body). He took the soul as an immaterial substance, defining substance as 
a whole that is ontologically prior to its parts in that those parts borrow 
their reality from the substance as a whole. In this view, the soul can be 
defined as a substantial self. As a consequence, the human person con-
sists of two substances. This runs counter the unity that was argued for 
on biblical grounds by Jackson, Olthuis, Boyd, and Duvall. 
Johnson (1998b) mentioned four reasons for a revival of the concept 
of the soul: it is biblical, it denotes inner life, it responds to the common 
sense experience of the body–soul duality in human life, and it accounts 
for a relatedness to God. Beck (2003b) in turn underlined the importance 
of focusing attention on the soul because this could contribute to the 
increase of confidence in Christian counseling on the part of the church at 
large. For interest in the soul brings about interest in soul care and spiri-
tual direction. He proposed to use the term soul with great elasticity as 
an end term; a word that covers concepts like individual, individuality, 
person, personality, (inner) self, and selfhood. If soul should be too Pla-
tonic, the Pauline spirit would be a good alternative because it is biblical, 
and it has an evident link with spirituality. From Scripture soul should be 
interpreted as the person, possessing a rich emotional life, an amazingly 
complex psychological existence, a capacity for deep spirituality, and a 
need for being in relationship with God. It is clear that Beck tried to    
 
7
  Libertarian freedom over against compatibilist freedom will return in the sub-
section about freedom and responsibility. 
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account for the person’s unity for all his/her variety as portrayed in the 
Bible, and that he did not distinguish soul conceptually from spirit.8 
In another direction, that of neuroscience, Cole (2002) and Brown 
(2004, 2005) appreciated non-reductive physicalism, which assumes, in 
their explanation, an embodied soul as an emergent, unifying entity of 
the whole person. Emergent means supervening on lower biological pro-
cesses, depending on them, and at the same time having causal proper-
ties that influence the lower level neurobiological functioning. In this way 
neurobiology can co-exist with Christian notions of the soul as the central 
faculty of personal relatedness. Similarly, Hill (2005) tried to demarcate 
the soul from man’s material existence (body). Appealing to Sperry 
(1988), he adopted a multilevel view of the mind–body relationship, dis-
tancing himself both from dualist and monist, usually materialist, posi-
tions. Speaking of mind and consciousness, he argued that this cannot 
exist independent of physical events but that mental states are dissimilar 
from physical events. He agreed with Sperry that mental states are higher 
level, holistic properties of the brain, operating top down, making use of 
but not violating the laws of lower levels of human existence. In sum, Hill 
said two things; first, the mind needs the material body (brain); second, 
the mind is not only governed by the brain, however, but also inversely, 
the brain/body is governed by the mind.9 In an interview, Behensky also 
emphasized how our own behavior and choices can affect the functioning 
of our brains. It is true that the reverse causation also occurs: our biologi-
cal functioning shapes our behavior, but the relationship is not simply 
unidirectional. This view is often missing from the neuroscience perspec-
tive, however (Yangarber-Hicks et al., 2006). In line with this but less 
specific about the relationship between mind and brain Brugger (2008) 
defended the non-reducibility of the human person to matter. Human life 
is not just a material phenomenon, and mind is not just an expression of 
the brain. Human persons are created as unified wholes, constituted of a 
material body and a spiritual soul. 
In conclusion, both the unity of body and soul, and the relative inde-
pendence of the soul from the body (brain) were defended on biblical 
 
8
  Beck showed affinity with Benner (1998), who understood the soul “as referring 
to the whole person, including the body, but with particular focus on the inner 
world of thinking, feeling, and willing” (p. 22), and defined the care of souls as 
the care of persons in their totality. 
9
  In the sub-section about free will and responsibility we return to the portrayal by 
Sperry. 
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and neuropsychological grounds. In this debate, the main interest of the 
distinction was religious; it was meant to leave room for a real contact 
with a spiritual world, instead of regarding the spiritual dimension as a 
kind of illusion produced by material existence. 
 
Morality: Antithesis 
Morality as a part of anthropology does not focus on practical issues of 
good and evil but on the question: What are we humans living for? So, it 
is about understanding the meaning of human life. This meaning creates 
a standard for our virtues and behavioral choices. In several ways the 
journals under scrutiny dealt with morality in this sense.10 The first way 
in which several contributions dealt with morality is by criticizing views 
of human life advocated or presupposed by secular psychologies and 
psychotherapeutic methods. Their critique aimed at unmasking the non-
neutrality and worldview dependence of alleged scientific results and 
cultural common sense. 
Llewellyn (1973) reprimanded behaviorist Skinner (cf. Beyond Free-
dom and Dignity, 1971) for denying morality to human beings, and attrib-
uting all good behavior to the force of attractive stimuli. In this line of 
thought, ethical dilemmas are no more than cultural competition be-
tween possible reinforcers. The author’s verdict was that Skinner erred 
by reductionism. Hammes (1973) moved in the same direction by char-
acterizing Skinner’s main assumption as environmental determinism. He 
concluded that Skinner committed the naturalistic fallacy in ethics, by 
deriving ought conclusions from is statements because  he held that the 
study of operant conditioning by reinforcement will yield value judg-
ments of what is good or bad in human behavior. 
Ellens (1984) criticized the contemporary Western notions of the 
meaning of illness and health that are inferred from the current ideal for 
humans to be alive, healthy, functional, happy, comfortable, wealthy, 
beautiful, and young. Conversely, the lack of these values is appreciated 
 
10
  This approach is indebted to social philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor. MacIntyre (1984) favored an ethics of virtue embedded in a 
community that finds its cohesion in a common tradition directed to the imple-
mentation of a specific practice. Taylor (1995) emphasized that we take position 
in our surroundings, and that our understanding of the world is grounded in our 
dealings with it. Both of them oppose the modern, liberal illusion of a disen-
gaged, objective position of humans to act freely and rationally in the natural and 
social worlds. 
 CHAPTER 3. BEING HUMAN 87 
 
as unfortunate, painful, demeaning, destructive, and wrong. In the Chris-
tian understanding, on the contrary, both illness and health are taken as 
part of the growth process that constitutes life coram Deo, in the pres-
ence of God. 
According to Beck (1990), therapeutic settings reveal the virtues 
adopted by society at large: accepting people as they are, assisting them 
in making their own choices, instead of confronting them with God’s 
standards as the pastor did in former times. Bergin and Payne (1991) 
identified a paradox in traditional psychology and psychotherapy. On the 
one hand these foster individualism, free expression, and tolerance of 
dissent, but on the other they are reluctant to address morality and spiri-
tuality. Speaking of wholeness, they insist on parts; appreciating open-
ness, they stay partly closed; preferring to be accepting, they limit this 
acceptance; favoring tolerance, they exclude the most fundamental con-
cerns from it.11 Further, Bergin and Payne signaled a danger for a moral 
frame of reference that is not rooted in spirituality of religion. It is the 
danger of relativeness, opportunism, and a changeable prioritizing of 
values. This may prompt the risk that the psychotherapist uses defense 
mechanisms and self-justifications to reconcile questionable intentions 
and needs with occasional moral imperatives. 
Olthuis’s (1994a) evaluation of secular views of human life leaned 
heavily on Browning (1987), who gave a detailed account of life values 
and virtues behind the different psychologies.12 As Olthuis observed, 
Browning associated Freud with a culture of detachment, Skinner with a 
culture of control, and the humanistic psychologists with a culture of joy. 
 
11
  Be aware that this was written in 1991. Openness and carefulness in the ap-
proach of different views of life have been increasing since then. Cf. Fulford’s ap-
proach of psychotherapy as a negotiation of values (Fulford, Dickenson, & Mur-
ray, 2002). 
12
  Browning (1987; 2nd edition: Browning & Cooper, 2004), who is held to be a 
liberal, mainstream protestant theologian, released a study about the moral 
background of the dominating psychotherapeutic methods that surpassed a lot 
of contributions by orthodox Reformed and evangelical authors in accuracy, pro-
fundity, and completeness. He pictured modern psychologies as mixed disciplines 
which contain examples of religious, ethical, and scientific language. So, Freud’s 
implicit morality is one in which the only effective and relevant ultimate context 
of experience is determined by the drives of eros and death (Browning, 1987, p. 
43); humanistic psychologists can be characterized as non-hedonist ethical ego-
ists (Browning, 1987, p. 74), and the cognitive psychologist Albert Ellis as a long 
term hedonist ethical egoist (Browning & Cooper, 2004, p. 219). 
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Modern psychoanalysts Kohut and Erikson represented a culture of care, 
which has the most affinity with Christian thought. 
Johnson (1997) was critical of the values of relativism, individualism, 
and secularity that permeate modern thought and express themselves in 
psychology and therapy. For example he pointed to the humanistic psy-
chologist Maslow’s concept of self-actualization, in which the self is seen 
as the supreme, orienting principle in human life, occupying the rank that 
is due to relationship, especially the relationship with God. 
Referring to Lowe (1976), Reber (2006) delineated modern secular 
life as one in which people view psychologists as moral authorities who 
make moral pronouncements in the name of science, just as in former 
days the clergy was called upon for religious directives. One of these pro-
nouncements says: individual autonomy and self-fulfillment is right and 
good for people, thus reflecting ethical egoism. Similarly, Slife and 
Whoolery (2006) argued that behaviorists, many Freudians, humanists 
and cognitive behaviorists assume the pleasure principle and/or self-
interest as the predominant moral motives. 
The last example of a critical stance toward the secular approach to 
the meaning of being human is Brugger (2008), who criticized the ma-
terialist evolutionary account of the human person, in which human  
value is roughly equivalent to other forms of complex mammalian life 
with survival as its highest aim. 
 
Morality: Synthesis 
There was not only antithesis, however. In a contribution as a guest   
author, Browning (1992) analyzed several developmental theories and 
explores their possible benefits for the church. He identified various non-
moral or pre-moral goods or values that underlie the held moral goods. A 
clear example is Erikson, whose various developmental stages of trust, 
autonomy, initiative, industry, identity, and intimacy, can be seen as a 
hierarchy of non-moral goods that prepare and support the seventh 
stage, generativity, which can be viewed as a moral good. Correspond-
ingly, Maslow’s stages that lead to self-actualization (viz., nurture, safety, 
love, esteem) can be interpreted as an alternative list of developmental 
pre-moral goods, preparing and supporting the different moral norm of 
self-actualizing. 
Several attempts are made to integrate secular insights into a       
Christian view of being human. Clouse (1974) tried to utilize the         
psychoanalytical categories of Ego and Superego for describing a healthy       
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development of moral behavior. Carter (1974b) adopted the humanistic 
notion of self-actualization, and paralleled it with Christian maturation, 
contending that for non-Christians and Christians the process is parallel 
but the content is different. Motet (1978) suggested that Jesus addressed 
his audience in all six stages of Kohlberg’s moral development, from the 
assumed punishment–obedience orientation (lowest moral level) up to 
the universal ethical principle orientation (highest moral level). 
Another example of this is Roberts (1987), who sought to reveal      
the Christian counterparts of Albert Ellis’s virtues of equanimity, self-
acceptance, and sense of humor in his Rational Emotive Therapy. He in-
terpreted equanimity by appealing to pronouncements by the apostle 
Paul in some of his letters: giving thanks in all circumstances (1 Thessa-
lonians 5:18), having learned to be content in whatever state (Philippians 
4:11-12), being not crushed, although afflicted in every way (2 Corin-  
thians 4:8-9), not losing heart (2 Corinthians 4:16-18), and always being 
of good courage (2 Corinthians 5:6). Self-acceptance cannot imply the 
avoidance of all terms of self-evaluation, as Ellis stated, but he is right in 
rejecting excessive self-evaluation, however. Different from what he 
holds, there can certainly be reason for self-condemnation, but this does 
not have the last word. The importance of forgiveness, reconciliation, 
God’s love, and being a child of God may lead to a kind of Christian self-
acceptance. Humor remains largely implicit in the Bible, but is implied in 
God’s solving our fatal needs over against our extreme worrying about 
relatively tiny problems. 
A similar positive account was given by Galbreath (1991) about the 
many characteristics of self-actualization elaborated by Maslow. He 
traced Maslow’s differentiations back to Jesus’ attitude and behavior       
in the Gospels, to wit, acceptance, spontaneity and naturalness, prob-  
lem centering ability, need for privacy, autonomy, continued open-          
mindedness, peak experiences, sense of community, loving interpersonal 
relations, democratic character structure, discrimination between means 
and ends, mild sense of humor, creativeness, and transcendence. 
Watson, Milliron, Morris, and Hood (1995a) tried to make self-
actualization operational in a Christian translation of a humanistic self-
actualization scale. They recognized a possible cultural bias in standard 
psychological scales against Christians. Therefore, reformulations of the 
items can help to gain more reliable results. So, “I do not feel ashamed of 
any of my emotions” became “I believe that people are essentially good 
and can be trusted: God’s love and trust of me has taught me to love and 
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trust other people” and “I fear failure” was converted to “Although             
I am told that God loves and forgives me, I can’t help being afraid that          
I am a failure in living the Christian life correctly.” This enterprise    
shows the authors’ confidence in the usefulness of the concept of self-
actualization.13  
Spilka and Bridges (1989) admitted the importance of the role of self, 
and the need for meaning, control, and self-esteem as advanced by social 
psychology. Process, liberation, and feminist theologies are adduced as 
Christian testimonies that support these values. Myers (1996) adopted 
the secular interest in self-acceptance, and stated that grace is a key to 
self-acceptance. Leffel (2007) opposed a hedonic (pleasure based) ap-
proach of a good life to a eudemonic (maturity based; wise and balanced) 
approach. The latter focuses on meaning making, moral reasoning, self-
realization, and virtue acquisition. In this approach, preferred by the 
author, the issues of personal identity and the good life are intertwined. 
The construction of a personal narrative seems to be the appropriate way 
to situate one’s identity in some moral stance, an ideological setting 
which provides a perspective on the good. 
Roman Catholics Moncher and Titus (2009) were ambivalent on the 
secular psychological appeal to virtues. They welcomed the growing in-
terest in morality, for instance in positive psychology as proposed by 
Peterson and Seligman (2004), but at the same time they held Petersen 
and Seligman liable for refusing to provide a normative frame of refer-
ence and therefore susceptible to relativism. On the other hand Moncher 
and Titus showed some trust in the natural human potential to create 
decent frameworks of morality. Wright and Strawn (2010), too, com-
bined positive and critical approaches to contemporary psychotherapy. 
The positive side is the shift from an obsessive interest in pathology to 
the emphasis on relationality and existential issues, as for example put 
forward by Peter Shabad. The negative side, however, is that the moral 
assumptions remain concealed.  The only thing that can be said of them is 
that they are of an individual and emotivist (feel-good) character. Yet, 
more is needed than a relationship with an authentic therapist. Life 
 
13
  Their elaboration may raise concerns, however. The revised Christian version 
contains many composite items, where the original version has simple items. 
Composite items are ambiguous, because the response can focus on either con-
stituent part of the item. Moreover, the difference in length of the items may 
create a difference in response tendency. 
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should not only be founded on feelings and experience, which are fleeting 
and variable, but on a directive moral framework, preferably the one the 
Christian tradition provides. 
In all these attempts to show the compatibility of secular psychology 
and psychotherapy for Christian use, Christian theorists submitted argu-
ments to defend that secular psychology and psychotherapy have to be 
taken seriously, and can be employed successfully provided that in some 
respects the content should be Christianized. 
 
Morality: Original Christian Content 
Apart from their attitudes to current psychotherapeutic models and 
methods, and related to the biblical sources, authors thought of the moral 
standard human nature should respond to. Hereby they substantiated 
the claim that Christian morality should be applied in the context of psy-
chotherapy. 
This is why Prater (1982), echoing Karl Barth, stated: only in doing 
the will of God persons realize their ontological possibility, i.e., their des-
tiny as creatures of the seventh day. Olthuis (1994a, p. 47) gave a concise 
definition of the core meaning of being human: “Being human is be-
(com)ing an embodied, male/female connective self-as-agent, alienated, 
and thus needing reconnection, gifted and called by God to love.” Accord-
ing to Narramore and Carter (2000) we should be guided by the life of 
Christ as the most complete and healthy example of ideal human func-
tioning. This seems close to the statement by Brugger (2008), that hu-
mans are created as persons, to know all truth, especially about God, and 
to live in loving communion with God and other persons. 
In an interview, Pak (Yangarber-Hicks, et al., 2006) introduced the 
cultural factor. He appealed to the widely discussed difference between 
Western and Eastern cultural views of self, the former promoting indi-
vidualism, and the latter fostering interdependence. They represent two 
opposing value orientations with different accents, such as egalitarian 
versus hierarchical relationships, individual rights versus duties and 
responsibilities, assertiveness and self-expression versus respect for 
authority and obedience, and personal achievement versus group status. 
He linked both value systems to biblical standards, connecting the West-
ern approach with the first commandment, to love God, that requires 
individual centered choice and response, and the Eastern approach with 
the second commandment, to love the neighbor, that requires a relation-
ship centered interdependence. This approach is similar to the appeal 
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made by Majerus and Sandage (2010) to Johnson (2007a), although the 
argument differs. It says that the Word of God moves the believers, com-
munally, into an increasingly theocentric way of life that gradually comes 
to resemble, as individuals, the form of Christ, and, as a body, the com-
munion of the Trinity. 
 
Free Will and Responsibility 
Free will and responsibility are not completely new subjects, inasmuch 
they have many interfaces with the last two items, about soul and moral-
ity. Like these items, the championing of free will and responsibility 
served the argument for a Christian version of psychotherapy in which 
an appeal can be made to patients’ religious worldview choice. 
Skinner’s behaviorist denial of morality was related to his determin-
istic conception of operant conditioning. Over against Skinner’s rejection 
of human autonomy, Llewellyn (1973) adhered to the Scriptural notion 
of decision making as an important function of human personality. This 
does not imply, however, that humans are excessively autonomous; John 
8:34 teaches that everybody who commits sin is a slave of sin. Still, our 
responsibility before God and fellow humans is unimpaired. Hammes 
(1973) observed that Skinner’s environmental determinism implies that 
humans are not free. Skinner contested the traditional mentalist inter-
pretations of human behavior by recommending evolution as a deter-
mining cause. Wolterstorff (1984b) perceived determinism in much          
psychology, even in developmental theorists as Piaget and Kohlberg (the 
humanistic creator of a developmental model of moral awareness). 
Narramore (1985) did not want to confine responsibility to right ac-
tions and right thinking, but to extend it to one’s hidden inner wishes and 
feelings and sinful nature. He applied this principle to homosexuality; the 
homosexual has a responsibility to both behave according to biblical in-
structions, and set on a way to alter the underlying orientation that 
drives to sinful actions. He painted a positive picture of Freud who as-
sumed that inducing awareness of repressed sexual desires makes it 
possible to gain a mastery over them which the previous repression was 
unable to achieve. 
Jones (1989) raised a point of criticism, directed against Albert Ellis’s 
Rational Emotive Therapy. Ellis argued that no particular aspect of be-
havior can serve as a standard for judging the whole person because 
there is no whole person, that is, no coordinating and uniting responsible 
core to our selfhood, and cognitions should stop persons to find fault 
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with the self for doing unwise things. We should evaluate each part of our 
persons in isolation from the whole. Ellis, then, proved to hold an atomis-
tic view of the self. A central, evaluative conscience was denied.14 Olthuis 
(1994a), on the contrary, emphasized the self-as-agent, responsible, 
committed, and free. From a social psychology viewpoint Myers (1995) 
stated that we are both creatures and creators of our social worlds. He 
drew a parallel with the Christian conviction that although God is ulti-
mately in control, yet we are responsible. 
Hoffman and Strawn (2009) offered a psychoanalytical view of human 
freedom. Unconscious processes may limit the freedom of choice. So, 
irrational emotions and distorted perceptions of present and past reality 
may actualize irrational, immoral, destructive, and unloving choices. This 
process is accompanied by an inability to tolerate ambiguity and para-
dox, and leads to psychopathological reactions. The limitedness of free 
will is supported by cognitive neuroscience. Automatic behavior appears 
to be an important survival tool, inasmuch 95% of our behavior is deter-
mined by previous learning. Still, humans have the ability to direct their 
limited attention to previously unconscious aspects. And a well balanced 
mind is able to alternate between concern for self and concern for other. 
As we saw in the sub-section about body and soul, Moreland (1998) 
advocated a libertarian freedom, i.e., a contra-causal freedom able to act 
independently from determining causes. Physicalism, on the other hand, 
implies determinism. So, to Moreland, what we experience as the mind is 
not caused by neurobiological processes, because that would be incom-
patible with (contra-causal) freedom. 
Others, however, did defend a freedom that is compatible with deter-
minism. One of them was Hill (2005), who subscribed to Sperry (1988) 
as we saw in the just mentioned sub-section about body, soul, and spirit. 
Sperry intended to integrate free will with determinism, and tried to 
manage this by assuming not only a bottom up causation from neurobio-
logical processes to mental processes, but also a top down causation 
from the train of thought to the brain’s neuronal firing pattern. Analog-
ously, a chosen TV program controls the electron flow, while at the same 
time the electron flow causes the moving pictures on the TV, without 
however determining the choice of the TV program. In the same way, the 
 
14
  Browning & Cooper (2004) adopted Jones’s analysis. They conclude that Ellis 
assumes “a fragmented self, that seems less than a cohesive, responsible agent” 
(p. 226). 
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laws of biophysics and biochemistry are inadequate to account for the 
cognitive sequence of a train of thought, although they are an indis-
pensable condition for the train of thought to be realized. Sperry admit-
ted, however, that the analogy with the TV program cannot be carried too 
far, because the TV cannot choose a channel itself, while the brain can 
generate its own mental programs. He spoke of a paradox in which both 
causal reality and mental autonomy are preserved. He contended that 
freedom to will our actions as we wish, moral choice and responsibility 
are real. Yet none of these is uncaused. He pointed to innate value      
preferences inherent in the human cognitive structure that have been 
developed by evolutional mechanisms; they are part of nature’s genetic 
provisions for survival, and include a basic social conscience, which is 
deemed central to morality. Here the mind is traced to deterministic evo-
lutional causality. 
 
Sin and Pathology 
One remarkable trait in which Christian anthropology differs from secu-
lar views of being human is the assumption of human failure and sin 
against God’s purpose with humankind. Narramore (1973a) accused 
liberal counselors of rejecting Christian notions like sinfulness and feel-
ings of guilt and remorse, and of dismissing them as the result of inhibit-
ing upbringing which produced overdeveloped superegos. In line with 
this thought humans are supposed to need the refutation of guilt feelings 
rather than forgiveness. Carter (1974a), however, tried to delimit the 
consequences of the fall in sin. The non-Christian may actualize his full 
potential as a person made in God’s image but fallen, he asserts. The fall 
does restrict the potential and direction of self-actualization but does not 
prevent the person from becoming a good, healthy and kind person, since 
being created in the image of God is more fundamental than the fall in 
sin. At the same time he intends to not underestimate the impact of sin. 
He criticized the Biblical Counseling approach for reducing sin and pa-
thology merely to symptoms. The Biblical Counseling procedure focuses 
on doing, saying, and thinking the right and wrong things as taught by the 
Bible, instead of penetrating into the deeper needs (Carter, 1977). 
Sin and psychopathology were linked up by several authors. Wilson 
(1974) put self-orientation, sin, and suffering together. He argued that 
self-orientation is sin and therefore wrong. Moreover, all of humans’ 
problems and sufferings are related to their self-orientation, i.e., to their 
selfishness and pride. This attitude makes them vulnerable to anger,  
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jealousy, sorrow, fear, pain, and shame. Carter and Mohline (1976), on 
the other hand, did not assume a causal relationship but a relationship of 
similarity. Both sin and psychopathology express lowered functioning, 
loss of potential and/or inappropriate behavior. Wilder (1978) did deem 
the relationship between sin and psychopathology causal. The essential 
element in sin is pride, or the need for self-deification, and is opposed to 
healthy self-esteem. The same causal relationship was defended by    
Koteskey (1979c), who defined adjustment as being like God,15 and mal-
adjustment as being unlike God. Physical disorder, learned responses, 
underlying conflicts, sin, immaturity, or demon possession may result in 
maladjustment. Olthuis (1994a), in his overall characterization of being 
human, talked of our being alienated in the tragedy of sin and evil. This 
understanding of a life destroying power is reflected in the psychothera-
peutic attention to developmental stagnation, fixation, splitting, and 
breakdown. In passing, Narramore and Carter (2000) spoke about “sinful 
(or pathological) personality functioning” (p. 74), herewith more or less 
identifying sin and pathology. 
In an instructive article, Carter (1994) connected the symptom        
oriented approach by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) with the notion of a universal negative human condition. 
He distinguished three streams of psychological theorizing about psy-
chopathology: two etiological explanations and a non-etiological one. The 
etiological explanations are the view of innate causation in psychody-
namics, and the view of acquired causation, advocated by humanistic  
and existential thinkers, as well as object relations and interpersonal 
theorists.16 Innate causation refers to primary narcissism, striving for  
superiority, overcoming inferiority, and the death instinct. Acquired cau-
sation refers to the split or incongruence because of a conflict between 
the innate valuing process and acquired behavior to protect the self 
against an unsafe environment. The innate psychoanalytical perspective 
is most similar to the theological concept of original sin. The acquired 
perspective, on the other hand, is similar to the effects of original sin. The 
third perspective, however, is the symptom oriented approach apart 
 
15
  Not in the meaning of “being in the same position as God” but “being in line with 
God.” 
16
  I would argue, on the other hand, that all psychodynamic approaches, including 
psychoanalytical, object relations and interpersonal approaches, adopt both in-
nate and acquired causation. The humanistic approach may indeed be limited to 
the assumption of acquired causation. 
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from any etiological understanding, and is found in behavioristic ap-
proaches.17 The latter way of classifying psychopathology is also the pol-
icy of the DSM manuals since 1980. It would be incorrect to characterize 
this approach as a-theoretical because preference for a descriptive     
phenotypical approach, disregarding the genotypes, is itself a theoretical 
position. In it, statistical empiricism comes instead of deeper universal 
understanding. So, it precludes the assumption of universal sin and its 
permeation in all behavior. Sixteen years later, Davis and Strawn (2010) 
reviewed the psychodynamic pendant of the DSM: the Psychodynamic 
Diagnostic Manual (PDM) that opts for a holistic and dialectic view of 
persons as auton-omous and relational, self-referential and other-
referential, unique and communal. PDM, by affirming the pervasive reach 
of psychopathology, parallels an orthodox Christian view of the pervasive 
reach of sin. 
Obviously, these reflections on sin and pathology served to demon-
strate both the relevance of much psychotherapy, and its need for Chris-
tian adaptation. 
 
Original Sin 
Apart from the relationship between sin and pathology, some authors 
drew attention to humans’ sinful condition as such. Myers (1995, 1996) 
paralleled the self-serving bias, that is, the praising of oneself for success, 
and the blaming of others or the circumstances for failure, with pride as 
the fundamental sin. 
Vitz and Gartner (1984) argued that the oedipal complex is a fairly apt 
characterization of original sin. In psychoanalytical theory, the oedipal 
crisis consists of the son’s envy toward his father as the rival lover of his 
mother. This rivalry with the father is projected onto God. Just like the 
son rebels against his father and tries to replace him, original sin is rebel-
lion against God and an attempt to replace Him. The authors asserted 
that the oedipal complex is not applicable to all humanity, and neither is 
its connection with original sin, but they do maintain that this kind of 
motivation characterizes many people, especially in modern Western 
society. 
 
17
  This analysis seems somewhat problematic, because behaviorism focuses on 
reinforcement, which points to acquired causation. Yet, Carter’s observation is 
true for some behavior techniques, like desensitization.  
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Bridgment and Carter (1989), however, linked the concept of original 
sin with the pre-oedipal drive toward omnipotence that arises from the 
infant state of primary narcissism. This position can be appreciated as an 
attempt to localize original sin as early as possible in human life, conform 
the traditional dogma of the church. On the other hand, in spite of this 
obvious chronological similarity, Greenlee (1986) drew an analogy be-
tween the original innocence attributed to the pre-fall condition, and 
Kohut’s undisturbed primary narcissistic equilibrium in the infant. The 
awareness of sin originates at the point of a heightened sense of narcis-
sistic vulnerability where people experience shame and a fragmentation 
of the self, paralleled by Adam and Eve’s shame about their nakedness 
after their disobedience, being cut off from the perfect self-object: God 
(Genesis 3). 
Vitz and Mango (1997) drew another parallel with psychodynamic 
theory, thinking about the function of hatred in the framework of object 
relations as developed by Melanie Klein and Otto Kernberg. Hatred was 
understood as an extreme resistance to change, and explained as a de-
fense against narcissistic injury. It protects the ego against a depressing, 
humiliating or inadequate past, and defends one’s unrealistic ego ideals 
and moral pride, permitting the pleasures of moral superiority. Hoffman 
(2010) referred to Klein’s picture of the envious and destructive infant to 
support the Christian narrative of original sin.18 Klein appealed to 
Freud’s death instinct as one of the two predominant drives, along with 
the lust principle, in human life. Not simply because of environmental 
failure but because of its innate capacity for destructiveness, the infant 
attacks the breast and the goodness of the mother represented by it. This 
basic destructiveness and envy contributes to the infant’s difficulties in 
building up his or her relationship with the good object, the mother.  
Later, Winnicott moderated the concept of this innate destructiveness 
however, and attributed the infant’s negative reactions to deficient pa-
rental care. Hoffman’s implicit criticism against Winnicott was uttered 
explicitly by Wolterstorff (1984b), who viewed the assumption that   
humans are inherently good as one of the main problems with much       
 
18
  An earlier appeal to Klein’s Envy and Gratitude was made by Sorenson (1996b), 
who favored personal integration (instead of conceptual integration), and re-
ferred to Klein to emphasize the importance of gratitude as the psychological 
correlate to grace. Meanwhile he cited her judgment about envy as the worst of 
the deadly sins. Envy is not only against one virtue but against all virtues and 
against all goodness. 
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contemporary psychology. Similarly, Brugger (2008) denounced the ma-
terialist assumption that humans are neither fallen nor non-fallen. 
The various explanations of original sin in psychological terms reveal 
a desire to demonstrate both the psychological significance of this doc-
trinal concept, and actual relevance of psychological and psychodynamic 
interpretations of the initial human state. 
 
Sin, Guilt, Sorrow, and Shame 
A remarkable line of thought ran from 1974 up to 2011. Bruce Narra-
more (1974a) initiated the debate by distinguishing between neurotic 
guilt and genuine regret, later on called “constructive sorrow” (Narra-
more, 1974d). Neurotic guilt is rooted in the punitive self that originates 
in a deficient upbringing and is characterized by a deep seated feeling of 
self-devaluation due to one’s felt weakness and inadequacy (Narramore, 
1974a). Together with sin it is involved in all pathology (Narramore, 
1974b). He equated it with the worldly grief or sorrow mentioned in 2 
Corinthians 7:8-10. Because believers share in the righteousness of 
Christ, he concludes that guilt feelings should have no place in the Chris-
tian life (Narramore, 1974c). On the other hand, constructive sorrow, a 
term also inferred from 2 Corinthians 7:8-10, is rooted in the disciplinary 
self that is not so much troubled by punishment, rejection, and dises-
teem, but concerned with loving self-acceptance, awareness of the conse-
quences of misbehavior, and constructive reasoning (Narramore, 1974a, 
1974d). Unlike negative guilt, positive sorrow can flourish in interper-
sonal relationships characterized by unconditional acceptance and mu-
tual regard, and may produce constructive change (Narramore, 1974c, 
1974d). 
Watson, Hood, Morris, and Hall (1985) referred to Narramore’s 
(1984) distinction between guilt feelings and constructive or godly sor-
row in their experimental attempt to find a way out of the dilemma of 
how to integrate biblical beliefs about sin with psychological notions 
associating positive self-regard with mental health. How can self-esteem 
be established when the self is flawed by the sin of pride? Stated more 
briefly, how can self-esteem be discerned from pride? Narramore’s dis-
tinction was supposed to be helpful to separate negative self-evaluation 
from positive desire to change in favor of the offended person and     
one’s relationship with God. In a research article, Bassett, Hill, Pogel,              
Lee, Hughes, and Masci (1990) concluded on the basis of two studies           
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conducted among college students that the respondents were fairly able 
to distinguish between guilt and godly sorrow. 
However, the adequacy of the definitions remained a moot point, as 
other studies showed. Hill and Hall (2002), for instance, explored the 
literature and revealed a distinction between exchange relationships and 
communal relationships. In the former, the main motive is maintaining 
equity, while in the latter partners do things to benefit each other with-
out necessarily expecting benefits in return. In this context a sense of 
interpersonal guilt is interpreted, not within the context of an exchange 
but in a communal relationship, while the authors assumed that guilt 
may be a primary enforcer of the communal norms of mutual concern 
and protect close bonds. Narramore’s distinction between guilt and godly 
sorrow seems to parallel the distinction between exchange and commu-
nal relationship, interpreting guilt inversely compared with Hill and 
Hall’s interpretation. Riek (2010) joined the main part of the literature as 
represented by Hill and Hall (2002), assuming that guilt is an inter-
personal emotion, acting as a mechanism by which relationships are 
maintained and repaired, an assumption that he examined empirically. 
Eventually, in their research study Bassett et al. (2011) chose the terms 
shame and guilt to name the difference between egocentrism and low 
self-esteem on the one hand, and concern about harm done to someone 
else, on the other, and equated Narramore’s guilt concept with shame. 
Apart from the empirical studies mentioned thus far, there are others 
about sin and guilt, relating this variable to self-forgiveness (Meek, Al-
bright, & McMinn, 1995; McConell & Dixon, 2012), religiosity and stress 
(Forman & Malony, 1986), and the relieving effects of confession (McCor-
mick & McMinn, 2012). These studies paid more attention to relational 
guilt than to psychic guilt feelings. 
The profit of this discussion among Christian theorists and re-   
searchers about guilt is the insight that there is a guilt factor that        
transcends psychological dimensions (guilt feelings), and is part of a          
relational reality. Anyway, for therapy this insight has the implication to 
not restrict the focus to the individual but expand it to his/her personal 
relationships. 
 
Renewal 
If, in Christian terms, psychopathology is interwoven with sin, then    
recovery is connected with restoration from sin, and with renewal in     
accordance with God’s design for our lives. Carter (1974b) deemed       
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the self-actualization process with Christians to be similar to the self-
actualization process described by secular psychologists, only the con-
tent is different. The Christian self-actualization process consists of    
salvation, sanctification, and glorification, and can be described in terms 
like congruence and maturity, if only these are interpreted in a Christian 
sense. Carter (1977) criticized, as we saw, biblical counseling for super-
ficially limiting itself to doing, saying, and thinking, and thus tending to 
become a symptoms removal or works sanctification, neglecting inner 
feelings.19 Oakland (1974), as well, equated the psychological concept of 
self-actualization with the theological concept of sanctification, and typ-
ified these kindred concepts as a long term growth process in the indi-
vidual. Bailey (1975) asked how the Christian concept of self-denial can 
be compatible with the humanistic concept of self-fulfillment. He looked 
for the solution in relating self-fulfillment with outside-the-self commit-
ments and concerns, as Maslow did, instead of focusing on a richer life 
experience. Clark (1990) raised the same question. How can self-denial 
go together with a positive self-concept? His answer was that self-denial 
refers to the selfish dimensions of fallen human personalities. Therefore, 
self-denial is consistent with having a positive concept of the self as it is 
created, loved, and meant by God. 
Hamon (1977) was somewhat more critical. Christian renewal does 
not run parallel with self-actualization, but goes beyond self-actualiza-
tion. It is an acceptance of self in Christ that transcends self-actualization, 
and that may result in martyrdom. Ingram (1995) advocated a “bibli-
cal/scientific humanism’” (p. 12) that aims at integrating the best of bib-
lical and secular truth to enhance understanding of redeemed, regenerate 
creatures in Christ. Unfortunately, the article did not contribute substan-
tially to this project itself, however. Coe (1999) seemed to meet this de-
sideratum, supporting a pneumatic dynamic approach to personality, 
psychopathology, and health, open to the movements of the Holy Spirit 
within human dynamics. This approach does not only focus on the rela-
tionality of the self, as some secular psychologies do, but also on the   
union with God. Olthuis (1994a) formulated somewhat more cautiously 
and conservatively, defining the core meaning of being human as a way 
of becoming more human: being human is becoming a person, initially 
 
19
  This cannot be said to be true for Biblical Counseling in its later developments. Cf. 
for instance Lane (2006). 
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being alienated and thus needing reconnection, gifted and called by God 
to love. 
Another attempt to identify the proper Christian character of mean-
ingful human life relates renewal to a model of health. According to 
McMinn and McRae (1997) health is not only the absence of pathological 
symptoms but, interpreted in a Christian fashion, the presence of hope 
and inner peace in a healing relationship with God, in which we have to 
move beyond the myth of self-sufficiency, and yield control of our lives to 
God. 
The attempt by Paul (1999) to render spiritual renewal in psychologi-
cal language is different again. He described Christian conversion in 
terms of object relationship with Jesus, and emphasizes the foundational 
role Christ plays in identity development. Narramore and Carter (2000) 
defended that Christ and the Holy Spirit have effect on Christian believers 
and their psychologies. The notion that the body of Christ, the church, is 
to function in such a way that its members will grow into increased 
Christ likeness, and thus will be sanctified, should be part of integrative 
psychological theory. In addition, Carson, Paolini, Ziglear, and Fox (2009) 
conceptualized the unconverted subconsciousness as subconscious parts 
of the self that need to be externalized in order to recover from being 
damaged. 
These efforts to articulate a specific Christian concept of renewal im-
ply that therapeutic goals should be formulated in terms of spiritual 
change and growth. 
 
 
3.3 Other Influences 
 
Introduction 
In the previous sub-section about biblical basics of Christian anthropol-
ogy, we noticed that authors attempted to connect the pictures inferred 
from the Bible with concepts developed and defended by secular theo-
rists. We were faced with many appeals to the relationality of human 
nature as it is advocated by the object relations approach. The attach-
ment theory was employed to explain the relationship with God. Descrip-
tions of the soul borrowed from secular ideas of the self, mind, and     
consciousness. Morality is defined in terms of meaning of life, and has 
been related to virtue ethics. These ideas and concepts have been devel-
oped by social philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. 
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Humanistic values like self-acceptance, self-actualization, and self-
fulfillment have been criticized, but also adopted with due amendments. 
We noted the concepts of identity and identity development which are 
popular since Erikson. Notions like the unconscious, repression, the Oe-
dipus complex, primary and secondary narcissism, lust drive, and death 
instinct, have been adopted from psychoanalytical theories. The self-
serving bias has been appraised as an affirmation of the human sin of 
pride. Sin and psychopathology have been paralleled in their pervasive 
reach. The humanistic values of unconditional acceptance, congruence, 
and maturity have been integrated in Christian language. Many other 
influences have already been identified as I surveyed the presentations of 
biblically justified anthropologies. 
Besides these secular influences connected with and integrated in bib-
lical views, there were other reflections that utilized cultural insights in 
human nature without attaching them explicitly to biblical notions. These 
insights stem from Jewish, Christian, or otherwise theistic philosophers. 
In the present section we pay attention to these inputs that contributed 
to the Christian understanding of humanity within the Christian integra-
tion debate. 
Beforehand, we have to consider in which sequence the data will be 
presented. The character of our inquiry seems to favor the chronological 
order of publication of studies about these influences, for our main inter-
est is in the processing of data and theories by Christian psychiatrists, 
psychologists, psychotherapists, and theologians. On the other hand, the 
materials processed have their own order of interdependency and, more-
over, these influences left their own traces in Christian and also non-
Christian approaches and presentations rather autonomously and even 
without explicit referral. This implies that influences may already have 
been at work before being fully analyzed. For the sake of tracing and un-
derstanding the impact of certain views and approaches, a historical or-
der of development seems to be preferable. For that reason we choose 
the historical sequence of the data. We distinguish the contributions by 
Kierkegaard, Buber and Levinas, Ernest Becker, and the narrative ap-
proach, as the main influences not yet identified in the accounts of the 
biblically oriented anthropologies of the previous section, and we pre-
sent them as they are reflected on by the participants of the integration 
debate. 
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Kierkegaard 
The attractiveness of Kierkegaard’s appeal lies in the immense influence 
it exerts both in non-Christian and Christian thoughts. This is related to 
the central significance of his teachings in the shift of attention from ob-
jective theorizing to human subjectivity. Interest in his message by or-
thodox Christians was exhibited in a monograph and collected essays by 
Evans (1990, 2006), and in some articles published in the journals under 
scrutiny (Watkin, 1998; Podmore, 2009; cf. Tietjen, & Evans, 2011), all 
focusing on the self. However, these were not the first studies dedicated 
to the 19th century Danish philosopher. Sobosan (1975) noticed Kierke-
gaard’s analyses of the finite and infinite components of the self, despair, 
man’s becoming in time, and God as an effective Power. Without giving 
any historical background he paralleled these elements with particulars 
in Carl Jung’s psychological theory, like the ego, the collective conscious 
and the collective unconscious.20 Teschner (1977) drew attention to the 
value Kierkegaard attached to our theological identity. Confronted with 
one’s conditioned and finite existence, the individual may end in despair. 
Only by living on intimate terms with God one can find happiness. One 
has to risk everything for an unknown with supreme importance. One 
fails to relate to this possibility by identifying too closely with the famil-
iar and the ordinary. The attribution of infinite value to the indifferent 
may result in pathology. Although Teschner revealed some important 
notions, he ignored the central significance of the self. The following ren-
derings do emphasize the self’s central function. 
Watkin (1998) reflected on Kierkegaard’s suggestion that the human 
self is a relation relating to itself (Kierkegaard, 1849/1983). His under-
standing of the self can be viewed in terms of dynamic process and goals, 
which is of special interest for psychologists and psychotherapists. The 
functioning of the psyche was viewed in terms of the purposes for which 
we live. He distinguished the actual self and the ideal self, the latter being 
both outside individuals as the image to grow toward, and within them, 
because it is they themselves. The ideal self was presented as a spiritual 
being, living in relationship with God. For Kierkegaard the spiritual di-
mension was a fundamental feature of human nature. The human is a 
self-transcending being. He made room for an authentically spiritual un-
derstanding of the self. There is a duality in human nature, a godlike and 
 
20
  This equation seems to detract from Kierkegaard’s specific message. 
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a beastlike tendency, contrasting like ideals and drives. The ideal self 
seeks after God, the inauthentic self seeks to be God and master of its 
own existence. In this alternative there is the possibility of freedom, and 
this freedom, in turn, creates anxiety and despair, because of the failure 
to develop a proper relationship to the eternal. The self can be swallowed 
up by the infinite sufferings in the world, and be absorbed by the finitude 
of purely temporal values. A truly balanced personality can only develop 
by centering one’s life on the eternal. 
Podmore (2009) added some perspective to the given sketch by delv-
ing deeper into the resistance against authentic selfhood and the despair 
caused by the discovery of the impairment due to this resistance. Like 
Watkin, he was focused on the self, and appreciated Kierkegaard’s think-
ing about the self as a very fruitful idea in the areas of psychotherapy and 
counseling. The self has to become disclosed to itself. The only way to 
this self-disclosure is in the relation to a transcendent Other. However, 
humans are on the run from themselves, because of despair about the 
sense of unworthiness in the confrontation with their inauthentic selves. 
This inauthentic selfhood consists of dissolving one’s identity within the 
amorphous inauthenticity of the crowd and of deceiving oneself that 
nothing is wrong. The flight can express itself in the seeking to create an 
“infinitized” self, a fantasized, hubristic self, trying to behave as its own 
master, and forsaking the relational call of the other. In order to restore 
the authentic self, humans have to receive and accept God’s forgiveness, 
but to be able to do so, they have to encounter themselves in their im-
proper way of maintaining their isolated control. The truth about oneself 
can lead to despair over sin and to despair over the forgiveness of sin. By 
accepting forgiveness humans abandon their self-oriented subterfuge to 
hold on to their narcissistic existence. This forgiveness, ensuing from the 
divine Other, transcends the self’s introspective capacities for self-
diagnosis and even despair. So, at an existential level Kierkegaard un-
masked the self-enclosed self, and indicated the open relationship with 
God as the essential factor in the real self. 
In these renderings, several aspects of Kierkegaard’s anthropological 
view were advanced. (1) Human subjectivity was highlighted, and ex-
plored as a reflexive self: the self is related to itself, and is moving itself 
into some direction. (2) The self is related to God, the transcendent    
Other. (3) Humans resist their authentic selves strongly, warding off  
anxiety and despair about their inauthentic selves. (4) Yet they are free 
to answer God’s calling to give up their resistance and surrender to Him. 
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(5) Recognition of God’s call leads to the facing of the inauthentic self, 
reveals guilt, and evokes anxiety and despair, but may lead to forgiveness 
and the realization of the authentic self. All these dimensions were put 
forward by theorists in order to have them permeate the content of psy-
chotherapy. 
 
Buber and Levinas 
Jewish philosopher Martin Buber received explicit attention from Watson 
(2006), who characterized his philosophy as dialogical philosophy. He 
appraised Buber’s famous book I and Thou (first German edition in 1923) 
as a clear articulation of orthodox Jewish anthropology, and as a mile-
stone in our understanding of the relational nature of humanity. Buber 
defined the self in terms of relationship, and opposed the related self to 
the severed I. The self engages in two kinds of relationships: the I–Thou 
and the I–It relationship, of which the former is fundamental. It has two 
dimensions, to wit, the dialogical encounter of two people in mutuality 
and reciprocal love, and the dialogical meeting with the eternal Thou. 
The relationship with God is made possible by Himself, as He enters into 
a direct relation with humans in creative, revealing and redeeming acts. 
The importance of the I–Thou relationship does not prejudice the I–It 
relationship, however. This relation is based on the principles of logical 
positivism, like objectivity, determinism, abstractive contemplation, and 
a utilitarian approach to the other. Philosophy itself is the highest ex-
pression of the I–It attitude. This attitude is relevant to everyday life as 
well. What is wrong is its overwhelming predominance in modern tech-
nocratic society. This predominance results in alienation of the other. 
This was Buber’s crucial objection against Freud’s psychoanalytic meth-
od. In it, the other person is viewed as an object to be analyzed, and the 
personal relationship is ignored. 
For the same reason, Buber rejected Freud’s conception of guilt as a 
neurosis born from social and parental taboos. Buber did recognize the 
existence of neurotic guilt but argued for the importance of existential 
guilt, which originates in the violation of inter human relationships. As 
individuals are always guilty in relation to others, an important question 
is how to overcome existential guilt. It can be overcome by illuminating 
the guilt, by persevering in that illumination, and by the repair of the 
injured order of existence. This final step allows for reconciliation with 
other persons and in turn to God, who is the ground of the I–Thou rela-
tion. 
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In the same issue, Barsness (2006) dwelled a moment upon the na-
ture of the relationship between the two dimensions of the I–Thou atti-
tude proposed by Buber. In some way the two dimensions merge. God is 
present in the interhuman encounter. When I meet you, I meet Him. Con-
versely, as soon as I look away from you, I ignore Him. I deny God as long 
as I merely experience or use you. God exceeds our rational comprehen-
sion, but He is also wholly present as He is experienced only in the rela-
tion to another. 
The philosophy of another Jewish thinker, Emmanuel Levinas, has 
some resemblance but also differences. Dueck and Parsons (2004) ap-
pealed to him as an advocate of the postmodern attitude that focuses on 
the unique and denounces the modern pretension of mastering universal, 
objective truth by autonomous, expressive selves. Levinas (1961/1969) 
argued that the face of the other is so unique that it cannot be reduced to 
totalizing, ontic categories. Doing justice to the other is incompatible with 
reducing the person to what is universal, neutral, or objective. In the 
same way, ontological descriptions of God fall short. God is mystery, 
which is other than being.21 All ontological definitions of the self are con-
taminated. The call of the other in the context of a face-to-face encounter 
makes a demand on the self and constitutes personal identity. In its brev-
ity, this rendering of Levinas’s thinking appears to be accurate; it demon-
strates the dubiousness, however, of characterizing it as a postmodern 
attitude. The demand on the self by the other is a kind of heteronomy 
that does not fit well in postmodernism, in which the moral norm is   
rather derived from the definition of the self. 
Levinas agreed with Buber in his emphasis on the encounter with the 
other that cannot be adapted to fit in with the demands of one’s own 
interests and life patterns. The other is beyond the I or the self and 
makes an appeal to me. I have to transcend my own territory to meet the 
other. On other points, however, it has become clear that Levinas op-
posed Buber. First, for Buber the I–Thou relationship is reciprocal and 
mutual, while for Levinas I am appealed to by the Other, not the other 
way round; it is just one way traffic.22 Second, while to Levinas every 
 
21
  This makes it dubitable whether Levinas can be regarded as a theistic philos-
opher, as is suggested in the introduction of this section. 
22
  In line with Levinas, Rosenstock-Huessy (1958) criticized Buber for this mutuality 
over against the priority of our being in the second person: we are addressed be-
fore we answer. 
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objective formulation about someone’s characteristics was suspect,   
Buber did allow for I–it relations as being relevant to everyday life. 
 
Becker 
In 1973 Becker released a book that attracted much attention and won 
the prestigious Pulitzer Prize, The Denial of Death. The title indicates the 
main statement of the discourse. Hartz (1980) was the first participant in 
the integration debate to reflect on its message. Humans feel the constant 
need to defend against their own finitude, their fear of death, and their 
anxiety about the chaotic world around them. To ward off this anxiety, 
people use two defense mechanisms: repression from consciousness, and 
self-absorption or narcissism. Repression is inevitable to function ad-
equately without constant fear, narcissism is neurotic. Confronting our 
finite limitations we develop infinite aspirations, we seek to self-actualize 
in ways that fulfill conditions of heroism and relieve doubts, often caused 
by death fears, about our initial self-esteem, aiming at self-deification. 
Becker equated this heroism with pride, the root of all sins. The healthy 
person, on the other hand, transcends the self by relating oneself to the 
Ultimate Power, a living God. Different from Becker, Hartz argued that a 
finite, self-deifying worldview is as good as a transcendent one in pre-
venting psychopathology. On this point, Rambo (1980) contested the 
separation Hartz made between psychological or mental health and exis-
tential health or spiritual maturity. To him, there is more coherence be-
tween these two, as our pathologies distort our view of God. 
Prater (1982) referred shortly to Becker, summarizing his message: 
As a consequence of the ambiguity of their existence, humans are born 
into a state of anxiety. In their efforts to escape this anxiety, they can 
choose to deal with it neurotically, that is, to avoid being their true selves, 
or non-neurotically, that is, to become authentic. Aden (1984) dedicated 
a complete article to Becker, to present his theory as a model for pastoral 
care. Aden, too, identified the fear of death as the core motive of human 
life in Becker’s account. The defense against this fear is repression and 
self-inflation. Self-inflation is pictured as the root cause of human evil. 
Therefore we should not only be comforted, but also confronted with our 
own self-centered attempt to secure life. In the paralyzing conflict be-
tween our being creatures and our transcendence, our being nature and 
spirit, we should transcend our egoistic attempts to become immortal 
and center our life in a God beyond the finite world. 
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In these renderings of Becker’s insights, we recognize much of what 
Kierkegaard has put forward. This is not to deny that other influences, 
too, were constitutive for Becker, like the major influence of Otto Rank, as 
he himself frankly acknowledged. But the impact of Kierkegaard is cer-
tainly there. Between the reviews of Kierkegaard and Becker I observe 
one major difference in content, however.  While Kierkegaard saw differ-
ent possibilities to avoid one’s authentic identity, Becker focuses on one. 
Kierkegaard related the reluctance to be oneself not merely to the effort 
to create an imagined hubristic self but also to the inclination to dissolve 
one’s identity within the crowd, while Becker restricted himself to the 
former option. Furthermore, I notice a formal difference in that Becker’s 
analyses lack the sharp edges, desperate predicaments, and complex 
states of mind that accompany Kierkegaard’s accounts, at least as far as 
the surveys reveal. 
 
Aftereffects 
The turn to subjectivity as enacted by Kierkegaard and others leaves its 
tracks in psychology, including Christian oriented psychology, often 
without any explicit account. With Christian psychologists, these tracks 
may run directly from the sources as they are revealed in the previous 
sub-sections, and they may derive indirectly via psychological theories 
that have been inspired by these sources themselves, or by the mental 
climate that they created and/or by which they have been fostered.23 I 
present some notable examples. 
Vande Kemp (1996) appealed to Tillich to underline that our souls 
and personhood perish when we lose touch with our basic relational 
nature, and the transpersonal world. Tillich (1952) interpreted human 
anxieties as a response to three pairs of existential terrors: the ontic ter-
rors of fate and death, the spiritual terrors of emptiness and loss of 
meaning, and the moral terror of guilt and condemnation. She welcomed 
the attention paid to object relations theory and inter-subjective theory 
by Christian psychologists as a warrant that our psychology will be           
a psychology of persons. McMinn and McRay (1997), too, viewed the    
 
23
  That someone’s influence is also determined by the mental climate in which 
his/her thoughts are received can be illustrated with Kierkegaard, who died in 
1855 but whose fame grew tremendously in the 1930s along with the rise of exis-
tentialism. Obviously, the times need to be ripe for the reception of some ideas. 
Conversely, from that point onward these ideas may fertilize further develop-
ments. 
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human person in its fundamental dimensions. Mental health is more than 
the absence of psychopathological symptoms, and the central human 
problem is much more pervasive than a psychiatric diagnosis can cap-
ture. Sickness is a part of human nature. Therefore, an awareness of per-
sonal need and brokenness is a prerequisite to healing. Inner peace can 
never come through personal efforts alone, but only by yielding control 
of one’s life to God. 
Olthuis (2006) presented a Reflexive Self Model that reminds us of 
Kierkegaard.24 He distinguished three dimensions of human personhood: 
me, myself, and I, or, the adaptive self, the authentic self, and the agent 
self, respectively. The agent self (I) is continuously called to choose 
whether to play a desired role (me) or to work for change and healing 
(myself). The model gives these dimensions their own place and simulta-
neously allows them to overlap, coalesce, enmesh, or split off, as the case 
may be. The latter constitution is the starting point for Bland (2009) to 
explore the divided self. Hidden and revealed parts of the self will conflict 
as soon as undesirable compulsions and behavioral tendencies cannot be 
kept in control, which leads to frustration and stagnation of self-
development. Courage and grace are identified as conditional virtues for 
self-integration. 
Barsness (2006) focused on surrender and self-transcendence. He 
qualified the nature of our being as other driven and other seeking, 
which characterizes our search for meaning. Basically, the search for the 
other is the search for a relationship with the One existing beyond the 
self, that is, for the holy. We are achieving our existential purpose when 
the contrived self is free to release itself of pretense and defense, to offer 
itself to the unknown, and to accept the risk of losing itself for something 
more. In spite of the often dangerous affective dynamics, the intimacy of 
the I–Thou encounter sustains persons in their search for the mystery of 
God. The notion of transcendence presupposes the centrality of human 
relatedness. 
 
Narrative Approach 
In line with the turn to subjectivity, but supplied with additional perspec-
tives, the narrative approach renders account of personal self and ident-
ity in a specific way. Dueck and Parsons (2004) classified the narrative 
 
24
  It also reminds us of the object relations approach by Fairbairn and Winnicott, 
who seem to be indebted to Kierkegaard on this point, too. 
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approach to as a postmodern view of life because it does not focus on 
general regularities and rules, as modernism does, but on the unique 
perception of personal experiences. In order to illustrate the difference, I 
contrast some articles from distinct authors. 
In a paper about personal identity and creative self-understanding, 
Conn (1977) opted for a creative, self-transcending subjectivity model of 
the human person. Moreover, he appealed to Piaget and Erikson to clarify 
the cognitive and affective roots of the self-transcending subject. The 
similarity between Piaget and Erikson, besides many differences, lies in 
their periodization of human development. At the end of one develop-
mental period humans have to cross a border and transcend their limita-
tions up to then. Both picture a development in which persons end up 
with integrating their thoughts and feelings about themselves into a total 
life perspective which expands beyond personal interest to the whole of 
mankind. What is going on here? Conn connected the concept of subjec-
tivity with a typical modern account of human development. Both Piaget 
and Erikson formulated universal stages of development that all humans 
are supposed to more or less complete. The general rule provides the 
framework for interpreting identity. 
Conversely, Ganzevoort (1998), distanced himself from a normative 
account of identity development in which identity is viewed as something 
to be obtained, and advocated a retrospective view of development. That 
is, identity development should not be seen as a process toward a certain 
fixed goal, but as the continuous reconstruction of goals. The former ap-
proach is related to a standard design of identity development, the latter 
to the unique story the subject, who is both the hero and the author of 
the story, constructs and reconstructs. The problem with developmental 
theories is that the impacts of social contexts, coping processes, and re-
ligion are precluded. However, identity should be seen as the continuous 
formulation and reformulation of how the person wants to be in the eyes 
of self and others. In this process, social context, coping, and religion in 
mutual dependence are inextricable. In another article, Ganzevoort 
(1993) defined a story as a way of interpreting facts of life. Human life 
should be seen as a process of interpreting and ordering the world of 
experience in images or stories. Understanding people’s life story is un-
derstanding the meaning they attribute to their experiences, reactions, 
and initiatives. 
The importance of our narratives was furnished with a neurobiologi-
cal juncture by Hall. As he derived from literature, we are hardwired for 
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two fundamentally distinct forms of knowing, the explicit and the implicit 
way, leading to cold and warm knowledge, respectively. Explicit knowl-
edge is processed in the prefrontal, mainly left cortex, but the processing 
of implicit knowledge occurs in the right hemisphere, which has exten-
sive connections with limbic and subcortical regions. This implicit 
knowledge comprises emotional information, and the interpretation of 
nonverbal communication and social relationships (Hall, 2004). This 
implicit knowledge is carried in our bodies, emotions, and stories. So, the 
narrative mode of knowing, being concerned with human wants, needs, 
and goals, operates in the implicit relational knowing system. It has to do 
with meaning, which derives from relationality, and therefore touches 
our fundamental sense of self-in-relationship (Hall, 2007). 
The narrative approach turned out to open new perspectives on psy-
chotherapy, particularly in providing opportunities to give meaning to 
life events, in a Christian setting even to give meaning in the light of God’s 
intentions with his human creatures. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The inquiry in this chapter resulted in the following outcomes. First, the 
classical theological notions about anthropology have been preserved, 
such as being created in the image of God, human soul, morality, respon-
sibility, universal sin, and renewal. However, these notions were often 
interpreted with the help of psychological insights. For instance, the soul 
has been defined with the help of the concept of the self, though not ab-
sorbed by this notion; renewal and Christian maturity were explained in 
terms of self-actualization; the pervasive reach of sin was paralleled with 
the pervasive reach of psychopathology; the enslaved will of the wicked 
was related to irrational emotions and distorted perceptions; the sin of 
pride was paralleled by the self-serving bias in attributions; original sin 
was put in line with primary narcissism or the oedipal complex; hatred 
was explained as defense against narcissistic injury; and the relationship 
with God was interpreted with the help of the attachment theory. 
Second, the move to subjectivity and relationality that was prepared 
and announced by Kierkegaard, has been followed by Christian psychol-
ogists, maybe even more consequently than by their secular colleagues. 
In conformity with theological interpretation, the human creation in the 
image of God was understood as the relational nature of humanity.     
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Accordingly, morality was often interpreted within socio-historic and 
social contexts that determine the meaning of life and its inherent values 
and virtues. In opposition to much secular psychology the essential im-
portance of our spiritual nature was emphasized. The spiritual character 
of humanity was derived from our being made in the image of God, and 
from our being a soul or spirit. From the more subjective perspective, 
spirituality was related to our self-transcendence. 
Third, about human freedom the age old controversy continued, albeit 
in other contexts than the former theological and ecclesiastical settings. 
The threat of determinism comes from the physicalist interpretation of 
neurobiology. 
Finally, the narrative approach highlighted human identity as a 
unique and continuously reformulated story of which the person con-
cerned is both the author and main character, aimed at the interpreting 
one’s life and attributing meaning to it, leaving ample room for Christian 
articulations. 
To build a bridge toward the evaluative appraisal in the chapters 5 
and 6, I formulate some questions that need further consideration. As to 
the first observation above, the interpretation of theological items by 
psychological views may contribute to further clarification, indeed; con-
fer the help of the attachment theory in explaining the relationship to 
God, or the psychodynamic clearing of hatred. On the other hand, the 
psychological framework easily takes the lead, becoming the standard to 
interpret and mold the theological notions, or the other way round, the-
ology dominates psychological understanding. What about these possible 
processes? How to judge them? 
The second observation leads to the question of how to think of the 
development toward a growing emphasis on subjectivity and relational-
ity. To what extent does this development reflect the rise of modern   
self-understanding, and to what extent is it indicative for a particular 
Christian understanding of human nature? 
The final issue concerns the problem of determinism. Sperry (1988) 
resorted to an evolutionary explanation of social conscience as basic for 
the human will, being a part of nature’s genetic provisions for survival. 
This implies a naturalistic, deterministic view of the human will. Did he 
really succeed in making the compatibility of freedom and determinism 
plausible? There is some reason to doubt it. The kind of mental freedom 
belonging to this view is not a libertarian freedom that is able to act in-
dependently from whatever causes, but a freedom as voluntariness of 
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acting in accordance with the determining causes (Van den Brink, 
1993).25 This is a kind of free will in which one cannot will otherwise 
than one has been determined to do by external causal factors. The free 
character of the will confines itself to the fact that this causally deter-
mined will does not run counter to what it wills. But this is implicit in the 
meaning of will. Then the question remains how humans can be held 
responsible for wrong choices if these are caused by irresistible natural 
forces to will them and thus make such choices. Non-reductive physical-
ism tries to find a way out of a deterministic framework. 
In the course of this chapter already some lines were drawn from an-
thropology to psychotherapy. In the next chapter these lines are made 
more explicit. We will see how Christian articulations of psychological 
anthropology are related to the pleas for a distinct Christian psychother-
apy. 
 
25
  Van den Brink (1993, p. 211) discussed compatibilism within the theological 
debate about the relationship between God’s almightiness and human freedom. 
  
Chapter 4 
Psychotherapy 
Introduction 
The journals under scrutiny abound in articles about psychotherapy. 
From the 1990s onward, psychotherapy has been enjoying growing pop-
ularity in the journals’ contributions. By 1994, Worthington observed a 
shift of attention from Christian oriented psychological theory to Chris-
tian inspired psychotherapy or counseling. He found a change from in-
terdisciplinary to intra-disciplinary integration, which, in his conception, 
proposes a variety of ways to integrate Christian values, beliefs, and as-
sumptions in various theories of therapy. This shift of attention is af-
firmed by the ongoing development after 1994.1 Some authors relate it to 
the move from the modern preoccupation with universal truth to the 
postmodern attraction of the unique and the personal. These distinctions 
will not dominate our discourse, however, but the mention of them may 
be meaningful to be able to grasp the trains of thought. 
Having charted the issue of anthropology in the previous chapter, our 
interest turns to the effects of the anthropological notions of relationality 
and spirituality in the psychotherapeutic context. Our main concern is 
whether these notions return in the conceptualization of Christian in-
spired psychotherapy and, if so, how. The large number of articles about 
psychotherapy can be classified in more than one systematic way.  
When we try to put them in a systematic order, the following principle 
of presentation may recommend itself. We can focus on psychotherapy as 
 
1
  A restriction has to be made, though, for the Journal of Psychology and Theology. 
From the start of this century the emphasis has shifted again to articles on psy-
chology, with an increasing supply of research articles. 
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the subject matter of this chapter, and ask for what is meant by it, how it 
works, and why it is understood that way in the conceptions that are put 
forward. Then, answering the What, we arrive at views of psychotherapy 
and its goal, as both distinct from and in relation with counseling, pas-
toral care or care of souls, and spiritual guidance. The How is answered 
by referring to the methods employed, the valuation of the therapeutic 
attitude and relationship, and the institutional setting. The Why hints at 
the religious and cultural backgrounds that affect views and expectations 
of therapy. 
As to the What, psychotherapy, including its goal, was related to other 
forms of help by conversation in different ways. Here, anthropology ap-
pears to be the leading principle (section 4.2). In this connection we also 
pay attention to accounts of soul care in Christian history as forerunners 
of present day psychotherapy. Some authors appealed to these deep 
roots of spiritual care to infer guidelines for contemporary therapeutic 
practice. Because of the particular nature of this kind of historical exam- 
ination, we devote a separate section to it (section 4.3). 
As to the How, several kinds of means have been employed. There 
were proposals to utilize secular models and methods of psychotherapy, 
adapted to Christian anthropological insights (section 4.4). Otherwise, 
the employment of spiritual techniques was proposed (section 4.5). Fur-
thermore, the therapeutic relationship was identified as a means to reach 
the therapeutic goal. One of the aspects of this relationship is the in-
fluence of the therapist’s ethical values. Another aspect is spirituality, 
justified by the understanding of humans as spiritual beings. The legit-
imization of spirituality as an intrinsic factor in psychotherapy was     
supposed to decide the success of integrative efforts with respect to psy-
chotherapy (section 4.6). Then, some argued for a specific institutional 
environment for Christian therapy, related to a church (section 4.7).  
Finally, the mutual differences between the various positions within the 
integration debate are mapped (section 4.8). 
As to the Why, we refer to the Christian anthropology that appears to 
be a leading principle for the ideas about a distinct psychotherapy in a 
Christian context. However, anthropology cannot explain all differences. 
Therefore, we turn to the cultural considerations of human functioning 
and needs, and clients’ expectations, as they are analyzed in both journals 
(section 4.9). They supplement the theological reflections on anthropol-
ogy that were presented in the previous chapter. 
Our systematic rendering need not coincide with a chronologic 
presentation, of course. Within the elementary building blocks,          
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chronology will be pursued, however, unless conceptual clarity requires 
completion of a train of thought. 
But first we face some figures (section 4.1). 
 
 
4.1 Numbers 
 
In total, 232 articles about psychotherapy in some relevant way were 
counted in the two journals, 118 of them in JPT, 114 in JPC. Of these ar-
ticles, 154 were mainly about psychotherapy (JPT 83, JPC 71), the rest 
share their focus of interest with epistemology (JPT 13, JPC 15), anthro-
pology (JPT 19, JPC 28), or both (JPT 3). Of the 233 articles about psycho-
therapy, 58 are empirical (JPT 38, JPC 20). 
These figures do not pretend to be exact, rather they are indicative. I 
focus on the articles that specifically account for the impact of epistemol-
ogy and/or anthropology on psychotherapy. However, in practice the 
boundary line with contributions about Christian oriented psychothera-
py without a straight connection with these other fields of interest is not 
sharp. More than once some subjective weighing for the purpose of selec-
tion was inevitable. 
Who are the contributors? In 161 articles the authors are psychol-     
ogists, including psychiatrists (6), sociologists (2), and philosophers of 
psychology (6) (JPT 85, JPC 76). The latter are not psychologists in the 
strict sense but presumably more familiar with the discipline in compari-
son with the category of theologians.  In 12 contributions the authors are 
theologians (JPT 7, JPC 5). A few articles were written by general philos-
ophers. 54 articles (JPT 24, JPC 30), were by psychologists and theolo-
gians, either cooperating or united in one person, or in a combination of 
these. Of one paper the author’s academic background was unclear. Is a 
Christian counselor a psychologist or a theologian? 
 
 
4.2 What is Psychotherapy About? 
 
This section concerns the What of psychotherapy, related to the goals it 
pursues as they are proposed by therapists and theorists. In this charac-
terization the interfaces with other practices are considered, such as 
pastoral counseling, spiritual direction, and medical care. 
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Psychotherapy and Counseling 
In the search of what psychotherapy is about, we meet with the remark-
able fact that in America psychotherapy and counseling are used almost 
interchangeably. In the journals surveyed this interchangeability is men-
tioned explicitly from time to time but rarely accounted for, although 
authors sometimes do appear to be aware of some difference. Narramore 
(1973b) spoke of Christian therapists, be they psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, or pastoral counselors. Carlson (1976) declared to avoid the de-
bate over the differences between counseling and psychotherapy, thus 
suggesting that differences do exist. He took counseling to denote a wide 
range of interventional, interpersonal relationships intended to bring 
about change in another person. This definition covers a wide range of 
changes indeed, from recovery to conversion and from adjustment to 
growth. Obviously, the intention to bring about change is still a rather 
unspecific formulation of a therapeutic goal. Worthington and Gascoyne 
(1985) noted that they use the term counseling to represent either coun-
seling or psychotherapy. This makes clear that they at least presumed a 
difference but that they do not deem the difference sufficiently important 
to merit further consideration. Similarly, Ridley (1986) asserted the in-
terchangeable use of the terms, although he allows for theoretical, his-
torical, and political arguments for differentiations. Unfortunately, he 
gave none of them, neither the arguments nor the possible differentia-
tions, nor did he refer to other literature. In the same vein, Underwood 
(1986, p. 304) talked about “pastoral counseling and related disciplines” 
such as psychotherapy. 
The only one to make some effort to give a closer account of the con-
fusing terminology was Jones (1991). For the meaning of psychotherapy 
he borrowed the following ingredients from the definition by Nietzel, 
Bernstein, and Milich (1991): it consists of the intentional relationship 
between a person struggling with an adjustment problem and a person 
specialized in dealing with that kind of problem. Psychological methods 
are used to bring about the desired changes, rooted in psychological the-
ories both of personality in general and of the particular type of problem. 
Jones notes that nowadays the relationship between counseling and clin-
ical psychology has become very blurred, and that the same is true for 
the distinction between psychotherapy and pastoral counseling. He ex-
plained this state of affairs by adopting the definition of pastoral care by 
Clebsch and Jaeckle (1975), herewith disregarding the distinction be-
tween pastoral care and pastoral counseling. These authors state: “Pas-
toral care consists of helping acts, done by representative Christian    
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persons, directed toward the healing, sustaining, guiding, and reconciling 
of troubled persons whose troubles arise in the context of ultimate mean-
ings and concerns” (p. 4). Because of the similarities between the respec-
tive definitions, Jones argued that pastoral counseling and professional 
psychotherapy in its Christian manifestation are not intrinsically differ-
ent but that nonetheless in practice differences in emphasis and focus 
often emerge. Counselors in both contexts deal with the same things; like 
pastors, psychotherapists may be “representative Christian persons” by 
virtue of the priesthood of all believers in Christ; and in many cases psy-
chotherapists, like pastors, venture into the domain of ultimate questions 
and concerns. 
 
Goal of Psychotherapy: Healing 
The main formulated goal of psychotherapy is promoting health, or heal-
ing. But what is meant by health and healing? Is it just absence of illness? 
Or does the meaning extend to proper functioning? If so, what does 
proper functioning mean? Nelson and Wilson (1984) tended toward the 
broader sense, and interpreted it in a Christian way. They stated that the 
basic intervention which begins the process of healing is to so present 
Jesus Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit that persons will come to 
place their trust in God and to serve Jesus Christ in the fellowship of the 
church. Here, incontestably, healing has a spiritual dimension. Johnson 
(1991) defined psychotherapy as the attempt to understand and heal 
visible pathologies as well as the results of sin. To attain this goal he  
preferred a multidimensional diagnostic process to pathology based di-
agnoses, utilizing temperament, type, gender, subculture, age, and other 
relevant dimensions of personality. Olthuis (1994b) spoke of a healing 
and empowering dynamic that belongs to the concept of relational psy-
chotherapy, not characterized by cure but by care through empathy, re-
story-ing, and transformation, in which both therapist and helped person 
share and grow. Both authors gave a broader interpretation to healing 
than a strict medical one. The same is true of Jones (1996). Likewise, 
Kunst and Tan (1996) pointed to psychotherapy’s most basic goal: repair 
of the broken personality. The work is done in cooperation with God, and 
its fruit is the healed and restored human person. It enables human be-
ings to be kingdom people, helping them live out their original, intended 
calling in mutual harmony, living unencumbered by the weight of self-
consciousness, shame, and pride. In the same vein, McMinn and McRay 
(1997) noticed that the predominant models of health in contemporary 
professional psychology conceptualize healing as eliminating symptoms 
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of psychopathology, but that Christians have historically viewed the goals 
of healing differently. Health has to do with hope and inner peace, which 
can never come through personal efforts alone. One has to yield control 
of one’s life to God. This asks for Christian spirituality, at the heart of 
which is a healing relationship with God. Correspondingly, Hall and Hall 
(1997) noted that religious persons view positive mental health not just 
as the absence of illness, but also as the continual development of a rela-
tionship with the supernatural. Coe (1999) expanded the boundaries of 
health in the same direction, not only pointing to the radical relationality 
of the self but viewing the nature of persons as one made for union with 
God. He associated health with being filled with the Spirit in the Christian 
community. A pneuma-dynamic approach will aid therapist and client in 
being open to the movements of the Holy Spirit within human dynamics. 
Without stressing the spiritual dimension, Sorenson (1998), too, doubted 
whether psychotherapy is best understood as a part of the health profes-
sion, defined as a diagnose-treat-and-cure approach to human suffering. 
Here the aim is remedial, to fight disease, and health is defined as the 
absence of disease. Coe preferred a more developmental model over a 
remedial one, in which health is about the wisdom to work to change 
what we can, and the grace to accept what we cannot alter. This view 
reflects a holistic, pre-modern conception of health, and denies the more 
reductionist methods employed by modernist approaches.  
Sometimes the concept of health and the goal of healing remained im-
plicit but became clear nonetheless, as with Mangis (2000). In response 
to an article about spiritual formation, he distinguished two ways of deal-
ing with pain in the field of psychotherapy, first by those who see the goal 
of treatment as ending pain, and second, those who see it as deriving 
meaning from pain. The former approach aims at symptom reduction, the 
latter at character transformation. This transformation approach would 
make room for Christian psychotherapists to facilitate the process of 
making spiritual meaning from pain. Here, implicitly healing is related 
with being able to cope with pain, to find balance and peace by actively 
accepting and handling the grief. More explicitly, Moon (2002a) stated 
that both psychotherapy and spiritual direction are about soul healing. 
With this he stretched the limits observed by traditional psychotherapy. 
It is only recently, he observed, that the modern integration movement is 
moving away from traditional psychotherapy whose goal, most typically, 
was to restore normalcy, and the techniques were taken from the field of 
applied psychology. However, Moon argued, problems can go deeper 
than psychiatric diagnosis; they can be due to the lack of experiential 
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awareness of the loving presence of God. In such a case spiritual tech-
niques may be employed in the service of a psychological goal. Develop-
ing an experiential relationship with God may be the best way to achieve 
certain goals of professional counseling. Sperry (2003) took a similar 
stance, adhering to a composite developmental and pathology model of 
health and well-being that views health and growth in a holistic fashion, 
including the psychological, moral, somatic and spiritual dimensions. 
Sperry mentioned and respected May’s (1992) distinction between     
curing and healing, however, implying that curing has to do with restor-
ing efficient functioning and increasing well-being, while healing refers to 
increasing love. Still, he attempted to integrate both purposes into one 
spiritual psychotherapy.2 
Like Coe (1999), Tan (2007) emphasized besides cognitive, behav-
ioral, and emotional change, the Holy Spirit’s ministry in bringing about 
inner healing. This spiritual health is established through dependence on 
the Lord for deep and lasting personality change, and consists eventually 
in holiness or Christ-likeness as the ultimate goal of counseling (cf. Tan, 
1987). In another contribution, Tan (2003) stated that psychotherapy 
often aims at the ultimate goal of facilitating spiritual growth, and not 
just at alleviation of symptoms and solving problems. Campbell (2007) 
fostered a more modest goal for psychotherapy, namely, to remove bar-
riers for the promotion of growth, including spiritual growth. The exposi-
tion by the Roman Catholics Moncher and Titus (2009) is less spiritual 
than Tan’s and Campbell’s but still broad in scope. Ultimately they rela-
ted psychological health to being able to choose goods that are objec-
tively adequate for human flourishing and acting in a consequent man-
ner. At this level, there is convergence between psychology and natural 
acquired virtue, as it has been called classically. Therefore, psychother-
apy might seek not only the reduction of symptoms, but also growth in 
the positive human capacities on virtues, character strengths, and prac-
tices, both goals being subsumed under the heading of health. This has 
something in common with Barrette (2002) (Roman Catholic) who typ-
ified the generic goal of psychotherapy as a healthy relationship with self, 
with others and with the world. He does not include the relationship with 
 
2
  He tried to do so by suggesting alternating the treatment goals by focusing three 
weeks on psychotherapy and one week on spiritual issues, assuming that a client 
asks for spiritual guidance. Such interruption of the therapeutic process by ses-
sions with other roles and goals seems to be rather confusing, however. 
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God. Lewis Hall, Langer, and McMartin (2010) did, however. They de-
fined the treatment goal as human flourishing and character formation, 
which may incorporate suffering. This suffering can be a point of per-
sonal connection with Christ. It is linked with the divine calling on our 
life and sanctification. 
 
Psychotherapy as Soul Care 
Soul care is a literal translation of psychotherapy. Several authors orient 
themselves to this original meaning of psychotherapy for the interpreta-
tion of its intent. Prater (1982, p. 34) asked the question whether thera-
pists are to be restricted to the role of providing temporary palliatives for 
symptoms, leaving the truly important cure of souls to the pastors. The 
answer was “May that never be!”3 A more systematic exposition of soul 
care was offered by Benner (1989). He viewed modern day psychother-
apy as rooted in and continuous with the venerable religious tradition of 
the care of souls. Yet, he underscored that psychotherapy approaches 
soul care in a manner different from that of spiritual guidance. The psy-
chotherapist treats spirituality psychologically, that is, by exploring the 
meaning, experience, and dynamics of the matter at issue in the person’s 
life, assuming that the relationships with God, self, and others are all  
mediated by the same internal psychological processes. In other publica-
tions, too, Benner distinguished two forms of soul care: spiritual direc-
tion and psychotherapy. Both belong to the same domain of personhood, 
namely, the whole person with particular attention to the inner self, for 
we cannot link the psychological and the spiritual aspects of a person to 
some parts of his or her being, psycho-spiritual-somatic beings as we are. 
While the psychotherapist focuses on the inner world, the spiritual direc-
tor focuses with equal attention on the activity of the Spirit of God in the 
other, in the interaction, and in oneself at the moment (Benner, 2002). In 
an interview with Moon (2000b) he explained that psychotherapy has a 
problem focus, and spiritual direction a more developmental focus. For 
this reason, he was not comfortable with the phrase Christian counseling 
or Christian psychotherapy. Both indications seem to suggest something 
like spiritual guidance or pastoral counseling, or traditional psychological 
care sprinkled with Christian terms like icing on a cake. 
 
3
  Remember his Barthian anthropology (section 3.1): only in doing the will of God 
persons realize their ontological potential (Möglichkeit). 
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In the context of the pursuit of wisdom, psychotherapy as care of 
souls is more appropriate than psychotherapy as health profession,   
according to Sorenson (1998). Somewhat less cautious in making distinc-
tions than Benner, Tan (1996a) stated that the ultimate goal of all Chris-
tian therapy and counseling is to find and know God more deeply, and 
not using God only to solve problems, alleviate symptoms, or enhance 
health. In the same way, from a developmental stance Watson (2000) 
contended that Christian psychotherapy is ultimately about developing 
the capacity to love. Such psychotherapy serves the process of spiritual 
formation for the person moving toward Christ. Moon (2002a), like   
Benner, qualified psychotherapy as soul healing and therefore as akin to 
spiritual direction. Only the centers of gravity differ; psychotherapeutic 
counseling is problem centered, spiritual direction is Spirit centered. 
 The spiritual direction–psychotherapy continuum as it is presupposed 
in this approach can be elaborated further. Sperry (2003) distinguished 
spiritual direction, pastoral counseling, spiritually oriented or pastoral 
psychotherapy, and generic psychotherapy. Here pastoral counseling, 
too, is supposed to be problem solving or solution focused. The differ-
ence between pastoral counseling and pastoral psychotherapy is identi-
fied in their short term and longer term character respectively. 
 An impressive example of psychotherapy as soul care was offered by 
Latini (2009). She advocated interdisciplinarity between psychology and 
theology in a way that precedence is given to theology, because theology 
alone addresses the ultimate questions of human existence. It is illus-
trated by the example of grief in the light of the cross of Jesus. It is an 
exercise in not repressing suffering. The components of this grief work 
include: experiencing repressed emotions, confronting internalized par-
ents, meeting needs and mourning those of them that can never be ful-
filled, unmasking all denial of human suffering. The cross of Jesus also 
defines the caregiver’s identity, disclosing any tendency to spiritualize or 
moralize the client’s suffering as indicative of his or her own defense 
mechanisms; it urges the counselor to suffer with others. The cross de-
fines Christian identity and lifestyle; the cross of the Christian may take 
the form of persecution, rejection, alienation, temptation, or any other 
form of creaturely suffering. Both the Christian counselor and client will 
be able to bear this cross from the conviction that the cross of Jesus  
judges and destroys all evil inflicted upon humanity. In this light Latini 
defined as the goal of therapy de-repression of repressed emotion. 
In trying to determine how psychotherapy relates to spirituality, some 
contributors thought in terms of preparation. According to Pfrimmer 
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(1978), psychotherapy may open the way toward conversion by remov-
ing the obstacles for the formation of faith, and facilitating the individ-
ual’s access to the love and grace of God. Even without preaching and 
evangelizing, said Prater (1982), therapists can prepare their clients for 
the kingdom of God by helping them remove any barriers to being their 
true selves, such as the neurotic channeling of anxiety. So, therapists can 
prepare the ground for a cure of souls. As Vitz and Mango (1997b) put it, 
the therapist’s faithfulness to a client with borderline features may be 
interpreted by that client as implicit forgiveness, helping him or her to 
re-inject the split off negative self-representations without overwhelm-
ing the good self-representations. Real repentance and forgiveness, how-
ever, cannot be supplied by psychotherapy. Strawn and Leffel (2001) 
spoke about convergent aims and complementary practices in psycho-
therapy and spiritual formation. Appealing to Harry Guntrip (1994),   
they argued that the personal integration sought in psychotherapy and 
the spiritual maturity sought in religious experience are closely related 
ways of looking at the same thing. With reference to the practical theol-
ogy of John Wesley, they contended that benevolent human relatedness 
can help to restore the natural side of Godward experience, as a kind of    
preparatory grace. From a psychoanalytic viewpoint object relations are 
understood to direct and determine interpersonal relationships and  
religious experience. 
 
Other Goal Formulations 
Not all formulations of the goal of psychotherapy are linked with health 
and healing or with soul care. Finney and Malony (1985) recognized self-
less love of God alone as one of the possible treatment goals of psycho-
therapy with Christians. Worthington (1994) distinguished two kinds of 
therapy: growth therapies and problem solving therapies. Which goal is 
emphasized is usually determined by the context of counseling and the 
nature of the client’s request for help. According to Tan (1996a) the ulti-
mate goal of all Christian therapy and counseling is to find and know God 
more deeply. By stressing this intent he tried to avoid the misconception 
that in Christian therapy God is only used to solve problems, alleviate 
symptoms, or enhance health. For Johnson (1997) the goals of psycho-
therapy are determined by the lordship of Christ and the kingdom of God. 
And Lattea (1997) conceived his work as psychotherapist as a special-
ized extension of the daily sanctification work going on in churches and 
individual lives. 
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4.3 Christian Sources 
 
Various writers emphasized that Christian oriented psychotherapy could 
benefit from the rich tradition of pastoral care and counseling in the his-
tory of Christian spirituality (e.g., Benner, 1989; Browning, 1992; Rob-
erts, 2000). Some contributions focused on classical insights and their 
relevance for contemporary counseling in Christian contexts. The exem-
plars of this evidence are offered below. For the sake of systematic 
presentation a chronology of the historical material is preferred over a 
chronology of publication. 
 
The Early Church 
From the 3rd century onward, the so-called Desert Fathers, small groups 
of Christian men in Egypt, retreated from daily society and dedicated 
their lives in stringent segregation to the thorough obedience to God. 
Watson and Mangis (2001) described the impact of their spirituality on 
their own implementation of psychotherapy. The desert tradition can be 
characterized as a tradition that seeks to be in touch with the deepest 
inner emotions and pursues complete honesty toward oneself and God. It 
teaches us that truths that transform cannot be preserved by theories, 
systems or techniques. Spiritual formation and healing cannot be accom-
plished by methodical mastery or professional expertise, but only by 
honest self-examination and receptive confidence in God. “Their correc-
tive is in rejecting correctives, or else in seeking to avoid becoming     
settled enough to need correctives” (p. 321). Both authors applied these 
lessons to their own attitude as therapists. Watson had to learn the pro-
gressive denouncement of false self-importance, i.e., seeing himself as the 
responsible, indispensable healer of patients seeking help. In the way of 
cautious self-disclosure he discarded initial pretenses of having control 
and being the authority. This process was accompanied by the presence 
of God’s spirit and healing power. Mangis discovered his own emotional 
distance and self-protective detachment by unmasking his interpretive 
focus on the defenses and pathologies of the client as rationalization. 
Through radical self-honesty derived from the contemplative desert tra-
dition he learned to embrace the intersubjective approach. He came to 
value and cherish his most difficult clients for calling forth radical and 
unambiguous self-honesty and awareness of what he needs most in his 
own spiritual life. Both Watson and Mangis agreed that admitting         
and accepting to be vulnerable like the patient creates openings for            
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community and spiritual intersubjectivity for the benefit of the patient 
and the therapist. 
 Oden (1992) presented a picture of the pastoral care tradition in the 
early history of the church. He identified evidence of empathy, con-
gruence, and unconditional love, and perceives an awareness of the          
importance of specificity and adaptation. He pointed to examples of em-
pathic caring and listening found with Saint Ambrose (c. 339-397), ob-
serving the appreciation of being open to one’s own inner emotional  
experience. Ambrose said that in coming to know ourselves truly, we 
may be able to take counsel from our own heart. Athanasius of Alexan-
dria (c. 295-373) praised his soul guide Anthony for the stability of char-
acter and the purity of the soul. Every man of counsel should be like that, 
having nothing dark or deceptive or false about him. Oden saw these 
statements as examples of the value of congruence. As to unconditional 
love, the church fathers were clear. Love casts a veil over sins innumer- 
able, says Clement of Rome. The importance of good timing and judging 
every situation on its own is shown by four metaphors used to elucidate 
the importance of flexibility and variability; the metaphor of the naviga-
tor (Clement of Alexandria; c. 150- c. 215), the military logistic coordina-
tor (John Chrysostom; c. 347-407), the physician (John Climacus; c. 525-
606), and the wrestler (Gregory of Nazianzus; c. 329-c. 389). Gregory 
formulated the famous rule that just as the same food and medicine is not 
appropriate to every bodily ailment, so neither is the same treatment and 
discipline proper for the guidance of souls. 
Zooming in on Saint Augustine (354-430), Johnson (1998a) drew at-
tention to his understanding of happiness and freedom. Augustine shared 
the common belief in the ancient world that humans are motivated by 
the search for happiness. He articulated true happiness, however, in a 
way that opposes the philosophies of many. It can only be found in the 
enjoyment of God. The lack of true happiness may have two causes. Some 
are unhappy because they do not have what they want; others are un-
happy although they do have what they want, but what they want does 
not satisfy their ultimate needs. Humans can only find true happiness 
through love that comes from God and that unites them with God. There 
is a hierarchy of love: external love (love of external goods), self-love (as 
a natural given), and love of one’s neighbor. Self-love can escape from 
being selfish and thus from lacking neighborly love only if we love God 
preeminently. The true interest of the self is served when God is loved 
more than the self, for then one chooses to be God’s rather than one’s 
own. Do humans have the freedom of will to choose for loving God?   
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Humans’ wills are free in the sense of non-coerced, but still their wills are 
determined by prior motives, that is, their loves. The human will has 
been created good and free by God, but has been defiled by the original 
sin of our first ancestors that was passed on to their descendants. The 
human will can only be liberated to will the ultimate good by the trans-
formation of its loves through God’s grace. As Johnson concluded, God’s 
grace should be seen as the basis of all Christian counseling activity. 
 
The Middle Ages 
In order to illustrate the importance of empathy, congruence, and uncon-
ditional love for a pastor or psychologist, Oden (1992) not only quoted 
from the church fathers but also appealed to theologians from the Middle 
Ages. William of St. Thierry (??-1148) distinguished between the outer 
cell of the monk and his inner cell, that is, the conscience. It is in the con-
science that God should dwell with the human’s spirit. God is more in-
terior to the believer than all else that is within him or her. The author 
also pointed to Bonaventure (1221-1274), who likewise concentrated on 
the inner experience by asserting that by entering one’s soul deeply one 
may come to meet God, because there one finds oneself as being made in 
the image of God. But why should so few be aware of Him when God is so 
close to our souls? The reason is that the human mind does not enter into 
itself because it is distracted by cares, clouded by sense images, and 
tempted by concupiscence. 
 Cross (1998) pointed to the psychology of Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274), as possible directive for counseling care. The author attributed to 
Aquinas the merit of successfully negotiating the material–immaterial 
juncture of human nature by connecting the soul’s powers and passions 
with the moral virtues that belong to humans as social and moral ani-
mals. Aquinas distinguished three powers of the soul: cognition, appetite, 
and vegetation, and a range of passions or emotions: desire, joy, hate, 
aversion, sorrow, hope, despair, courage, fear, and anger. All of the soul’s 
passions presuppose love of some kind, and each of the basic passions 
has one or more derivatives. Sorrow, for example, includes anxiety, pity, 
and envy. These types of sorrow are classified by the proper objects of 
each derivative, such as one’s own loss of well-being, or fear to lose it, 
one’s being sorry for someone else’s loss of well-being, or one’s being 
sorry for missing a good that is owned by someone else and contributes 
to his or her well-being. Moncher (2001) reflected on Aquinas’ theology 
of moral virtue as a handle for psychotherapy of virtue. Aquinas empha-
sized the superiority of reason over the emotions, viewing humans as 
 CHAPTER 4. PSYCHOTHERAPY 127 
 
rational beings. Therefore, through the exercise of reason, humans are 
able to order their emotions and achieve self-mastery and discipline in 
the living of a truly good, virtuous and fully human life. Consequentially, 
by this exercise emotional well-being and psychological health is 
strengthened. This rational approach, I add, fits well in a more cognitive 
method of therapy. 
 
Puritanism 
From the end of the 16th and during the 17th century the Puritan move-
ment in the churches of the Reformation pursued an ongoing reform of 
the church and its members by submitting all areas of life to God’s direc-
tion. In A Christian Directory, Richard Baxter (1615-1691) wrote a work 
of casuistry as a resource of pastoral guidance for an immense number of 
problems and situations. He distinguished four major causes of human 
problems: motivational, physiological, temperamental, and demonic. He 
often found the root cause to lie in the corruption of a person’s funda-
mental drives, owing to original sin. His counseling method focused on 
the curing of our motivational drives by applying the biblical doctrine of 
sanctification: sinful motivation should be replaced through repentance 
by a love for holy living through faith (Roth, 1998). Roth observed that 
Baxter’s counseling is characterized by a Christ-like compassion and op-
timism based upon God’s grace. This approach shows affinity with the 
present-day Biblical Counseling approach. 
 Yarhouse (2001) reflected on the treatise The Grace and Duty of Being 
Spiritually Minded by Baxter’s contemporary John Owen (1616-1683), 
focusing on sanctification, self-examination, and the experience of weak 
making indwelling sins. When spiritual affections are wanting, self-
examination is appropriate. We should shape our beliefs by habitually 
contemplating on spiritual matters through the help of the Holy Spirit. 
Lack of spiritual affections should give rise to considerations of whether 
we are thinking rightly about the right things. Thinking rightly is only 
possible in a personal relationship with God. It is both cognitive and af-
fective, so that our contemplation stirs an emotional reaction. Yarhouse 
conceded that the spiritual guidance by Owen can be applied to the clini-
cal setting only with limitations, because some mental health concerns 
are not sins in and of themselves and, conversely, some sins are not men-
tal disorders. He maintained, however, that many mental problems entail 
both psychological and spiritual concerns which can hardly be distin-
guished. And because, for Owen, self-examination is related to a careful 
assessment of one’s thoughts and emotions, it fits well in a cognitive  
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approach to treatment. As a difference from current cognitive therapy, an 
approach inspired by Owen does introduce appropriate shoulds and 
oughts for the sake of promoting spirit mindedness. 
 
In these renderings of classical anthropology and soul care from pre-
modern times, some normative directions for counseling are indicated, 
sometimes in connection with contemporary cognitive approaches. They 
are aimed at some way of integrating age-old Christian insights with 
modern psychological understandings and psychotherapeutic practice. 
 
 
4.4 How Does Psychotherapy Work? Protocolled Methods 
 
In the sections 4.4 to 4.8 we face the How of psychotherapy as it is envis-
aged by contributors to the integration debate on psychotherapy and 
Christianity. We start with those who argued for adopting and adapting 
protocolled methods in a Christian oriented therapy. The kind of adjust-
ments turn out to be inspired by the assumption of Christian versions of 
anthropology. 
 Can behavioral and cognitive behavioral protocols be employed to 
perform psychotherapy within Christian goals or objectives? Bufford 
(1977) was rather positive about behaviorism. Its major principles, like 
the importance of social influences, the power of reinforcement, and the 
limited role of punishment accompanied by explaining words (classical 
conditioning) are to be found in the Bible as well. In response to some 
criticism, he distinguished between metaphysical behaviorism and 
methodological behaviorism. Metaphysical behaviorism is characterized 
by determinism and has no room for moral responsibility. Methodologi-
cal behaviorism, however, may make a significant contribution in helping 
us put biblical principles into practice (Bufford, 1978). Ratcliff (1978), 
too, welcomed practical behavioral techniques like role playing, expo-
sure, reinforcement, and desensitization. Bolin and Goldberg (1979) 
were even more open to the behavioristic approach. They marked off 
philosophical behaviorism from methodological behaviorism without 
disclaiming the former totally. The philosophical side concerns man’s 
freedom, dignity, self-control, and responsibility. The outcome should not 
be assessed too badly, however, because behaviorist therapists do not 
violate the clients’ free will. The practical side, on the other hand, is about 
goals, anticipations and rewards that work as incentives in both biblical 
eschatology (i.e., future consummation) and behavioral reinforcement. 
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 Pecheur (1978) offered a similar consideration about cognitive theory 
and therapy. He stated that the process posited by cognitive therapists as 
underlying change and growth is identical to the scriptural process of 
sanctification. Put otherwise, Pecheur saw the processes in psychology 
and theology as the same, but the contents as different. The philosophical 
presupposition of cognitive therapy, that each person is ultimately re-
sponsible for his or her own behavior, is very compatible with the bibli-
cal view. There is a difference, however: in cognitive theory the person is 
the sole agent of change; in Christian sanctification there is an interactive 
relationship between the person and God.  
Others did not agree with the separation between philosophical (or 
metaphysical) and methodological levels in behavioral and/or cognitive 
approaches. Petty (1984) argued that the Christian worldview is more 
than a philosophical foundation. He asserted that the results of scriptural 
study will have immediate impact on the content of psychology and psy-
chotherapy because these disciplines respond to the same questions 
about personality and behavior as the Bible. He posed the rhetorical 
question “Can we really censor Ellis, Rogers, or Skinner for their strong 
rejection of biblical Christianity and then absorb their basic schemata?” 
The negative answer is implied in the sequel: “Examination of their work-
ing assumption that humans can, without essential deception, know 
themselves and the world apart from the self-revelation of God, is the 
root of the matter” (Petty, 1984, p. 13). Wolterstorff (1984) was as little 
satisfied with the delimitation at issue. Focusing on practical applications 
while rejecting the philosophical presuppositions is only allowed on con-
dition that a more comprehensive theory (philosophy) explains the re-
mainder of data that are not explained by radical theorizing; in the case 
of behaviorism, for instance, we need an overall theory that explains not 
only classical and operant conditioning, but also that which remains out-
side behaviorism’s purview: free choice, responsibility and the reality of 
sin. Such a Christian theory should be linked to a research program. Un-
fortunately, no such proposals exist.  
 Tan (1987) fostered an adapted application of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy, using biblical truth in conducting cognitive restructuring and 
behavioral change instead of relativistic, empirically oriented values. Fur-
thermore, he recommended the involvement of larger contextual factors 
like family, social context, religion, and culture, and the application of 
prayer and appropriate community resources. Craigie and Tan (1989) 
reported the employment of behavioral strategies, social support, im-
agery, and prayer as vehicles for experiencing and incorporating God’s 
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truth in a deeper way. They contended that clients can experience in im-
agery the Lord’s presence coming to bear on their struggles to be liber-
ated from misbeliefs. Here, too, the cognitive behavioral perspective 
takes the lead. Lipsker and Oordt (1990) presented a Christian cognitive 
behavior therapy approach in which they include religious activities like 
prayer, church and youth group attendances, Bible reading and study, 
and God related attributions reflected in cognitions. Stories narrated in 
the Bible may help processing the maladaptive nature of the client’s cog-
nitions. 
McMinn and Lebold (1989) showed the same reserve by dismissing 
Ellis’s opinion that religious individuals are not emotionally healthy and 
that blaming oneself is irrational. They advocated a mutual agreement 
between therapist and client about the philosophical framework the  
client relies on, thus supporting a version of cognitive behavioral therapy 
that is less directive and confronting.  
Jones (1989) concluded from a Christian perspective that values en-
dorsed by Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) overemphasize rationality, 
have problems with understanding rationality and emotion, and view the 
self atomistically. In Jones’s view, it is one-sided to trace emotions to 
cognitions, the reverse often being the case. McMinn (1994) introduced a 
new element by establishing a connection between RET and con-
structivism. He noticed a difference between the cognitive therapist in 
earlier days and the contemporary cognitive therapist. The former was 
seen as an objective observer of clients’ irrational thinking, while the 
latter collaborated with the clients to transform the narratives of their 
lives. Here, human values and context are an integral part of the process. 
McMinn advocated a moderate form of constructivism that emphasizes 
the constructive character of our view of reality without denying the 
existence and relevance of objective reality. Therefore, he preferred the 
term interpretation over construction. Recent developments have opened 
doors for the integration with other kinds of theories and therapies. Cog-
nitive therapists have become interested in deep cognitive structures 
named schemas. Schemas are closely linked to the psychodynamic under-
standing of narrative, and thus to the understanding of a client’s per-
ceptions of the past. At the same time there are reasons to be cautious, 
however. Constructivism introduces a subtle form of ethical indi-
vidualism by looking for truth inside oneself. It can lose contact with 
external reality by appealing to memory without external validation. 
Moreover, for the constructivist RET therapist the client takes the role of 
the hero of the story, while the Christian narrative includes God, not self, 
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as the central figure, and therefore focuses on self-denial and yielding to 
divine authority more than self-direction and self-fulfillment. Finally, the 
goal of traditional RET is to assert greater control over one’s life by    
dismissing ideas of a divine being, but the goal of Christian maturity is 
giving up control to God and to foster dependence, one of the allegedly 
irrational, dysfunctional thoughts in RET. McMinn observed that Chris-
tian forms of cognitive therapy have been developed, but none has been 
based on a distinctively Christian hermeneutic or a critical examination 
of the RET worldview.4 
For the sake of adapting cognitive behavioral therapy, this section 
contains several proposals on different levels, such as methodological, 
relational, and philosophical levels. But they find their similarity in a 
distinct Christian anthropology that fuels methodology, the therapeutic 
relationship and philosophy, by suggesting religious interventions, a 
collaborative relationship and restrictions on constructivism respect-
ively. 
 Outcomes of empirical studies about the use of Christian versions of 
cognitive behavioral or rational emotive therapy to Christians are di-
vided. Some find positive results (Propst, 1980; Hawkins, Tan, & Turk, 
1999), others do not observe significant differences (Pecheur & Edwards, 
1984; Johnson, DeVries, Ridley, Pettorini, & Peterson, 1994). 
 
 
4.5 Spiritual Interventions 
 
Spiritual Techniques 
Many kinds of spiritual practices have been proposed and adopted within 
a therapeutic framework as means to attain the therapeutic goal. Narra-
more (1973b) denounced the wrong dichotomy between spiritual and 
psychological. He championed a holistic view of counseling. Wilson 
(1974) favored what he calls spiritual commitment, confession of sin, 
forgiving other persons, and fellowship change through attending a Bible 
study group, a church or a conversation group. Edwards (1976) em-
phasized that the therapist and client should have a common concept-
tual system. From this common system a variety of actions such as            
prayer, Bible study, fellowship, confession, forgiveness, encouragement,          
 
4
  Thirteen years later he filled this vacuum together with Campbell (McMinn & 
Campbell, 2007). 
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confrontation, etc. may be performed. Edwards situated these interven-
tions in a cognitive behavioral setting. He assumed that most of God’s 
supernatural influence on his children is through cognitions inspired by 
the Holy Spirit. A salvation experience is the basis for restructuring 
thought patterns, and these in turn mediate emotional and behavioral 
change. 
Propst (1980) advocated the use of imagery for cognitive restructur-
ing. She described an experiment in which individuals were asked to 
visualize, for instance, Christ present with them in a depressive situation 
they were imagining. Another instruction to participants was to combine 
relaxation and concentration, in which they visualized God and then vis-
ualized themselves being filled with the Holy Spirit. Nelson and Wilson 
(1984) put forward prayer, Bible quotations, conversion, confession, 
repentance, forgiveness, and discipleship as appropriate means, but em-
phasized that the basic intervention which begins the process of healing 
is to so present Jesus Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit that persons 
will come to put their trust in God, and serve Him in the fellowship of the 
church. Finney and Malony (1985) introduced contemplative prayer, 
defining it as a form of Christian prayer in which one gives one’s full at-
tention to relating to God in a passive, non-defensive, non-demanding, 
open way. 
Worthington, Dupont, Berry, and Duncan (1988) investigated the fre-
quency of the use of spiritual guidance techniques. Most frequently used 
were religious homework, quoting Scripture, interpreting Scripture, dis-
cussing the client’s faith, prayer during the session. Some of the least 
frequently employed activities are laying hands on the client, and anoint-
ing the client with oil. 
A rather exhaustive rendering of spiritual counseling techniques was 
given by Moon, Bailey, Kwasny, and Willis (1991). Among other things, 
they listed concrete meditation about biblical words or creatural objects; 
abstract meditation such as a passive focus on one of the attributes of 
God; intercessory prayer by making our requests known to God; contem-
plative prayer preparing a passive openness to the experience of God 
through non-analytical focus of attention; listening prayer with the pri-
mary focus on receptivity to communication from God; prayer in the 
Spirit, i.e. a type of prayer involving the presence of not recognizable, 
verbal utterances, as a prayer of interior surrender; didactic use of Scrip-
ture by the counselor; Scriptural study and memorization as a structured 
homework technique; confessions of transgressions; obedience, in the 
sense of giving up one’s personal autonomy and entering into a life of 
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freely accepted service of God; structural discussion of one’s spiritual 
history; healing by laying on of hands or anointing with oil. They do not 
mention the Christian adaptation of the generic psychotherapeutic tech-
nique of imagination. Tan (1996a) mentioned twelve key disciplines, 
most of which have been mentioned in the preceding lines, in the context 
of practicing the presence of God as advanced by the Quaker Richard J. 
Foster, and applicable to psychotherapeutic practice. Later on, Tan 
(1999) unfolded the methods of a Spirit-filled psychotherapy. It includes 
dealing with spiritual issues such as guilt, sin, spiritual emptiness, doubt, 
and the search for meaning; then, using religious and spiritual resources 
such as prayer, Scripture, and referral to church or para-church groups; 
and finally, developing the spirituality of both client and therapist by 
meditation, prayer, fasting, study, etc. 
In 2007, Tan explained how specific disciplines might be appropriate 
for specific problems. Christian clients experiencing spiritual emptiness 
may be helped by Scriptural and spiritual teaching about solitude and 
wilderness experiences. Clients struggling with tension, stress, anxiety, 
perfectionism, burnout, addictions, and/or compulsions may be helped 
by solitude and silence, prayer, and private retreats. And in cases of men-
tal trauma, healing prayer may facilitate the client’s ability to process 
effectively painful memories through vividly recalling them and asking 
for the presence of Christ or God to minister while they feel the pain. Tan 
(2007, pp. 105-106) gave an impression of the way a session like this 
goes. 
 
Therapist:  Good. Before we begin, let us remember that this is prayer and not 
a technique per se. We will come before the Lord with your need and painful 
memory, and let Him minister to you in whatever way He wants to, and 
knows you need. Let us be open and receptive to what He may want to do to-
day, with no specific expectations or demands on our part, okay? 
 
The therapist pronounces a prayer and asks the client, Jane, to do some 
relaxation techniques. In a relaxed mood, she is asked to focus her atten-
tion on a painful moment in the past. After she has described her memory 
and corresponding feelings, the therapist proposes to pray again: 
 
Therapist:  At this point, I would like to pause here and pray for the Lord to 
come and minister to you, by the power and presence of the Holy Spirit, and 
to touch you with His healing grace and truth, okay? 
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After the prayer: 
Therapist:  Now Jane, just wait for a few moments and be in a receptive, open, 
prayerful mode allowing the Lord to minster to you, to speak to you, to touch 
you in whatever way He wants to and knows you need… 
 
After some time the therapist asks the client to describe her experience. 
She answers: 
 
Jane:  I actually sense the presence of Jesus with me; He is having lunch with 
me, spreading out a blanket with a picnic basket filled with food like sand-
wiches and tea to drink, on green pastures beside the still waters as Psalm 23 
describes, … and He eats a leisurely lunch with me, giving me His full and lov-
ing attention. ...  and He speaks to me and tells me that I am His beloved child 
and very precious to Him… (with some tears)… I really feel close to Him and 
my heart is experiencing some warmth and joy and… deep peace. This is very 
meaningful and healing for me… I feel that I can experience God more now as 
a loving and present Heavenly Father or Parent… 
  
Entwistle (2004a) and Hunter and Yarhouse (2009a) described and 
criticized a procedure that is named Theophostic Prayer Ministry (TPM). 
The founder, Ed Smith, coined the term from the Greek words for God 
(theos) and light (phoos). TPM is built on the presupposition that painful 
memories containing lies is at the root of current distress, and in the be-
lief that Christ can bring release by uncovering the lies and replacing 
them with truth as He discloses his real presence in the person’s 
memory. The counselee is encouraged to review memories and the lies 
attached to them, and then to wait for an encounter with Jesus. The for-
mer name was Theophostic Counseling, but doubts about legal and ethi-
cal issues concerning the counseling quality were the reason for the 
name change. 
 Another variant is the charisma of “word of knowledge” which is not 
so much presented as spiritual technique but more as a spiritual tool. It is 
viewed as a gift of the Holy Spirit by which the therapist recognizes 
something about the person or their problem that could not have been 
known by natural means (Parker, 2014). 
 One distinction should be mentioned that was made by Tan (2001, 
2003, 2007). It is the distinction between implicit and explicit integration 
between faith and psychotherapy. Implicit use of Christian elements con-
cern, for instance, the personal prayer of the therapist before and after 
the sessions, a Christian attitude of the therapist, and advancing Christian 
values without naming them as such. Within implicit integration religious 
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issues can be dealt with, however, as soon as the client brings them up 
for discussion. More explicit forms of religiously oriented therapy include 
joint prayer, reading and discussing Bible verses, and imagining God’s or 
Jesus’ presence. Christian clients seem to prefer the use of spiritual re-
sources, and the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct of 
APA identify religion as one of the significant dimensions of human dif-
ferences which require special skills on the therapist’s part.5 Terrell 
(2007), however, relativized the distinction of explicit and implicit inte-
gration, arguing that it can only be applied to the level of cognitions, the 
level of what we say to patients, which is either explicit or implicit. How-
ever, at a deeper, psychodynamic level an intentional relational approach 
motivated by Christian love evades a simple explicit–implicit taxonomy 
of integrative psychotherapy. 
 
Universal Spirituality in the Service of Therapy 
Not only specific Christian spirituality was addressed, some authors 
broadened their scope to include spirituality as a universal anthropologi-
cal phenomenon that should be deployed in therapy. According to Ben-
ner (1989) spirituality involves natural spirituality, religious spirituality, 
and Christian spirituality, the latter being a subset of the second. Natural 
spirituality is seen by him as the ground of all religious spirituality, and 
defined as our response to a deep and mysterious human yearning for 
self-transcendence and surrender, a yearning to find our place.  Natural 
spirituality is, Brenner says, a fundamental part of our being creatures 
made in the image of God. Bergin and Payne (1991) aimed at a systematic 
spiritual approach to personality and psychotherapy characterized by a 
conception of human nature, a moral frame of reference, specific tech-
niques of change, empirical confirmation, and an eclectic and ecumenical 
design. Next, this generic system can be denominationally specified into a 
distinct spiritual strategy. So, Christian spirituality, or one of the denomi-
national strands of Christianity, is a species of spirituality as a common 
trait of humanity. An overall theory should aspire at assessing values in 
universal terms and progress toward a generalized conception of univer-
salistic values in order to bridge the gap between therapeutic values and 
spiritual values. Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010) advocated a strongly 
theistic psychotherapy, and contend that God would have to be viewed as 
at least one of several necessary conditions, including notions like ethical 
 
5
  Cf. Tan (1996b), where the author treats the subject extensively. 
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values, free will, holism, transcendence, and spiritual activities like    
meditation, mindfulness and forgiveness. They described a spiritual prac-
tice performed at an academic institute, in which God is called “the 
Source.” This term was used to accommodate several widely varying 
theistic traditions. The rationale behind this accommodation is the strong 
theistic assumption that God can be active in the lives of all people. 
Jones (2006) opposed the thinking in terms of religion and theism:  
 
As a Christian, I am a particularist; my faith is real not (first) because of a real 
and universal human capacity to engage the transcendent, but because God 
really became man 2000 years ago and lived, died, and rose again. (p. 256)  
 
He preferred to view religion as a sometimes useful abstraction rather 
than a universal phenomenon. 
 
Ethical Constraints 
In the expositions of some, the application of spiritual techniques was re-
stricted by certain ethical constraints. Nelson and Wilson (1984) indi-
cated that the use of spiritual interventions is only allowed if therapists 
are working within the patients’ belief systems, and if they include spiri-
tual interventions in the treatment contract. In an article about coun-
seling Aboriginal North American people, Koverola (1992) dismissed 
proselytism as a violation of the client’s trust in the counselor. Tan 
(1994) formulated ethical issues in the form of pitfalls for the therapist, 
such as imposing religious beliefs or values on the client, providing in-
sufficient information, one-sidedly focusing on religious goals rather than 
therapeutic goals, lacking competence in religious affairs, arguing doctri-
nal issues instead of clarifying them, using spiritual resources to avoid 
painful issues, blurring boundaries between therapist and client, assum-
ing ecclesiastical authority inappropriately, and withdrawing medication 
with appeal to the sufficiency of religious interventions. Some years later, 
he emphasized as the key ethical guideline the requirement of obtaining 
informed consent from clients with full respect for their freedom to 
choose (Tan, 1996a). McMinn and McRay (1997) advanced their ethical 
considerations by way of asking questions. They asked whether it is legit-
imate to charge for work that has historically been viewed as part of pas-
toral care. And if insurance companies pay part of the client’s bill, what 
information should be given to them? Time-limited interventions are 
increasingly the standard of psychotherapeutic care. Is spiritual de-     
velopment a legitimate goal nowadays? They called these questions       
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troubling matters that demand careful consideration. Furthermore, they  
underlined the need of empirical evidence of the efficacy of spiritual in-
terventions. 
On another occasion, Tan (2003) referred to the ethical guidelines  
advanced by Richards and Bergin (1997). They include avoiding dual 
relationships (religious leader and therapist), displacing or usurping 
religious authority, imposing religious values on clients, violating opera-
tional boundaries (between church and state), and practicing outside the 
boundary of professional competence. Tan joined McMinn and McRay 
(1997) in attaching importance to the empirical demonstration of the 
effectiveness. According to Garzon (2005), the incorporation of the Word 
of God into clinical care should only be performed with “appropriately 
religious Christians” who themselves desire the integration of spiritual 
resources. Finally, Hunter and Yarhouse (2009b) considered the use of 
religiously based interventions in a licensed, clinical setting. They ad-
dressed the risk of role identity confusion and billing issues. Some think 
to find the solution in practicing additional religiously based interven-
tions in a different setting such as an office space at a church. But, as 
Hunter and Yarhouse pointed out, here again the question of who pays 
for the service, the insurance company or the client, should be clarified. 
They recalled Entwistle’s (2004b) guideline that within the framework of 
a spiritual ministry services should not be billed. They repeated 
McMinn’s (1996) recommendation to inform the client of the possibility 
to receive similar service at a lesser cost or even no cost at some   
churches. Their final emphasis was on informed consent about the na-
ture, implications and financial consequences of religiously based inter-
ventions. In one of his contributions, Entwistle (2009) urged that ethical 
and legal issues be handled with caution, especially when the proposed 
interventions stand somewhere between recognized secular treatment 
and specifically religious guidance. 
 
Critique and Caution 
Spiritual interventions in psychotherapy are welcomed by many as a way 
of integrating mental health care and Christian faith. However, criticism 
against this development was also raised. Vande Kemp (1982b) under-
pinned her hesitations by stressing a clinical rationale for the distinction 
between the psychological and the spiritual. She does recognize corre-
spondences, however. The spiritual processes of justification, regen-
eration and sanctification capacitate the person to pursue psychological 
wholeness. On the other hand, it is of importance to approach the psyche 
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on its own terms, because there are many aspects of the psyche that are 
not addressed by biblical anthropology. 
The critique by Sorenson (1995) delved somewhat deeper. He tried to 
apply the implications of Gerald May’s concept of willingness. In his Will 
and Spirit, May (1982) opposed willingness to willfulness. Willingness 
has to do with surrender, willfulness with control and the will for power. 
Spirituality focuses on willingness, and psychology on willfulness, cf. the 
endeavors of coping, happiness, and growth. Because of these contrary 
aims, psychology and religion cannot be integrated. Efforts to do so end 
up in a psychologized religion “denuded of its legitimately transcendent 
focus by a psychology run amok with willfulness” (Sorenson, 1995, p. 
332). This is not integration, but absorption of religion into psychology. 
The only integration that does full justice to religion is a more spiritual-
ized psychology of personal relationships, including empathy, gratitude 
and doxology (laudation) (cf. Sorenson, 1996b). In the same vein, Ent-
wistle (2009) opposed the reduction of religious belief to its pragmatic 
value. Spirituality may not be explored simply as a utilitarian force for 
personal improvement, but it may function as a legitimate encounter 
between persons, religious communities, and God. Meanwhile, dealing 
with biological, psychological and social forces remains the core business 
of psychology. Like Sorenson and May, Entwistle acknowledged the dan-
gers of reducing religious belief to a therapeutic activity. 
There is also an approach from the opposite direction, however, view-
ing therapy as a spiritual event. Documentation is given in the next sec-
tion, related to the names of Buber, Benner, and others. 
McMinn and McRay (1997) approached the matter from another an-
gle. They listed the possible benefits of praying aloud with a client. They 
mentioned  strengthening of the psychotherapeutic relationship, reduc-
tion of the inherent power distinction, possible enhancement of the cli-
ent’s spiritual life and modeling of healthy interpersonal communication 
(in marital therapy). But the risks are possibly larger: distraction from 
emotions that need to be explored, intimacy at an unhealthy level, epis-
temological clashes about understanding health and healing. 
Some were also cautious but at the same time more positive about 
spiritual interventions. Finney and Malony (1985) admitted that it is 
inappropriate to use contemplative prayer simply for desensitization or 
anxiety reduction. It must be employed in a manner that is consistent 
with its religious meaning. They saw room for this in psychotherapy, 
because they thought that selfless love of God alone can be a treatment 
goal of both the Christian therapist and the Christian client. And Tan 
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(1987) urged his colleagues to not simplistically use whatever spiritual 
techniques work. Conversely, biblical approaches will reaffirm biblical 
perspectives on suffering, and are completely compatible with the ulti-
mate goal of counseling, which is holiness or Christ-likeness rather than 
temporal happiness. A goal like this includes being more open to receiv-
ing God’s love and grace and to overcoming anguish due to unbiblical 
beliefs.  
 
 
4.6 The Therapeutic Relationship 
 
In the first chapter we already paid attention to the impact of the thera-
peutic relationship on the therapeutic practice. Now we focus on the 
therapeutic relationship again, but from another angle. In chapter 1 we 
took notice of this therapeutic aspect in order to identify the importation 
of worldview influences, witting or unwitting, into the process through 
the relationship between therapist and client. In the present section, 
however, the relationship aspect is introduced from a specific worldview 
content, namely, that humans are relational beings, and that the thera-
peutic relationship should be a means to pursue the therapeutic goal. 
This section is mainly about this therapeutic operation of the relation-
ship. Closest to the function as worldview conductor is the sub-section 
“Religious and Ethical Values in Therapy,” which signals intentional and 
unintentional transference of norms and values in the therapeutic en-
counter. However, this sub-section joins the common intention of the 
section to survey the influence of the relationship in the therapeutic pro-
cess as an aspect of the how of psychotherapy. The focus is not on the 
prevalence of worldviews in the therapeutic relationship, as in chapter 1, 
but on the role of the relationship in the client’s process of change. This 
focus is due to an overall view on human nature itself. 
 
Relationship 
Already in 1973, Bellairs drew attention to the relational character of the 
therapeutic process. Quoting Paul Tournier (1968, p. 106), he called this 
process “the living experience of dialogue.” As the relationship grows, a 
sincere exchange of feelings evolves. In such a context of warmth and 
trust, ample space arises to discuss religious and moral issues. So, there 
need not be any tension within the therapist as to whether and when his 
or her values should be imposed on the client. Carter (1980) asserted 
that a biblically based therapy is a relationship oriented therapy, based 
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on an ongoing relationship between client and counselor. It finds its way 
between two unspiritual, carnal approaches in psychotherapy: legalisti-
cally structured therapy on the one hand, and impulse oriented or liber-
tarian therapy on the other. The former is to be found in directive,   
short-term cognitive behavioral therapy with the primary responsibility 
lying with the therapist; the latter is characterized by unspecific goals, a 
unilateral responsibility for the client alone, relativity of values, focus on 
emotions, a reflecting and interpreting style, and a long-term period. 
Behind this loom the shadows of Albert Ellis and Carl Rogers, the found-
ing fathers of two well-known types of therapy. Vanderploeg (1981b) 
understood the therapeutic relationship as covenantal and as an affirma-
tion of God’s election. In this relationship clients are universally sup-
ported in enhancing their relationships. 
White (1984) was the first to employ the conceptualization of internal 
object relations to understand the dynamic interrelationship between 
self, God, and significant others. His model emphasizes the primal im-
portance of the client–therapist relationship, and it stimulates psycho-
logical research and biblical study aiming at a clearer conception of how 
one’s need for relationship with God is displayed in various aspects of 
human relating. In line with this approach, Gaultiere (1990) defined the 
qualified therapist as a good enough object mediating God’s love for the 
client. By utilizing the client’s temporary dependence on the therapist, 
the therapist may enable the client to make the transition from depend-
ence on visible but imperfect parental figures to reliance on the invisible, 
perfectly loving God. Appealing to recent developments in psychothera-
peutic theory, Olthuis (1994a) supported a relational psychotherapeutic 
model as well. For this he referred to object relations theory, self-
psychology, and family systems models. He deemed such relational mod-
els congenial to the Christian faith, and distinguished three core features 
in it: empathy, restory-ing, and transformation, in a setting of mutuality 
in which both therapist and counselee share and grow (Olthuis, 1994b). 
Vande Kemp (1996), too, appreciated the recent attention to object rela-
tions theory by Christian psychologists as a promise that Christian psy-
chology will be a psychology of persons. She also appealed to the psycho-
analytic intersubjective theory of Stolorow et al. (1987) which highlights 
the interplay between the different subjective worlds of the observer and 
the observed. It opens the eye to the phenomenon that persons-in-
relation constantly influence each other’s reality, whether in the thera-
peutic situation, or in the world at large. 
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 LaMothe (1998) however, criticized the utilization of object relations 
theory to undergird the relational and religious profile of some kinds of 
psychotherapy. He feared a reduction of the reality content of God’s rep-
resentations when the concept of illusory transitional objects is applied 
to God representations. In my own words, God is really present in the 
witness of a minister, in the Lord’s Supper, or in the contributions of a 
Christian therapist. The concept of transitional objects cannot do justice 
to this reality. He quoted Rizzuto (1979) who asserted that God, psycho-
logically speaking, is an illusory transitional object.6 LaMothe contended 
that intersubjectively held religious symbols or sacred objects are shared 
and vital objects rather than transitional ones, without however specify-
ing this assertion. 
More generally, McMinn and McRay (1997) admitted that the thera-
peutic relationship is a vital part of treatment outcome, and stressed the 
importance of the personal qualities of the therapist that shape his or her 
ability. Wright and Strawn (2010) introduced Peter Shabad as the inte-
grator of relational psychoanalysis, object relations, self-psychology, and 
philosophical existentialism. However, they attributed to him individual-
istic and emotivist assumptions, that is, they blamed him for grounding 
life on something as variable as feelings and experience without doing 
justice to the serious commitments and obligations living life entails. The 
relational orientation should be corrected by providing it with direction 
and placing it within the Christian tradition. Strawn (2007) called for 
another correction or completion. He acknowledged the importance of 
relational models of psychotherapy but also pleaded for attention to the 
harder part of being human, that is, the real needs, motivations and 
drives around sex and aggression.  
 
Religious and Ethical Values in Therapy 
If the therapeutic relationship is an important given in psychotherapy, 
then this relationship is a means that can be employed to reach the   
 
6
  This does not mean that God does not exist, however. Illusion is not the same as 
delusion. Psychologically speaking, illusion refers to the fact that a conviction is 
not derived from sense perception but relates to personal wishes. Later on, Riz-
zuto (1996) asserted that psychology and psychoanalysis do not have the epis-
temological competence to affirm or deny God’s existence. In the transitional 
space the profound conviction of the believer is located that his or her experi-
ence is not only an intra-psychic phenomenon but the actual and internally per-
ceptible relationship with a living God. 
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therapeutic goal. However, it is also possible that all kinds of unintended 
influences occur that remain out of control. Both may be true of religious 
and ethical values cherished by the therapist. In what way and to what 
extent did the contributors to the two journals take these processes into 
consideration? In the same vein as Bellairs (1973, see above, under “Re-
lationship,” Amundson and Willson (1973) faced the fact that therapists 
cannot avoid applying their values in the therapeutic situation. Here they 
opposed Rogers with his assumption of non-directive therapy. The very 
function of getting involved already implies that therapists must incorpo-
rate their values into the situation. In the same sense, Edwards (1976) 
opposed Rogers’s contention. Therapy cannot be a value free enterprise 
but should be appreciated as a moral enterprise in which the values of 
the therapist and those of the culture he represents permeate the thera-
peutic relationship. Edwards stated that research evidence indicates that 
clients change in the direction of the therapist’s values. Prater (1982) 
acknowledged that psychotherapy is a value laden process guided by the 
moral choices of the client, the clinician and the community at large. 
McMinn (1984) cited Bergin (1980) who stated that values are an inevi-
table and pervasive part of psychotherapy, and that therapeutic change 
processes are affected by value laden factors. Moreover, in 1980 Bergin 
assumed that two value systems dominated the mental health profes-
sions, namely, humanism and clinical pragmatism, both excluding reli-
gious values. As McMinn continued in agreement with Bergin, values of 
mental health professionals are in contrast with values of many of their 
clients. Clinicians should openly acknowledge the fact that they are im-
plementing their own value systems, and they should be explicit about 
the values they hold, at the same time respecting the values of others. He 
argued that it is widely accepted that therapists’ values do affect the  
values of their clients. This value transfusion is a basic element of thera-
py. So, a proselytism without consent should be avoided. As an example, 
McMinn referred to Ellis’s opinion about the irrational character of guilt 
feelings overruling a theist’s conviction of guilt as a potential change 
agent. 
Tjeltveit (1992) spoke in a similar vein about ethical issues as inher-
ent in psychotherapy. He thought that therapists function as applied ethi-
cists, as psychotherapy is inextricably ethical in nature. Furthermore, he 
suggested that theology, including Christian ethics, may be able to clarify 
the role of values in psychotherapy, by distinguishing between value (a) 
in the sense of meaning, that is, what is valuable in life’s ultimate context, 
and (b) in the sense of challenging traditional approaches in secular   
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psychotherapy that rule out the significance of religion (Tjeltveit, 1991). 
Tan (1994) warned of the anti-religious sentiment of many secular thera-
pists, who presume that religious clients share nonreligious cultural  
values, and promote therapeutic conduct that contradicts the morals of 
evangelical clients. Wright and Strawn (2010) denounced the individual-
istic  moral claims inherent in psychoanalysis, such as autonomy, expres-
siveness, attention seeking, entitlement and self-centeredness, as obvious 
modes of being. It is essential to psychotherapy that it embodies an alter-
native moral frame challenging the one to which patients are committed. 
 If the therapeutic relationship is so important that it entails all kinds 
of value systems, and that even a part of the process is to modify the cli-
ent’s or patient’s value system, are there any conditions to be satisfied to 
obtain workable matches between therapists and patients? Edwards 
(1976) deemed patient–therapist value similarity important for the es-
tablishment of a therapeutic relationship in the early phase of therapy. 
He referred to some studies from the 1950s that adduce evidence for the 
thesis that deeply religious clients tend to lose confidence in therapy 
with a counselor who does not share the client’s religious belief system. 
The following references are about patients’ preference for Christian 
therapists and therapy’s effects. Although the issues of preference and 
effect are beyond the scope of this study, the results might be indicative 
for the measure of comfort and confidence the therapist brings to the 
patient, depending on sharing or not sharing the patients’ values. Re-
search by Dougherty and Worthington (1982) indicated that participat-
ing Christians, both conservative and moderate, preferred help from 
counselors who were perceived as having similar religious beliefs. Three 
years later a follow-up inquiry among students from psychology classes 
produced a somewhat more nuanced picture (Worthington and Gas-
coyne, 1985). In general, participants preferred counselors who had be-
liefs similar to their own. However, the degree of preference apparently 
differed among two types of Christians: those defining their Christianity 
as due to a personal relationship with Jesus, and those defining it as due 
to loving their fellow humans, the degree being higher for the former 
group. 
A study among 250 undergraduates by Wyatt and Johnson (1990) 
mitigated the overall picture even more. It appeared that information 
about therapists’ religious values did not generally affect client percep-
tions and expectations of counselors when other information was also 
furnished, except for strongly religious persons. Martinez (1991) investi-
gated the effect on client improvement of therapist–client convergence 
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and similarity of religious values. The results were partly ambiguous, and 
partly contrary to the results of earlier studies performed by Worthing-
ton. Clients rated greater self-improvement when their therapist had 
dissimilar religious values (which is inconsistent with Worthington’s 
outcomes) or was more theologically conservative than the client prior to 
therapy. Therapists rated greater client improvement when their client 
was less theologically conservative at pre-testing (which is consistent 
with the client’s estimation) or had religious values or orientations con-
verging toward the therapist’s religious values and orientations (which is 
inconsistent with the client’s opinion). Inquiry by Pan, Deng, Tsai, and 
Yuan (2013) suggests that counselors of a secular context can gain the 
confidence of clients with religious wants in the initial sessions. Many of 
these counselors would qualify to develop religious knowledge and skills, 
and apply them successfully. 
Finally, Hathaway (2009) referred to Worthington and Sandage 
(2002) for the assertion of positive benefit gained from matching clients 
and therapists in terms of religious congruence. 
 
Incarnational Love and Containment 
In the therapeutic relationship the therapist’s position and attitude is 
delineated by some as similar to the position and attitude Jesus took as 
the Son of God by incarnating in a man of flesh and blood, and dealing 
with people while living on earth. As Benner (1983) put it, the therapist’s 
analogous incarnation is more than empathy, respect, congruence, and 
acceptance. It is entering into the life and experience of the sufferer,   
taking the suffering upon oneself, and then overcoming it. Referring to 
Saretsky (1981), he described the psychotherapist as a container for the 
sickness of the patient. To be a container, he or she has to accept the  
projections and transferences of the patient and bear them patiently, 
including the pain this can produce as a consequence of unreasonable 
reproaches. By containing it he or she absorbs the pain and the confusion 
without retaliation or defensiveness, and offers safety and strength. It 
can help the patient to accept his or her split off parts in the internal self-
representations, because he/she experiences the acceptance of these 
parts by the therapist. In 1989, Benner spoke of an incarnate style 
wherein therapists accept their patients on the patients’ terms and make 
themselves available to be used and even abused by the patient. This 
style is most closely akin to the way God relates to us. Souder (1986) 
derived the containment terminology from Bion (1963), who pictured 
the infant’s overwhelming fear that it is dying, which is communicated to 
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the mother container. She “detoxicates” it, that is, modifies it so that the 
infant may take it back into its own personality in a tolerable form. The 
ideal therapist container reflects the ideal mother container, and is in-
spired by Jesus as the Infinite Container. Like Souder did, Vitz and Mango 
(1997b) applied this function of the therapist to borderline personality 
disorder patients. They joined Gartner (1992), a disciple of Kernberg 
who pointed out that the splitting defense provides a dramatic challenge 
for the therapist to show that he or she has not given up on the patient   
in spite of the patient’s frequent expressions of hostility. This therapist 
support allows the patient to re-inject the split off negative self-
representations without overwhelming or destroying the good self-
representations. Such containing of the borderline patient’s aggression 
without retaliating or withdrawing is an act of love. Olthuis (2006) fol-
lowed Benner (1983) in calling the incarnation a metaphor for psycho-
therapy. Olt-huis spoke of “with-ing,” implying that even as God is with 
us, as Immanuel, so we are to be with others. “Suffering-with” is a healing 
connection of the therapist with the patient, an act of empowerment able 
to revitalize the human spirit that is paralyzed by pain, abuse, and other 
circumstances. It involves connecting with one’s self and one’s own 
woundedness, as a prerequisite for empathizing with other people’s suf-
fering, in the same way as Henri Nouwen (1979) talked of the “wounded 
healer.”7 Similarly, Terrell (2007) fostered an intentionally incarnational 
and relational approach to psychotherapy. The descriptive term incarna-
tional underscores the intensity of the dynamic therapeutic relationship, 
which is able to make room for all imperfections, failures, and even the 
worst and most humiliating experiences of the patient through the loving 
acceptance by the therapist. 
 
Defense Mechanisms and (Counter) Transference 
As already apparent in the container role of the therapist, the relation-
ship between therapist and patient/client is a dynamic one. Defenses, 
transference and counter transference play their parts, which the thera-
pist should deal with professionally. Westendorp (1982) notes that in 
many training programs for young psychiatrists religion is ignored. He 
cites a message by the American Psychiatric Association (1975) that  
 
7
  The notion of the wounded healer is derived from Jung, and inspired by Kierke-
gaard (Podmore, 2009). 
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pinpoints the consequences of this shortcoming for the professional func-
tioning of the psychiatrist: 
 
Ignoring the subject of religion (in many training programs the subject is ta-
boo) leaves his own religious world as untouched as that of his patients. In 
consequence, the opportunity for integration of religious beliefs or attitudes, 
at the personal level, into the emotional growth pattern provided by psy-   
chiatric training is lost to their [sic] future professional competence. This may 
engender insecurity or defensiveness in dealing with religious issues which 
may arise in working with patients. (pp. 43-44) 
 
Bergin and Payne (1991) strengthened the objection against this pos-
sible deficiency. If the therapist’s moral frame of reference is not an-
chored to something like a spirituality of religion, then relativeness,   
opportunism and arbitrariness are lurking. Defense mechanisms and 
self-justifications may be used by the therapist to determine the next step 
in the process. 
On the other hand, Narramore (1994) dealt with resistances that may 
be supported by the patient’s religious belief system. Therapists may be 
tempted to either avoid confronting the resistances for fear of (being ac-
cused of) undermining the patient’s faith or to indeed undermine the 
patient’s faith or at least interpret it as irrelevant to the patient’s health. 
Implicitly then, Narramore also dealt with therapists’ resistances. Like all 
patients, Christian patients frame their resistances within the context of 
their worldviews. Patients may resort to Bible passages about Satan to 
support their projections of warded off parts of themselves into an ex-
ternal object. They may say: “We only need the Bible,” to keep the thera-
pist at a distance, or: “I just think I ought to take my problems to God.” 
Reluctant to deal with the past, a patient may argue: “The Bible says we 
should forget the past” (Philippians 3:13-14). And in the case of sexual 
abuse by the father, one could claim: “I am supposed to be submissive” 
(Ephesians 5:22), or: “Christians shouldn’t be angry” (Ephesians 4:26). 
Narramore gave advice on how to deal with any kind of resistance, in-
cluding this specific kind of resistance supported by religious considera-
tions. 
Following Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood (1987), Baker (1999) 
understood resistance as an aspect of the intersubjective field between 
therapist and patient, which is affected by both. This understanding was 
viewed as a great help in the treatment of difficult patients. Gooden, 
Leung, and Hindman (2000) connected the dynamics of the therapeutic 
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relationship with attachment theory. The therapist should be aware of 
the dynamics of each patient’s attachment style, each style having impli-
cations for the transference and countertransference, and asking for a 
specific way of responding. Avoidant clients are cut off from their feelings 
and avoid the encounter with the therapist in an attempt to defend 
against a repeat of past hurts. Anxious/ambivalent patients, on the con-
trary, are always in touch with feelings, and have difficulty modulating 
them. The two types of patient demand different approaches by the ther-
apist. In both cases, however, the therapist has to deal with the patient’s 
transference that centers on the configuration of the therapist with dis-
appointing or abandoning figures from the patient’s past. The therapist 
may help the patient change his or her working model by interpreting the 
models as they appear in the transference to the therapist and significant 
others. The attachment theory also provides a framework for exploring 
the patient’s relation to God in terms of secure and insecure attachments. 
Watson (2007) focused on periods of stagnation in the therapy pro-
cess caused by the fact that in some way both patient and therapist are 
resisting. This requires self-reflection on the part of the therapist and 
willingness to surrender some aspects of his or her own defenses and 
make himself or herself more vulnerable personally and emotionally. It 
makes the therapeutic relationship more mutual, reciprocal, and inter-
subjective, and that is just how it should be. Campbell (2007) asked at-
tention for transference and counter transference issues in supervision, 
defining them as the tendency to respond with the emotional residue of 
previous relationships that were characterized by hurts or traumatic 
experiences. The influence of these dynamics on the therapeutic relation-
ship may reflect the client’s and the therapist’s experience of their rela-
tionship with God. In accordance with current relational psychoanalytic 
work, Parlow and Goodman (2010) viewed counter transference as a 
primary helping tool for transformation. When damaged bonds of love 
are being reworked in a new therapeutic relationship through mutually 
engaged remembering, repeating and resolving, love can be set free and 
the religious self renewed. 
 
Relationality and Spirituality 
Christian authors linked the relational character of the psychotherapeu-
tic process with the relational character of human nature and human’s 
relationship with God. In the first sub-section of this section about the 
therapeutic relationship, addressing relationality, we already saw that 
object relations theory plays a prominent role in this connection between 
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relationality and spirituality. I refer to the abstracts of the contributions 
by White (1984), Gaultiere (1990), and Wright and Strawn (2010) in  
that sub-section without repeating them. Jones (1997), referring to the 
leading object relations theorists, saw a promising perspective in con-
temporary relational psychoanalytic theory in that it provides new op-
portunities in the dialogue between psychology and religion by focusing 
on how religious forms embody various relational themes. Watson 
(2000), on the other hand, appealed to attachment literature, and 
claimed that psychotherapy, when establishing a relational space, ad-
dressing interpersonal fears and fostering love and a loving atmosphere, 
serves the process of spiritual formation for the person moving toward 
Christ. Strawn and Leffel (2001) involved the theory of internal object 
relations for structuring personality and religious experience. Hall (2004, 
2007b) offered a specific contribution by combining the different at-
tachment patterns that shape people’s relationship with God with cogni-
tive science that affiliates implicit relational representations and 
knowledge with sub-symbolic codes of emotional information processing 
in the brain. He also connected Fairbairn’s object relations theory and 
Bowlby’s attachment theory in a model of psychotherapy that links rela-
tionality with spirituality (Hall, 2007a) 
 Without referring to specific psychological theories, Olthuis (1999) 
appealed to postmodernism with its emphasis on difference and unique-
ness in his attempt to develop an integrative psychotherapy that is inte-
grally and thoroughly spiritual, rather than just secular psychology plus 
prayer. Neither reason nor method but love – the love of God – creates 
healing connections with ourselves, others, creation, and God. This does 
not mean that method is unimportant, but that psychotherapy is a here-
and-now, moment-to-moment spontaneous interplay which should not 
be directed and controlled rigidly. Watson (2006), in his appreciation of 
Martin Buber, went one step further. For Buber and his adept Watson, 
psychotherapy as it should be is spiritual as such, because it is a sacred 
encounter between therapist and patient. Buber rejected a radical sub-
jectivism that blocks access to the “transcendent other,” and results in 
spiritual blindness to the living presence of God. Watson observed that 
Buber’s relational approach to psychotherapy played a major role in the 
development of spiritual approaches in psychotherapy. Barsness (2006) 
too described Buber’s significance for the therapeutic encounter. He ex-
plained that in Buber’s view God is present in an encounter between 
humans. God exceeds our comprehension but is wholly present and ex-
perienced in relation to another. Entwistle (2009) understood Buber to 
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say that the relationship between therapist and client can actually be 
seen as a legitimate spiritual encounter. In the same vein, Rogers (2007) 
characterized psychotherapy that focuses on the process and the here-
and-now as a sacred space where clients can connect to new under-
standings of themselves, others, and God. He derived this interpretation 
from object relations theory that turns away from the mechanistic focus 
on classic Freudian theory and emphasizes the impact of early relation-
ships and transitional objects representing the primary objects (principal 
caregivers) on human development and well-being. Our concept and 
views of God are construed directly out of these early experiences. In 
therapy, the here-and-now encounter with the therapist may serve as a 
transitional psychic space for clarifying and discarding older representa-
tions, and for approaching the sacred. The process oriented approach in 
object relations is deemed as spiritual as prayer. Both techniques, the 
object relations approach and prayer, evoke something transcendent and 
transformational. 
Sandage and Shults (2007) bound relationality, spirituality, and trans-
formation together in the therapeutic alliance (cf. Shults and Sandage, 
2006). Spiritual transformation involves pursuing new goals, e.g. spiritu-
al intimacy with God (vs. reluctant obedience), or new pathways toward 
one’s goals, e.g. surrender (vs. determination), that is, changing the ways 
of relating to the sacred. Parker, Dewberry, Lloyd, and Smith (2009), 
referring to Karen Horney, highlighted three neurotic trends in the rela-
tionship to God: moving away from, moving against, and moving toward 
God. Moving toward designates a neurotic need for affection and ap-
proval, and the solution of self-effacing compliance. Moving against rep-
resents the neurotic need for power, control, perfection, and prestige, 
and the solution of aggressively exploiting others. Moving away hints at 
the neurotic need to restrict one’s life within narrow boundaries, and at 
the solution of resignation, withdrawal, and detachment. These neurotic 
tendencies may be applied to unsound relationships with God. 
 
 
4.7 Institutional Environment 
 
The last but not least aspect of the how of psychotherapy is the institu-
tional environment in which the practice can prosper. The institutional 
setting is fraught with norms and values, as we saw in the first chapter 
(section 1.2). In the same chapter we observed, however, that in the inte-
gration debate as described in Psychology and Christianity: Five Views, 
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this institutional factor was underexposed. Only Powlison (2010d) men-
tioned it as one of the relevant segments of counseling, which in his view 
should be Biblical Counseling. He assigned the church as its institutional 
environment. In the journals under scrutiny, a few contributions ac-
counted for the importance of this institutional aspect, some only de-
scriptive, others more directive. 
 In a descriptive way, Worthington and Scott (1983) reported an in-
quiry among Christian counselors in Christian and non-Christian settings. 
They found that counselors in Christian settings tended to define prob-
lems in spiritual terms and to set spiritual goals for religious clients more 
often than counselors in secular settings. 
 Eck (1996) related the institutional factor to the various views of the 
relationship between psychology and theology. He worked with another 
classification of the different approaches but the five views introduced in 
chapter 1 can be recognized in it. He argued for a varied application of 
the different views, depending on someone’s position in the field. In a 
secular clinical institute the Levels of Explanation approach may be ap-
propriate, in a private Christian counseling practice, on the other hand, 
there is room for an approach that explicitly employs a Christian world-
view in the treatment of a religious client, he asserted. 
 In a more directive, if not destructive, way, Farnsworth (1980)         
impeached the culture of professionalism as a major factor in the secular-
ization of Christian counseling. He opposed the lordship of professional-
ism to the lordship of Jesus Christ, and concluded that Christian         
counselors and counseling centers should free themselves from the sov-
ereignty of the mental health profession, and should accept accountabil-
ity to the Christian community. 
 The connection with the church can be found in other reflections as 
well. Jones (1996) identified the church as a center of healing. He won-
dered whether institutional psychotherapy as a context for healing may-
be violates the church’s healing identity. Psychologists and pastoral care 
ministers should cooperate in preventative and reparative healing work, 
in which both should be accountable to the church. Similarly, Farnsworth 
and Regier (1997) conceived of a caring relationship that is not contract 
based but covenant based, in other words, not transactional but trans-
formational. They recommended partnering with local churches in de-
veloping caring communities for the promotion of the transformational 
process.  
From another angle, Sorenson (1998) observed that outpatient psy-
chotherapy is increasingly viewed as a dying enterprise, because of the 
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decreasing reimbursement by managed care organizations. He opted for 
applied integration of psychology and faith which is personal. This 
means, among other things, that it is intersubjective, including the com-
munal subjectivity of the church (Sorenson, 1996b). 
 
 
4.8 Mutual Differences in the How 
 
The different approaches to the relationship between psychology and 
Christianity are reflected in different views of the how of psychotherapy. 
In this section we try to map these differences, as they appear in the ar-
ticles referred to in this chapter. The demarcation lines are not sharp, 
however, and inevitably the grouping of transitional forms preserves       
a subjective point. With this restriction a schematic chart will be at-
tempted. 
 First, some distinguishing characteristics are given of psychotherapy 
according to the five approaches represented in chapter 1 (section 1.4). 
At the one end of the spectrum is the Levels of Explanation View. Here, 
psychotherapy is mainly focused on psychological processes and distor-
tions with the client or patient. Then, in the Integration View both psy-
chological and spiritual issues are addressed. They are dealt with as two 
distinct levels of interest. Spirituality can be addressed in two different 
ways. It can be utilized as a tool for sound psychological functioning, im-
plying that mental health in medical and social terms is the goal of ther-
apy. We call this Integration A. But the reverse also occurs, to wit, that 
sound psychological functioning is viewed as a stepping stone to spiritual 
functioning, implying that the ultimate goal of therapy is sound spiritual 
functioning. This is called Integration B. A combination of both ap-
proaches is possible as well. The Christian Psychology View subsumes 
therapy under soul care as it has been practiced in the Christian tradition 
throughout the ages. Psychological and spiritual functioning are seen as 
one undifferentiated reality. Here, the restored relationship with God is 
the leading perspective. Then, the Transformational Psychology View 
aims at the spiritual transformation process of therapist and client, focus-
ing on higher levels of spiritual functioning. It is more experientially and 
less cognitively oriented than the Christian Psychology View. Finally, the 
Biblical Counseling View denies the legitimacy of secular psychology, and 
reduces problems in psychic functioning to either neuropsychiatric or 
spiritual causes. In this view biblical counseling is the only legitimate 
therapy. 
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 The last column is dedicated to the institutional embedding of thera-
peutic practice, an aspect the importance of which is scarcely accounted 
for in the five views and mentioned in only a few contributions. 
 
Year  Authors                     L. of E.  Int. A   Int. B   Chr. Ps.  Transf.  Bibl. C.     Inst. 
1973  Amundson & Willson        x 
1973  Bellair                x 
1973b  Narramore              x        x 
1974  Wilson              x  x 
1976  Edwards             x  x 
1977  Bufford              x 
1978  Pecheur              x 
1978  Pfrimmer              x 
1979  Bolin & Goldberg          x 
1980  Carter              x        x 
1980  Ellens                 x 
1980  De Graaff                x 
1980  Farnsworth                     x 
1980  Propst              x 
1981b  Vanderploeg                x 
1982  Dougherty & Worthington       x 
1982  Prater               x        x 
1982b  Vande Kemp             x 
1983  Benner              x 
1983  Worthington & Scott                  x 
1984  McMinn              x 
1984    Nelson & Wilson            x 
1984  Pecheur & Edwards           x 
1984  Petty                           x 
1984  White              x        x 
1985  Finney & Malony           x        x 
1985    Worthington & Gascoyne  x 
1986 Souder              x 
1987 Tan              x        x 
1989 Benner                 x 
1989 Craigie & Tan             x 
1989 Jones              x 
1989  McMinn & Lebold           x 
1990  Gaultiere                 x 
1990  Lipsker & Oordt            x 
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Year  Authors                     L. of E.  Int. A   Int. B   Chr. Ps.  Transf.   Bibl. C.    Inst. 
1991  Bergin & Payne           x 
1991  Jones               x 
1991  Moon                  x 
1991  Tjeltveit              x 
1992  Koverola              x 
1992  Tjeltveit             x 
1994  Johnson, W.B., et al.          x 
1994  McMinn              x 
1994b  Olthuis                             x 
1994  Tan               x 
1994  Worthington             x        x 
1995  Sorenson               x 
1996  Eck                        x 
1996  Jones                        x 
1996  Kunst & Tan               x 
1996a  Tan               x        x 
1996  Vande Kemp             x                 x                    x 
1997  Clouse              x 
1997  Farnsworth & Regier                               x           x 
1997  Hall & Hall             x        x 
1997  Hurley & Berry            x 
1997  Johnson                    x 
1997  Jones, J.W.             x 
1997  Lattea                     x 
1997  McMinn & McRay           x 
1997b  Vitz & Mango            x 
1998a  Johnson                     x 
1998  LaMothe               x 
1998  Roth                    x 
1998  Sorenson                                x 
1999  Baker                 x 
1999  Coe                          x 
1999  Hawkins, Tan & Turk        x 
1999  Olthuis                         x 
1999  Tan                x 
2000  Gooden, Leung, & Hindman x 
2000  Mangis         x 
2000  Roberts                     x 
2000  McMinn & Hall            x       x 
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Year  Authors                     L. of E.  Int. A   Int. B   Chr. Ps.  Transf.   Bibl. C.    Inst. 
2000  Watson, R.A.                   x 
2001  Strawn & Leffel             x        x 
2001  Tan               x        x 
2001  Watson & Mangis         x 
2001  Yarhouse              x        x 
2002  Barrette                 x 
2002  Benner                x 
2002a  Moon               x        x 
2002b  Moon (Benner)              x 
2003  Sperry              x        x 
2003  Tan               x        x 
2004  Hall                             x 
2005  Garzon              x 
2006  Barsness                            x 
2006  Beck             x 
2006  Olthuis                            x 
2006  Roberts                     x 
2007  Campbell              x 
2007b  Hall                             x 
2007  Rogers                            x 
2007  Sandage & Shults                         x 
2007  Strawn              x 
2007  Tan               x        x 
2007  Terrell              x 
2007  Watson           x 
2009  Entwistle            x 
2009  Hathaway             x 
2009  Latini                             x 
2009  Moncher & Titus         x 
2010  Parlow & Goodman           x 
2010  Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt                 x 
2010  Wright & Strawn           x 
2011  Johnson                      x 
2012  Roberts                      x 
2013  Pan, Deng, Tsai, & Yuan          x 
2014  Strawn, Wright, & Jones        x 
2014  Parker             x        x         x                   x 
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Table 1 Survey of the different orientations of the contributions about psycho-
therapy and Christianity mentioned in this chapter. 
   L. of E. = Levels of Explanation View 
Int. A = Integration View, spirituality being a means to psychological 
well-being 
Int. B = Integration View, psychotherapy being a means to spiritual 
functioning 
Chr. Ps. = Christian Psychology View 
   Transf. = Transformational Psychology View 
   Bibl.C. = Biblical Counseling View 
   Inst. = Paying attention to the institutional context 
 
Notable in this table are the next particulars. The Integration View 
that applies spirituality to psychological well-being has the most sup-
porters, followed by the other species of the Integration View that views 
spiritual functioning as its goal. Often these two versions go together. The 
other remarkable thing is the rise in the course of time of Christian Psy-
chology View contributions and, even more so, of those of Transfor-
mational Psychology. 
There are three details that ask for some explanation. One article 
(Wilson, 1974) is inconsistent in that it defends a Biblical Counseling-like 
position in its theory, tracing psychological malfunctioning to actual sin, 
but, on the other hand, an integration view in the inquiry, adding spiri-
tual techniques to standard psychotherapeutic interventions. Two other 
papers (Vande Kemp, 1996; Parker, 2014) connect the Levels of Explana-
tion View with integrational and transformational approaches of therapy. 
Vande Kemp uses phenomenological and existential insights as a step-
ping stone to an exposition of therapy that can be called transformational 
before its day; Parker leaves all options open in therapy, starting with a 
Levels of Explanation View on epistemology. Both authors show that 
dividing lines can be permeable. 
 
 
4.9 Why Should Psychotherapy Be What It Is? 
 
The Role of Anthropology 
To answer the question as to why in the view of Christian theorists psy-
chotherapy is what it is, and works the way it works, we can point to    
the influence of anthropology that is manifest in the characterizations    
of Christian oriented psychotherapy in distinction from prevailing           
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psychotherapy, as they were reported in the previous sections. There, the  
common denominator of psychotherapy in a Christian context can be 
summarized as the importance of spirituality as the experience of the 
relationship with God for therapist and client, and from that, the mutual 
relationship between therapist and client. This accent is justified with 
reference to biblical anthropological notions such as being created in the 
image of God, being created as body and soul, and being created for lov-
ing relationships. 
However well anthropology can explain the overall distinction of 
Christian inspired psychotherapy from mainstream psychotherapy, it 
cannot explain the different positions taken within the integration debate 
that we have mapped in the previous section. The simple reason is that 
regarding anthropology there was not much disagreement. So, different 
approaches to psychotherapy cannot be explained by differences in the 
adopted anthropologies. Only one argument can be detected in the de-
bate, to wit, Vande Kemp’s (1982a, 1982b) preference for a trichotomy of 
body, soul, and spirit. She underlined the importance of this distinction 
by arguing that psychopathology should not be confused with a spiritual 
problem (section 3.2). Here it may be asked what came first, the biblically 
justified trichotomy, or the understanding of psychopathology as a sepa-
rate category. In other words, it is not a foregone conclusion that her 
position on psychotherapy as a distinct practice was prompted by a 
Christian anthropology, and not, conversely, that her anthropology was 
motivated by her psychological view. 
 A recent development can be identified in the Integration View on 
psychotherapy. This is about differentiating the integration of Christian-
ity and psychology or psychotherapy into multiple tradition-based inte-
gration designs: Roman-Catholic, Pentecostal, Reformed, Wesleyan, and 
others (Strawn, Wright, & Jones, 2014). The authors argue for an anthro-
pology in which humans are part of communities with their own tradi-
tions, values, virtues, purposes and practices, and in which much of our 
self-understanding is precognitive. It is rooted in a shared narrative that 
is handed down by tradition, and that shapes us before any conscious 
reflection on it. This kind of self-understanding should be articulated in a 
tradition-based integration of Christianity on the one hand, and psychol-
ogy and psychotherapy on the other. 
 
Cultural Backgrounds 
Cultural factors may play a part and we need to take them into considera-
tion.  Reflections on cultural backgrounds of psychotherapy are scarce, 
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and historical inquiries of cultural developments even more so. In 1983, 
Dueck offered a historical perspective on the use of Western psychology 
in cross-cultural settings. He drew attention to the implicit bias in West-
ern epistemology within psychotherapy. Mainstream American psychol-
ogy displays the ethos of American culture in its implicit commitment to 
science, secularity, technology, capitalism, rationality, pluralism, and 
individualism. The psychologist who uses Western psychology in cross-
cultural situations should be wary of socializing members of a host cul-
ture into modernity. Dueck holds that the most relevant historical shift is 
the move from tradition to modern existence. Here he employs Tönnies’s 
famous distinction from 1887 between Gemeinschaft (community) and 
Gesellschaft (society). In the former, knowledge is based on tradition, 
faith and religion, while in the latter it is based on science and public 
opinion. The background is that in the modernization process traditional 
communities and their authoritative structures fall apart and succumb to 
rationalization and individualization. 
Benner (1989) distinguished three different periods in which the 
opinion about what psychotherapy is changed. In the very first part of the 
20th century psychotherapy is understood as treatment of disease by 
psychic methods, such as analysis of dreams, hypnosis, and suggestion. 
Here, psychotherapy is taken as psychosomatic medicine, and aims at 
healing of the body through the psyche. In the second understanding it is 
conceived as healing of the psyche; mind cure or mental healing being the 
main approach in psychoanalytic treatment. Later on, the meaning was 
broadened through the influence of the Emmanuel Movement8 and the 
Institute for Rankian Psychoanalysis.9 Psychotherapy was now taken to 
refer to healing through the use of mental, moral and spiritual methods. 
Benner did not confine himself to this short term explanation of the his-
tory of psychotherapy, however. He traced the roots of psychotherapy in 
the age-old religious tradition of the care of souls. He linked modern day 
psychotherapy with this tradition. With Neaman (1975) he noted a shift 
in present psychotherapy from the treatment of the mentally ill back to 
the aid of people with spiritual struggles. This corresponds with Jung’s 
 
8
  Started in the first decade of the 20th century in North-America as an attempt to 
combine spirituality with a kind of pre-psychoanalytic psychotherapy. 
9
  Established in the middle of the century; inspired by Otto Rank, a one-time disci-
ple and colleague of Freud, and member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, 
who emancipated from his mentor, and extended his interest to emotion, here-
and-now experience, relationship, and religion. 
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observation that patients force the psychotherapist into the role of the 
priest. 
Ridley (1986) reflected on the meaning of mental health, implying 
that psychotherapy focuses on mental health. He distinguished two inter-
pretations of mental health, one pretending to be culturally neutral, and 
the other aiming at cultural sensitivity. The former conception defines 
mental health with the help of a fixed adjustment–maladjustment contin-
uum of particular behavioral patterns. It implies a universal and immut-
able standard of normalcy and health which spans cultural-ethnic-racial 
lines. The latter conception, on the other hand, suggests that the cultural 
context defines its own norms of mental health. The first category draws 
heavily upon the medical model, while the second category, the more 
recent one, views cross-cultural counseling as a more appropriate   
method in which both the counselor and the counselee go through a 
unique learning form. Although Ridley did not focus on it, it will be clear 
that the cultural context defining its own norms of mental health is close 
to a   religious context defining its own norms of mental health. Here 
Ridley’s second conception comes close to Benner’s third understanding 
of psychotherapy. Consistent with this emphasis but not going as far as to 
define mental health by culture, Lownsdale (1997) called attention to the 
multicultural counseling movement that has been raising the mental 
health community’s awareness of how multicultural factors such as eth-
nicity, gender, and religion influence the client, the therapist, and the 
client–therapist relationship. 
 Instead of giving a sketch of the impact of culture on therapy, Beck 
(1990) proceeded the other way round, and outlined psychologizing 
influences that emanate from the therapeutic practice and affect the 
American culture at large. This psychotherapeutic flavor permeating 
society is characterized by the unspoken values to accept people as they 
are, to be sympathetic as you help them understand and accept them-
selves, and to assist them in making their own choices. In my words,  
people demand that the autonomy principle be respected in everyday 
life. This is just the opposite of the task of the former minister to impress 
God’s standards upon persons, Beck contended. Accordingly, Olthuis 
(1994b) offered a characterization of current psychotherapy by appeal-
ing to a picture drawn by Jerome Frank in 1975. Frank stated that despite 
their diversity all psychotherapies share values that accord primacy to 
individual self-fulfillment with a main concern for autonomous mastery 
over self and circumstance. The same kind of analysis was offered by Van 
Leeuwen (1996), not applying it to the American society at large, though, 
 CHAPTER 4. PSYCHOTHERAPY 159 
 
but focusing on the evangelical community. She signals a major change in 
attitude toward psychotherapy. Previously, evangelicals distinguished 
themselves by categorically refusing psychotherapy, but nowadays they 
rush to the therapist’s office. They represent a historically separatist and 
collectivist subculture, belatedly adopting the wider societal values of 
instrumental and expressive individualism, buying heavily into the thera-
peutic culture of feel-goodism, and being caught up in a cycle of over-
spending like everyone else, Van Leeuwen said. 
A similar voice was raised by Cooper (2006). Appealing to various so-
cial critiques, he attacked the excessively individualistic and even narcis-
sistic aspects of psychotherapy, and identified with Browning (1976) a 
questionable process of privatism and pietism in pastoral care, which he 
interpreted as a consequence of secular individualism that has become 
the dominant lifestyle of the day. There should however remain a com-
monly shared sense for normative values. Cooper’s concern was exempli-
fied by Moncher and Titus (2009) who criticized the positive psychology 
paradigm for rejecting any normative reference. It tries to establish char-
acter strength by the cultivation of matching virtues that are abstracted 
from moral norms. Cooper (2006) noticed, however, that throughout the 
last couple of decades this individualistic model of care has come under 
pressure in all Christian modalities. 
Still another aversion to prevailing approaches can be noted. Wright 
and Strawn (2010) signaled contemporary clinical psychology’s critique 
against psychotherapeutic theory for being obsessed with pathology. 
Positive psychology’s counter reaction is based on reappraisal of the 
importance of resiliency, strength, and the ability to make use of one’s 
resources. In the same vein, Lewis Hall, Langer, and McMartin (2010) 
thought that the profession sometimes suffered from a pragmatic hedon-
ism that sees pleasure as good and pain as bad, with clients being satu-
rated with a hedonistic culture. They joined the eudemonistic tradition of 
the virtuous life, and appealed to positive psychology’s research of the 
prevalent virtues in all cultures that seems to show similarities with the 
Pauline virtues of faith, hope, and love. 
 In 2004, Dueck returned to the cultural changes that are related to 
modernity. As he contrasted pre-modernity and modernity in 1983, he 
now set modernity against postmodernity (Dueck & Parsons, 2004). 
While modernists approach psychotherapy as an empirically verifiable 
system, postmodernists attach more importance to the process of the 
conversation than to controlled procedure. Appealing to the hermeneutic 
principle of fusing horizons of understanding, Dueck and Parsons       
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described the function of postmodern therapy as helping clients who 
have lost their way to reconstruct their worlds. So, therapists offer their 
alternative horizon of understanding in order to furnish material that 
clients might internalize and that might lead to revising their personal 
theories.  
Five years earlier, Olthuis (1999) advocated a postmodern Christian 
model for psychotherapy, opposed to modernism’s emphasis on method 
and control. The salient features are care instead of cure, art instead of 
science, adventure instead of treatment, and spiritual process instead of 
secular psychology plus prayer; the therapist is not responsible for     
others, but responsible with others. For the therapist this implies that 
listening is more important than talking, inviting more important than 
directing, encouraging than protecting, sharing than rescuing, being sen-
sitive than interpreting. This is at odds with the opinion of Vande Kemp 
(1998) that Christian therapies must be evaluated on the basis of ongo-
ing, basic scientific research. 
 
The Role of Epistemology 
The differences in appraisal of modernism and postmodernism bring us 
to the role of epistemology. Modernism is associated with a high valua-
tion of standardized epistemic procedures and quantitative measures as 
conditional for scientific knowledge. Those who appreciate this way of 
knowledge gathering as a reliable method, will also be positive about 
protocolled and evidence based treatments. On the other hand, theorists 
who are suspicious of uniform and generalized empirical results, and 
emphasize the uniqueness of every single individual, will favor a kind of 
therapy in which the unique relationship between therapist and client is 
central. Roughly speaking, theorists who respect scientific findings and 
are prepared to adopt scientific results fostered by modernism, are likely 
to be found among the supporters of the Levels of Explanation View and 
the Integration View. This does not imply, however, that every therapist 
who supports one of these approaches views scientific outcomes for that 
very reason as the only or even main directive for doing therapy. The 
controversy in secular theory and practice between proponents and  
opponents of the applicability of generalized empirical research in indi-
vidual situations is reflected in the different approaches of Christian the-
orists and therapist representing one of the two mentioned views. They 
can foster psychodynamic approaches that are looked upon by others as 
inferior to hard scientific data and explanations in academic circles.  
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Added to this, in the Christian context the religious dimension can be 
viewed and handled as a dynamic force. 
Adherents of the Christian Psychology View all do suspect the results 
of secular research, not so much because of a specific suspicion of con-
trolled research but on account of its assumed bias against Christians 
within the population examined. Its limitation is deemed to be due to the 
ignorance of specifically Christian beliefs about life (cf. the empirical and 
theoretical contributions by J.P. Watson). For this reason they are hesi-
tant to employ secular methods in therapy. Instead, they draw from psy-
chological insights that have been developed during the ages of Christian 
soul care. 
  The Transformational Psychology View presents a somewhat differ-
ent picture. This approach explicitly rejects modernism and secular   
science with their analytical and statistical interest emphasizing the gen-
eral and ignoring the particular. In psychotherapy this is translated in the 
option for a relational, experiential, and transformational process. 
For completeness, I recall the rejection of psychotherapy as a separate 
practice, expressed by representatives of the Biblical Counseling View. 
They dismiss psychotherapy as a way of healing, thinking that there is 
either a medical cause that needs pharmacological psychiatry, or a spiri-
tual cause like sin or alienation needing a biblical, pastoral treatment. 
The reflections above are rather tentative because only a few articles 
draw an explicit line from their epistemology to their view of psycho-
therapy. The following publications do. The lines were drawn 
- by Ellens (1980), De Graaff (1980), and Entwistle (2009) to what 
comes closest to the Levels of Explanation View on psy-
chotherapy; 
- by Pecheur (1978), Bolin and Goldberg (1979), Tan (1987, 2001, 
2006), Clouse (1997), Hurley and Berry (1997), McMinn and Hall 
(2000), and Beck (2006) to the Integration View on therapy; 
- by Johnson (1997, 2011), Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010), 
and Roberts (2006, 2012) to the Christian Psychology View; 
- by Hall (2004, 2007b), and Latini (2009) to what comes close to 
the Transformational Psychology View of therapy; 
- by Powlison (1984), and Welch and Powlison (1997) to the Bibli-
cal Counseling View. 
Additionally, in one paper agreement with a Levels of Explanation epis-
temology is connected with a wide variety of psychotherapeutic ap-
proaches (Parker, 2014). These accounts confirm the sketch drawn 
above. 
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Clients’ Expectations 
Apart from the general expectations resulting from the cultural settings 
of psychotherapy, there are hardly any references concerning expecta-
tions with which patients or clients engage in a therapeutic trajectory. 
One of the few exceptions is the reference to the famous observation by 
Carl Jung, that patients came to the psychotherapist with their spiritual 
struggles and forced him into the role of the priest (Benner, 1989). Sper-
ry (2003) recalled recent research and clinical experience suggesting that 
clients are increasingly expecting that psychotherapists will deal with 
their spiritual concerns. Weld and Eriksen (2007) affirmed the rise of 
spirituality concerns among mental health practitioners, but could not 
detect whether any research in Christian clients’ expectations regarding 
prayer in counseling is available. Their empirical study surveyed first-
visit Christian clients to ascertain their expectations. Analysis indicated 
that the large majority of the clients had strong expectations that prayer 
would be included in counseling by Christian therapists. Religious expec-
tations are also reported by Pan, Deng, Tsai, and Yuan (2013). 
 Expectations were related to the clients’ preferences for a specific 
kind of therapist. Section 4.6 shows that research outcomes on correla-
tions between religiousness and therapist preference of clients are am-
biguous. 
 
Evaluation 
The profiling of a distinct Christian way of viewing and doing psycho-
therapy over against mainstream psychotherapy can be traced back to a 
biblically inspired anthropology, whether or not reinforced by the pre-
modern traditions of soul care. However, this anthropology cannot ac-
count for the mutual differences within the Christian integration debate. 
These are more likely attributable to differences in estimation of the  
cultural factors contributing to conceptions of the what and how of psy-
chotherapy. Because only a few authors expressed themselves on the 
cultural background of psychotherapy, we can only tentatively make 
connections between appraisals of cultural influences and the character-
istics of distinct manifestations of psychotherapy. 
Several critical turning points can be identified. One is the apprecia-
tion of the extent to which psychotherapy gives in to the modern way of 
life typified by critics as hedonism, individualism, and moral autonomy. 
Theorists and professionals who are most critical of the modern lifestyle 
will distance themselves most from mainstream psychotherapy, and opt 
for a distinct Christian therapy practice. 
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Another turning point is the degree of accountability of the shift from 
modernism to postmodernism. Theorists and professionals who are most 
positive about postmodernism will also easily adopt methods that em-
phasize personal, cultural, and religious particulars of clients, while those 
who feel comfortable with modernist notions of uniformity and control 
will have the least problems with protocolled procedures that are typical 
of much secular methodology. 
Finally, clients’ expectations could serve as a turning point with re-
gard to the attitude of theorists and professionals toward mainstream 
and Christian articulated psychotherapy. Those whose anthropology 
leads them to meet these expectations seem to be more inclined to create 
a distinct Christian setting for psychotherapy than those who interpret 
these expectations critically from a psychodynamic point of view, and 
consequently are unwilling to satisfy these expectations, being more 
sympathetic to mainstream psychotherapy on this point. 
 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
In the present chapter we explored the appreciation and application of 
psychotherapy in Christian settings. We met with a variety of reflections 
and proposals on the What, How, and Why of psychotherapy at different 
levels of argument. In this variety, however, some main lines of thoughts 
can be distinguished that all proved to have some connection with an-
thropological topics. These mainline approaches gave rise to counter 
arguments, so that the debate goes on. The mutual dissimilarity of these 
counter arguments requires some systematizing of the debate to avoid 
confusion. 
 One of the main trends is that the concept of healing as the overall 
goal of therapy was broadened, including not only recovery from illness 
and the learning of relational sensitivity and abilities, but also develop-
mental and spiritual growth, and increasing wisdom. Psychotherapy was 
viewed as similar to soul care and spiritual direction in such a measure 
that the pre-modern concept of soul care, as authoritative aid to come to 
terms with God, could function as a model for present-day psychother-
apy. This evoked the counter argument stressing the distinction between 
spiritual and mental issues and the distinct importance of psychology 
and psychotherapy. 
 As to the How, spiritual techniques in protocolled treatments were 
recommended by several authors, as a clear example of how psychology 
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and theology (or faith) can be integrated in psychotherapy. In spite of the 
ethical constraints by which this recommendation of spiritual techniques 
was surrounded, a serious doubt was raised by others about the appro-
priateness of spirituality as a technical device because of the unique pur-
pose and perspective of spirituality in the light of its focus on God. Apart 
from methodical protocols, the addressing of spiritual issues on the rela-
tional level was argued for. Some supported a therapeutic application of 
universal spirituality, like the awareness of transcendence, but others 
questioned the appropriateness of classifying Christianity under univer-
sal spirituality. Attention was drawn to several kinds of implications of 
the therapeutic relationship, such as the influence of the ethical values of 
the therapist, the importance of containment, and the occurrence of 
transference dynamics. Some qualified the therapeutic encounter itself as 
a spiritual event that may bring about internal transformation for both 
therapist and patient. Some others consistently advocated an institu-
tional setting of psychotherapy that was not attached to medical health 
care organizations, but associated with churches. Opposite to this ap-
proach, again the differences between psychological and spiritual issues 
were stressed. 
As to the Why, we looked at the cultural backgrounds of secular thera-
peutic practice and the inherent expectations by patients. We were in-
formed about the predominant presupposition of individualism that 
should be avoided by Christian therapists. However, we also met the 
critical counter question of whether evangelical patients were actually 
different from their secular contemporaries. So, will Christianity be able 
to provide a particular cultural background as a matrix for psycho-    
therapy, or is it tainted with the secular individualistic culture? The re-
commendation of secular models of behavioral and cognitive therapy 
with Christian adaptations brought critics to the question whether the    
methodology and philosophy of the mentioned therapies can be separat-
ed, and whether the method can be used without surreptitious intrusion 
of unchristian anthropological and moral presuppositions. 
 
How shall we continue? First, with the help of the results of the chapters 
2, 3, and 4 we try to answer the first sub-question of our inquiry: 
What do the analyses by participants in the Christian integration de-
bate yield on the interrelationship between worldview and psycho-
therapy?  
 We think to find the answer by testing the first hypothesis:  
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The Christian integration debate demonstrates the dependence of psy-
chotherapy on worldviews, and draws implications for psychotherapeu-
tic professionalism. 
This will be the subject matter in the 5th chapter. Next, we will deal with 
our second sub-question:  
Why are the positions assumed in this debate, or some of them, not ca-
pable of carrying the discussions any further?  
The answer should come from a test of the second hypothesis: 
The Christian integration debate arrived at unsolved disagreements 
that can be traced back to (1) epistemic confusion about the practice of 
psychological research and theorizing in relation to faith knowledge de-
rived from the Bible, and (2) conceptual confusion about the distinctions 
between the psychological, psychotherapeutic, and pastoral practices. 
The discussion about this issue will be the subject-matter of chapter 6,  
although the “unsolved disagreements” become already apparent in 
chapter 5. 
  
Chapter 5 
Internal Evaluation of Psychology and 
Psychotherapy in relation to Worldview 
Introduction 
In the previous three chapters an overview was given of how Christian 
psychologists, philosophers and theologians appreciate secular ap-
proaches of knowledge, human nature and their effects on psychother-
apy on the one hand, and suggest additions or develop alternatives on the 
other. This was done on the assumption that approaches of knowledge 
(epistemology) and human nature (anthropology) reveal particular 
worldviews. These worldviews affect conceptions of psychotherapy. The 
present chapter offers an internal evaluation of the debate, that is, an 
evaluation on the basis of the own standards applied by the participants, 
all of whom hold the Bible to be an important standard. In this chapter I 
confine myself to intrinsic arguments, to disagreements, inconsistencies, 
misunderstandings and the like. An external evaluation, from a specific 
point of view, will be undertaken in chapter 6. 
Three steps will be taken. First, I try to focus the picture by demon-
strating that, according to the participants in the debate, epistemology 
and anthropology are expressions of worldviews, and how they are re-
lated to psychotherapy. Second, I summarize the internal differences and 
controversies within the Christian integration debate about the appro-
priate criteria for both the assessment of and the proposed alternatives 
to what is viewed as objectionable secularism. These internal controver-
sies apply to the epistemic and anthropological issues, and to their rela-
tionships to psychotherapy. And third, I present some additional critical 
remarks about the internal consistency of the arguments put forward in 
the Christian integration debate. Internal inconsistencies in the criteria 
might be due to unacknowledged indebtedness to secular approaches. In 
this third endeavor, then, we are moving toward an external evaluation. 
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This means that, although the evaluation remains based on the presuppo-
sitions of the participants, I now enter the debate as one whose back-
ground is continental European rather than American. 
These steps are taken in order to answer the first sub-question of our 
inquiry, formulated in the introductory chapter: 
What do the analyses by participants in the Christian integration de-
bate yield on the interrelationship between worldview and psychother-
apy?  
In looking for the answer we are testing the first hypothesis and the first 
part of the second hypothesis:  
(1) The Christian integration debate demonstrates the dependence of 
psychotherapy on worldviews, and draws implications for psy-
chotherapeutic professionalism. 
(2) The Christian integration debate arrived at unsolved disagreements. 
Prior to this qualitative procedure, I will review some quantitative     
particulars in order to get some grip on what has been going on in the 
debate. 
 
 
5.1 Numbers 
 
Contributors 
When we try to oversee the more formal and quantitative side of the 
integration debate, several details draw our attention. First of all, of the 
487 selected articles (JPT 286; JPC 201) merely a small minority was 
written by theologians only, including philosophers of religion (42, JPT 
35, JPC 7), which amounts to 9% of the total. Contrast this with the num-
ber of articles written by psychologists only, including psychiatrists and 
philosophers of psychology (327, JPT 189, JPC 138), or 67%. Articles 
written by both psychologists and theologians, either in cooperation, or 
united in one person, or in combination of the two, reach the number of 
98 (JPT 54, JPC 44), or 20%. The small remaining portion is written by 
general philosophers. 
Can we detect any trends within the time frame we analyzed? I com-
pared periods of one decade each, which resulted in a single significant 
tendency, to wit, the increasing number of articles written by psychol-
ogists and theologians both, either in cooperation, or united in one per-
son, or in combination of the two. In the decade 1973-1982 their share in 
both journals was 12%, in the period 1983-1992 it was 10%, from 1993 
until 2002 23%, and in the last decade up to 2012 it was 34%. This was 
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at the expense of the percentage of articles written by psychologists only, 
which declined from 74% in the initial decades to 55% in the last one. 
However, in 2013 and 2014 this trend is not confirmed. Only one ar-
ticle contributing to the Integration Debate was authored by a theologian 
and psychologist. All other authors are to be classified as psychologists. 
 
Number of Research Articles 
Another striking phenomenon is the relatively small number of empirical 
studies, namely 59 of 488, which makes 12% (JPT 39 of 286 = 13%, JPC 
20 of 202 = 10%). This circumstance can be explained in two ways. The 
first explaining factor is that particularly in the beginning research ar-
ticles were scarce anyway (Goldsmith, 1983; Struthers, 2005). However, 
in the course of time this situation improved. Yet, during the succeeding 
decades there is no clear trend of an increasing number of research ar-
ticles in the selections made for the present inquiry. Ripley (2012) ob-
serves that only a small pool of people is regularly engaged in empirical 
research on integrative issues. In our case it may play a role that our re-
search questions are quite foundational philosophical ones. At the same 
time, appropriate empirical research designs are characterized by limited 
focuses. Consequently, many empirical contributions are too specific to 
have direct relevance for the answering of our fundamental research 
questions, and thus fall outside the present selection. On the whole, it is 
remarkable that in the Journal of Psychology and Theology of the last dec-
ade empirical studies dominate; for the most part however they do not 
concern integration issues. 
 
Representation of the Different Views in the Debate 
The next question that concerns us relates to the five views identified in 
the debate (Johnson, 2010), and summarized in chapter 1 (section 1.4). 
Does the debate as it has been conducted reflect these main positions or 
can we distinguish other trends? Three observations can be made. 
 The first observation is that the articles are dominated by one of the 
five views, the so-called Integration View. A close second is the Christian 
Psychology View. It is represented by articles from pioneer E.L. Johnson, 
prolific research psychologist J.P. Watson, philosopher of psychology R.C. 
Roberts, and philosopher C.S. Evans. A complete issue of the Journal of 
Psychology and Christianity (30/4, 2011) was devoted to this view. We 
should keep in mind that during the early period of the integration de-
bate the various positions about integration were not yet differentiated 
 CHAPTER 5. INTERNAL EVALUATION 169 
 
to the extent that a Christian Psychology View could be distinguished 
from an Integration View. 
The Biblical Counseling View was represented by some articles, writ-
ten by Ganz (1976), Powlison (1984; Welch & Powlison, 1997), and 
Cheong and DiBlasio (2007). The influence of the Levels of Explanation 
View is limited to some contributions by Myers (1995, 1996), with the 
inputs of Ellens (1980), De Graaff (1980), Timpe (1983), Cole (1998, 
2000), and Entwistle (2009) coming close to it. The Transformational 
Psychology View is the youngest entrant in the field, and is argued for by 
Coe (1999) and Tisdale (2007), among others, while from 1994 onward 
Olthuis (1994a, 1994b, 1999, 2006) moves in this direction.1 
Secondly, it is striking that what is called the Integration View com-
prises at least two different approaches that do crystallize in the journals 
but are not distinguished by Jones (2010) in the Five Views book. The first 
approach argues for a model in which theology and psychology are per-
ceived as two sources of knowledge about human nature, more or less 
equivalent, with on principle no possibility of real contradiction because 
all truth is God’s truth. This two sources approach is advocated by Collins 
(1980), Rambo (1980), Mathisen (1980), Farnsworth (1982a), DeVries 
(1982), Guy (1982), Vande Kemp (1982b; 1998), Anderson (1989),  
Bouma-Prediger (1990), Eck (1996), Carter (1996), Shults (1997), Nar-
ramore & Carter (2000), Tan (2001), and Porter (2010a; 2010b). Some of 
them, like Mathisen, Guy, and Porter, enter into a discussion about the 
primacy of theology or psychology in the integrative effort. Other authors 
explicitly reject the two sources approach, like Worthington (1994), and 
Sorenson (1996a). 
The other line within the Integration View explicitly draws on the 
worldview concept, and expects the task of integration not to be fulfilled 
at the level of the sources but at the presuppositional level. Larzelere 
(1980) contends that differences in formulating research questions, col-
lecting data, interpreting them, and developing theories all relate to pre-
suppositions inherent in a worldview. Other advocates of this approach 
are Pascoe (1980), and Jones (2010b). This approach has benefited from 
Wolterstorff’s (1984a) concept of control beliefs (see section 2.2). 
Our final observation relates to a sixth view that has been presented 
but did not succeed in developing a clear profile in the journals. This 
could be called the Reformational Philosophy View developed by Herman 
 
1
  For a more complete overview, see table 1 of section 4.8. 
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Dooyeweerd, Dutch philosopher at the Free University of Amsterdam 
(VU). This approach is reflected by De Graaff (1980, 1981), Pascoe 
(1980), Olthuis (1985), and Cole (1998, 2000). Its result comes closest to 
the Levels of Explanation View but its account is quite original. Its con-
tents are described not in this context but in the next chapter, because it 
offers the framework for my own external evaluation of the integration 
debate. 
 
 
5.2 The Impact of Worldviews 
 
Epistemology 
In epistemology, the main criticism was directed at the reductionist ten-
dency in secular scientific practice (chapter 2). The emphasis there is on 
quantified, measurable and repeatable research, neglecting the unique, 
and the purposes and meanings attributed to unique phenomena. It ac-
cepts only natural causes and denies supernatural influences. Some par-
ticipants in the debate observe the assumption of a cognitive dualism 
between nature and rationality, on the one hand, and grace, freedom, 
faith and the non-rational on the other, in which the former is adopted, 
and the latter rejected as source or means of knowledge. This dualistic 
methodological approach only accepts obvious and self-evident truths as 
knowledge, including both intuitions (rationalism) and measured obser-
vations (empiricism), and the inferences drawn from these obvious and 
self-evident truths by logical reasoning. In this conception knowledge is 
deemed to be built upon an alleged foundation of indubitable truths by 
self-evidence and logical inference. This kind of scientific knowledge 
presupposes the ability of a detached, punctual observer to draw abstrac-
tions and make objectifications from the intuitions and measured obser-
vations by logical reasoning. This reductionist procedure is also labeled 
foundationalism, because of its contention that knowledge is founded in 
truths that are self-evident or evident to our senses. 
As we have seen in chapter 2, the claim of this rationalistic, objec-
tivistic, and quantitative approach to knowledge as the only method of 
acquiring true knowledge is contested in different ways. It is contested 
on principle by appealing to the Bible as the main source of revealed 
knowledge acquired by faith, and it is contested methodically by appeal-
ing to the actual developments in philosophy of science which show the 
influence of tacit presuppositions and paradigms, and the impact of        
all kinds of interests of researchers and stakeholders on scientific         
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measurements and conclusions. All these considerations argue against 
the logical positivist reduction of knowledge to the self-evident, the 
measurable and repeatable, and the derivable. 
Although Christian integrationists commonly criticize the reductionist 
confinement of knowledge to the self-evident, the observable and the 
derivable, some appraisals are more moderate, others more radical. On 
the one hand there is the rejection of naturalism, which is an ontological 
position, denying the existence of anything that is beyond natural causa-
tion, but has epistemic consequences, limiting the range of explanations 
to the physical. However, this rejection of naturalism can coexist with 
adopting a methodological limitation of science to natural causality. On 
the other hand, more radical theorists even reject the strict scientific 
methodology of only accepting natural causation as scientific expla-
nation. To them this methodological choice reeks too much of a natural-
istic view of reality. This radical wing argues that God is involved in all 
empirical reality so that every investigation of this reality that puts God 
in brackets, as it were, fails to do justice to both empirical reality and 
God. Obviously, they refuse to adopt the modernist disposition to retreat 
from participation in the cosmic whole, and to take a subjective stance 
toward experienced reality, and select separate aspects of it for further 
examination apart from their connections with totality. The moderate 
wing, however, has no qualms about taking advantage of scientific epis-
temology, arguing that science has only a limited scope. In other words, 
science reveals but one aspect of reality, without denying the existence of 
other aspects. Only, it remains silent about those other aspects. What we 
meet with here, then, is critical adoption of modernism by the moderates 
over against its total rejection by the radicals. 
Thus far we saw that Christian authors, in order to dispute the scien-
tific pretenses about true knowledge, appealed to the Bible or took either 
a critically modern or a pre-modern stance within philosophy of science. 
Besides this they referred to postmodernism over against modernism. In 
their view, prevailing science is a result of modernism with its overesti-
mation of empiricism and reason. It focuses on generalized objective 
truths of what is valid everywhere and always under constant circum-
stances. Postmodernism, on the contrary, does not focus on the regular 
and generic, but on the unique, and on subjective meaning rather than 
causal explanation. Thus, it has some similarity with the hermeneutic 
approach. One of the philosophical accounts of subjective knowledge is 
constructivism, which holds that every person constructs his or her own 
narrative about his or her experiences and observations. As far as I could 
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observe, all authors who draw attention to constructivism and narra-
tivism are moderately or even predominantly positive about those ap-
proaches to knowledge, for they appeal to our understanding of reality as 
meaningful, and match with the appeal God’s Word in the Bible makes to 
interpret our lives in the light of God’s involvement with our existence. 
Some cautions have been uttered, however. Constructivism and the nar-
rative approach put the person in the center of the story and therefore 
foster subjectivity and the ideal of human autonomy. This could be to the 
detriment of the acknowledgement of external reality, and at the expense 
of the recognition of external direction and authority. 
As we observe in this sub-section, the epistemic debate largely comes 
down to evaluation of the status of pre-modernity, modernism, and post-
modernism, and the role of the Bible in each of them. These orientations 
can be understood as the main worldview positions people may adopt 
consciously or unconsciously. 
 
Anthropology 
Obviously, anthropology, i.e., the systematic account of one’s view of hu-
manity, is a substantial part of one’s worldview. As in the case of episte-
mology, a part of the Christian criticism of secular anthropology can be 
subsumed under the heading “reductionism” (chapter 3). Some secular 
personality views, such as psychoanalytic and behavioristic views, are 
assumed to be characterized by mechanicism. Even object relations   
theory is denounced in view of the mechanistic flavor showing up in the 
use of the term object as an internal representation. Other reductionist 
views of humanity refer to the humanistic pre-moral values of independ-
ence, autonomy, and self-reliance. The reduction of human nature is con-
sidered evident in the neglect of relationality as an essential human trait. 
One-sided moral values are identified: the ideal of health and happiness 
in individualism, undifferentiated tolerance, relativism, survivalism, and 
ethical egoism, or hedonism. In the latter two moral stances, self-interest 
or the pleasure principle respectively dominates the scene. The funda-
mental shortcoming of secular morality is supposed to be its lack of an 
independent standard and, in consequence, a lapse into one-sidedness 
and instability. 
Another example of reductionism criticized by Christian authors is the 
alleged denial of the duality of human nature in body and soul. When 
mental and spiritual activities are reduced to neurobiological mecha-
nisms, reductionism takes the shape of neuromonism, or physicalism, 
implying determinism.  Christian psychologists and theologians advocate 
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a duality that warrants the possibility of a spiritual life that is more than 
a human illusion and mediates a real contact with God, Who is Spirit. In 
spite of this emphasis on a non-reductive spiritual life, however, Chris-
tian philosophers and scientists have not yet been able to demonstrate 
rather than simply assume the existence of an independent mind or soul. 
In three ways, Christian theorists have tried to not only criticize the 
reductionist tendencies of secular psychology but also to expand their 
theoretical efforts by reinterpreting widely recognized notions of psycho-
logical functioning, and relating them to biblical notions. In the first place 
some have paralleled a psychodynamic view of the pervasive reach of 
psychopathology with the Christian assumption of universal sin and 
pride. Both views run parallel regarding the devastating effects on rela-
tionships, and regarding alienation from the deeper levels of calling and 
being oneself. Some proposed to designate sin, that is, moral debt, as a 
cause of pathology. However, in that case there is no parallel anymore.  
Secondly, a rapprochement was attempted between the humanistic 
notion of self-actualization and a Christian re-interpretation of this no-
tion. Self-actualization was related to the Christian value of self-denial by 
way of aiming at self-actualizing through an outward looking attitude in 
which self-fulfillment is pursued outside the immediate self-interest. 
Third, although Christian authors can hardly appeal to the acknowl-
edgement of a separate mental and spiritual organ by secular theorists, 
they try to make this immaterial functioning plausible by connecting it 
with widely recognized notion of the self. Here they can refer to the 19th 
century Christian philosopher Søren Kierkegaard who explored the self 
as the center of subjectivity and self-reflection. At the same time,       
Kierkegaard viewed the self as the instance which is aware of its own 
limitedness and its responsibility before the transcendent One. Because 
Kierkegaard is an influential authority in the history of the humanities, 
Christian psychologists can gratefully appeal to him in equating the soul 
with the self as a kind of mental center of identity and behavior. How-
ever, one voice suggested a difference between the concepts of the self 
and the soul from a Christian point of view. Self is a construct, while soul 
is a substance, that is, a whole that is ontologically prior to its parts in 
that those parts (like consciousness, intentionality, sameness through 
change, and freedom) borrow their reality from the substance as a whole. 
In this contribution, it was contended apologetically that the concept of 
self only makes sense if it is conceived as a substantial entity, like the 
soul. 
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Effects on Psychotherapeutic Practice 
As we have seen in the previous chapter (section 4.9), there is a con-
nection between epistemology and psychotherapy. Those who favor a 
modernist scientific methodology of quantitative analyses and statistical 
evidence will also be positive toward protocolled methods for doing ther-
apy. Those who have their reservations about researching averages and 
standard deviations because these fail to appreciate the unique are like-
wise dismissive of standard procedures in therapy. This difference does 
not only occur in Christian theory and practice, but in the secular sector 
as well. Christians sometimes deploy arguments derived from a religious-
ly motivated rejection of modern science; other Christians, however, 
adopt modernist methodology in theory and practice with adaptations. 
Among religious theorists and therapists, then, different approaches can 
be distinguished going back to different epistemic positions. 
Partly the same is true for anthropology (section 4.9). The Christian 
emphasis on spirituality as the relationship with God, and relationality in 
general between individuals, has been transformed by some into a kind 
of therapy in which spirituality and relationality are deemed crucial for 
Christian clients or patients (sections 4.3 and 4.6). Furthermore, human 
values embraced and pursued differ in certain respects. Instead of the 
moral autonomy and hedonistic and egoistic orientations found to be 
directive in various therapeutic schools, Christian therapists argue for 
serving love. However, because Christian views of human nature ap-
peared to be largely similar, anthropology has occasioned little therapeu-
tic variety. The only exception may be found in the Biblical Counseling 
approach that makes a major point of conversion from sin, but this dif-
ference in emphasis remained less obvious in the debate as conducted in 
the journals under scrutiny. 
Various authors contend that non-directive counseling as promoted 
by humanistic psychotherapist Carl Rogers does not exist. Psychotherapy 
is a value laden, moral enterprise (section 4.6). In fact, one of the im-
portant means employed by therapy is changing the hierarchy of values 
of the client. Clinicians implement their own value systems, and they 
should be explicit about the values they hold, at the same time respecting 
and, as far as possible, understanding and working with the values of 
clients. 
Furthermore, a too narrow conception of mental health was identified 
(section 4.2). Much of this criticism is shared by secular theorists, though. 
These voices raise arguments to broaden the concept, and to not restrict 
 CHAPTER 5. INTERNAL EVALUATION 175 
 
it to eliminating the symptoms of psychopathology. The emphasis is shift-
ing from medical health to holistic growth, as it is advocated by Positive 
Psychology’s resorting to resiliency, strength, and resources. The focus is 
no longer exclusively on fighting pain, but also on accepting and integrat-
ing pain. In this climate there is room for spirituality as an essential part 
of growth. Illustrations of this broader perspective are the development 
in cognitive therapy from a mainly rationally and analytically focused 
practice to a more integrated enterprise including psychodynamically 
influenced basic assumptions, and the formation of narrative construc-
tions conveying meaning of life. A critical adoption of constructivist Ra-
tional Emotive Therapy (RET) has been pursued by Christian profes-
sionals, in which some caveats were placed on ethical individualism, lack 
of external validation, anthropocentrism instead of God-centrism, and on 
rejecting surrender to God as dysfunctional thinking. 
Integrative Christian psychotherapists do support the commonly 
growing attention and importance of the factor of relationality in the 
therapeutic process. They appeal to several theoretical accounts of thera-
peutic approaches, such as object relations theory, attachment theory, 
intersubjective theory, and the neurobiological substratum of the more 
implicit and affective types of knowledge. In the margin, from a Christian 
point of view, some objections are raised about the reality content of the 
divine object in object relations theory as applied to religious issues in 
secular settings, and the limited awareness of the overall importance of 
relatedness apparent from the use of the term “object” as an internal 
representation. 
What do worldview issues like epistemology and anthropology imply 
for the account of professionalism within the integration movement? 
Deficiencies have been identified about religious education in training 
programs and the way many secular therapists approach the patients’ 
religious convictions. As a consequence of ignorance of religious issues, 
non-religious therapists run the risk of either being insecure and defen-
sive in dealing with those issues, resorting to self-justifications, or assum-
ing that religious patients do share non-religious cultural values, and 
promoting a kind of behavior that they consider obvious but that contra-
dicts the patients’ morals. 
Another link with professionalism, established by some, is the appli-
cation of ethical constraints (section 4.5). These entail that the Christian 
professional works within the patients’ belief systems, is not engaged     
in proselytism, is competent in religious affairs, does recognize moral 
consequences of religious orientations, does not blur the boundaries 
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between the therapist and the patient, does not displace or usurp reli-
gious authority, does not adopt spiritual techniques without informed 
consent by the patient, and has a clear view of the admissibility of pay-
ment. Some theorists stress that the therapist be able and willing to rely 
on evidence based methods; others, however, refrain from approaches 
characterized by control and measurable effects, and as postmodernists 
attach more importance to the process of conversation than to a con-
trolled procedure. These ethical guidelines are derived from the general 
standards of psychotherapy, without any explicit reference, however, to 
their world-view background. This circumstance will concern us later. 
Others argue for a spiritual practice far from the medical context of much 
psychotherapy, in the vicinity of the church. 
On still another point professionalism in integrative Christian psy-
chotherapy should be further considered, viz., about the issue whether 
the cobbler sticks to his last. Do therapists who adopt spiritual interven-
tions to achieve spiritual goals really provide professional therapy? This 
issue exceeds the boundaries of internal criticism, and requires an inde-
pendent vantage point and will therefore be taken up in chapter 6. 
 
 
5.3 Disagreements on Epistemology 
 
Disagreements within the Debate 
Apart from the critique against reductionism in secular scientific episte-
mology, an internal debate is going on in which different positions about 
epistemology and science are being taken. The first disagreement we 
already met in the previous section. It is about scientific methodology 
that accepts only natural causes, focusing on the repeatable, controllable, 
quantifiable, and generalizable. Some accept it as a legitimate methodol-
ogy for Christian scientists, others do not. The opponents argue that it 
does not allow for God’s continuous activity; the supporters, however, 
argue that its use only says something about the limited scope of the  
scientific inquiry, being constrained to treat religious and spiritual mat-
ters as biological, psychological and social processes. In line with this 
discussion, four answers are given on the question of whether scientific 
methodology produces true knowledge: the knowledge it yields is reli-
able though limited as a consequence of the limited scope of science (1); 
it is of some value but should be complemented by revelatory knowledge 
in order to become more complete and less biased (2); it is not reliable as 
such but could be helpful sometimes to provide additional information 
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(3); it is false and of no value (4). The first position is taken by those who 
view science as a specific but limited way of gaining knowledge, function-
ing on a different level from religious belief. It has been labeled the Lev-
els of Explanation View. The second position can be identified as the  
Integration View. It does show a decent respect for the status of science 
but assesses it as deficient because it ignores biblical revelation. As ob-
served in section 5.1, this view is elaborated in two distinct ways: the 
more rational one, taking biblical texts as additional sources of factual 
information that are considered useful within a scientific context, and  
the more hermeneutic one, localizing the importance of the Bible on     
the worldview level, and concentrating its influence on our pre-
understanding by which we interpret our observations and judge the 
conclusions of others. The third position is the Christian Psychology 
View, which holds that secular research is biased toward Christian par-
ticipants by not allowing for their specific beliefs. The fourth position is 
the one occupied by the Biblical Counseling View, which denounces psy-
chology as a vain enterprise that tries to answer questions to which the 
Bible gives the right answers. 
As expected, these positions give rise to further discussion. A pivotal 
issue is the suitability of Scriptural data or facts in a scientific discourse. 
The classical integrative answer is that God reveals His truth in nature 
and in the Bible. So, to know the truth about humanity’s behavior, drives 
and motives, we should combine psychological observations with biblical 
data. One should not deny the cognitive content of the Bible. In later  
developments, some emphasize the priority of biblical teachings over 
results of scientific inquiry, and still others the priority of religious expe-
rience inspired by the Bible. There are also voices, however, that            
explicitly question a naïve conception of the authority of the Bible in  
scientific affairs. They point to the contextual character of Scripture. 
Scripture has to be understood as a culturally located divine discourse 
that must now be re-contextualized in the contemporary context. Fur-
thermore, because of the fallible transmission of the biblical texts 
through the ages and the often equivocal meaning of the texts, they can-
not serve as a source of scientific data. 
A prominent controversy is about the role of foundationalism. Secular 
foundationalism is suspect among Christian integrationists (in the broad 
sense of participants of the integration debate), because it is judged re-
ductionist. It assumes that every proposition is either in the foundations 
of our knowledge or is believed on the evidential basis of other proposi-
tions that are in the end based in the foundations. Further, a proposition 
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is in the foundations of our knowledge if and only if it is basic for us, and 
it is basic for us if and only if we don’t accept it on the basis of other 
propositions. And we accept it as basic if it is self-evident, incorrigible, or 
evident to our senses (see section 2.3 on Plantinga). Clearly, in this con-
ception knowledge is limited to the logical and empirical; religious beliefs 
are excluded. Still, some integrationists are accused of clinging to an al-
ternative kind of foundationalism in their rigid conception of the Bible as 
an objective database, evident for faith. One objection is that in dealing 
with biblical data as brute facts apart from values, hermeneutics as the 
art of giving meaning to old texts is ignored (see section 2.3). Another 
objection is that biblical texts lack incorruptibility (see sections 2.3 and 
2.5) while they should be indisputable if they are to qualify as founda-
tional for scientific knowledge. An alternative attempt to do justice to the 
biblical input is to relate it to the worldview level of basic beliefs instead 
of to the data level. Through the worldview of Christian researchers and 
theorists, the Bible exerts influence on the selection of research items, 
interpretation of the results, and theorizing. 
Still another debate about the employment of biblical data as un-
doubted fundamental truths in a scientific context focused on the role of 
theology. Some argue that in a scientific setting the Bible can only speak 
through theological interpretation. But theology, like psychology, is the 
result of human theorizing and therefore the two disciplines are not  
related hierarchically. To them, both theology and psychology stand 
equally under the authority of the Scripture. Others, however, contend 
that if the Bible deserves our highest recognition, then theology deserves 
priority over psychology the moment that our best interpretation of psy-
chological data conflicts with our best interpretation of relevant biblical 
assertions. Not all accept this consequence of theological mediation of 
biblical data. Some argue that theologically interpreted biblical data do 
not meet the standards of scientific data, and opt for the position that 
Scripture should have a primary, determinative role, not in scientific 
theorizing but in worldview formation that is the background of all    
theorizing. 
In opposition to the monopoly of objectifying, quantitative, and gener-
alizing research, roughly speaking, three approaches by Christian theo-
rists compete for priority. The first way is the older one, and concerns the 
underscoring of biblical authority. More recently Jones (2006, p. 257) 
firmly reiterated this opinion: “A tradition that has denied that special 
revelation has any cognitive content that merits primacy among our in-
tellectual commitments (which is the core of integration) seems to me to 
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have departed [sic] essential elements of orthodoxy.” Here, the cognitive 
content of the Bible is seen as true knowledge that can compete with 
results of psychological research, whether or not mediated by theology – 
a position undergirded philosophically by Alvin Plantinga. 
The second approach stresses the defective character of objectifying, 
quantitative observations and this-worldly, causal explanations, because 
they suggest that the researcher is able to take a neutral observational 
position, and forget that any observer is part of the dynamic process he 
or she perceives. This implies that the context in which investigators live 
affects the observations they make. So, observations are never neutral 
but always the results of interplay between the observer and his or her 
environment and therefore consist of interpretation and understanding. 
This insight has led to the justification and adoption of a hermeneutical 
mode of acquiring knowledge. This need not mean that the procedure of 
observing produces fanciful results (Hathaway, 2002; 2005) but it does 
mean that every observation is tendentious, colored by the observer’s 
interpretation that is influenced by his or her frame of reference. This 
hermeneutical approach accounts for the complex implicit processes that 
result in a situation in which the observed opens itself to the observer. It 
has some kinship with the trend to view basic biblical beliefs as 
worldview items that affect our way of looking at data and theories (con-
trol beliefs). 
While hermeneutical theories, like the one by Gadamer (2004), try to 
balance the input of the observed (the Sache; or subject matter at issue) 
and the input of the observer in a merging of horizons of understanding, 
a third approach, i.e. the experiential one, seems to leave the balance 
tipped on the side of the observer’s experience to the process of under-
standing. Here, the affective involvement of the observer seems to be the 
guiding principle for the resulting interpretation. 
 
Additional comments 
In order to make my main point, I start with a brief recapitulation of the 
various directions taken by the integration movement regarding episte-
mology. The traditional approach that intends to unite the cognitive   
content of the Bible with methodological empiricism, may be called the 
foundationalist integrative method. It views biblical information as obvi-
ous data that are foundational for psychological knowledge, and may be 
seen as characteristic for a part of the Integration View and for the Chris-
tian Psychology View. The second approach can be named the her-       
meneutical integrative method. It addresses our pre-understanding as 
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part of the process, and can be linked with the conception of basic bibli-
cal beliefs as presuppositional control beliefs for the interpretation of 
psychological data and the acceptance of theories, and as incentives for 
further research. It can be identified as a later current of the Integration 
View. The third approach relies on experiential-spiritual knowledge, both 
from dealing with the Bible and with human behavior, and therefore can 
be viewed as the experiential integrative method, applied by Transforma-
tional Psychology. 
The problem is that these ways of dismissing the one-sided emphasis 
on logical empiricist scientific knowledge are not mutually compatible. 
This means that each of them can only exist at the expense of the other 
two. First, let us compare the foundational and the hermeneutical solu-
tions. If an appeal is made to the hermeneutic process this appeal must 
also be applied, in at least two ways, to the truth claims derived from the 
Bible.  
Primarily, we need to allow for the influence of our own pre-            
understanding on interpreting biblical texts; a pre-understanding that is 
attached to the cultural-historical context in which we participate and 
our personal life stories. So, the input of biblical material does not consist 
of objective data; it does not exceed the status of fallibly interpreted data. 
This circumstance delimits the influence of the objectifying truth claims. 
However, even this is not the most salient consequence, as the majority 
of theorists do think from Rambo (1980) and Farnsworth (1980; 1982a) 
onward. 
There is a second consequence that only few theorists happen to face. 
That is that the hermeneutic approach has implications for God’s rev-
elation and the inspiration of the Bible themselves. The contention that 
the Bible is an ageless document because it comes from the eternal God 
(Berry, 1980) is far behind us. Yet, there is hardly any reflection on the 
impact of this circumstance. For instance, Hathaway (2002) convincingly 
advocates a hermeneutic approach that does no harm to the realistic 
character of what is interpreted and understood from the Bible, but he 
stops considering the truth value of the Bible at the point of interpreting 
the given texts. However, if it is true that our understanding is affected by 
our connections in the world we live in, then the same is true of the first 
receivers of God’s revelation and the Bible writers. Most orthodox believ-
ers do not hold a mechanistic view of the constitution of the Bible, to be 
sure, but adhere to a more organic view of the inspiration of the Bible. 
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That is to say that the words of God were received by the writers accord-
ing to their own interests, pre-understandings and capacities.2 If our 
understanding in the process of appropriation of all kinds of information 
has been pushed to the acknowledgement of the hermeneutical circle, as 
it is called, in which presuppositions affect the outcome of the process, 
then this has to be integrated in the view of organic inspiration. I found 
only one article accounting for this hermeneutic character of the Scrip-
ture itself (Sandage & Brown, 2010), referring to the contextuality of 
Scripture, and appealing to theologians like Vanhoozer (2002; 2005) and 
Brown (2007, one of the two authors of the article). Therefore, within a 
hermeneutic framework the Bible cannot be dealt with as a collection of 
data being on the same level as scientific data. The respective data are 
disparate, being of a hermeneutical over against analytical genus.3 
Conversely, if we take our starting point in the Bible as a source of 
truths that are applicable in a scientific context, we have to discard the 
hermeneutical perspective of interpretation and understanding because 
then we implicitly deny its significance in the communicative context of 
divine revelation to human beings. In that case, biblical truths are viewed 
as analytic, cognitive, objective, quantitative, detached states of affairs 
(which in spiritual life should be appropriated afterward in affective 
functioning), which gives way to the epistemological principle of founda-
tionalism: knowledge being founded in evident truths, universally access-
ible and independent of any presuppositions. For biblical truths the evi-
dence is rooted in the consistent notion of revelation, and the universal 
accessibility is implied in the availability of the Bible with its content 
being addressed to everyone. This would be a return to the rationalism of 
modernity. 
 Another problem arises with the position of experiential knowledge.  
If experientially obtained knowledge is recommended as the best way    
to achieve truth, both scientifically and practically, then theological  
 
2
  This notion of organic inspiration has been developed and promoted among 
orthodox Reformation theology by the neo-orthodox Dutch theologians Herman 
Bavinck and Abraham Kuyper. 
3
  For the sake of simplicity I leave it at this distinction. However, it should be noted 
that the analytic approach too has its presuppositions and cannot shirk interpre-
tations. The justification of the simple distinction is that, different from under-
standing, scientific analysis does aim at objectifiable and quantifiable, generally 
accessible knowledge. Cf. Ricoeur (1970/1981) for the distinction and the com-
plementary character of interpretation and explanation. 
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problems may arise about the orthodox doctrine of revelation. 20th (and 
21st) century orthodox theology has resisted the liberal emphasis on 
experience as the ultimate source of knowing God.4 When experience is 
rated above revelation, the approach from below will predominate the 
approach from above, from God, and human authority will prevail over 
divine authority. An obvious counter argument is that God’s revelation is 
received and appropriated only by way of experience. For that reason, 
however, we should not put it all under the heading of experience but 
adopt the dialectic of revelation and experience. By doing so, we end      
up in the hermeneutical approach. Experience needs some normative 
counterweight, like Gadamer’s Sache, to avoid subjectivism. This subject 
matter of the text makes a truth claim about the world. Without this 
counterweight, as a selection criterion for truth in religious affairs, expe-
rience, including spiritual experience, becomes a rival of revelation as 
authoritative arbiter of what should be recognized as religious truth. 
From these considerations it can be concluded that an objective data 
approach to the Bible does not allow for the contextual communicative 
character of revelation that is implied by the orthodox doctrine of the 
organic inspiration of the Bible. Furthermore, a one-sided emphasis       
on spiritual experience does no justice to the authority of God’s words 
coming from beyond. In order to do justice to this external authority, a 
dialectic account of the relationship between revelation and experience 
is necessary. The hermeneutic approach meets these wants. It does allow 
for legitimate truth claims about reality, though not in the manner of 
objective data ready for scientific use. So, of all three approaches under 
consideration, this appears to be the appropriate one. 
 
 
5.4 Disagreements on Anthropology 
 
Disagreements within the Debate 
As a matter of fact there are no real controversies within the integration 
movement about human nature. The main emphasis is on relationality, 
sociability, the ability to communicate with other people and with God, 
 
4
  Cf. Wright (2006): “If ‘experience’ is itself a source of authority, we can no longer 
be addressed by a word which comes from beyond ourselves. At this point, the-
ology and Christian living cease to be rooted in God himself, and are rooted in-
stead in our own selves; in other words, they become a form of idolatry in which 
we exchange the truth about God for a human-made lie” (p. 103). 
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spirituality, freedom, responsibility, moral agency, and redeemability 
from sin and psychopathology. There are some differences about the 
soul, being reflected in the debate about the simple, dichotomous or  
trichotomous nature of humanity, consisting of body, body and soul, or 
body, soul and spirit, respectively. In general, the temptation has been 
resisted to force the issue or to speculate about it. The main interest of 
the discussion is to safeguard a warrant for the character of humans as 
spiritual beings able to maintain contact with God. 
Differences do exist in the views of human freedom. Some advocate a 
libertarian freedom as a prerequisite for moral responsibility, in which 
the will is able to will contrary to whatever causes. Others, however, un-
der the pressure of neurobiology, confine themselves to freedom as vol-
untariness of acting in accord with the determining causes, named    
compatibilist freedom for being compatible with determinism. Still others 
appeal to nonreductive physicalism in which mental processes are sup-
posed to emerge from physical processes, in order to vindicate the exist-
ence of top down relationships of the mind to the brain, suggesting    
freedom of the mind. 
 
Additional Comments 
Is what was promoted as Christian anthropology in the integration de-
bate really as Christian and anti-secular as has been pretended? Some 
doubts might be raised about this picture. For instance, in the equation of 
soul and self, soul does not have the Old Testament meaning of vital  
power, nor the classical meaning of the eternal source of reality (as in 
Neoplatonism), or the eternal essence of human nature (as in much 
Christian theology), but the modern subjective meaning of inward coor-
dination center toward experiential reality. The main difference between 
soul and self is that in the latter an inherent relationship with God is lack-
ing. Of course, one could decide to use the word self by including its rela-
tionship with God, but then it is still under discussion whether this can be 
done without bringing secular notions into the concept, such as the idea 
of subjective experience as the measure of all things. 
Another topic is the concept of relationality. The main characteristic 
of a professed Christian anthropology has been sought in its relationality 
toward God and toward fellow people. This is seen by many as the most 
concise definition of the being created in the image of God. But what   
kind of relationality is meant here? There are various ways in which enti-
ties can interrelate. There may be relationality by participation, causa-
tion, correlation, chronology, comparison, similarity, localization (before,  
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behind, near, etc.), hierarchy, reciprocity, etc. Most of these kinds of   
relationships are no candidates for the relationality meant as a character-
ization of human nature created in the image of God. 
Systematic theologian Collin Gunton, to whom various authors ap-
pealed, stresses relationality as the main characteristic of the triune God, 
and of humans being created similar to Him, and advocates “otherness-
in-relation” or “communion in otherness” in which particularity is pre-
served (Gunton, 1993, p. 7, 51, 216). This comes closest to relationality 
by reciprocity, but what does he mean by the particular otherness of the 
constituents of the relation? Elsewhere, he speaks of “persons in rela-
tion,” being “in mutually constitutive relations to other persons” (Gunton, 
1998, pp. 206, 208). This explanation brings a shift in the focus of the 
question. What is meant by persons? 
Studies in the history of the doctrine of Trinity have revealed that the 
terms person and relation in the descriptions of how Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit interrelate, have an original meaning quite different from the 
prevailing use of the terms today. According to Saint Augustine, Richard 
of St. Victor, and John Calvin, the relations should be understood as rela-
tions of origin, the Father producing the Son (generatio) and the Spirit 
(spiratio), the Son being produced by the Father, and producing the   
Spirit, and the Spirit being produced by the Father and the Son (Den Bok, 
1996; Baars, 2004). In this context person is defined by the relations of 
origin: the term denotes the distinction between Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. This is an interpretation of the terms person and relation entirely 
different from our present-day use. In the latter context, person means a 
free subject with its own initiative, and relationality refers to the ability 
to voluntarily make mutual connections with other self-oriented subjects. 
This difference makes it difficult to derive our psychological notions of 
personhood and relationality from the classical doctrine of Trinity.  
Furthermore, when Grenz (2001) points to a “relational vein” (p. 168) 
in Calvin’s interpretation of the imago Dei, this referral lacks sufficient ac-
curacy. Calvin designated the core of the creation of humans in God’s 
image as “being blessed not by any goods of themselves but by participa-
tion in God.”5 In fact, the relationship Calvin aimed at is not determined 
by personal reciprocity, as Grenz suggests, but by belonging or par-
ticipation. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that relationality in the 
 
5
  Calvin (1958; Institutio II ii 1): “non propriis bonis, sed Dei participatione fuisse 
beatum.” 
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sense of personal reciprocity is a popular concept not only in Christian 
contexts but as much in secular developmental psychology. So, where 
does the present-day notion of relationality come from? 
Tentatively, I raise the possibility that some parts of anthropology de-
fended by Christian psychologists and theologians, in claiming to give a 
biblical alternative for modernity’s intuition of the priority of individual 
self-determination, in fact do complement it by the concept of rela-
tionality, at the same time adopting a modern concept. In doing so these 
theorists run the risk of unsuspectingly adopting traits of this self-
oriented attitude. We should be aware of this possibility, in order to 
make an accurate analysis of the worldview content of Christian anthro-
pology and prevent unidentified implications. In the present chapter’s 
framework we cannot yet go deeper into the cultural-historical deter-
minants of the present-day experience of personality and individuality. 
This has to wait until the next chapter (section 6.6). 
 
 
5.5 Disagreements on Psychotherapy 
 
Disagreements on Worldview Influences on Psychotherapy 
Trying to provide an overview of internal disagreements on epistemic 
and anthropological worldview influences, I identify the following points. 
The first disagreement is about the use of secular psychotherapeutic 
methods, like the behavioristic, cognitive, humanistic, and psychoanalytic 
ones. A discussion arose about the relationship between therapeutic 
methods and the underlying philosophies (sections 4.4 and 4.6). Many 
contended that the methods can be used without accepting the under-
lying philosophy. Others replied that through this approach hidden    
presuppositions about human nature and moral values sneak into the 
therapy. They argued that an appropriate theological backing is condi-
tional for the adoption of secular methods. In fact, this is what various 
authors intended when they defended the usefulness of secular methods 
by adducing biblical notions that support them. However, a shift from 
modernism to postmodernism in which Christian theorists followed the 
mainline cultural developments lessened the need for theoretical hair 
splitting. A postmodern Christian model for psychotherapy is character-
ized by putting less emphasis on method and control, and more on the 
experiential flow of the encounter. 
Not a real controversy among Christian theorists but rather a criti-
cism of current practice by Christian caregivers is the individualistic and 
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hedonistic thrust in much psychotherapy they do (section 4.9). At the 
same time it was observed that there is a development across the board 
away from these self-orienting tendencies. 
Furthermore, a kind of tension can be perceived among Christian 
therapists between the accent on well organized, evidence based inter-
ventions on the one hand, and on the other hand the let go approach that 
refrains from emphasis on method and control (section 4.9). This differ-
ence was reduced to the difference between the modernist and postmod-
ernist approaches. 
There is some difference in goal-settings of therapeutic care as well 
(section 4.2). Some distinguished between growth therapies, including 
spiritual growth, and problem solving therapies or, in other terms, be-
tween healing (that is, increasing love) and curing, without separating 
them. Others, however, stressed the clinical rationale for the distinction 
between the psychological and the spiritual, and argued that they should 
be seen as different categories. Others again brought the whole therapeu-
tic enterprise under the umbrella of spiritual goals such as to find and 
know God more deeply, to acknowledge the lordship of Christ and the 
kingdom of God, and to promote the process of sanctification of life. 
Comparable to the differences in goal-setting is the different appreci-
ation of the use of spiritual techniques in psychotherapy (section 4.5). 
Many propagated the application of spiritual interventions as manifesta-
tions of real integration of faith and psychology. Some, however, opposed 
this attempt at integration for different reasons. It could hurt the thera-
peutic relationship by blurring the professional role of the therapist, for 
instance when he prays aloud together with the patient; it could be in 
tension with the ethical code of conduct in which the application of evi-
dence based interventions is provided; and it can be understood as a 
violation of what spirituality is about. Spirituality is a matter of ultimacy, 
so it must not be explored as a utilitarian device. This would end up in 
reducing religious belief to a therapeutic technique, and thus in psy-
chologizing religion. 
 Finally, there is disagreement about the kinds of spirituality that are 
proposed to be applied in psychotherapy (section 4.5). Some advocated 
the use of spiritual orientations in a framework in which spirituality is 
defined as broad as a theistic scope can be. This breadth is preferred in 
order to develop therapeutic models that are maximally applicable both 
in Christian and religious non-Christian contexts. Others chose to confine 
themselves to specifically Christian forms of spirituality because they 
refused to subsume Christianity to the generic denominator of religion, 
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appealing to the fact that the faith Jesus and his apostles taught is op-
posed to all other religious practices. 
  
Consistent Psychotherapy: Additional Comments 
In section 4.2 we observed a lack of clarity in the use of the term counsel-
ing for psychotherapy. What does the use of the term imply for the char-
acter of psychotherapy? To Americans this may seem an odd question, 
because psychotherapy and counseling are commonly used interchange-
ably in the United States. However, this may indicate a shared idea of the 
concept that as a consequence of its widespread acceptance might escape 
perception. The reason why I point at this terminological issue is that 
possibly by its use strange elements might be imported which at the 
same time are criticized explicitly. Without driving the matter to the ex-
treme, we might do well to face up to this possibility in order to promote 
conceptual and practical clarity. 
 The term counseling has been promoted in the context of clinical psy-
chology by humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers. He did this because he 
opposed the claims of an exclusively medical view of psychotherapy. As a 
matter of fact, he was not a psychiatrist himself. More important was the 
consideration that the medical frame of reference attributed unequal 
roles to the helper and the helped, who were seen as the expert over 
against the incompetent patient. For this reason he also dismissed quali-
fications like normal, neurotic, psychotic and patient as misleading labels. 
Beneath the surface of external behavior there is a central longing for 
authenticity, to come into contact with the real self (Rogers, 1995).     
Instead of the imbalance of the expert–inexpert relation, he favored 
equality and the client’s individual autonomy being respected and 
strengthened. Where did Rogers derive the counseling terminology 
from? In 1908 Frank Parsons published the book Choosing a Vocation in 
which this early counselor introduced counseling as a professional sup-
port activity for vocational development. With this he set the trend of 
school counseling in order to help individuals make occupational and 
career choices, and to promote personal and social skills and competen-
cies for the sake of career and college readiness. The tradition of school 
counseling received a special application in the 1940s, when the United 
States appointed psychologists and counselors to select, recruit and train 
military personnel. In the educational and professional context coun-
seling is still a widely recognized concept. The American Counseling As-
sociation (2012) merges the health and education contexts, and views 
counseling as a professional relationship empowering clients to achieve 
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mental health, well-being, education, and career goals. The educational 
background of the health oriented counseling movement features an 
emphasis on personal interests that have to be identified and imple-
mented. 
Does this say anything to the detriment of the use of the term coun-
seling in a Christian setting? One would say no, for what could be against 
it when the founder and inspirer of the Christian faith is called “wonder-
ful counselor” in one of the famous prophecies about Him (Isaiah 9:6)? 
This circumstance does tell us that the term is not unusable in this con-
text, but this does not detract from the urgency to examine its secular 
background. This background creates a mental template by which coun-
seling might be molded, implying an individualistic bias toward the inter-
pretation of human values. Here, the standard lies with the clients with 
their needs, wishes, and interests as they understand them. A priori there 
is nothing wrong with this, but the starting point in human priorities 
stands in tension to that part of Christian inspired psychotherapy which 
gives priority to God centered values in helping relationships, like   
knowing God, submission to the lordship of Christ, and promoting sancti-
fication of life in helping relationships. Against this background it is re-
markable that precisely the Biblical Counseling View adopted the term. 
Presumably it did so in opposition to the humanistic counseling ap-
proach, emphasizing the contrast by using the same term. 
Apart from this consideration about the mental framework suggested 
by the use of the term counseling, another point of critical appraisal pre-
sents itself. It was already hinted at in the debate, namely the methodical 
use of spirituality in therapy. The use of spirituality was recommended as 
a Christian application of therapeutic techniques in a highly integrated 
version of psychotherapy. However, this application of spirituality in a 
therapeutic setting tends to reduce the spiritual to the psychological, 
ignoring its assumed external reality content. Particularly in the pleas for 
the application of spirituality in general (belief in a higher power or an 
ultimate presence) the spiritual is subjectified, and disconnected from 
the world order as known by Christians. The same is true in sessions 
evoking imaginations of Jesus’ presence, if the objective reality content of 
His appearance is of secondary importance to the therapist. In all these 
cases, the integral unity of reality and experience has been reduced to the 
subjective view of the psychological. This is at odds with the religious 
function of spirituality as conceived by evangelical and Reformed Chris-
tians, who are the main supporters of the integration debate: to honor 
the transcendent God in His real existence. 
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In the third place, it can be asked how some professional ethical 
guidelines relate to the presuppositions of spiritual interventions recom-
mended as constituent of integrated psychotherapy. Spirituality is about 
dedication and obedience to God, acknowledging Him as our supreme 
authority. Some of the ethical rules, however, are about the client’s au-
tonomy, informed consent, and the priority of his/her belief system. In 
orthodox Christian spirituality, the supremacy is with God but in the 
mentioned ethical principles the ultimate judgment is with the client. 
This may appear to be contradictory. It is not immediately clear how in 
this context of legal autonomy spiritual heteronomy can function. 
 
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
How, according to participants of the Christian integration debate, do 
worldview and psychotherapy interrelate? To get an answer to this ques-
tion we have to distinguish two levels; the level of how participants of the 
debate view this relationship, and the level of how we view the partici-
pants’ view. So, the answer combines their answers, and our review of 
these answers. In other words, it contains a descriptive and an evaluative 
aspect. 
 
Worldview, Psychology, and Psychotherapy  
as Viewed by Christian Theorists 
In our survey of Christian views of the interrelationships between 
worldview, psychology, and psychotherapy as brought forward in the 
scrutinized journals, we condense the results as they have been de-
scribed in the chapters 2, 3, and 4, and summarized in section 5.2. Chris-
tian theorists agree that all psychology and psychotherapy contain tacit 
presuppositions. These presuppositions should be made explicit in order 
to control their influence. The debate directs criticism against a reduc-
tionist tendency in empirical-logical science. However, not only in epis-
temology but in anthropology as well, reductionism was identified, 
namely, in mechanistic views of human nature; the neglect of relational-
ity, including the relationship toward God; individualistic moral values; 
and the materialist approach, equating mind and brain. Apart from re-
ductionism, Christian theorists puncture the suggestion that counseling 
could be non-directive. They unmask much of the psychotherapeutic 
focus as individualistic and narcissistic. The moral directions given by 
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psychotherapists lack any explicit external normative reference and are 
therefore biased and arbitrary. 
 The proposed completions and alternatives vary and are sometimes 
mutually exclusive. Many view biblical data as full source of scientific 
knowledge; others underscore hermeneutic processes as means to un-
derstanding, or point to experience as the first option for gaining knowl-
edge. Some dismiss objectifying, quantitative knowledge completely; 
others recognize its value to a greater or lesser extent. In anthropology, 
relationality and spirituality are stressed as vital functions of human 
nature. In accordance with this, psychotherapy focuses on interpersonal 
relationality in love, and with Christian patients on submission to God, 
similitude with Christ, and guidance by the holy Spirit in obedience to the 
Word of God. 
 
Uncritically Adopted Presuppositions 
In spite of the alertness by Christian theorists to identify non-Christian 
presuppositions in secular psychology and psychotherapy, in many re-
spects they do adopt modern ways of viewing knowledge, human nature, 
and psychological theory and practice. Among them there is much var-
iety, though, so that all characteristics do not apply to all of them. 
Many participants in the debate do accept scientific methodology. 
This means that they adopt the disengaged, objectifying stance that is re-
quired by scientific research, revealing in this approach an attitude that 
is favored by modernism, which is admitted by some (Dueck & Parsons, 
2004). Further, the desire of many to anchor their knowledge in the 
propositional content of the Bible is dismissed by others as a disguised 
form of modern foundationalism, that is, the need to base knowledge on 
evident beliefs. For evident beliefs the former point to the Bible as the 
treasure grove. The critical counterargument is that there does not exist 
any biblical knowledge without interpretation, and interpretations are 
not so evident that they are beyond debate. In the course of time this has 
been admitted by many, so that the discussion shifted somewhat. The 
debate switched to the relationship between the theological interpreta-
tion of biblical statements and the psychological interpretation of re-
search results; in this specific case they are in tension with each other. 
Here, apart from the outcome of the debate, the reproach of foundation-
alism is not appropriate.  
On other points traces of the modernist sense of life are identifiable. 
Some promote limited constructivism, conceding that we contribute 
meaning to observed and remembered matter. Constructivism, however, 
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presupposes an autonomous subject that constructs. Another example of 
modern influence in epistemology is the exceptional rating of experien-
tial knowledge by some (who do not so much allude with this to empiri-
cal but to emotional experience). If this way of finding truth is promoted 
as the main source of knowledge, it is subject-oriented, ignoring external 
authority, just like modernism advocates. 
 If one would reply that these constructivist and experiential ap-
proaches are typically post-modern, I would agree. But I would add that 
this postmodernism may be viewed as an offshoot of modernism, not 
opposing its progenitor in adopting the subjective point of gravity which 
modernism assumes as well, but only in rejecting the common standard 
of rationality, which is not at stake in the previous paragraph. Immedi-
ately I would add that the issues of modernism and postmodernism need 
further reflection, which will be provided in the next chapter. This note 
relates to the following paragraphs as well. 
 In the view of human nature several unintended bows to modern 
worldviews might seep in, such as in the equation of soul and self, self 
lacking an implicit connection with God. Issues like self-acceptance and 
self-actualization are in line with modern understanding. By relationality 
as an essential trait of human nature, Christian theorists mean rela-   
tionality of different subjects, and thus seem to adopt the modernist  
priority of subjects. As to psychotherapy, three issues are related to in-
sufficiently recognized affiliations with modern worldviews. First, the 
use of the term ‘counseling’ might surreptitiously inject secular con-
notations related to individual self-actualization, as a consequence of its 
original context in school and career advisory activities, and its adoption 
by the humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers to avoid inequality with the 
client, thus respecting his or her autonomy – a modern notion indeed. 
Then, the operationalization of spirituality in therapeutic care detaches 
the religious exercise from its immediate intertwining with the God who 
is served, and is viewed as an inner resource of recovery and strength-
ening. This, too, meets the modern preference to start from the subjective 
side of reality. Besides, on this point postmodernism is a true heir of 
modernism. And third, the clients’ autonomy about involving religious 
affairs in therapy is hardly compatible with the particular character of 
religion as relating to the heteronomy of ultimate reality that is decisive 
for the whole of life. 
 Does this possible indebtedness to modernity compromise the Chris-
tian efforts to develop a Christian oriented psychology and psychother-
apy? An answer to this question requires an external stance, which will 
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be developed in the next chapter. But at least it seems to blur the posi-
tions taken.  
 
Conclusions 
When we look at the first hypothesis, the conclusion seems justified that 
this hypothesis is confirmed by the present examination. The Christian 
integration debate indeed does demonstrate the interdependency be-
tween worldviews and psychotherapy. However, this conclusion is a little 
hasty. Do these analyses really add something to our understanding, or 
have there already been other analyses from other viewpoints that pre-
cede or run synchronously with the present debate? One could think of 
the sharp analyses by Browning (1987; Browning and Cooper, 2004) that 
exceed much of what orthodox Christian psychologists have to offer. On 
the other hand, the Christian integration movement has an older authen-
tic tradition. Another objection could be the reference to the Reforma-
tional Philosophy tradition represented by Herman Dooyeweerd (1953, 
1955, 1957), who revealed the religious ground motives in all scientific 
and professional endeavor.6 This argument is downplayed by the consid-
eration that application of these insights to psychology and psychiatry 
was only fragmentary. So, we can retain the proposition that the Chris-
tian integration debate played its own part in opening people’s eyes to 
the presuppositions that affect psychotherapy of all kind. 
There remains a restriction, however. Apparently, the debate did not 
fully fathom the extent of modern thought that is involved in the Western 
Christian reflections – philosophical, theological, and psychological. So, 
for a number of aspects of psychotherapy’s worldview background the 
debate does not clearly demonstrate all existing and possible dependen-
cies.  
Does the debate meet the final part of the hypothesis? It states that 
the Christian integration debate has drawn implications of the interde-
pendencies for psychotherapeutic professionalism. Several implications 
have been identified, indeed, such as the need of competence in religious 
matters, and the failures caused by the lack of it with many secular thera-
pists; an understanding of the moral consequences of faith; the ability to 
deal with the religiously wrapped resistance by the patient (chapter 4); a 
clear view of the therapeutic goal of employing the patient’s faith; aware-
ness and observance of the ethical constraints regarding the patient’s 
 
6
  See chapter 6 for a more detailed account. 
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belief system; and the use of spirituality for therapeutic purposes. From 
this we may conclude that participants of the Christian integration de-
bate really drew consequences from the interdependency of worldview 
and psychotherapy for psychotherapeutic professionalism. Here, too, 
however, there remains some lack of clarity in the analyses and recom-
mendations concerning the therapeutic professionalism in dealing with 
religious affairs and setting religious goals. 
 When we measure the first part of the second hypothesis by our    
observations, we may conclude that there are unsolved disagreements, 
indeed, especially in the epistemic parts, and to a lesser degree in the 
applications of epistemology and anthropology to psychotherapy. There 
is some contradiction in the answers to the question whether biblical or 
theological data may function on the same cognitive level as empirically 
collected data. Some say yes, others say no. It remains an issue whether 
biblical or theological cognitions fit in a common framework with empiri-
cally controlled facts. Can we distinguish facts and interpretations of the 
Bible in the same way as we distinguish them in science? Approached 
from the other direction, scientific hypotheses and theories are always 
subject to critical testing with the help of systematic observations. Is the 
same true of biblical or theological contentions? So, can the latter be 
submitted to scientific scrutiny and possible correction? In other words, 
do they meet the standards of the scientific method with its critically dis-
tancing approach? Or does this combination spell a blurring of cat-
egories? Or should we, with others, dispute the objectifying analytic 
stance that is conventional in scientific practice, and argue for a more 
engaged, emotional experiential style? If so, that would mark the end of 
the standard scientific enterprise. 
 In the reflections on psychotherapy the anomalies are less sharp but 
still obvious. Against the common background of emphasizing relational-
ity, the main unsolved discrepancy consists of a different appreciation of 
the use of religion and spirituality in psychotherapy. Can religion be re-
cruited as a means to other, therapeutic, ends or does the high valuation 
of religion and spirituality as dealing with ultimate reality prevent us 
from this opportunistic use? Would the same be true here, as with Bible 
and science, namely, that the combination or integration of spirituality 
and psychotherapy imply a confusion of different categories? 
 The problematic relationships between Bible and science and be-
tween spirituality and psychotherapy give support to the former part     
of the second hypothesis: that the Christian integration debate arrived   
at unsolved inconsistencies. I did already hint at the cause of these     
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inconsistencies, to wit, a confusion of categories. That is the latter part of 
the second hypothesis and will be tested in the next chapter.  
In order to form an opinion about this issue we need an independent 
vantage point which exceeds the boundaries of chapter 5. We need a 
point of view from which external criticism can be performed, that is, 
criticism depending on the particular position one takes. Until now, we 
have been involved in an internal appraisal of the arguments employed 
by Christian theorists of psychology and psychotherapy. The appraisal 
focused on consistency, not on the value of particular viewpoints. In the 
next chapter, we make a move toward debate external assessment of the 
adopted positions. For this I make grateful use of the analyses and reflec-
tions of Reformational Philosophy. 
  
Chapter 6 
External Evaluation of Psychology and 
Psychotherapy in Relation to Worldview 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we summarized the main conclusions by Chris-
tian theorists about worldview elements that are associated with episte-
mology, anthropology, and their influence on psychotherapy, and applied 
a tentative internal criticism. It was internal in that it started with the 
presuppositions held by the mentioned thinkers themselves and ex-
pressed in the worldview(s) they advocated. Our main outcome ap-
peared to be that, to be sure, Christian theorists did detect modernist 
presuppositions and demonstrated their incompatibility with basic as-
pects of their Christian worldview, but, on the other hand, we suspected 
that modernism might have intruded more deeply into Christian assump-
tions and positions than its critics were inclined to acknowledge. 
The present chapter will continue the critical evaluation from an ex-
ternal viewpoint, that is, an independent tool as a normative measure for 
the sustainability of the analyses in whatever form by Christian theorists. 
Questions like the following remained still unresolved in the previous 
chapter, and ask for further reflection. How should the relationship be-
tween empirical knowledge in science and faith knowledge derived from 
the Bible be viewed? And, how should we deal with the modernist em-
phasis on the self as fostered in psychotherapy, i.e., the self as the inward 
center of control with its concomitant values like personal autonomy and 
self-actualization, in the light of biblical teachings that go beyond psycho-
logical personality theory? How should we estimate spiritual interven-
tions in a psychotherapeutic context, anyway? In these questions the 
second part of the second hypothesis becomes relevant, viz., that the 
unsolved disagreements of the Christian integration debate can be traced 
back to confusion about the relations between faith knowledge, science, 
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psychotherapy, and pastoral care. The questions concern the difference 
between faith knowledge and psychological science, the relationship be-
tween psychology, faith knowledge and psychotherapy, and the distinc-
tions and connections between faith knowledge, psychotherapy, and 
pastoral care. Faith knowledge is here understood as knowledge that 
arises from the recognition of the Bible as the main source of divine reve-
lation. 
In order to test this part of the hypothesis, analyses by Reformational 
Philosophy are being applied, and that for various reasons. The Reforma-
tional approach combines several benefits in developing a balanced phil-
osophy of worldview and psychotherapy. In the first place, it recognizes 
the impact of worldviews in all human activity. Secondly, it cannot be 
under suspicion of being unfavorable to Christian motives and values 
because it is built upon fundamental Christian assumptions itself. It em-
phasizes that all human reflection and action is guided by a religious 
ground motive, be it Christian or non-Christian. The Reformational ap-
proach has proven to be fruitful in areas like technology, political philos-
ophy and cultural analysis and has been worked out for medicine and 
psychiatry. It is attractive because it develops its arguments from within, 
by elucidating the proper nature and structure of certain activities and 
practices. It has a rich set of heuristic  ideas about the structure of reality 
as we know it. This approach is congenial enough to Christian motives in 
psychological reasoning to do justice to their intentions. Further, it has a 
proper balance in its account of both reality’s unity and diversity. So, it 
avoids both reduction of reality to only one primary aspect, and fragmen-
tation into scattered realms of experience and action. In other words, it 
meets both the modernist drive to demonstrate unity and coherence, and 
the postmodern concern for the different and the unique, without falling 
into the biases of either of them, to wit, reductionism and subjectivism, 
respectively. To appraise the impact of modernism we appeal, next to 
Reformational Philosophy, to some philosophical reviews about the cul-
tural history of human identity in Europe presented by Taylor, Foucault, 
and Levinas. These reviews help us prepare our position on the tensions 
between modernist and traditional Christian approaches of the human 
subject. 
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6.1 Reformational Philosophy as an External Standard  
 
First, we turn to Reformational Philosophy as an external tool. To begin 
with, I draw some main lines to introduce the core of the Reformational 
philosophical representation that has been developed by Herman Dooye-
weerd (1953, 1955, 1957, 1960) and has been pictured by scholars like 
Kalsbeek (1970/1975), Clouser (1991), and Van Woudenberg (1992). 
 
Principle 1: The Unity of Reality 
Reformational Philosophy considers the reality in which we live and 
which we perceive as a unity. By our naïve, or everyday experience the 
reality we face is understood as a totality. There is no reason to suspect 
this unreflective perception in advance. Sure, it may be biased, but can-
not be ignored. Rather, it may be taken as a guiding intuition of how 
things are. There is more reason to suspect all kinds of prejudiced, and 
philosophical critique of our naïve experience. Such critique invariably 
tends to reduce integral reality as it is experienced to some aspects of it, 
such as perception (sensitive aspect) and interpretation (analytic aspect) 
by Kant; matter (physical/biotic aspect) and economy (economic aspect) 
by Marx; or just matter by many contemporary neurobiologists. Naïve 
experience is embedded in the fullness of reality with all its possible as-
pects (or functional modi). 
This unity of unreflective experience furnishes an a priori account of 
the ontological state of affairs. Christian naïve experience understands 
reality as a product of God’s creation. God has created all things to His 
own glory. All things are meaningful in that they refer to the Creator and 
His greatness. All reality belongs to Him. However, unreflective experi-
ences may take many kinds of forms, each with its own implicit meaning. 
This meaning of life finds expression in the religious ground motive that 
drives every person. Every responsible human creature does have some-
one or something as his or her deepest drive and highest purpose, be it 
the recognition and glorification of the Creator or something else. If it is 
not a personal God who is assumed to reveal Himself in people’s lives 
there might be other individuals, or things, that serve as ultimate con-
cerns. Although the contents of religious ground motives are very differ-
ent, the existence of religious ground motives is universal. In spite of 
their diversity they are all religious in the sense of referring to the ulti-
mate values of life. This religious ground motive is part of one’s world-
view and may function as an integrative force preserving the unity of life 
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perception, or at least the peaceful co-existence of multiple life orienta-
tions in an apparently fragmented world. 
The fact remains, however, that there are different ground motives, 
and many different systems of life perception. This is held to be the con-
sequence of our fall into sin and our apostasy from the living God. Instead 
of Him we take created aspects of reality to be the highest principle of 
our existence, like reason, matter, or economy, as has already alluded to 
in the first paragraph of this section. Fortunately, we can retrieve the 
unique recognition God our Creator deserves, thanks to our redemption 
by Jesus Christ, God incarnate. So, there are two qualitatively different 
ground motives: the one moving toward God, and the other moving away 
from Him. In this fundamental duality Reformational Philosophy is in-
debted to the champion of neo-Calvinism, Abraham Kuyper (1898) who 
emphasized that all areas of life belong to God, and who assumed a reli-
gious antithesis also in science. This antithesis was tempered, however, 
by the assumption of the influence of common grace thanks to which 
there is truth in science done by non-Christians. 
 
Principle 2: The Diversity of Reality 
Reality is diverse. We can distinguish various aspects, also called func-
tions, modal aspects, (modal) spheres, or modalities. These aspects are 
not intentionally discerned by naïve experience, but by rational analysis. 
Dooyeweerd distinguished the following modal aspects: the quantitative 
(or numeric), the spatial, the kinematic, the physical, the biotic (or         
organic), the sensitive (or psychic), the analytical (or logical), the cul-
tural-historical (or formative), the lingual, the social, the economic, the 
esthetic, the juridical, the moral, and the faith-related.1 There is a pro-
gressive sequence in these modal aspects in the sense that the higher 
aspects are built upon and thus presuppose the lower ones. These as-
pects have their relative sovereignty, that is, they cannot be derived from 
or reduced to one another. At the same time though, they are interde-
pendent. From the post-sensitive aspect onward the modal aspects have 
a normative character. That is to say that they can be violated by humans 
who are subject to them. 2 With the pre-analytical aspects this is imposs-
ible. Aspects are not about concrete entities, the What, but about the 
 
1
  The term forged for this aspect is pistic aspect (from Greek pistis = faith). 
2
  Note that normative is not an exclusively moral category. There is also analytic, 
economic, aesthetic, etc. normativity. 
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How. In that sense, all of them tell something of reality. Aiming to do jus-
tice to the fundamental intuition of diversity, Dooyeweerd assumed that 
these aspects refer to the law-side of created reality, as the way God has 
structured reality, as the lines along which creation has been ordered to 
function. 
In another respect, creation consists of all individualities or entities, 
comprising concrete things, people, happenings, institutions, practices, 
etc. These diverse individual entities are all subject to more than one 
modal aspect. For instance, a tree is subject to the quantitative, spatial, 
kinematic, physical, and biotic aspects, an association is subject to all 
these aspects plus the sensitive, analytical, historical, lingual, and social 
aspects. Every kind of entities has a qualifying aspect that distinguishes it 
from other kinds of entities. For animals this is the sensitive aspect which 
distinguishes them from, for instance, the flora that is qualified by the 
biotic aspect; for pieces of art the qualifying function is their aesthetic 
one, other than utensils like chairs and spoons that are supposed to be 
qualified by their social functions. 
This distinguishing, analyzing approach of reality cannot do justice to 
the integral unity of reality, because the unity is more than the sum of its 
components and aspects. Therefore, within Reformational Philosophy 
there is an awareness that the unraveling of all different aspects is some-
how artificial. In fact, it is an approach to reality from the vantage point 
of only one aspect, that is, the analytical one. This is the qualifying func-
tion of all sciences, which are characterized by their rational analysis of 
reality. Empirical sciences focus, in principle, on one aspect of reality, for 
instance, the physical aspect, or the economic, and by doing so abstract 
from all other aspects of reality. Things go wrong in science when scien-
tists forget their abstraction and treat the aspect under study as if it is 
reality in itself and stands on its own. Succumbing to this temptation 
leads to reductionism. It is one of philosophy’s tasks to unmask these 
biases and to do justice to all aspects in their coherence. Reformational 
Philosophy seeks to interrelate the various aspects of concrete reality, 
and to show how they are connected in the so-called individuality struc-
tures of all entities. 
 
Principle 3: Unity in Diversity 
As Reformational Philosophy teaches, all entities have one qualifying 
aspect, and a number of modal aspects they are subject to. Every entity, 
in fact, functions in all aspects in one way or another. Each aspect is sov-
ereign in its own sphere, but it is also universal in the sense that the  
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principles and laws which hold for that aspect, also hold for everything 
else that exists. This is what Dooyeweerd called the universality of the 
modal aspects. They function in all individual entities, albeit differently. 
Apart from the qualifying aspect the entity is subject to, there is usually 
also a founding or foundational aspect. And there are other aspects, with 
their own laws and normative principles, to which the entity is subject 
but without particular qualification. 
Vegetation, for instance, cannot exist without quantity, space, move-
ment, matter, and life. A plant, therefore, functions in the quantitative, 
spatial, kinematic, physical, and biotic spheres. These spheres are called 
subject-functions: the plant functions as subject (i.e., actively, by itself) in 
these five spheres. One of these spheres is the qualifying or leading func-
tion, in this case the biotic sphere. The other subject functions or aspects 
are in service of this function; they anticipate on biotic functioning. The 
leading function, in its turn, refers back to the preceding, lower functions. 
The technical term minted for this is retrocipation. In all other aspects 
the plant functions as objects. So, the plant also functions in the analytic 
sphere, in the historical, the lingual sphere, and so on; not as subject, but 
as object, i.e., as object in relation with other entities and, most im-
portantly, with humans. These other, higher aspects are called object 
functions. A plant can be cultivated as a houseplant and put in the living 
room. Here, it has a social object function or an aesthetic object function 
in which it is not founded. These object functions may even acquire a 
qualifying status. The houseplant exists, as object, in order to function as 
social or aesthetic object. The technical term for this functioning in   
higher spheres is anticipation. The material thing anticipates functioning 
in these higher spheres. 
The same story can be told of instruments which are used in medical 
care, such as a surgical knife. The knife is a physical object, but is not 
qualified by its physical sphere, but by its use in surgical practice, which 
ultimately has a moral destination. In fact there is a two-step type of 
analysis needed here: the knife as such is the product of manufacturing, it 
is not just a physical thing, but a product of a process of designing and 
engineering, which makes the knife suited for its technical function in 
certain surgical procedures. However, these procedures, in their turn, do 
not stand on their own and are part of a practice with an ultimately   
moral destination. The knife acquires, secondarily so to say, a healing 
function. Other functions (or aspects) anticipate on this healing function. 
And in the production process of the knife this future role of the knife as 
technical object in an ultimately moral practice is imaginatively taken 
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account of: the engineer literally anticipates, in a process of trial and er-
ror, which spatial and physical features of the knife would make it most 
suited for its future task. 
Both retrocipation and anticipation can be referred to by the technical 
term disclosure. Lower spheres can be disclosed by higher ones by retro-
cipation, and higher spheres can be disclosed by lower ones by anticipa-
tion. 
 
Elaboration: Normative Practices 
Sofar we have faced the law-side and the subject-side of reality, and its 
unity in diversity. The modalities and the individualities (entities) repre-
sent the diversity and find their unity in the purpose of the Creator with 
His creation. In the present subsection we address a certain kind of enti-
ties, namely, social practices. The entities we paid attention to can be 
roughly distinguished in natural entities (like stones, trees, and rivers), 
and cultural entities (like spoons, streets, and canals) which, in one way 
or another, are products of human activity. One kind of culturally formed 
entities are practices, and more specifically, social practices. Examples of 
social practices are sports, arts, education, managing a company, training 
guide dogs, sciences, medical care, nursing, psychotherapy, etc. These 
practices as such have not been created by God but have been developed 
in the course of the cultural-historical process. We are quite interested in 
the analysis of these social practices, because our focus is upon some of 
them: psychological science, psychotherapy, and pastoral care. 
 The notion of social practices has been introduced by Alasdair Mac-
Intyre (1984), and elaborated by Reformational philosophers like 
Jochemsen and Glas (1997; Jochemsen, 2006a, 2006b; Glas, 2009a). Mac-
Intyre defines a social practice as 
 
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human ac-
tivity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are ap-
propriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended. (p. 187) 
 
As an example of an inherent good (“internal to that form of activity”) he 
describes the practice of portrait painting as it developed in Western 
Europe from the late Middle Ages to the eighteenth century. The internal 
goods to be achieved are related to the historically developed standard 
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that the human body is the best picture of the human soul. We can extend 
this example with the inherent good of, for instance, acquiring knowledge 
within the practice of natural science that meets the condition of control-
lable observations and conclusions. 
 By Reformational philosophers this concept of a social practice has 
been interpreted and extended by analyzing it in terms of Dooyeweerd’s 
theory of  individuality structures. Practices are normative because there 
are normative principles which hold for these practices. 
 The normative structure of social (and other) practices implies that 
there is, again, a qualifying aspect or function. The qualifying aspect de-
termines the raison d’etre of the practice, it signifies the goal of the   
practice, the ideal it pursues. For medical care this is a moral function 
(helping patients to regain or retain a maximum of health), and for edu-
cation a cultural-historical function (the formation of pupils or students). 
Apart from the qualifying aspect there are founding aspects that make 
the pursuit of that practice possible, like professional skills that are de-
termined by science (know what) and technology (know how). It is    
important not to mix up the qualitative and foundational aspects of a 
practice. Not the professional’s expertise is the qualifying moment of the 
practice but the intrinsic intent of the professional practice. Furthermore, 
there is a conditioning side to a practice, consisting of the conditions 
under which the practice can be performed, such as social, juridical, and 
economic rules. These three kinds of aspects together, qualifying, founda-
tional, and conditioning, form the constitutive or structural side of prac-
tices. There is also a regulative or directional side, referring to the way 
the rules or aspects are interpreted and applied in a wider interpretative 
context that is ultimately determined by the religious ground motive of 
those who perform the practice. 
 Figure 1 shows the various aspects of the practice of psychotherapy in 
a schematic overview. It distinguishes the structural or constitutive side 
from the directional or regulative side. A great deal of the structural part 
goes back on the modal aspects that express the law-side of creation. 
These represent the ever equal creational dimension of normative prac-
tices. However, the role these aspects play are not immutable. They de-
velop into a specific direction. How rules are understood and applied is a 
matter of human choices in specific religious, moral, legal, and economic 
circumstances, scientific progress, and technical possibilities. These 
choices are finally inspired by ground motives. The direction into which 
practices develop, and its underlying dynamic, forms the regulative side 
of normative practices. It represents the changing cultural dimension of 
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these practices. This state of things implies that the normativity inherent 
to normative practices cannot be absolute. From a Christian or other 
ideological perspective they might be put under criticism for the direc-
tion they take. Culture is not value free, indeed. 
 Finally, it should be stressed that the debates about the details of the 
Reformational Philosophy analyses of reality have not yet been settled; 
the results thereof present continuous occasions for further argument. 
Figure 1 Structure and Direction of Psychotherapy According to the Normative 
Practices Model; after Glas (2009b). 
 
Relevance of the Distinctions 
The relevance of the distinctions between qualifying, conditioning, foun-
dational, and regulative aspects can be exemplified by referring to the 
actual practice of psychotherapy. Currently there is an urgent call for 
effective treatment within a limited period of time at costs as low as  
possible. Insurance companies ask for the employment of evidence- 
based treatment methods by competent therapists as a prerequisite for        
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reimbursement. Professional organizations bolster the evidence-based 
approach as a warrant of treatment expediency. The overall sociopolitical 
context in which this controllability and efficiency argument is put for-
ward is one of budget cuts and evidence-based results.  
Here several conditional and foundational aspects of the psychothera-
peutic practice are emphasized. Effectiveness, time limits, and low costs 
point to the economic conditions; evidence-based treatment and profes-
sional expertise to foundational side. The exclusive focus on efficiency 
and expertise might tend to result in an appraisal of psychotherapy that 
regards professional expertise and efficiency as its qualifying function. 
But then the core value of the practice is likely to be ignored, to wit, its 
moral function of helping patients. This moral quality of the practice 
makes the therapy a fellow-human enterprise in which the patient’s indi-
vidual life story may be opened up and deserves due attention. In this life 
story worldview issues may play a role. Justice can be done to the moral 
character of psychotherapy only if the economic aspect does not play too 
dominant a role in the process and retains its conditional character rela-
tive to its capacity of disinterested help. 
Is this person-oriented approach not inherent in the evidence-based 
approach favored by the occupational sector and the insurance com-    
panies? In the APA’s (2005) view, evidence-based practice does not only 
include the best available research and clinical expertise, but also patient 
characteristics, culture, and preferences. However, when maximizing 
patient choice among effective alternative interventions is mentioned as 
a central goal of evidence-based practice in psychotherapy, this presup-
poses the existence of “effective alternative interventions.” But such       
alternatives may well have been assessed effective only by means of 
quantitative, statistical comparisons. If so, they would necessarily have a 
standardized character, and disregard personal issues like one’s world-
view or one’s experience of meaning in life. By contrast, the emphasis put 
by the Normative Practices Model on the helping character of therapy 
directs the focus on the patients and the way they relate to their distress. 
It has an individualizing focus. Here, meaning of life comes into play, and 
because of its idiosyncratic nature this is hard to approach quantitatively. 
 These reflections on how psychotherapy is being dealt with under-
score the indispensable importance of the Normative Practices Model. 
They uncover the illegitimate substitution of conditional (such as eco-
nomic) or founding (such as measurable expertise) aspects for the real 
qualifying aspect of helping people. 
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Issues to Be Reviewed 
Our next step will be an attempt to apply the main lines of Reformational 
Philosophy to the bottlenecks of the Christian integration debate. Which 
are these issues to be reviewed? I try to rephrase and extend the provi-
sionally formulated questions at the beginning of the present chapter. 
(a) The first issue is the question whether biblical teachings and theo-
logical reflections should prevail over results of empirical research, and 
should be recognized as primary scientific knowledge.3 The discussion, 
here, is on the status of faith knowledge or theological knowledge, in light 
of the fundamental distinction in the Reformational philosophical tradi-
tion between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge. 
(b) A related question concerns the issue of whether biblical infor-
mation and systematically collected empirical data are equivalent and 
should be put on equal footing. The discussion about this issue will focus 
on levels or types of knowledge. 
 (c) The next issue is about the relationship between psychological 
science and psychotherapeutic practice. Is psychotherapy an applied   
science, or is the relationship somewhat more complicated? Here, the 
theory of normative practices should offer some clarification. 
 (d) Fourth, there is the issue of the relationship between psychother-
apy and spirituality, the former being a normative practice characterized 
by its own norms, the latter originally being addressed by another prac-
tice, namely pastoral care, with its own characteristic norms. What does 
Reformational philosophical analysis imply for the role of spirituality in 
psychotherapeutic practice? 
 (e) Finally, and closely  connected with the previous topic, the issue 
arises how the psychotherapeutic interest in the self and personal auton-
omy should be evaluated in light of Christian spirituality’s focus on altru-
ism, unselfishness, and self-sacrifice. 
 These five issues cover most of the questions which remained after 
our analyses of the Christian integration debate. In chapter 5, the impact 
of biblical content and theological interpretation on psychological theo-
rizing appeared to be an important issue in the integration debate (a). 
Part of the discussion concerned the question of whether biblical argu-
ments are appropriate in a scientific psychological discourse and how 
they should be brought in (b). Chapter 5 also identified as important  
 
3
  Knowledge in Plantinga’s (2000) terminology and interpretation taken as war-
ranted beliefs; see chapter 2. 
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issues in the integration debate: the legitimacy of spiritual interventions 
(d), and the orientation on the self in current psychotherapy (e). 
 It should be noted that one issue was not yet identified explicitly in 
the previous chapter, although it implicitly played a role in all positions 
in the integration debate. This issue concerns the relationship between 
psychological science and psychotherapy (c). It has not been thematized 
in the debate because there was no controversy about it, and it was not 
addressed in my analyses because it is not a matter of internal incon-
sistency. Reformational Philosophy, however, sees a problem here. I will 
explain this below. First we will review what Reformational Philosophy 
has to say about the first two issues (a, b). After this follows an analysis of 
issue c. The chapter will close with a discussion of Reformational philo-
sophical insights into topics d and e. 
 
 
6.2 Psychological Science Dependent on Biblical Truths (Ad a) 
 
Christian Psychology 
Can or should biblical information be part of and even have the lead in 
psychology as a science? We have seen in chapter 2 that in answering 
this question both psychologists and philosophers of Christian persua-
sion are internally divided. In order to perform a Reformational Philoso-
phy analysis, I first present a systematic account of the Christian         
Psychology answer, rendered by Eric Johnson (2007b) in a programmatic 
article. It can be seen as a concise formulation of the position he develops 
in his book (2007a), and a continuation of his article from 1997. My 
choice is prompted by the outstanding clarity of his contribution. 
 Johnson advocates a holistic approach of understanding human na-
ture, defining human knowledge as a fallible imprint of God’s perfect 
knowledge of all things. Human nature is so complex “that it can only be 
properly grasped within a holistic, hierarchical, and interdependent set 
of orders of discourse: biological, psychosocial, ethical, and spiritual” (p. 
15). This sequence and its characterization as hierarchical and interde-
pendent remind us of the various modal categories in Reformational 
Philosophy that Johnson is familiar with.4 In his explanation of the      
 
4
  This information I derive from personal conversation, in which Johnson ex-
pressed his admiration for the principal design, especially the role of the religious 
ground motive in it, but at the same time his disappointment about the practical 
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hierarchical organization we recognize the disclosure of the higher in the 
lower, the founding function of the lower with respect to the higher, and 
the religious ground motive in all human life:  
 
the lower ground the higher and the higher fulfill the lower, and the lower 
can only properly be understood and interpreted within the context of the 
higher. Ultimately, all of human life is spiritual, that is, it is all related to God. 
(p. 15) 
 
This principal starting point has consequences for both the contents of 
psychology and the sources of psychological knowledge. About the con-
tents he writes: 
 
God knows that human beings are made in his image, that they are sinners 
whose minds are blinded to aspects of God’s glory, and that God has justified 
and adopted those who believe and who then have the Holy Spirit dwelling in 
them. … for my part, it is hard to see how, from a Christian standpoint, it 
would make sense to exclude such knowledge from psychology, the science of 
individual human beings. (p. 9) 
 
These details about human nature do not result from empirical research 
but from reading and believing the Bible, according to Johnson. Since the 
Bible supplies reliable knowledge there is no reason to disqualify biblical 
teachings as a possible source of knowledge for a Christian psychology. 
On the contrary, the Bible occupies primary significance. Johnson admits 
that there are other cultural and religious contexts in which other types 
of psychology can be developed legitimately, for instance secular psy-
chology which denies all authoritative religious sources of knowledge, or 
even all results of non-quantitative research. He appears to be inclined to 
let all these different context and worldviews have their own forms of 
psychology, and let them all serve their own communities, provided that 
they remain transparent about their sources, and underlying worldviews. 
The legitimacy of these other psychological concepts needs some 
qualification, though. They form a legitimate variety from a pragmatic 
point of view but not from a principle Christian point of view. Johnson 
appeals to Augustine and Abraham Kuyper (1898) to underscore the 
fundamental dichotomy of humanity and of human scientific activity in 
 
elaboration of the different disciplines of the Reformational Philosophy analysis 
of reality. 
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two distinct communities and two different types of scientists; the city of 
God over against the terrestrial city, and the Abnormalists (assuming by 
grace that the present reality because of sin deviates from the reality as 
God created it) over against the Normalists (assuming that the present 
reality is normal). All people, including scientists, fall into one of the two 
categories. From a Christian viewpoint, all psychology that belongs to the 
Normalist category cannot do justice to our human condition, although 
this does not rule out the possibility that we can learn from it. 
 For the sake of his holism, Johnson accepts many sources of knowl-
edge. He compares his program with Aquinas’ extension of an Augus-
tinian epistemology with an Aristotelian paradigm of rational analysis. 
He is ready to employ the Bible, the Christian tradition, natural science 
methods, human science methods, experiential methods (introspection, 
phenomenology, narrative analysis, among others), critical science meth-
ods (such as depth psychology), poetry, novels, essays, movies. An Augus-
tinian-Thomist approach aims at wisdom, rather than simply knowledge. 
 In a defense of this plea for the use of all possible information, includ-
ing that from the Bible, Plantinga (2007) offers an appealing comparison. 
 
My neighbor’s lawn is full of dandelions; I want to learn why. There are many 
avenues of investigation: I can take soil analyses, try to find out how many 
dandelions there were last year, look to see if there are large numbers of 
dandelions in the yards on either side – suppose my neighbor has also told 
me that he purposely planted them (he really likes the color yellow); it would 
be folly for me to refuse to consider that bit of what I know in my in-
vestigation. In conducting any inquiry or investigation, obviously, I should 
employ everything I know, all the relevant information I have. (p. 32) 
 
Reformational Philosophy’s View 
What would be the response of representatives of Reformational Philos-
ophy? As Van Woudenberg (1992) observes, the theory of modal aspects 
is not only a means to distinguish the different aspects of life and to re-
late them to one another in an overarching philosophy of life, it also 
works as the foundation of an encyclopedia of the sciences. Each science 
is related to (ideally) one of the modalities of reality; psychology to the 
sensitive aspect, economy to the economic aspect, and theology to the 
aspect of faith. Since the modal aspects of reality are irreducible to one 
another, the sciences will also be irreducible to one another. In other 
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words, every aspect is sovereign in its own sphere, and, therefore, every 
science too.5 If that would not be the case, this would pave the way for 
scientistic reductionism in which one science, investigating a particular 
aspect of reality, is supposed to define the deepest essence of life, at the 
expense of other sciences. Examples of such absolute claims for the ex-
clusiveness of one science over others are (evolutionistic) biologism, and 
(materialistic) physicalism. Reformational philosophers consider all  
sciences equal and as having their own laws, methods, and theories. 
There are, however, relations between the different modal aspects. 
Anything that exists, exists in all modal aspects. Sciences study a particu-
lar aspect of things (or: types of things). But each aspect refers analogi-
cally to all other aspects. The technical way of phrasing this is, that each 
aspect has a meaning kernel which is surrounded by analogical meanings 
which refer to other modal spheres.  For the sciences this means that 
there are analogies between the basic concepts of all sciences, such, that 
the basic concepts in a particular science analogically refer to meanings 
which are rooted in other modal spheres.  
To give a simple example, the particular modal sphere studied by psy-
chology is the psychic or sensitive, with feeling as its meaning kernel. 
Within this field of inquiry there are many kinds of feeling, such as emo-
tion, sense of logic, linguistic feeling, sense of economy, sense of justice, 
feeling for art, moral sense, and religious joy. They are all about feeling 
but in this modality of the sensitive a specifying meaning is added that is 
analogous to the meaning kernel of another modal sphere. These spheres 
are: the kinematic (e-motion), the logical, the linguistic, the economic, the 
juridical, the esthetic, the moral, and the sphere of faith. Yet, they are 
further specifications only by analogy, because the meaning is always 
qualified by the sensitive aspect. 
Modal spheres as well as sciences are therefore interrelated via these 
analogical references. These analogous references reflect the coherence 
between the modal spheres and therefore the coherence between the 
sciences. This coherence is grounded in the coherence of the modal as-
pects as the law-side of the one created reality. As the coherence of the 
 
5
  Nowadays, we would prefer the word autonomy, but Dooyeweerd would pre-
sumably object to its use because of its association with making one’s own law 
which is in contradiction with the law structure of reality as it is determined by 
the Creator. 
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modalities is intuitively grasped by everyday experience, so the coher-
ence of the sciences is reflected purposefully by philosophy. 
What does this imply for the analysis by Reformational Philosophy of 
the Christian Psychology account as presented by Johnson? Different en-
trances to the issue are possible. We can put the finger on the holism that 
Johnson advocates. The Reformational approach to science is not holistic. 
On the contrary, every science investigates one single aspect of reality. By 
doing so it is selective, it accomplishes a reduction of reality without be-
coming reductionist, that is, without proclaiming this aspect to be the all-
determining principle of reality. Simply, one aspect is abstracted from the 
totality of experience, and analyzed, inter alia, in its relationships to   
other aspects. Therefore, the religious, social, psychic, and biotic func-
tions of human beings are to be distinguished, and selected for investiga-
tion separately because these aspects cannot be reduced to each other. 
Again, this is not to say that there are no cross references. There may be a    
psychology of religion, and neurobiology as an auxiliary science for psy-
chology. But in each of these connections one modality has the lead; in 
psychology of religion that is the sensitive function, investigated by psy-
chology, in neurobiology it is the biotic one, subject of biological inquiry. 
So, the holistic ideal of Christian Psychology can be criticized from a 
Reformational Philosophy viewpoint as doing insufficient justice to the 
modal focus of any science, and the use of abstraction. 
 Another entrance to the issue is to pay attention to the angle of reduc-
tionism. With the spectrum of modalities and modality focused sciences, 
Reformational Philosophy attempts to do justice to the irreducible var-
iety of aspects of reality that respond to a variety of sovereign and equiv-
alent laws and normative principles. What is Christian Psychology in fact 
doing by its holistic program? There are several possibilities. 
 One possibility is that biblical statements are taken as divine revela-
tions of truth and therefore can be applied as reliable knowledge. In that 
case, the answer of Reformational Philosophy would be: Biblical state-
ments are divine truths not in a scientific way, that is, modality specific, 
and processed rationally, but in the naïve way of everyday experience. 
Biblical teachings help to shape and fuel the religious ground motive and, 
indirectly, its philosophical conceptualization which in turn is directional 
for psychological research. 
This brings us to the next option, the other possibility: Theology is 
taking the lead in scientific research. This seems to be the more plausible 
interpretation of Christian Psychology approach, because the appeal to 
the Christian tradition and insights from poetry and movie can hardly be 
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ranked under divine revelation but can be studied by theology as the 
human enterprise of interpreting God’s revelation. However, this domi-
nating role results in the subjugation, or reduction of all other sciences to 
theology. To this Reformational Philosophy would strongly object, be-
cause such absolutization would imply a kind of rationalism in theology 
and underestimation of the modal diversity of reality. It also obstructs 
the emancipation of secular reality from the realm of the sacred launched 
in early modernity, partly as a result of the renewed appreciation of the 
ordinary life in the earthly world of marriage, family life, and labor in the 
16th century Reformation (Taylor, 1989). In this mindset each of the  
sciences claims its own legitimate place among the other sciences with-
out being inferior to and dependent on allegedly sacred theology. 
 
Answers to Remaining Questions 
This analysis of the Christian Psychology approach may raise some ques-
tions, the following ones of which will be faced now. The main question is 
about the principle formulated by Plantinga that we should employ all 
available information. Why not taking advantage of the biblical insight 
that human beings are created to live in relationship with God, that they 
are sinners who turn away from God, that their main sins are pride and 
greed, that they should and can be redeemed and reconciled with God by 
Jesus Christ and will be renewed by the Holy Spirit by way of faith? How 
could we gain a complete picture of human nature without these charac-
teristics that will never be detected by secular psychology? Moreover, 
isn’t the appealing example by Plantinga about the dandelions so con-
vincing that it can hardly be downplayed? 
 The answer to the main question is that a science primarily focuses on 
phenomena at a modal level (modal in the sense of Reformational Philos-
ophy). Johnson’s definition of psychology (“the science of individual   
human beings”) is too unspecific and even inaccurate. It is inaccurate 
because psychology is not only about individual human beings, it is     
also about human perception, sensation, cognition, behavior, and devel-
opment in general. Only certain segments of psychology are about      
individual human beings, such as individual differences in intelligence or 
temperament, and mental disorders. But even if we take this deficiency 
for granted, the indistinctness remains. In reaction to the definition one 
would reply: If psychology is the science of (individual) human beings, in 
what sense, on what level, do you want to investigate human beings? On 
the biological level, the moral level, or the religious level? No, you want  
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to do psychology. So, you choose the sensory, sensitive, cognitive, and    
behavioral levels of human functioning, or some part within this range. 
As a counterargument one could say that human nature will be frag-
mented by this modal approach. How can one investigate human behav-
ior without taking into account the morals, norms and values, and the 
religious orientation by which humans are led? The answer is that moral 
and religious orientations are not neglected. They are of importance, 
indeed, as far as they play a part in humans’ psychological functioning. 
Religious impact is investigated in psychology of religion, as values and 
virtues are incorporated in positive psychology. 
But how about the religious ground motive of the psychologists? Isn’t 
their research colored by their own worldview, consciously or uncon-
sciously? To be sure, provided that we perceive this ground motive and 
annex worldview as shared values of research communities. However, 
these presuppositions should be made as explicit as possible, and marked 
as directive forces that are not normative of themselves and can be criti-
cized by others in the psychological discourse. 
 This all might be true for academic psychology, one could object, but 
how about clinical psychology, and psychotherapy in particular? Aren’t 
the therapist’s views of man co-decisive for the direction into which the 
treatment goes? Shouldn’t a Christian psychotherapist rely on a biblically 
informed anthropology? Here all psychologists of Christian confession 
and Reformational philosophers agree. But Reformational Philosophy 
will add that what is valid for psychotherapy isn’t valid for psychology in 
the same way. It distinguishes between psychology and psychotherapy as 
belonging to different normative practices, as section 6.5 will explain in 
more detail. 
 Finally, we pay attention to the import of Plantinga’s example, starting 
with ‘”My neighbor’s lawn is full of dandelions; I want to learn why.” This 
practical example should vindicate the maxim or truism “in investigating 
a given subject or topic, one should use all that one knows.” However, the 
example is misleading because the formulated question is not a scientific 
one. The phrase “I want to learn why” is ambiguous. Does he want to 
know the reason why? Then he is asking about the personal motive of his 
neighbor. This is not a scientific issue. Science is about regularities. If he 
should want to know why many people in his town keep dandelions, he 
could conduct a sociological survey to the regularity of this motive re-
lated to its absence in a town nearby. Then he would search for supra-
personal factors that might cause or contribute to this prevalent motive 
(although he might not be the most suitable person to conduct the survey 
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because he is part of the population studied). Or does he want to know 
what causes the prosperous growth of dandelions in that area? Then the 
knowledge about the neighbor’s preference of the yellow color is irrele-
vant to the inquiry. Or is his interest indiscriminately directed to all pos-
sible answers on the question why? Then the question is definitely too 
unspecific to deserve the qualification scientific. The conclusion is that 
Plantinga’s example does not contribute to the clarification of the issue. 
 
 
6.3 Theology and Psychology: Two Sources (Ad b) 
 
One Sample of the Integration Approach 
In the previous section we faced the construction of psychology domi-
nated and determined by the Bible, the Christian tradition, and theology. 
In the present section we face a model in which theology and psychology 
are perceived as two sources of knowledge about human nature, more or 
less equivalent, with in principle no possibility of real contradiction   
because all truth is God’s truth. Here other questions arise, not about 
reductionism but about the combining of different methodologies. The 
variant is one of the options defended within the Integration View of the 
relationship between Christianity and psychology. 
 Advocates of this integration approach are Collins (1980) and Farns-
worth (1982a) (cf. section 5.1). Collins distinguishes two fields, theology 
and psychology, each filled with complex assumptions, changing data, 
and hotly debated issues. None of these is unified or static. This makes 
the task of integrating the two fields anything but easy. Farnsworth 
thinks it can be done. He distinguishes two databases, the Bible and the 
human person, respectively, or, God’s special revelation in His Word 
(propositional revelation), and the general revelation in His creation (i.e., 
nature and human existence). The interpretation of the databases leads 
to two categories of facts, theological and psychological; facts taken as 
interpreted data. When the facts of both kinds contradict, the integration 
process must be delayed because evidently something has gone wrong in 
data collection and interpretation. In that case we cannot suffice with a 
reinterpretation of the conclusions but should re-analyze the data or 
even adapt our methods and replicate a study from the Christian per-
spective. Farnsworth’s approach is familiar with the Christian Psychology 
project in that it utilizes the Bible on the level of data to be interpreted 
and processed in theorizing. The difference is that he favors a correla-
tion model between psychological and theological facts, and charges  
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approaches like the one favored by Christian Psychology of being a ma-
nipulation model subsuming psychological facts under theological facts. 
What can be said about this model from a Reformational Philosophy 
point of view? 
 
Reformational Philosophy’s View 
For a systematic appreciation we refer to the analysis of the scientific 
practice by Stafleu (1980, 1987) as it is applied by Glas (2009c) to the 
issue that engages us. In this analysis scientific research can disclose 
reality into four possible directions, to wit, retrocipating, anticipating, 
universalizing, and specifying. Our special interest is in the last-
mentioned direction. Retrocipating disclosure is focused on objectifying 
the phenomenon and making it manageable for calculation, comparison, 
and prediction. In psychology this is performed by way of statistical   
processing in order to find influencing factors. It is called retrocipating 
because in it psychological phenomena are put in terms belonging to a 
modality preceding the analytic, here the arithmetic. On the other side, 
there is an anticipating disclosure, which consists of a focus on practical 
applications. The practical functioning is about technical designs and sev-
eral practices that use applied science. It anticipates higher aspects than 
the analytical one by addressing the social, economic, and/or ethical as-
pects. Think of the new social media, advanced radiation techniques, 
automation of the labor process, or psychotherapy. The universalizing 
disclosure relates to the analysis of general theoretical interconnections 
in pure science that are valid for specific modalities like number theory 
and theoretical physics. 
Our special attention is raised by the so-called specifying disclosure, 
relating to all kinds of interdisciplinary research of specific topics. Glas 
mentions the example of emotions as a subject of inquiry. Emotions be-
long to a certain type of psychic phenomena that can also be studied in 
various ways: physically, biologically, psychologically, and socially. By 
employing all these approaches, an attempt can be made to understand 
such a type of phenomena integrally. 
In the context of our reflections, the question can be raised whether 
theology could be an additional science to be applied to the phenomenon 
of emotions. For if we can investigate the physical, biological and psycho-
logical aspects of emotions, being foundational to the phenomenon, and 
the social side of it, being an object function of emotions that occur with-
in social relationships, why not the aspect of faith? There is an openness 
between emotions and religious faith, from emotions to faith, and vice 
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versa from faith to emotions. With all kinds of emotions, like loneliness, 
longing, distress, or joy, we can go to God for comfort, shelter, and com-
pany. And the other way round, concepts and awareness of God stir emo-
tions of awe, fear, love, or revolt. Further, from a theological viewpoint 
the appropriateness of some emotions under particular circumstances is 
assessed. And besides this affective part of the psyche, there are also the 
cognitive and behavioral sides of psychic functioning on which faith   
exerts influence. 
Let us try to imagine how the interdisciplinarity between theology 
and psychology regarding a specific topic such as emotions could take 
place. Theology is about the interpretation and application of traditional 
sacred texts, and central dogmatic notions that exert their authoritative 
influence in a religious community. Psychology, on the other hand, is 
about empirical observations, hypotheses, testing, and theorizing. How-
ever, here interpretation is of importance, too, especially the inter-
pretation of observations and test results. Moreover, psychology as     
well accepts an authoritative tradition of common theory, based on the 
dominant paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). Can these similarities help to bring 
theology and psychology together? This depends on one issue in which 
the disciplines should converge in order to be able to work together: in 
their methodologies, and here the differences come to the fore. 
 Theology is about understanding. Its main method is hermeneutic, or, 
it is the art of interpreting sacred texts and uncovering their meaning for 
us. What is the criterion to which the proposed results are measured? 
There can be no objective standard of truth, but there is an intersubjec-
tive one, that is, one on which the evangelical community can agree, to 
wit, the standard of orthodoxy, which in turn should be interpreted and 
applied as well. In spite of the hermeneutical circle which emerges here – 
orthodoxy as the standard of its own interpretation and application, only 
functioning however through interpretation –, a substantive criterion 
governs the process. 
 Psychology, on the other hand, is a complex matter from a methodo-
logical point of view. It is primarily about describing and explaining 
causes and effects. Its main method is empirical observation and codifica-
tion of psychological phenomena in their supposed causal relationships. 
The criteria to which the outcomes and conclusions are measured consist 
of methodological uniformity, replicability of research designs, and a 
tight link to the actual state of research and the literature that attests 
thereto. In this context conclusions become new hypotheses that are 
subjected to new testing. It is true, psychology does not only include 
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quantitative but also qualitative research, which demands a more her-
meneutic method for the sake of interpretive understanding. However, 
this hermeneutical method is subject to the requirement of empirical 
validation, as well, be it less rigid than the quantitative method requires. 
 If the two disciplines of theology and psychology should work to-
gether on the specific topic of emotions, two options arise. The one    
option is that empirical psychological research is put into service of the 
hermeneutic enterprise performed by theology to confirm and extend the 
results of theological considerations. In that case theology is the domi-
nant discipline, the importance of psychology being reduced to its signifi-
cance for theological understanding. This involves a kind of reductionism 
that is expressed in Christian Psychology, and denounced by Reforma-
tional Philosophy (see section 6.2). 
 From a Reformational Philosophy perspective this priority of theology 
to psychology gives rise to another difficulty. If theology has the lead in a 
specific topic, what role does it play in other topics that are object of psy-
chological inquiry? Not all issues have a primary faith component, cf. the 
examination of individual differences, personal development, or psycho-
dynamics. Should theology take all these issues in its charge, on prin-
ciple? But then theology would exceed the focus on the faith aspect that 
Reformational Philosophy has assigned to it. 
The second option is that the hermeneutic approach of theology is 
subservient to empirical research, in the sphere of generating hypotheses 
to be tested, and with the risk of hypotheses not being confirmed and, 
even worse, opposing hypotheses derived from non-Christian under-
standings being confirmed. Here empirical research has the supremacy,6 
and religious orthodoxy is subject to its testing. This is not what integra-
tion psychologists have in mind, though. Moreover, it is a kind of reduc-
tionism, too, reducing theology to psychological criteria. 
 Our conclusion has to be that an integrated interdisciplinary approach 
of theology and psychology with the two disciplines being equivalent 
runs afoul of the qualitative difference of methods of inquiry, even in the 
case of a limited cooperation focusing on a specific subject of inquiry. 
 
6
  Someone might object that in professional psychology the hermeneutic method 
of interpretation can be rather dominant. Without contesting this, I refer to sec-
tion 6.5 about the relationship between psychology and psychotherapy, and with 
this in mind I leave the topic undiscussed for now. 
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An Alternative Arrangement 
Besides the above disputed two sources approach, there is another line 
within the Integration View on the relationship of Christianity and psy-
chology. This line draws explicitly on the worldview concept. Differences 
in formulating research questions, collecting data, interpreting them and 
developing theories are all traced back to presuppositions on the 
worldview level (Larzelere, 1980). This does not mean, however, that 
unwelcome psychological positions can be disqualified by a simple ap-
peal to the Bible as the provider of Christian worldview notions. Instead, 
an argument for modifying or rejecting some general psychological 
proposition should focus on all levels of scientific inquiry: research ques-
tions, data collection, etc. Christians should not be afraid of any conflict 
between their faith content and the results of psychology, for all truth is 
God’s truth; according to this worldview approach reliable empirical data 
should fit into a Christian worldview that is filled and molded by biblical 
teachings. The causes of trouble lie in the biases caused by secular re-
searchers’ own preconceptions, and in Christian psychologists’ being 
insufficiently versed in the Bible. In short, on the level of principle there 
can be no contradictions between faith and Christian worldview on the 
one hand, and psychology on the other; on the practical level, however, 
contradictory propositions may occur. 
If we continue this line of thought, all kinds of psychology may arise as 
a consequence of applying different worldview systems, like humanistic, 
agnostic, Christian psychologies, etc. However, if these presuppositional 
worldviews would dominate the theoretical results, the related psychol-
ogies would lose general credibility. How should we limit the worldview 
impact in order to safeguard the validity of the results? 
As noted before, in section 2.5, Wolterstorff (1984a) introduced the 
notion of control beliefs. First, one should examine the biblical and con-
fessional content of the worldview held, and once this critical test is 
passed one should uphold basic control beliefs that regulate the weighing 
of existing psychological theories and the development of new ones. 
These control beliefs belong to the Christian’s worldview. Jones (2010b) 
appeared to favor this approach. Defending his preference for focusing 
on the relationship of psychology with Christianity rather than the Bible 
or theology (as a separate source of knowledge), he argued: 
 
it is the personal faith convictions and commitments of individual psychol-   
ogists that can and will shape their scientific and professional work, not the 
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teachings of the Bible that are supposedly disconnected from the person nor 
the abstract discipline or body of Christian theology. (p.106)7 
 
The advantage of introducing Christian notions on the worldview level is 
that this approach does not assume a separate theological source and 
method of gaining knowledge that happens to compete with the psycho-
logical sources and methods. There is only one set of empirical methods 
that are normative for research without combining incommensurate 
approaches. At the same time the influence of Christian faith is guaran-
teed by the recognition of basic assumptions that are co-directive and 
corrective for psychological hypothesizing and theorizing. 
As we have seen in sections 2.3 and 2.5, Pascoe (1980) connected this 
impact of worldview presuppositions with Dooyeweerd’s assumption of 
the religious ground motive as directive for Christian views of human 
nature over against divergent worldviews that covertly direct others’ 
psychological research and interpretations. There should be made one 
restriction, however, about the reference to Dooyeweerd’s ground mo-
tive. Dooyeweerd distinguished it from worldview in that the latter    
entails a more explicit and conscious image that is suggested by the met-
aphor view (Wolters, 1989). Presumably, he wanted to avoid too rational 
a system of worldview, which would impede free investigation and might 
even work, I add, as defense mechanism of rationalization against dis-
pleasing outcomes. This is in line with Wolterstorff’s (1984a) appeal that 
control beliefs are not so dominating that they fully control the process of 
theorizing. So, according to the Dooyeweerdian approach worldview as 
regulative principle is fine, lest we concentrate on its religious impulse 
and avoid to employ it as a rational system. 
With this reservation psychology and worldview can be combined 
without derogating from the proper practice of regular psychology. At 
the same time, this approach can do justice to the fact that there is always 
a directional component in psychology as it presents itself, as reflected in 
bias, resistance to paradigm change, absolutizing of aspects, and explicit 
worldview preferences. 
 
7
  There seems to be some shift in his position compared to Jones (2006), cf. the 
sections 2.4 and 5.3, from the integration of two sources toward an integration in 
personal appropriation. 
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6.4 Psychology and Psychotherapy (Ad c) 
 
Merging of Psychology and Psychotherapy in the Integration Debate 
In the Christian integration debate the distinction between psychology 
and psychotherapy is not thematized by any of the contributors. How-
ever, in the Normative Practices Model developed within Reformational 
Philosophy the distinction between different practices such as between 
psychological science and psychotherapeutic care is crucial. Let us first 
try to gain some insight into the way psychology and psychotherapy have 
been pieced together by theorists that attended the debate. 
 As an exemplar of this kind of fusing the two practices I recount the 
argument for Transformational Psychology as it is conceptualized by Coe 
and Hall (2010d) and summarized in chapter 1 as one of the five views 
on the relationship between psychology and Christianity (section 1.4). 
The present rendition is not about the justification of their approach but 
on how they conceived the relationship of psychology and psychother-
apy. Coe and Hall were focused on a “scientific” grounding for Christian 
psychotherapy (2010a, p. 91) by a new inclusive kind of psychological 
science in which the spiritual-emotional transformation of the psy-
chologist is vital, which develops a methodology that can provide a uni-
fied vision of the person as a whole, and in which the employment of 
results of current psychology is only one aspect. Doing psychology as God 
intended is a means to the goal of love through union with the Holy Spirit 
(2010d, p. 212). They saw a logical move in the spiritual formation model 
of psychology from theory to praxis, from understanding to treatment, 
and from reflection to loving others (2010d, p. 224). Psychology’s prod-
uct includes research, reflection, and praxis. So, psychotherapy was seen 
as a part of psychology, and psychology as the legitimation of psycho-
therapy. As observed earlier, none of the interlocutors pointed  to this 
characteristic way of presenting matters. 
 This way of connecting psychology and psychotherapy is reflected in 
articles about the integration issue as published by the two journals 
about psychology and Christianity. Berry (1980) wrote an article about 
“the integration of the social sciences and biblical theology,” according to 
the title, which is, however, confined to doing therapy as a Christian. Fos-
ter and Bolsinger (1990) tried to make up the balance of more than fif-
teen years of evangelical integration literature and treat themes that 
include modeling, counseling, mental disorders, scientific method, and 
God’s one and all-encompassing truth without any discrimination.    
Bouma-Prediger (1990) distinguished intra-disciplinary integration from 
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inter-disciplinary integration, and by intra-disciplinary integration he 
meant the integration of psychology and psychotherapy, defined as the 
attempt within a given discipline or profession to unite theoretical per-
spective and professional practice, or, the task of rendering theory and 
practice consistent. He noticed that with the turn to a more postmodern 
epistemology characterized by the emphasis on hermeneutical con-
sciousness and personal interests, this task of intra-disciplinary integra-
tion has been made easier, because it has made psychologists aware of 
the subjective side of knowledge which is crucial for any psycho-
therapeutic process. Here, too, all attention goes to the continuity       
between psychology and psychotherapy without any interest in the   
possible distinction between the two. Hathaway (2004) spoke about 
“psychological scientists who are skilled investigators of both the subjec-
tive and objective aspects of personhood” (p. 218). Obviously, the subjec-
tive aspects refer to the idiosyncratic personality traits as revealed in 
therapeutic conversation. In this case, too, the distinction between scien-
tific investigation and therapeutic practice is blurred. Narramore and 
Carter (2000) acknowledged that in the non-clinical and non-applied 
areas of psychology the relevance of Scripture is limited, but emphasized 
that inside the clinical psychologist’s office patients struggle with practi-
cal issues about daily life of which the Bible has much to tell us, like guilt, 
anger, lust, depression, anxiety, and family disintegration. Here again, 
psychotherapy, labeled as “clinical and applied psychology,” was looked 
upon as a part of psychology. Even Cole (2000) who, in line with Dooye-
weerd, argued on the basis of the autonomous character of the psycho-
logical and other dimensions of God’s creation, did not challenge the 
merger of psychology and psychotherapy. 
 
Reformational Philosophy’s View 
Because psychological science and psychotherapy are different social 
practices, they obey different rules. It is not sufficient to characterize 
psychotherapy as applied psychology. Psychotherapy is other than appli-
cation of scientific laws and regularities to specific cases, and the em-
ployment of statistical evidence based treatment protocols. Glas (2007; 
2009a) who emphasizes the differences between the types of conceptu-
alization and of languages used in the different practices. The psycho-
therapeutic profession is located somewhere between naïve knowledge 
related to everyday experience and scientific knowledge. Naïve, unreflec-
tive knowledge includes moral, value-laden, and religious interpretations 
of everyday life; scientific knowledge cannot be without presupposed 
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moral and religious values either, but there is a difference. In everyday 
experience the presupposed and acquired values (for instance by reading 
and believing the Bible) are an integral part of life, scientific endeavor 
however tries to proceed to conclusions that surpass worldview peculi-
arities. To be sure, science cannot dispose of bare facts – all observations 
are value-laden – but scientific discourse pursues consensus as broad as 
possible, in the best case scenario controlling for worldview differences. 
From the Reformational Philosophy vantage point it would be expedient 
that theorists be more explicit about their anthropological and moral 
presuppositions just to be able to control them. For psychology rational 
analysis is the qualifying aspect. The professional practice of the psy-
chotherapist, on the other hand, combines the two levels of knowledge, 
naïve and scientific, in a distinct clinical knowledge that knows how to 
assess the individual condition of the patient and deal with it. It is about 
applying psychological insights in the context of an individual, acknowl-
edging the existential layer of the patient’s problems with its relational 
intertwining. In the psychotherapeutic setting the values of the person(s) 
requesting help and those of the caregiver should not be suspended, but 
integrated in the conversation and the treatment. 
 What does this mean for the requirements for the psychology in ser-
vice of our psychotherapy? It implies that there is no need for a specifi-
cally Christian psychology promoting a specifically Christian anthropol-
ogy in order to legitimize a Christian psychotherapy. In general, scientific 
psychology intends to be modest with respect to worldview issues, and in 
the specific psychotherapeutic setting there is enough room for the inte-
gration of Christian truths and values if the situation and the choice of 
the patient demand it, because his or her total life experience can be  
topic of conversation, provided that on other levels, of institutional rules, 
e.g., no barriers are raised. 
 
Answer to a Remaining Question 
So far, the difference between psychology and psychotherapy has been 
demarcated as a difference in social practices, the former being qualified 
by the norm of rational analysis of human thought, feeling, and behavior, 
the latter by the moral norm of helping people. This difference is con-
nected with a difference in levels of language and concepts. Science is on 
the level of theoretical knowledge; the helping professions are on a level 
halfway between everyday experience and theoretical knowledge. In this 
in-between area occupied by psychotherapy there is ample room for and 
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even a need of integrating religious articles of faith and moral values that 
belong to the everyday knowledge of the patient. 
 Here a question arises, however. Is it true that truth revealed in the 
Bible belongs to the knowledge of everyday experience only? Isn’t revela-
tory truth a separate category besides the other modes of knowledge, like 
naïve, scientific, professional, and philosophical knowledge, distin-
guished by Glas (2007; 2009a)? The discussion was raised by Narramore 
and Carter (2000) in their response to Cole (1998) who by following 
Dooyeweerd claimed a sphere sovereignty for the psychic aspect and 
psychological science. Both critics replied by asking: 
 
But if we are only to use Scripture to give us a place from which to view crea-
tion and to understand our purpose in creation, what are we to do with all of 
the biblical content that speaks specifically to the psychological and relational 
aspects of human existence? It provides massive amounts of information on 
healthy, mature and sinful (or pathological) personality functioning. It pro-
vides very specific data on how the body of Christ is to function so that its 
members will grow into increased Christ likeness (doctrines of the church 
and sanctification). And it speaks of dealing with emotions like fear, guilt, an-
ger, love, and anguish. It is precisely here that our approach to integration 
radically departs from that of Cole’s. (p. 73) 
 
Narramore and Carter suggested that biblical information outweighs all 
kinds of truth tracked down by other means than obediently believing 
what the perfectly reliable God reveals in his Word. Are we not down-
playing biblical truth by assigning it to human naïve experience, contin-
gent as such experience may be? 
 Reformational Philosophy’s answer to this question emphasizes the 
fundamental importance of everyday human experience. Everyday expe-
rience grasps reality as a totality with all its interrelated aspects and 
entities. Reformational Philosophy further insists on the limited signifi-
cance of theoretical, scientific knowledge, limited by its rational analyti-
cal method of observing, hypothesizing, testing, and theorizing, and its 
methodological selection of only one of the modal aspects of the object to 
focus on. That divine revelation addresses us on the level of the lived 
everyday life is not to its detriment, but underscores its vital and all-
encompassing importance. In refusing to assign biblical truths about 
human feelings, motives, behaviors, and destination to everyday experi-
ence instead of psychological theory, Narramore and Carter seem to rate 
everyday experience lower than theoretical knowledge, as if everyday 
experience is inferior to theoretical knowledge. In doing so, they turn out 
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to pay tribute to the modernist, Enlightenment idea of the priority of 
theoretical knowledge over naïve experience, overestimating the pursuit 
of objective knowledge. The totality experience expressed in the biblical 
encounter of God and humans cannot be fitted into a reductionist analyti-
cal exposition rendered by standardized scientific language. It belongs in 
the practical experience of believers in their dealings with God, and 
therefore, in case of psychic problems, in the consulting room of the psy-
chotherapist. Objective knowledge is an artifact that can go deeper into 
details of perceived reality than integral experience, and therefore has its 
value, but it cannot do justice to the rich variety of life, including our life 
with God and the existential doubts and anxieties associated with it.8 
 
 
6.5 Psychotherapy and Pastoral Care (Ad d) 
 
Overlap 
In order to consider the relationship between psychotherapy and pasto-
ral care or counseling it might be clarifying to sketch what both activities 
are about, and to assess the interfaces and overlaps between them. In 
chapter 1 different approaches to psychotherapy were reviewed. What 
they all have in common is that someone with emotional and/or behav-
ioral problems is helped by a professional in order to regain mastery 
over the difficulties and to address the exigencies of life. For a provisional 
characterization of pastoral care or counseling we can refer to the broad 
definition of Clebsch and Jaeckle (1975) to which Jones (1991) appealed 
(see section 4.2); they described pastoral care as helping acts, done by 
representative Christian persons, directed toward the healing, sustaining, 
guiding, and reconciling of troubled persons whose troubles arise in the 
context of ultimate meanings and concerns. Judging from these charac-
terizations a lot of common content can be identified. Both psychother-
apy and pastoral care are directed to persons in trouble; both are caring 
and helping activities, aiming at managing problems, or healing; in both 
mental support is given, spread over a number of conversations; in both 
qualified persons lead the conversations; and the context of ultimate 
 
8
  This primacy of everyday experience has also been appealed to in the issue of 
human freedom over against the determinism claimed by many neurobiologists. 
The intuition of freedom as a feature of everyday experience is valued higher 
than conclusions from selective scientific observations; cf. Geertsema (2011). 
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meanings and concerns is at issue not only in pastoral contacts, but often 
in psychotherapy as well. 
In view of these overlaps, one might suggest to put Christian psycho-
therapy and pastoral care on a continuum from severe to less severe 
complaints, possibly interacting with a second continuum from not    
necessarily explicitly religious or spiritual to explicitly religious or spiri-
tual. Whether the notion of a continuum is the most accurate one to de-
scribe the relationship between psychotherapy and pastoral care and 
counseling, depends on the final definition of pastoral care, of course. 
Intuition might be inclined to separate them and to define the distinctive 
character of pastoral care as dealing with spirituality, and of psychother-
apy as dealing with mental health. Let us first have a closer look at the 
nature of pastoral care. 
 
Some Approaches in Pastoral Care and a Common Denominator 
Which approach to pastoral care would be preferable? Several alterna-
tives suggest themselves, four of which I refer to now (cf. Van der       
Meulen, 2010). The first to be mentioned is the classical one, eloquently 
stated by Karl Barth’s colleague and friend Thurneysen (1968) as keryg-
matic pastoral care. The emphasis on the Gospel message, the kerygma, 
determines the nature of the conversation. The task of the pastor is to 
help the other to see his or her life in the light of the Word of God. The 
second concept of pastoral care can be characterized as therapeutic pas-
toral care or counseling. It has been advanced by Seward Hiltner (1949), 
and was inspired by theologian Paul Tillich and humanistic psychothera-
pist Carl Rogers. Keywords are growth, healing, self-fulfillment, to be 
pursued by means of understanding, clarification on ethical issues, and 
basic respect. The third way of understanding pastoral care is by conceiv-
ing it as hermeneutic pastoral care, which turns on making sense of the 
life story of people in relation to God (Gerkin, 1997; Heitink, 1998;     
Ganzevoort & Visser, 2007). A fourth direction of pastoral care is called 
charismatic pastoral care, which is focused on spiritual healing. It in-
cludes prayer for physical healing, healing from sin and sinful patterns, 
healing of memories and emotions, and the ministry of deliverance from 
demonic oppression. 
 Despite their difference, three of the four approaches explicitly refer 
to God’s reality as a divine presence in the pastoral encounter: the ker-
ygmatic, hermeneutic, and charismatic alternatives. The fourth alterna-
tive, therapeutic pastoral counseling, lacks this explicit reference. Even 
so, the context of pastoral counseling is the Christian community (Hiltner 
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and Colston, 1961), suggesting that there is room for a divine instance as 
a standard for the parishioner’s responsibility, and a source of strength. 
So, all in all, there is good reason to speak of God as the third in the pas-
toral conversation (Klein Kranenburg, 1988) Who in one way or another 
participates in the encounter. Noticing this characteristic is the same as 
admitting that pastoral care has to do with the spiritual as the experience 
of the – maybe problematic – relationship with God. 
It is possible, of course, to expand the meaning of God to other inter-
pretations than those bound to God’s self-disclosure in the biblical narra-
tive, by appealing to God images and instances of ultimacy related to 
other religions and philosophies. One could think, for instance, of the 
spiritual care provided by a counselor of humanistic orientation. Here 
too, the spiritual, referring to the awareness of and encounter with the 
ultimate reality, is at the core of the practice, be it that its meaning differs 
from the Christian connotation of the relationship with the triune God. 
On this account, in Reformational philosophical terms, the qualifying 
aspect of pastoral care may be designated in spirituality as faith in God, 
or relatedness to the ultimate. The caring capacity, belonging to the  
moral aspect, appears to be one of the foundational sides of the practice, 
as a substantial prerogative for the pastoral relationship. 
 
The Alleged Spiritual Character of Psychotherapy 
Is the spiritual an exclusive structural issue for pastoral care, or is it 
equally important for psychotherapy? The latter has been advocated 
forcefully by James Olthuis (2001) who developed “a new psychology of 
loving and being loved.” He opposed the expert model of psychotherapy, 
as we saw already in the articles that drew our attention in the preceding 
chapters (Olthuis, 1994a, 1994b, 1999, 2006). He characterized psy-
chotherapy as “an emotional-spiritual process in which we journey to-
gether in the hope that God will bring healing” (Olthuis, 2001, p. 12), 
pursuing a spiritual psychology, in the sense that people get in touch 
again with their inner selves, and become open to authentic and deep 
connection with others, creation, and God. Psychotherapy, rightly under-
stood, is a journey of healing with others. Olthuis put this over against 
the modernist purpose of psychotherapy to gain control, mastery, and 
adjustment by rigidly employing uniform methods. 
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 What does this view of spiritual psychotherapy mean for the relation-
ship between psychotherapy and pastoral counseling? Olthuis9 criticizes 
Gerald May (1982, 1992) for drawing a line between the two, reserving 
spirituality for the pastoral practice. May juxtaposes willfulness and will-
ingness, the former denoting deliberate intention and autonomy, and 
belonging to therapy, the latter including voluntary surrender to the real-
ity and will of God. For May, these are contrasting and yet com-
plementary activities. This gives rise to Olthuis’s critical question of how 
these two diametrically opposed systems can be complementary. To him 
they are mutually alien and incompatible, and therefore one should 
choose between these two divergent “routes to fulfillment” (Olthuis, 
2001, p. 55). In his own view, psychotherapy and pastoral counseling (or 
spiritual direction10) are twin ministries of care and compassion. There is 
only one reality, that is, creation, held together by the love of God, and 
not two separate domains, a secular and a spiritual one. There is a differ-
ence of focus though, either on a person’s sense of identity and emotional 
health, or on his or her life of faith. However, these two focuses do not 
exist separately; for identity includes being in relation to God and the 
ultimate of life, and personal faith includes emotions. From an integral 
spiritual perspective, spiritual needs are central to both psychotherapy 
and pastoral counseling. To Olthuis, then, the difference between psycho-
therapy and pastoral counseling is a matter of accent, and thus remains 
relative. 
 
Reformational Philosophical Analyses of Psychotherapy and Pastoral Care 
Olthuis’s kinship with the Dooyeweerdian legacy is clear from his advo-
cacy for the unity of our reality as God’s creation, and his opposition 
against dichotomizing tendencies. So the present reflection can be under-
stood as an internal argument within Reformational Philosophy. The 
question we deal with is: How do Christian inspired psychotherapy and 
pastoral care turn out to interrelate if they are analyzed from the Norma-
tive Practices Model? 
 In Olthuis’s (2001, p. 57) view, psychotherapy is about a person’s 
sense of personal identity and about emotional health. Let us examine 
 
9
  Like Rambo(1980); see chapter 3.3 on Becker. 
10
  Mostly, pastoral counseling and spiritual direction are distinguished from one 
another as problem focused and relatively short-term, over against growth fo-
cused and long-term. 
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these concepts somewhat further. Sense of personal identity and emo-
tions are qualified by the sensitive aspect. This means that psycho-
therapy focuses on the experiential (sensitive) aspect of personhood. As 
Olt-huis argues, a person’s sense of identity includes the person’s feeling 
life in relation to God and the ultimate values of life. In the context of the 
caring practice of psychotherapy then, spirituality or the relationship to 
God11 may also be a topic in the conversation setting. I would comment, 
however, that in psychotherapy spirituality is not dealt with directly but 
indirectly. In therapy the focus on spirituality is derived from the focus 
on the sense of identity, which is the specific focus of therapy. So, spiri-
tuality enters the field of attention in terms of the perceived and poten-
tial significance it has for the patient’s sense of personal identity. This 
means that spirituality is not a distinctive aspect of psychotherapy, al-
though it may play a clarifying part. The sensitive (psychic) may be dis-
closed toward the religious, but this is not automatically the case. 
On the other hand, the aspect of faith is the qualifying aspect of pas-
toral care, in the sense that the  aspect of faith extends its influence to 
religion as the central dynamic of human life, disclosing faith to the   
moral, social, and sensitive aspects of humanness. Pastoral care tries to 
connect the interlocutor with ultimate reality in the awareness of God’s 
presence. Room is created for giving account of God’s significance in 
one’s life. As Olthuis states, in this pastoral conversation too questions 
about feelings and identity are dealt with, but now we can add that they 
are not qualifying the pastoral practice. They can occur as retrocipations 
of the faith aspect toward the sensitive and social aspects. 
 The characterizing moment of faith in the pastoral encounter asks for 
some further consideration. There is something peculiar about faith and 
the spiritual that has been alluded to already in chapter 4. This has to do 
with its connection with the ultimate reality one recognizes, in the Chris-
tian context the ultimate reality of the triune God. It is ultimate in that it 
is directive for the meaning awarded to all other activities and experi-
ences. In this capacity the ultimate exerts some kind of authority. Given 
its character of ultimacy it is contradictory to instrumentalize it as a 
means for other goals, specifically, to use spirituality as an instrument for 
 
11
  Some confusion may arise when the meaning of spirituality is stretched too far. 
Olthuis (2001, p. 77), for example, uses it in the sense of having contact with our 
true or authentic selves. I propose to limit it to the relationship with ultimate re-
ality as it is conceived. 
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feeling better. Is there a tension here between the ultimate as end and 
the ultimate as means? Not necessarily. There is a kind of reciprocity 
between serving God for his own sake, and being blessed by Him out of 
free goodness. It is up to the prudence and competence of the pastor to 
lead this two-directional intercourse in a balanced way. 
 
Conclusion and Question 
This review of the relationship between psychotherapy and pastoral care 
does confirm the common areas of interest as well as the difference of 
focus between psychotherapy and pastoral care, as Olthuis has put for-
ward. But we also traced a qualitative difference between both. The ques-
tion remains how far this difference goes. Is Olthuis’s objection to May’s 
opposition of psychotherapy and pastoral care well taken? Is May’s as-
sertion that they do not only contrast but also complement each other 
really self-contradictory? Are willfulness (initiative) as the goal of psy-
chotherapy, and willingness (surrender) as the goal of pastoral care,  
mutually exclusive? Put in Reformational Philosophy terms: do they  
represent different and incongruous directions, or are they somehow 
compatible? Should psychotherapy and pastoral care have the same goal, 
or is it legitimate that they have disparate goals? By way of a cultural 
critique we try to shed some additional light on the topic. 
 
 
6.6 Historical Reflections on the Self 
 
The Self in the Integration Debate 
The theme of continuity or dissimilarity between psychotherapy and 
pastoral care was represented by Gerald May (1982, 1992) as an issue 
about the relationship to the self. In the integration debate the self has 
been embraced as a modern expression of the kindred soul. In the pres-
ent acceptance of the orientation on the self, humanistic concepts of self-
acceptance and self-actualization have been adopted in a Christian sense 
as self-acceptance by God’s grace, and actualization of the new self by the 
Holy Spirit. Sometimes Gerald May’s distinction between willfulness (in-
itiative and control) and willingness (surrender) has been employed; 
willfulness as the goal of psychotherapy has been characterized as cop-
ing, happiness, and growth. 
In Kierkegaard (1849/1983), the attention for the self was balanced 
by the importance of the relationality of the self toward God (cf.           
Evans, 2006). Christian theorists highlight this line of thought against 
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humanistic interpretations. The central position of the self in most     
psycho-therapeutic approaches should not degenerate into individualism 
and pretended autonomy but should emphasize the interrelatedness of 
our human nature, including the relationship with God. Some even chal-
lenge the legitimacy of focusing on the self in the therapeutic practice, 
because they doubt whether the humanistic interest in the self and con-
solidation of the self can be detached from the self-centered focus of hu-
manistic ideology. They raise the question whether the methodology   
and philosophy of secular therapies can be separated, and whether the 
method can be used without being infiltrated by unchristian anthropo-
logical and moral presuppositions. These considerations have been high-
lighted in chapter 3. 
 However, this discussion needs more clarity about the presupposi-
tions implied by the attention paid to the self as the central inner coordi-
nation center of human behavior. In order to assess the roots and the 
value of individuality, self-reflectivity, and relationality, in the present 
section I try to gain a historical perspective on Western appreciation of 
the human self by appealing to culturally oriented philosophers who 
published about the manifestations of the self in Western history: Charles 
Taylor, Michel Foucault, and Emmanuel Levinas. Related to this context 
we try to weigh some theological reflections on the importance of indi-
viduality and relatedness. The purpose of this sub-section is to back up 
the subsequent reflections by Reformational Philosophy about human 
individuality and their implications for individualist notions in Christian 
psychological theorizing. 
 
The Individual Self 
In a cultural-philosophical analysis of the history of the concept of self, 
Charles Taylor depicts a development in basic understanding of human 
individuality and personhood (Taylor, 1989, part II). As he observes, the 
crucial turning point in the rise of modernity is articulated by René Des-
cartes. Descartes looks for clarity and distinctness, and attempts to reach 
this by taking a disengaged perspective, disqualifying his own sensory 
impressions as unreliable sources of knowledge. The infallible starting 
point for certain knowledge is the thinking I: “I think, therefore I am.” 
The cosmos is no longer seen as the embodiment of meaningful order but 
grasped as mechanism, demystified by reason, and falling under instru-
mental control. Rationality is now an internal property of subjective 
thinking, rather than a pre-given property of external reality. Here, a turn 
to the subject is taking place. In his view, humankind is no longer part of 
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a coherent totality but retires to internal appreciation, claiming to exert 
ultimate control over the external world. 
Taylor not only wants to make clear that there were shifts in the phil-
osophical or conceptual level of the outlook on life. No, he includes the 
experiential, intuitional level in his conclusions. The philosophical inter-
pretation by Descartes gives expression to what had already been devel-
oping in human awareness and experience during the period before. So, 
Taylor’s conclusion entails that something had been changing in people’s 
everyday experience over the ages. 
The increasing emphasis on the inner world relative to the world 
around may have been prepared by the separation between the natural 
and the supernatural propagated by late Medieval and early Renaissance 
nominalist commentators on Augustine and Aquinas, such as Nicolas of 
Cusa. They imagined a state of pure nature within which man is created 
without a supernatural desire and destiny (De Lubac, 1945/1998; 
1965/2000). This deviates from the natural inclination toward God that 
is expressed in the famous saying of Augustine which states in the open-
ing paragraph of his Confessions: “our heart is restless, until it repose in 
Thee” (Augustinus, 1981). Here the human heart is dependent on God. 
Throughout the 15th century a shift takes place. We see a disintegrating 
force at work, through which the totality experience falls to pieces. It is a 
cultural process in which humanity is viewed more and more as emanci-
pating from their ontological dependence on God. Humans are increas-
ingly supposed to be capable of functioning as autonomous beings in 
their natural existence. 
 Not fully synchronous but yet akin to Taylor’s expositions are the 
reflections by Foucault (1966/1971) in The Order of Things, where he 
sees a difference between early and late modernity, covering about the 
16th-18th centuries and the 19th-20th centuries respectively. Analyses of 
written texts from these times result in the conclusion that in the former 
period humanity is still viewed as a part of nature in an unbroken se-
quence; apparently, thinking and being were linked together in an un-
problematic way. In the latter period, however, the human subject and its 
inner life become a separate category that gives rise to a separate science 
of man, or anthropology, in which human existence could be called into 
question. In his characteristically aphoristic and provocative style Fou-
cault states: “man is an invention of recent date” (p. 386). 
 Illuminating is the way Levinas (1961/1969) accounts for the rela-
tionship between individuality and relations by giving a favorable review 
of Descartes. He observes that Descartes with his concentration on the 
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thinking I does not deny or ignore the existence of the Infinite (God); on 
the contrary, by thinking properly one can know God. Descartes does 
deny a presupposed participation of the knowing human being with the 
known infinite being. Referring to Descartes, Levinas dismisses participa-
tion or totality, and teaches a radical separation of the self from the other. 
In this separation the I is unique and solitary par excellence. This denial 
of participation implies a kind of atheism, by which Levinas does not 
mean the denial of God’s existence but the refusal by the self to define 
itself by any connection with the Infinite. The self, though not being its 
own origin, is at home with itself; it drives into the dimension of interior-
ity. Only as an atheist being in the given sense can the I relate itself to the 
other. It can only open itself to exteriority if it can be closed in its own 
interiority. 
 What do these historical analyses of individuality yield? Taylor and 
Foucault describe a new kind of individualism in which the human self 
consciously puts its mental activity in the center of its experiential world. 
This is not about the origin of individuality in the sense of the awareness 
that Me is different from You. This awareness could be qualified as intrin-
sically human. Nor is the change about self-reflectivity, of which Augus-
tine was already a champion in the transition from the fourth to the fifth 
century, as appears from his Confessions (Augustinus, 1981). As a matter 
of fact, already in the New Testament individuals are called to examine 
themselves and repent. Maybe the difference with earlier times can be 
stated this way: human self-reflection is of all times but reflection on the 
self is typically modern. Self-reflection and reflection on the self are two 
different things. In self-reflection the focus is on the own ideas, motives, 
decisions, feelings, and behavior. In reflection on the self, however, the 
self itself as the center of thinking, willing, feeling, deciding, and acting is 
the explicit object of consideration. This is more of a meta-reflection, 
underlining the growing importance that is attached to the human sub-
ject or self as being the vital operating system in human functioning.12 
This is what Descartes does. Thinking is a universal human activity, but 
his “cogito ergo sum” is a conclusion of his thinking about his thinking 
activity, drawing the thinking subject to the center of interest. 
Still another element is at issue, having to do with participation or be-
longing. In the opening part of his study Taylor (1989) observed that in 
modern times people’s commitment and identification with larger social 
 
12
  Cf. also the analyses of modernity by Anthony Giddens (1991). 
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units is no longer self-evident. He explains the importance of notions 
such as being catholic, anarchist, Armenian, or Quebecois, as follows: 
 
My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide 
the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case 
what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or op-
pose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a 
stand. (p. 27) 
 
The difference between modernity and the pre-modern area is not that in 
modern times commitments and identifications have disappeared but 
that they do no longer arise automatically. Individuals have to decide 
which commitments and identifications they will adopt. Lack of such 
commitments and identifications leads to identity crises, forms of dis-
orientation, and loss of meaning, implying that people do not know who 
they are or where they stand. Apparently, for Taylor the disappearance of 
participation is a negative phenomenon. Against the background of     
Taylor’s observations, Levinas’s interpretations are more radical. He 
conceives the absence of participation as the ideal starting position for 
dealing with our lives. 
From ancient times people as individuals participated in larger com-
munities with their traditions and values. The delineation between indi-
viduals was evident but the dividing line between the individual and 
his/her community was blurred. Identity was derived from belonging. 
The individual was more or less absorbed in a meaningful cosmic order 
(Taylor, 2007). The rise of modernism entailed an increasing independ-
ence and self-sufficiency of the individual self, implying both a kind of 
autonomy in determining what kind of person one wants to be, and an 
openness to incalculable encounters with equally self-sufficient and 
unique others. An essential change in the character of relationships has 
taken place. In earlier times, relationality was first and foremost charac-
terized by familiarity and participation, from early modern times onward 
it was and is more and more determined by independent encounter 
(Levinas: from face to face). In Totality and Infinity Levinas shows us that 
this kind of relation to the other is not a refutation of modern individual-
ism, rather it is its confirmation, presupposing it. 
Remarkably, postmodernist thinkers do agree that the self is con-     
ditioned and instantiated by the surrounding social world. However,  
they do not evaluate this decisive influence as a constituting force       
resulting in a powerful self-identity, but as a confusing factor that blurs        
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self-knowledge as partial and fallible. Usually, this observation is named 
the decentering of the subject. The subject is supposed to be formed by 
many hidden cultural and social powers. On the other hand, however, 
this decentering of the subject does not imply that the self is ignored. For 
the sake of moral action the individual self is held to be as necessary as it 
is fictitious (cf. Butler, 2005). 
 
The Present Obtrusiveness of the Priority Attributed to the Inner World 
How did Christian consciousness deal with the consequences of this ex-
perienced priority of the inner world? To be clear from the outset, this is 
not about individuality. Individuality is an intrinsically human value and 
plays a vital rol in the Christian tradition, as indicated in the previous 
sub-section. Individuality refers to personal identity and responsibility. 
What is at stake here is individual subjectivity as the ultimate reference 
point for how to interprete reality and deal with it. How did Christianity 
undergo this shift toward the subject? 
Some of the consequences of this shift seem to be barely avoidable, as 
the following examples may illustrate. Taylor (1989) focuses the atten-
tion on the explanation of mental disorders. In the pre-modern world 
melancholia was interpreted as an imbalance among the four corporeal 
humors of which the human body is composed, with an excess of black 
bile. Melancholia was not seen as a mental disorder with a possibly phys-
ical cause; melancholia was black bile. There was no clear boundary line 
between the physical and the psychical. 
His second example is about the pre-modern merger of inner and out-
er world in the influence of magic and good and evil spirits over against 
the modern disenchantment of the world and the focus on the mind as 
the central operating system that can work properly or be in disorder. 
This corresponds with the way Christians see psychic complaints and 
social malfunctioning: while the Gospels frequently diagnose these as 
demonic possession, Christians today are more reluctant to do so, and 
are inclined to attribute problematic social behavior to mental causes. 
A third expression of the sensed primacy of the inner world versus 
the outer world, the soul versus God, is the perception of the glory of God. 
In early times, human activity of glorifying God was seen in one line with 
the actual glory of God as a divine property. The act of glorification was 
felt to be the appropriate answer to, and part of the reality of God’s glory 
being reflected in the cosmos. An ontological connection was assumed. In 
the contemporary view, however, our valuation of God is not in God, like 
under the ancient ontic logic, but in our minds, subjectively. The truth of 
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God’s glorious existence is no longer self-evident, but depends on a con-
tingent conviction. For “minds are now the exclusive locus” of thought 
and valuation. So, these are “psychic” in a new sense (Taylor, 1989, p. 
187). This division reinforces the perception of spirituality as a particu-
larly subjective phenomenon, which, to be clear, does not rule out the 
subjective claim of an independent reality outside and beyond our 
awareness. 
Another illustration is a contemporary one with older roots as well, 
not mentioned by Taylor, but highlighted by Lesslie Newbigin (1986). It 
is the ecclesiastical phenomenon in Western societies of denominational-
ism, referring to the tendency to choose our favorite denomination that 
best suits our individual needs and preferences, contrary to the essence 
of the Christian community as assembled and nourished by Jesus Christ. 
This attitude evidently matches both developments described by Taylor, 
to wit, the attitude of initial mental disengagement from one’s primary 
social unit as the larger social order that has been created by Christ, and 
of which one had become a part, and, second, mental engagement toward 
what really suits one’s particular nature. 
A fifth example of the inevitability of giving in to the turn to the sub-
ject is the very rise of the concept of worldview. Because of its origin in 
German Idealism and Romanticism (Wolters, 1989; cf. section 1.2), it is 
captured in subjective thinking, being subject to perspectives of particu-
larity. Surely, this does not preclude claims to universal validity, but it 
does in a modernist way preclude the obviousness of the outside world’s 
appearance.13 This fact does not prevent Christians from employing the 
concept however, herewith demonstrating their indebtedness to modern 
or postmodern thinking. 
Christians are more modern than they perhaps want to admit, but it is 
senseless to deny it. As Western civilians they are children of their age; as 
such they participate in the cultural-historical development of the self as 
the center of identity. From this sense of the self they try to understand 
themselves in the light of the biblical message. Their opposition to secu-
lar approaches of individual dignity and autonomy should therefore be 
nuanced. In a certain sense people in Western society are all in this to-
gether, whether they are religious or not. 
Our conclusion is that the modernist cultural-historical shift to the 
centrality of self-reflexive subjectivity can hardly be escaped by anyone 
 
13
  Cf. Griffioen (2012, p. 43): “Worldview as such is a modern phenomenon.” 
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in the Western world. Every effort to correct negative offshoots of this 
subjective orientation, such as self-engaged individualism, should ac-
count for this state of affairs in understanding humanity. This raises the 
question how to appreciate this evolution. We consult Reformational 
Philosophy to see whether it can help us evaluate the Western primacy of 
individual subjectivity. 
 
 
6.7 Control and/or Surrender of the Self (Ad e) 
 
The Self in Reformational Philosophy 
For Dooyeweerd the self, which he also called our I, ego, or heart, is the 
integrating and organizing center of our created being, the root of our 
individual personality. It is even more than this; it is the base of our abil-
ity to transcend time and to communicate with the eternal. So it is the 
seat of religion, understood as the innate impulse to direct our existence 
toward God or toward some substitute. To vindicate this central function 
Dooyeweerd refers for instance to Proverbs 4:23 which proclaims that 
from the heart flow the springs of life. Furthermore, the self is viewed as 
the central sphere of occurrence, which means that whatever occurs 
through human action originates out of our selves (Dooyeweerd, 1953; 
cf. McIntire, 1985). 
In early times, the whole of cultural activity was determined by the 
undifferentiated community in which all normative modal spheres, from 
the social to the religious [pistic], were still enclosed by the family, clan, 
or tribe. The paterfamilias was not only the father and grandfather, but 
also the leader, the teacher, the judge, and the priest. Individual per-
sonality was still absorbed in this undifferentiated community (Dooye-
weerd, 1979b). Cultural differentiation, however, opens the way for per-
sonal and individual potential to make itself felt in history, because it 
receives an opportunity for the free unfolding of its talent and genius. 
Here we see how Dooyeweerd depicts individualization as a   disclosure 
of creational potentials in the course of cultural history, and appreciates 
this disclosure positively. 
On the other hand, he notices that much of the drive behind this cul-
tural disclosure of personal identity and societal relationships has been 
apostate from divine revelation; it was a development in a wrong direc-
tion, away from God, in the historical process that culminated in the   
influential humanistic movement of Enlightenment. Dooyeweerd (1953) 
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did recognize the historical turning point documented by Descartes and 
he assessed it negatively, as appears from the next quotation: 
 
After much preparation in various sorts of directions (especially in the sys-
tem of NICOLAUS CUSANUS) the principles of Humanistic philosophical thought 
received their first clear formulation in the system of DESCARTES. The cogito in 
which this thinker supposed he had found his Archimedean point, is in no 
sense identical with the "logos" or "nous" of classic Greek philosophy. In the 
latter, human reason was conceived of as bound to an objective metaphysical 
order of being, in which the thinking subject only has a part. This metaphysi-
cal order was considered as the standard of truth in respect to theoretical 
thought. Quite different from this Greek conception of reason is that of the 
founder of Humanistic philosophy. (p. 195) 
 
Dooyeweerd criticized the withdrawal of the individual self to the inner 
life as an abstraction from “the entire experienceable reality” in time   
and space (p. 6). This is not to say that he favored the approach by Greek 
philosophy; he preferred a Christian alternative, advocating the devel-
opment of individuality as a part of created reality, and related to the 
Creator via the heart (inner self) as transcendental organ. So he rejects 
the solitary self and opts for being in participation and steady relation-
ship. 
 In appreciating Dooyeweerd’s position we should distinguish two lev-
els, the conceptual one and the experiential one. Conceptually, we might 
agree with him, but this does not preclude that experientially things feel 
different. Modern and postmodern experience do not start with a sense 
of totality (created reality) but with individuality. In fact, our differenti-
ated and complicated society asks for a strong sense of individuality in 
order to be capable of finding one’s own way without intolerable 
amounts of stress and/or anxiety, or other kinds of mental barriers. 
 How could these insights be applied to our approach of psychother-
apy? The focus on psychic functioning in mental care is intensified by the 
modern emphasis on the inner subject as a rather disconnected control 
center of daily life. If this center does not work properly, it should be sup-
ported and strengthened by psychotherapy. At the same time psycho-
therapy has the task to help develop new connections, thus superseding 
frustrations caused by individual isolation. So, there is a dual aim: the   
increase of ego-strength, and the establishment of connections, or, for-
mulated somewhat paradoxically: autonomy or separation, and partici-
pation or belonging. And if Dooyeweerd is correct, it is by connectedness 
and participation that ego-strength and individuality will be enhanced. 
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Self-Control and Self-Surrender 
In view of these observations it is time to draw up the balance between 
control and surrender in the relationship between psychotherapy and 
pastoral care. We observe in the history of Western culture the increas-
ing emphasis on the inner self as the rather disconnected coordination 
center of human activity. On the one hand, this inner self should be en-
hanced. In a differentiated and complex community like the Western 
society it is of utmost importance to have enough ego-strength to be able 
to form and express one’s own opinions, make one’s own decisions, and 
stick to them. This requires a well-organized and sufficiently stable self 
to maintain one’s position within this ravel of circumstances and pres-
sures without neglecting one’s duties. On the other hand, however, the 
isolated position of the inner self may in turn cause mental problems and 
should be overcome by new connections. All for the sake of self-
assurance. 
 People looking for psychotherapeutic help usually lack the ego-
strength to chart their own way within the bounds of their relational 
obligations. They are impeded by fear of being out of control, or being 
abandoned, and so on. So, what would be against the task of psychother-
apy to contribute to the reinforcement of self-control and own initiative? 
 It is surprising that Olthuis (2001), who disputes the role of psycho-
therapy to promote control, has such a keen view of the functioning of 
the self, the weaknesses of the self, and the ways it should be restored in 
its proper operation. He observes that we can lose our true selves and 
identify with our adapted selves because we become emotionally fully 
dependent on and enmeshed with others and what we think they want of 
us (p. 77). We can wall off the inner self and seal off damaged parts, so 
that we do not feel the wounds (p. 83). When the connections between 
our authentic self and adaptive self are very tenuous, we are vulnerable 
to developing addictions that function as substitutes for the authentic 
experience of inner connectedness (pp. 90-91). In all these cases, the self 
is so weak that it cannot cope with the challenges of modern life. It seems 
reasonable that psychotherapy has the goal to strengthen damaged 
selves to empower people to manage their lives, distinctive from the goal 
of pastoral care. 
 Our conclusion is that there is good reason to adopt the distinction 
made by May (1982) between willfulness and willingness as some indica-
tion of the different goals of psychotherapy and pastoral care (May, 
1992). There seems to be no objection against calling these two attitudes 
complementary, however paradoxical this seems to be. As Western civil-
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ians we need both the willfulness to maintain our positions and make 
progress in our learning processes, and the willingness to let go, to be 
freed from the rigid needs to be in full control and to exercise trust in 
others. This willingness is an important ability of the self, too, and as such 
it is a part of the aim of psychotherapy. With respect to our ultimate trust 
in the ultimate reality of the divine, however, this willingness belongs to 
the objective of pastoral care.14 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we tested the second part of our second hypothesis by 
assessing the results of the Christian integration debate with the help of 
external criteria that have been suggested by Reformational Philosophy. 
This part of the hypothesis in question reads that unsolved disagree-
ments of the Christian integration debate can be traced back to confusion 
about the relationships between faith knowledge derived from the Bible, 
science, psychotherapy, and pastoral care. The inapplicability of faith 
knowledge in a scientific psychological context has to do with the differ-
ent levels of faith knowledge, belonging to everyday experience, and  
scientific knowledge, which is knowledge with a limited scope based on 
analytical reflection of only one aspect of reality. This is not to deny that 
secular, Christian, or other presuppositions influence scientific research 
questions, observations, selective attention, and conclusions. However, 
these presuppositions should be made as explicit as possible in order to 
avoid their uncontrolled impact. In psychotherapy, on the other hand, 
faith knowledge has its rightful place, for psychotherapy is more than 
applied science; it connects scientific knowledge with the everyday 
knowledge of the patient and the therapist. This means that psychother-
apy dealing with the Christian faith of the patient does not need to legit-
imize its religious activity by a Christian version of psychological theory. 
This legitimate space for the religious aspect in the psychotherapeutic 
conversation does not alter the fact, however, that there is a difference 
between psychotherapy and pastoral care. Spirituality or faith is not a 
 
14
  In the course of time there has been much research on religious coping (cf. Par-
gament, 1997). On the basis of the different goals of psychotherapy and pastoral 
care, identified with the help of Reformational Philosophy, one would attribute 
the training of this skill to psychotherapy, with all the caveats for the use of God, 
being the Ultimate, as a means for coping interests. 
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qualifying norm for psychotherapy; it is for pastoral care. Psychotherapy 
focuses on reinforcing personal integrity and open relationships, and 
spirituality should come up for discussion if it turns out to be a part of 
the patient or client’s experience. 
 With the help of Reformational Philosophy, and against the back-
ground of Levinas’s rejection of participation in favor of personal en-
counter of the other in his or her complete otherness, we traced the   
importance of participation, counter to Levinas’s intention, in order to 
avoid individualism. When we read back the Christian integration debate 
as it is summarized in chapters 3 and 4, we find that, unfortunately, for 
the most part the notion of participation or belonging is not an explicit 
theme. 
 Reformational Philosophy criticizes the humanistic focus on human 
autonomy but welcomes the emphasis on the self as the inner center of 
human life in distinction from the outer world. For this emphasis it can 
appeal to the biblical notions of personal motivation and responsibility. It 
should be distinguished from the modern orientation on the subject as 
the measure of all things we have to deal with. Reformational Philosophy 
rightly stresses that this is only a starting point for going into the direc-
tion of making connections. Clarity would be served if we distinguish an 
indispensable autonomy consisting of ego-strength that people need in 
an individualistic society such as ours, from an absolute autonomy that 
emancipates us from God and denies any obliging participation and rela-
tionship with our neighbors.15 This distinction and the appreciation of 
the former part would avoid the sometimes hypercritical attitude of 
Christian psychologists in the debate toward an emphatic dealing with 
self-acceptance and self-actualization. 
In the next chapter we summarize and expand the results from chapters 
5 and 6, and test the third hypothesis on the basis of these results. Chap-
ter 8 generalizes our conclusions about the relationship between psy-
chotherapy and Christian worldviews, as we have reviewed up till now, 
to the relationship with any conceivable worldview. There the fourth and 
final hypothesis should demonstrate its value. 
 
15
  These are not necessarily two different types of autonomy; rather they might be 
different grades. If autonomy is a kind of self-confidence by which people stand 
up for themselves, the difference is that in the first mentioned form (ego-
strength) autonomy is counterbalanced by belonging, but in the second form 
(absolute autonomy) it is not. 
  
Chapter 7 
Psychotherapy and Christianity 
Introduction 
The previous chapter led to the conclusion that psychotherapy should be 
distinguished from soul care or pastoral care and that spirituality has a 
legitimate place in therapy, not as a specific field of attention or a thera-
peutic technique, but as a part of the life lived by the patient who should 
be in touch with all the levels of his/her existence, internally and exter-
nally, including the faith-related level. In the present chapter we take on 
the questions whether and how this connection between psychotherapy 
and Christian spirituality can be made. How can we find a way to inte-
grate psychotherapy and Christian faith, and at the same time preserve 
both psychotherapeutic professionalism and the specific nature of Chris-
tianity? By demonstrating the How we answer the question whether such 
a combination is possible. The positive answer to the latter question is 
expressed in the third hypothesis: 
It is possible to integrate psychotherapy and Christian faith, and at the 
same time preserve both psychotherapeutic professionalism and the 
specific nature of Christian faith. 
We are going to test this hypothesis by looking for a way to substan-
tiate the hypothesized possibility. First, I describe the tensions between 
secular therapeutic practice and Christianity as they are felt most se-
verely by opponents of any sort of integration. Then, I try to mitigate the 
assumed incommensurability by introducing the distinction of different 
levels of knowledge as it is made in Reformational Philosophy (Glas, 
2007), namely, everyday knowledge including worldview, scientific 
knowledge, and professional knowledge, the latter of which is charac-
teristic for psychotherapy. By making this distinction we are able to 
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acknowledge the proper right of psychotherapy without denying the 
interaction of these levels in psychotherapy (7.1).  
Subsequently, I try to find a way of transforming the tensions into a 
fertile polarity. After putting forward some hesitations about the narra-
tive approach, I seek to pave the way for a combination of subjectivity 
and communality, autonomy and heteronomy, by sketching an anthro-
pology that may do justice to the basic structures of human existence, 
derived from Reformational philosophical analysis. Herewith I hope to 
substantiate that psychotherapy may open itself toward connections 
with communities – an important issue in Christian faith. Actually, psy-
chotherapy opposes the individual’s isolation by creating a temporary 
communicative setting, but it might be encouraged and equipped to focus 
on the patient’s participation in communities not only for the duration of 
the treatment but also for the long term (7.2). 
Finally, I try to develop a model of interaction between basic psycho-
logical  self-functions on the side of subjectivity, and self-evident anthro-
pological conditions appealing to both subjectivity and communality, in 
order to provide a schematic structure for worldview related existential 
themes that can be dealt with in psychotherapy. In this way I try to make 
room for respecting and processing Christian values in psychotherapy 
(7.3).  
 
 
7.1 Tensions  
 
A Radical View 
Mainstream psychotherapy concentrates on the disordered subject, ex-
plores internal psychological processes, and focuses on reinforcing ego-
strength and autonomy in the sense of ability to make, defend and behave 
according to one’s own decisions. In doing so, it shares the self-orientation 
of modernity, approaching the subject as the ultimate standard. Even 
where current psychotherapy pursues the renewal of relationships or 
deals with family-systems, the proper mental functioning of the systems’ 
individual members and their interests are conditional for these renewed 
relationships. According to some Christian critics, this entails an ap-
proach different from a traditional Christian one. They admit that in the 
tradition of Christian soul care due attention has been paid to the inter-
nal spiritual functioning of the believers, but argue that from the start 
this attention is intertwined with the relational attitude before God, and 
is focused not primarily on personal well-being but on honoring God, 
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participating in His glory, and being dependent on His mercy. Put briefly, 
it is God focused and not human focused. How can psychotherapy be a 
tool for Christian transformation that pursues relationships that are not 
self-oriented? 
For this reason, the Biblical Counseling View categorically rejects psy-
chotherapy (see section 1.4). It argues that psychotherapy is absent in 
the Bible, is human-focused and disregards God, ignores or even denies 
sin as a structural cause of mental and behavioral problems, and can be 
characterized as a means of self-redemption. These objections are re-
lated. The neglect of God leads to the neglect of sin, which is committed 
against Him; and when God is absent, people are left to themselves with-
out His help. The Biblical Counseling View concludes that the secular 
presuppositions inevitably affect the practice. It can be evaluated as an 
attempt to resist the power of modernity with its focus on the human 
subject, and to lead people back to a God filled reality in which everyone 
participates knowingly or unknowingly. On the other hand, if we are go-
ing to transform psychotherapy into a kind of soul care in the presence 
and under the invocation of God, we are not loyal to the professional 
practice of psychotherapy as it has been established in the course of time. 
The Biblical Counseling View is consistent in fully accepting this conse-
quence and in waiving any resort to psychotherapeutic methods. 
 
A More Differentiated Approach 
How do these different orientations carry over in therapeutic practice? 
Are Christians able to preserve and utilize professional psychotherapy 
without renouncing their deepest convictions? Should we apply profes-
sional psychotherapy as a means of coping with psychosocial problems 
that relate to the modern mindset? But if so, how can Christianity be in-
volved in it? Would it be possible to accept psychotherapy’s modernist 
focus on the individual subject as an obvious starting point, and at the 
same time integrate the subject in the multifaceted – including spiritual – 
reality outside? Or should we denounce current psychotherapy to shield 
our Christian worldview against further influence of modernist thinking? 
The approach I propose is a differentiated one. For this I refer to        
an analysis of the levels of knowledge presented in Reformational Phi-
losophy. Within professional care it distinguishes different levels of 
knowledge. Worldview issues operate on the level of everyday experi-
ence, for they affect our perceptions and intuitive interpretations.       
Science is on another level, approaching reality by selecting a specific as-
pect of reality, and subjecting some part of it to a systematic theoretical 
 CHAPTER 7. PSYCHOTHERAPY AND CHRISTIANITY 243 
 
investigation. Professional practice operates on the level of practical 
knowledge, the level on which the expert is able to apply both worldview 
and scientific knowledge to the well-being of the client or patient. 
Both worldviews and science act upon the practice of psychotherapy, 
but this practice is not merged with worldviews and science. It has its 
own rules. Roughly speaking, scientific knowledge generalizes, and prac-
tical knowledge individualizes. The professional’s expertise helps to as-
sess the way individual clients or patients relate to their trouble, and 
other professional skills contribute to appropriate treatment. Here the 
practice shows to be qualified by the moral rule of helping people (cf. 
section 6.1). The therapist needs science to arrive at a diagnosis and to 
interpret the process, and he needs a worldview to tune in to the pa-
tient’s purpose of life which the two of them will be committed to during 
the process. We reflected already on the relationship between worldview 
and psychotherapy in section 1.2, on the relationship between worldview 
and science in section 6.3, and on the relationship between science and 
psychotherapy in section 6.4 
In the next sub-sections we have a closer look at these levels in order 
to assess the legitimate right of each. 
 
Worldview Level 
The worldviews at stake concentrate on different views of humanness. As 
we have seen in section 3.2, theorists participating in the Christian inte-
gration debate distinguish secular and Christian anthropologies, and 
ascribe to them different, even opposing orientations. I recapitulate these 
anthropologies in rough lines in order to recall the main features as they 
have been identified from Christian perspectives. 
As the Christian participants of the debate view it, on both sides rela-
tionality is emphasized but on the secular side self-directedness seems to 
be valued more highly than other-directedness, while Christians tend to 
prioritize other-directedness. In other words, relationality tends to be 
put in service of either self-interest or voluntary servitude, respectively. 
Moreover, relationality in the Christian conception goes further than 
interpersonal relationships, it extends to the relationship with God. Here, 
the concept of the soul demonstrates its meaning. That humans have or 
are souls indicates that they are receptive to a relationship with God. 
Love as a property of human nature fueled by God, and leading to self-
surrender and sacrifice, is put over against the emphasis and focus on the 
self, self-acceptance, self-esteem, and self-confidence in secular ap-
proaches. 
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Connected to the overall orientations that differ, there are a lot of 
more detailed moral particularities on which Christian and secular pref-
erences are supposed to be at odds. Community, anthropology, and mo-
rality are closely linked in the social cultural understanding of humanity 
promoted by MacIntyre and Taylor – an understanding that has partially 
been adopted in much Christian psychological theorizing. Altruism in 
Christianity as a characteristic of our meaning of life and being part of 
larger social units are opposed by Christian theorists to hedonistic or 
eudemonistic ethical egoism in the different trends of secular psycho-
therapeutic theorizing. Renewal, and renunciation or self-denial are op-
posed by some to self-actualization and self-fulfillment. The connected 
self has been put over against the autonomous self. And a God-oriented 
attitude to life is supposed to compete with a self-oriented attitude. 
A last, profound contrast was recognized on the deepest level of exis-
tential motives in the approaches to sin and guilt. In the Christian area, 
apart from neurotic guilt feelings, guilt is viewed as real guilt before God 
or other humans. Some secular approaches view sin as something irra-
tional and unreal, and guilt as the mere result of the developmental culti-
vation of the super-ego, or collective conventions to keep the members of 
the community under control, and to limit their autonomy. Associated 
with this, in Christian circles, guilt, anxiety and despair are related to a 
transcendent Other; in the secular camp anxiety and despair are either 
declared irrational, or assigned to only the existential fears of death or 
infinite freedom. 
To summarize the tensions in two key terms, we might put charac-
terizations such as self-directedness, self-orientation, ethical egoism (in 
both hedonism and eudemonism), and autonomy, all identified by Chris-
tian theorists as secular values, under the heading of subjectivity. On the 
other hand, Christian values like other-directedness, trust in God, altru-
ism, and heteronomy might be typified by the term communality, being 
part of a larger whole with its own hierarchical structures.1 These are 
meant as loose references, used to indicate the respective core interests 
rather than drawing a boundary line between them. The main reason for 
this is that there is no boundary line. 
 
1
  It might be surprising that subjectivity is put over against communality. The most 
familiar opposition is subjectivity versus objectivity. However, historically the 
turn to the subject is a turn from communality and being part of larger wholes 
toward individualizing subjectivity; cf. section 6.6. 
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As we have seen in section 6.6, the increasing focus on the self is a 
characteristic of modernity, and goes back to the era of the Renaissance. 
On worldview level Western Christianity has been influenced by modern-
ity, too, in focusing on the self and its claims of autonomy. In the cultural-
historical process of the differentiation of Western society this seems to 
be an inevitable development. There is no reason whatsoever to blame 
Christians for this assimilation. The point is, however, that the strong 
criticism some Christian theorists express against modernist views in 
secular therapy is out of proportion as compared to their own modern 
tendencies. As long as Christians propose to adapt or replace psychother-
apy to oppose modernity with its focal point and standard in the subject, 
they should be aware of their own assimilation of modernity, if they give 
priority to inner experience themselves. The modernist mindset has be-
come an integral part of the mental constitution even of Christians when 
they intend to combat its detrimental by-effects. 
What can we learn from this internal Christian discussion about the 
genuinely Christian worldview content? It makes clear that on worldview 
level there is a continuous dynamic of appropriation and adjustment of 
traditional values in the face of the requirements of the time. On the 
worldview level, we should take the history of Christian worldviews into 
account, and process the outcome it yields, before we indiscriminately 
draw any conclusions from worldview characteristics to the legitimacy of 
a professional practice. 
 
Scientific Level 
The cultural-historical evolution of modernity not only affected anthro-
pology but had its impact on epistemology as well. Not coincidentally   
the start of modernism was accompanied by the rise of modern           
science. Among other things, modern science is characterized by critical 
investigation independent from any authority exercised by leaders of    
traditional communities such as the church. Emancipated science has        
obtained a legitimate place in knowledge acquisition in our Western  
society. Scientific results have confirmed the success of this strategy of 
the growth of knowledge. 
Some Christian theorists argue that biblical information should be 
added to the empirical sources of scientific knowledge, and contest    
conclusions of empirical research that run counter to biblical insights 
(chapter 2; sections 6.2 and 6.3). This can be interpreted as an implicit 
protest against the loss of control on the part of religious authority over 
the body of knowledge. In this epistemological context, too, the polarity 
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of individuality and communality is at issue. The traditional ecclesiastical 
community that accords the highest authority to the Bible refuses to ac-
cept any autonomous science that withdraws from traditionally 
acknowledged truths and values. 
There is an interesting development, however, consisting in the for-
mation of new scientific communities in the course of time with their 
own authoritative bodies of knowledge, paradigms, rules, values, tradi-
tions, and policies: the scientific practice. 
What was said above about the scientific level shows that there are 
clear connections between worldviews and the rise and recognition of 
scientific knowledge. It would however be too hasty a conclusion to say 
that science is a product of worldview. It contains too much specific ex-
pertise and too many particular procedures to be reduced to the 
worldview level. Moreover, there is also an opposite move from science 
to worldviews, in that scientific results help to change traditional world-
views, compare the view of planet earth as a tiny object in the immense 
universe, or the psychologizing of daily life (interpretation of problems 
and needs) and segments of professional life (such as education, adver-
tising, jurisdiction, and human resources). 
 
Level of Psychotherapy 
In the Christian integration debate several elaborations of what psycho-
therapy is about are given. An overall analysis of psychotherapy as a 
well-defined practice is lacking, however. On this score the Normative 
Practices Model provides a welcome addition. In section 6.1 its most sali-
ent features turned out to be, first, the distinction between the constitu-
tive, structural side and the regulative, directional side, and second, the 
distinction of the qualifying rules and founding as well as conditioning 
rules. A further characteristic is the tradition by which it has been 
shaped. 
Let us have a closer look at the rule that qualifies the therapeutic 
practice, that is, the moral function. This qualifying norm means that psy-
chotherapy is about caring for people. Consequently, therapy, like the 
medical profession, is focused on human health and optimal well-being, 
be it mainly on the psychological rather than the biological level. For this 
purpose it individualizes generalized scientific knowledge. This caring 
nature of the practice in turn means that we should not immediately in-
terpret the focus on the subject and its well-being as a modernist trait of 
giving priority to the human subject. The focus on the human self is    
inherent to therapy’s character as a caring profession. Given this, the 
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question may be asked whether the focus on helping the human subject 
reflects Christian values. 
In considering the level proper to psychotherapeutic functioning we 
note specific forces to which psychotherapy is exposed. Under pressure 
of academic psychology and insurance companies, a large segment of 
usual psychotherapy consists of directive, protocolled, instant, short 
term, problem solving and symptoms reductive, evidence based and pa-
thology based treatments according to the expert model. Here, the eco-
nomic rule of efficiency threatens to dominate the scene. A conditional 
aspect, namely, economic rules, is being made so important that it is go-
ing to function as a substitute qualifying norm, expelling the moral rule 
from that position. In this scenario psychotherapy is going to forget 
about its identity as a caring profession. 
Without arguing for the primacy of economic rules, a number of Chris-
tian psychotherapy theorists have been supporting the advocacy of    
protocolled and evidence based treatments. Some of them proposed 
Christian versions of protocolled treatments, especially in cognitive be-
havioral therapy (cf. Propst, 1980; Tan, 1987, 2007). Christian beliefs and 
rituals are incorporated in the techniques for cognitive and behavioral 
change. 
On the other hand, there is a great deal of discontent among psycho-
therapists about efficiency approaches because such approaches dis-
regard underlying dynamic patterns in patients’ functioning that need 
sustained attention, and disregard dynamic processes within the thera-
peutic relationship. This discontent is accompanied by some distancing 
from the medical model of therapy, and an increasing focus on health     
as healing of hurt feelings, maturation, and emotional growth and well-
being (cf. Cloninger, 2004; Slade, 2009; Seligman, 2011). Process-
oriented psychotherapy can easily combine with a growing focus on  
spirituality as both a resource that helps to cope with problems and a 
contribution to emotional stability (Verhagen, Van Praag, López-Ibor, 
Cox, and Moussaoui, 2010). Here, healing includes growth toward spiri-
tual well-being and maturity. The therapist performs the role of empa-
thizing with the patient and containing his or her distress. The healing 
process is fostered by a relationship of love and understanding. A part of 
this process oriented approach focuses on analyzing and working 
through object relations, including God images.  
These are examples of participation by Christian professionals in     
the vicissitudes of mainstream psychotherapy, both in the pursuit of ef-
fective treatment protocols, and in the preference of process oriented, 
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psychodynamically inspired approaches. These joint efforts confirm that 
worldview differences need not result automatically in antagonisms 
about the character and legitimacy of psychotherapy. This can be under-
stood as soon as we realize that worldview and psychotherapy are dis-
parate entities, and act on different levels of knowledge and functioning. 
 
Worldviews and Psychotherapy 
The previous subsections indicate two things about worldviews and psy-
chotherapy. We started with the observation that worldviews do affect 
the content of psychotherapy. Anthropologies do influence the values 
that predominate the therapeutic conversations, and scientific theory 
that is utilized by the therapist is influenced by worldview, too. On the 
other hand, however – and this was our second observation –, we noted 
with the help of Reformational philosophical insights, that knowledge on 
worldview level and knowledge on professional level are not on equal 
footing. 
What do these conclusions mean, if secular ideas about individual 
freedom which is the focus of mainstream psychotherapy, run counter to 
Christian ideas about connectedness and servitude? The radical solution 
of abandoning all psychotherapy appeared to be too hasty, because of the 
own nature of professional knowledge and practice. On the other hand, 
doing psychotherapy without reflecting on worldview presuppositions is 
just as wrong. Worldviews do affect what we practice in therapy. How 
should we adapt opposite ideas to the kind of care and counseling that 
meets Christian requirements, and leaves the professional psychothera-
peutic practice intact? 
Various alternatives seem to present themselves. First, we could    
consider to replace all secular values by Christian ones, and adjust psy-
chotherapy accordingly. In that case the question is whether we can 
maintain the character of psychotherapy as a well-established practice of 
human oriented care. It seems that the nature of psychotherapy will be 
transformed into a kind of spiritual counseling (cf. section 6.5). 
Second, we could propose to reinterpret the secular values by Chris-
tian notions, as has often been done by integrationists. For instance, the 
concept of self is interpreted by the concept of soul, and self-actualization 
by self-denial. Here again, uncertainty is created about the legitimate 
position of psychotherapy, although the confrontation between Christian 
and non-Christian views and values is less explicit. One of the problems is 
whether in this way we can still account for the influence of modernity 
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on both the focus of therapy and the present shape of Christian world-
views (cf. section 6.6). 
Finally, we could face the opposite tendencies or directions but at the 
same time try to interpret the tensions as polarities, as will be attempted 
in the present study. Without denying fundamental differences in basic 
beliefs, we might conclude that in practical applications a larger degree 
of similarity and cooperation is possible. Secular insights might be made 
fruitful for a practice that pursues Christian values, and Christian values 
might enrich secular practice. 
 
 
7.2 From Tensions to Polarities 
 
We identified some tensions between secular and Christian views of be-
ing human that may affect the focus of psychotherapy. Although 
worldview and practice are disparate phenomena, relating to different 
conceptual levels, we saw in the sections 1.2 and 7.1 how worldviews still 
may affect a practice. Can these tensions be mitigated for the purpose of 
clinical and/or counseling practice? In our search for relaxing the ten-
sions and transforming the opposites into fruitful polarities, we look for 
perspectives on worldview level that face the tensions and might be able 
to guide us toward some kind of connection between subjectivity and 
communality, in order to give to therapeutic practice a direction that is 
compatible with Christian values. From our analyses we arrive at the 
narrative approach that might utilize the biblical narrative and Reforma-
tional Philosophy as possible tools. 
 
Narrative 
One of the guides in uniting our cultural-historical background character-
ized by modernity and basic Christian notions of being human might be 
found in the narrative approach that is employed in some types of psy-
chotherapy. Advantageously, it both focuses on the individual in his or 
her personal experience as distinct from the actual state of affairs in the 
world around, and honors all kinds of relationships by which the individ-
ual feels connected with the world around. It accomplishes this twofold 
task by making the patient construct and reconstruct the own memories 
of his or her experienced personal history by interconnecting them. By 
doing so, the patient gives meaning to his or her life events. 
However, as argued by McMinn (1994; section 4.4), from a Christian 
viewpoint there should be some caution about applying the narrative   
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approach. It includes a kind of constructivism which favors the client’s or 
patient’s individual perspective. There may be corrections from the input 
by important others, of course (cf. Ricoeur, 1990/1992). Yet, the inter-
ests of the patients are indicative here, and for the purpose of these in-
terests the narratives of their lives are reconstructed. Is it right to modify 
their perceptions of the past if by doing so the past is adapted, and, for 
example, the roles of important others are wronged? Of course, this kind 
of result is not intended, for people can only find their identity by giving 
meaning to their lives through sincere reflections on their remembered 
experiences. But if the patients’ well-being and good feeling is the ulti-
mate standard, there is no real control of self-serving biases. Here the 
subjectivity of (post)modernism seems to be directive, or at least, the 
narrative approach seems to be vulnerable to subjective individualism. 
To oppose these imbalances we need some additional instance that 
stimulates patients to be honest even when accounting for situations in 
which they play an unfavorable role. The first additional instance is       
the person of the therapist. He or she is keen on making sure that the 
patient’s perception of reality will not be manipulated by easy self-
justifications that conceal a lack of self-acceptance. Unconditional ac-
ceptance of the patient by the therapist may be an important prerequisite 
for this. In many cases, however, a self-justifying bias will affect the pro-
cessing of troublesome memories. 
For Christian patients a second corrective instance may help to re-
store the balance: the introduction of God, Who accepts, forgives, and 
demands. Introducing Him in the conversation would meet two require-
ments. First, it would create a safe space in which the confrontation with 
inconvenient memories is less threatening. And second, it would be able 
to correct one-sided or distorted views of how God was related to re-
membered incidents. The private narrative of the patient can with all 
prudence be associated with and even integrated in the encompassing 
narrative of God’s gracious, powerful and faithful deeds. In this way both 
the inevitable modern shift to the subject is respected, and the connec-
tion with the outside world seems to be secured. This is not a simple pro-
cedure, though, and requires a matured spiritual practice and sensitivity 
on the part of the therapist. 
The question may be posed, however, whether the introduction of a 
divine warrant is sufficient to counterbalance the predominance of sub-
jectivity in dealing with outer reality. It sounds promising, yet there may 
be a problem. In the context of a subjective reconstruction of the per-
sonal narrative, the reflection on God’s involvement, too, is susceptible to 
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subjective reconstruction. In that case, the picture of God runs the risk of 
being molded after the patient’s needs and interests. Though well in-
tended, the narrative approach is vulnerable to an over-emphasis on 
subjectivity at the expense of communality by making the patient’s expe-
riences, memories, and interpretations the normative starting-point of 
psychotherapeutic treatment. We need a counterweight to this potential 
imbalance. 
 
Reconsidering the Issue 
Up to now we have been looking for a philosophical model of reality that 
has the potential of combining a modernist-like interest in subjective 
experiencing and control with the adoption of communality which over-
comes subjective gaze narrowing. In the case of a subjective approach, 
the individual subject is the absolute interpretative ruler of all phenom-
ena that are sensed by him/her. This runs counter to the Christian intu-
ition or belief of a pre-given reality in which the meaning of our existence 
has been established by the divine authority of our Creator. As the previ-
ous subsection showed, some effort has been made by the narrative ap-
proach to do justice to this intuition. However, as we have noticed, in this 
approach the subject and protagonist of the narrative that describes 
his/her identity is at the same time the producer of the product, even 
when relationships with important others in the outer world, including 
God, are part of the story. So, here too, the subject remains the alleged 
master of his or her universe. 
Our problem can be stated as follows. How can be avoided that the di-
rection of psychotherapy is characterized by establishing the subject as 
the center of his/her world by only strengthening his/her autonomy? 
And how can be promoted that the subject’s experience is opened up 
toward social, moral, and religious communality? The interest in this 
question can be explained from the concern expressed by many Christian 
theorists, that justice be done to the basic structures of human existence. 
Inspired by Christian values, and encouraged by analyses such as those 
by MacIntyre (1984) and Taylor (1989) they emphasize the community 
aspect of human existence besides the individual aspect. Our involve-
ment in this issue arises from the psychotherapeutic focus on healthy 
mental functioning. A view of healthy functioning requires a view on the 
basic ontological structures of human existence. 
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Reformational Philosophical Anthropology 
A model of reality meant to avoid this subject centered gaze narrowing is 
offered by Reformational Philosophy. Here, both parts of the balance are 
recognized: the call of the subject to be heard and respected, and the 
validity of a pre-given and encompassing reality in which the reality con-
tent, meaning and value of human existence is delineated. In this subsec-
tion I try to picture the main features of philosophical anthropology and 
their connection with psychotherapy. For Dooyeweerd’s anthropology I 
draw from the exposition by Glas (2010). In this conception subjectivity 
is recognized as a basic human property but warded off from individual-
istic subjectivism. How is this done? The presentation focuses on the 
human body, comprehensively conceived as the temporal existential 
form of human life and containing a structural side and a dynamic side 
which are inextricably linked. This approach avoids both monism and 
dualism in the relationship between body and soul or self. 
Structurally, temporal human existence is viewed as a complex 
whole.2 It is a whole; this means that it has its own internal qualification 
of being human. At the same time it is complex; it consists of parts that 
contribute to the whole but also retain their own structural principle. 
How does this apply to the complex whole of human existence? This 
whole consists of four substructures, namely, the physical-chemical sub-
structure, the biotic substructure, the psychical substructure, and the act 
structure. On the basis of the physical and chemical laws, the biotic sub-
structure refers to all life processes that are not influenced by psychical 
or other higher functions. The psychical refers to sensory awareness, 
temperament, emotion and affective expression. The latter three sub-
structures can only contribute to the whole of human existence, however, 
in their connection with the fourth and highest structure, i.e., the act 
structure. The acts in the act structure are inner, intentional operations 
that are specific for human beings. They relate to all levels or modal as-
pects of reality on which humans can act intentionally: the social, linguis-
tic, developmental, logical, economic, aesthetic, juridical, moral, and faith 
related levels. Accordingly, the act structure connects human existence 
with all aspects of reality. 
This is only half the story, however. Inextricably linked with the struc-
ture of human existence is the existential dynamics that pushes the    
 
2
  Dooyeweerd speaks of an enkaptic structural whole, from enkapsis, intertwining, 
interlacement. 
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person in a certain direction, and appeals to the act structure of human 
existence. The spiritual center of the human activity is the heart, or the 
soul, the self, which points beyond the self toward the origin of meaning, 
in Christian terms: to God our Creator and Redeemer. Herewith the heart 
is characterized as seat of religious drives. It has to do with ultimate mo-
tivation. Here self-relatedness turns out to be linked with knowledge of 
our deepest values. At the same time, I add, it is connected with other-
relatedness, among other reasons because values relate to the role of 
other people in our lives, and are communicated by important others. 
Self-relatedness presupposes the embedment in a vast number of rela-
tions to objects, events, and persons in the world (Glas, 2006). 
In this exposition we see how, rather than looked upon as an isolated 
entity, the subject is connected with all levels of human existence. These 
connections are very evident when we consider how individuals function 
through participation in communities either by chance or by choice. With 
the help of Reformational philosophical distinctions, communities may 
be viewed as complex structural wholes that are qualified by the social 
aspect of reality, and in which the substructures of cultural development 
(e.g., tradition) and linguistics (think of communication), and the human 
act structure determine composition and functioning. From the human 
act structure all higher aspects, such as the moral aspect, and the aspect 
of faith, are involved. Community life explains how ultimate reality that 
determines the intentions of the human heart is articulated, namely, by 
tradition and communication within the community. 
 
Result 
What does this presentation yield for the focus area of psychotherapy? As 
a matter of course, its primary focus is on psychical and social function-
ing. But mental and social malfunctioning is intertwined with deeper 
existential problems that in turn relate to conscious or subconscious 
worldviews. Worldviews are about what is important to human beings. 
The existential underlay of the client’s or patient’s distress should be 
explicated and become an issue of reflection and clarification with the 
help of the therapist (Glas, 2001). Additionally, it might be helpful to 
place worldview issues in a wider context of belonging to social units 
whose main features attest to the worldviews at stake. The theme of be-
longing to, being rejected as a member of, or being alienated from one    
or more communities sheds light on experiences of isolation and dis-
connectedness and on the function of underlying worldviews. Paying       
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attention to all these facets may help to keep the focus of the therapist on 
the relationship between subjectivity and communality. 
A balance between subjectivity and communality may create the con-
ditions for doing justice to human nature as being-in-connection, and 
avoiding the risk of self-centered subjectivism. I realize that this sentence 
is worldview dependent itself. Additional anthropological arguments for 
it will be adduced in the next section. What can be said at this point is 
that this position allows room for Christian interpretations recognizing 
that humans are given to each another in relationships and communities 
in which God and fellow humans appear. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, in (post)modernist worldviews subjectivity tends to be 
overvalued at the expense of communality, that is, the sense of being part 
of and belonging to larger communities. This may lead to the idea of the 
subject’s intellectual and moral dominance over (parts of) the outside 
world. This runs counter Christian notions of our interlacement in the 
order of created reality. 
The focus on the subject is inevitable, even for Christian theorists and 
therapists, but this should not lead to neglect of the innumerable ties 
with objects, events, and persons in the world, nor should the relation-
ship with this outside world be shaped by intellectual and moral domi-
nance. We look for a polarity that does justice to both subjectivity and 
communality, and that overcomes any dichotomy by recognizing the 
overall unity and embedment of our existence characterized by belong-
ing or participation. Pursuing this, the narrative approach does relate to 
the environment, indeed, but fails to be as receptive to the pre-given and 
reacting world around as the embedment in it would require. The narra-
tive approach grants the subject a great deal of autonomy when recon-
structing and rewriting the own story. 
Reformational Philosophy succeeds in creating a balance of both  
honoring subjectivity and recognizing the subject’s embedment in the 
fundamental order of creation. Using Reformational philosophical dis-
tinctions I elaborated this embedment in the field of the social units to 
which individuals belong, and which play such an important part in their 
mental development and functioning, as well as in the origin and conser-
vation of their worldviews. 
These theoretical considerations must be translated now into the  
psychotherapeutic practice, which covers the processing of everyday 
experience. Psychotherapy, too, adopts the subject-oriented approach of 
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reality by (post-)modernist lifestyle, affirming the intellectual and moral 
priority of the patient. At the same time, it has gained importance be-
cause of its deployment against the deleterious effects of (post-) modern-
ist worldviews and lifestyles that favor individualism. Consequently, sev-
eral schools of psychotherapy are aiming at connectivity in the lives of 
patients, as a counterbalance to subjectivity. At the same time, in many 
cases subjectivity seems to prevail in mainstream therapy on account of 
its restrictive focus on improving mental strength and social skills. 
Can Christian faith function in a context like this, or are Christian and 
secular worldviews incompatible because of their different appraisals of 
the relation between subjectivity and communality? Different appraisals 
of this relationship imply different valuations of autonomy and heteron-
omy because participating in communities entails accepting the main 
rules that control and guide these communities. By finding answers to 
these questions we try to vindicate that the third hypothesis is accepta-
ble, which reads that it is possible to make psychotherapy and Christian 
faith interact, and at the same time preserve both psychotherapeutic pro-
fessionalism and the specific nature of Christian faith. This issue will be 
dealt with in the next section. 
 
 
7.3 The Compatibility of Christian Faith and Psychotherapy  
Examined 
 
In the present section we are looking for some viewpoints that can help 
to do justice to both the focus on the subject as the practical norm of psy-
chotherapy, and worldview issues that bear witness to wider embed-
ment, like Christian values of faith in God, love toward God and the 
neighbor, and belonging to God’s family. In other words, can the subject-
oriented direction of psychotherapy be shifted such that there is room 
for a Christian interpretation of what humanness is about? I intend to 
provide a heuristic framework for worldview issues that is capable of 
doing two things: making clear that psychotherapy should direct its   
orientation toward the larger communities we participate in (among 
which religious communities) as the indispensable context of our func-
tioning, and at the same time taking into account most of the presently 
recognized therapeutic methods, admitting the importance of individual 
empowerment. The starting point of this quest is the individual self that 
can prosper within the force field of interplay between subjectivity and 
communality. 
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Anthropological Requirements for Connection 
Wondering where the subjective self touches the world around, we 
should realize that the starting point in the self demands an obvious an-
thropological substrate in which the self is grounded. It should be obvi-
ous for anyone, indeed, because for the sake of the subject’s autonomy 
we do not want to impose any kind of self-understanding upon the sub-
ject that he or she is not ready to accept. The obviousness of this anthro-
pological basis should appear from the experiential identity of what we 
sense and what we think, so that we stay close to ourselves in our rea-
soning. An obvious and common anthropological starting point of both 
non-Christians and Christians meets this want. This is what we are look-
ing for: a common intuition or everyday experience of the human condi-
tion that (1) urges modern individuals to face their intertwining with the 
world around, (2) is adequate to be appealed to by professional psycho-
therapy, and (3) is open to a Christian articulation. Such a common intui-
tion appears to be basic in the sense that its content is recognized as 
structural for human existence. Could we succeed in finding such a com-
mon ground? 
As a matter of fact, most of the ingredients for this common ground 
seem to be before us. The first constituent part that presents itself is the 
recognition of our subjectivity. This has been discussed at length in sec-
tion 6.6 and the preceding sections of the present chapter. The second 
ingredient to be proposed is communality. Communities can be analyzed 
as complex structural wholes in which humans participate and which 
they need to obtain meaning and moral direction in their lives. Here 
again I can refer to the sections mentioned. A third possible ingredient 
might be relationality. Relationality plays an important role in personal 
development and proper functioning. However, it might be doubted 
whether relationality should be viewed as a distinct constituent besides 
subjectivity and communality. On the one hand, on the level of sub-
jectivity it may be viewed as the way different subjects relate to one an-
other. On the other hand, on the level of communality it may be viewed as 
a prerequisite of interpersonal connections necessary to form a commu-
nity. The importance of relationality has been duly discussed in the sec-
tions 4.6, 5.2, 5,4, and 5.5. 
Obviously, the just mentioned ingredients, subjectivity, communality, 
and relationality, whether they are or are not three distinct elements,    
do contribute to the clarification of the structural anthropological re-
quirement of connectedness. Maybe we can reduce the three to two even 
more basic principles, namely otherness and nearness. Otherness is a 
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prerequisite for the experience of subjectivity. From birth, siblings turn 
out to have inherent skills for intersubjective communication that 
evolves toward the awareness of the otherness of their primary care-
givers from themselves (cf. Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). Otherness is also 
a prerequisite for relationality. The dialectic of otherness and relationali-
ty has been argued convincingly by Buber (1923/2004) and Ricoeur 
(1990/1992).  It is not all Me, Buber says. There is also Beyond Me. I face 
Thou. Ricoeur explains that our identity is embedded in relations with 
others that operate into both directions, from the self to the other and 
vice versa. 
The term nearness sounds as a complement of otherness. First, it has 
a spatial connotation. As every introductory textbook of psychology re-
veals, social psychological inquiry has demonstrated that proximity is an 
important variable for mutual solidarity. However, nearness does not 
only function on the spatial level, it also discloses the genetic (biotic), 
cultural, social, and moral aspects. In this full range of aspects nearness 
indicates mutual connectedness and belonging to a community. Within a 
community distinct subjects interact, relating to one another, and have 
their own position within the group, obeying common rules, and sharing 
common values. 
One indispensable requirement for connection we did not notice yet, 
namely, synchronism, i.e., covering a common period of time, and sharing 
time. This time factor has a numerical aspect (clock time and calendar 
time), and a psychic aspect (time experience). In a large range of circum-
stances related to connection temporality plays a role; think of loss, 
mourning, memories, time pressure, chances and changes in life, future 
prospects. In existentially oriented philosophy of the 20th century, tem-
porality was a profound theme in Heidegger (1927/1996), who states 
that being human is characterized by its effectively being determined by 
the past, by being temporal (“being toward death”), and by being open to 
transcend the submissiveness to ordinary life. Levinas (1948/1990) rec-
ognizes temporality and death as determinative for our existence, but 
seeks victory over it in recognizing the significance of the other.  
Reducing the anthropological requirements for connection to their 
most elementary form, I suggest to limit their number to three, and         
to speak of otherness, nearness, and temporality. These three basic prin-
ciples respectively refer to the How, the Where, and the When that any 
person has to deal with. 
The How covers the question: How am I related to the other? The in-
dividual, being aware of the own distinct existence, meets the other 
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(Levinas, 1961/1969). Another person can be accepted as a neighbor, 
rejected as a rival, or made to submit to one’s wishes. In my distinction 
from and relationship to the other, the reach of the other can be extended 
to all kinds of things (objects, phenomena) beyond me that impress me 
personally in their otherness. 
The Where represents the questions: Where do I belong? Where do I 
stand? Nearness as the keyword of the answer covers proximity, famili-
arity, same nature and nurture, membership, the position one holds with-
in the community, implying that anyone is specifically determined by the 
properties, life patterns, and social history of the group, and yet different 
from other group members. 
The When stands for the questions: When, in what era, for how long 
do I exist, synchronic with which people and conditions, and synchronic 
for how long? The answers extend over life span, one’s remembered par-
ticular history, one’s finite existence, the specific cultural period, and the 
opportunities one receives. Human beings are aware of their own origin 
and temporal finitude, and those of other people and things.3 One can try 
to shut one’s eyes to transience, but one can also be inescapably con-
fronted with this reality. Temporality creates a condition for being able 
to relate to contemporary people, and situations. 
 
Psychological Importance of the Basic Anthropological Principles 
As the previous subsection already hinted, the basic anthropological intu-
itions of otherness, nearness, and temporality suggest a meaningful per-
spective on much of psychological functioning. In this subsection I want 
to explore these psychological consequences a little further. 
The thing that strikes most is that often people are not ready to accept 
the elementary features of humanness in all respects. There are re-
sistances to overcome. In various ways people try to handle the finitude 
of their lifetime (temporality) mentally and behaviorally. Many of their 
coping strategies for this are functional in so far as they are effective 
without causing personal suffering or behavioral impediments. A re-
markable line of inquiry developed in experimental existential psy-   
chology shows how people react when thoughts about their own mor-
tality are induced. The following hypotheses were tested and confirmed. 
 
3
  From now on every time the words finite and finitude are used, I refer to tem-
poral finitude. 
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(a) When people think of their death, they try to enhance their self-
esteem; and (b) they do so by defending the norms and values held by 
their own sociocultural group, in order to secure the approval of their 
peers (Terror Management Theory; Solomon, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 
2004). In this way the sense of being temporally finite is counterbalanced 
and driven back by enhancing the self through affirmation of the own 
group. A variant on this theory hypothesized and confirmed by experi-
ments is that people who are aware of their own mortality want to iden-
tify with a group, not so much to enhance their self-esteem, but to partici-
pate in the relative immortality of the group (Wisman & Koole, 2003; 
Castano,    Yzerbyt & Paladino, 2004). The awareness of being finite is 
dissolved by enlarging one’s conceptual boundaries, i.e., through identifi-
cation with a group (Nearness). 
“Striving for power” is another way to handle the basics of being hu-
man. Especially Alfred Adler identified this as a fundamental motive for 
human life. From an inferiority position in childhood, the person aims at 
a superiority position by way of gaining power (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 
1956). Striving for power can be associated with two of the three prin-
ciples. By gaining power people increase their own prestige in the group 
(Nearness). And by power individuals get hold of a position that enables 
them to relate to others, in either an exploiting or a helping way (Other-
ness). 
We might imagine some variations on the theme of reducing the 
awareness of the negative sides of humanness, and strengthening the 
positive sides. One can think of seeking to be widely known, which might 
create the illusion of immortal fame (Temporality). Another strategy is to 
pursue pleasure and delight. By enjoying themselves humans forget 
about their finitude (“Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die”), em-
phasizing the here and now. Moreover, creating affordable health care 
(among which mental health care), and dispensing vaccinations and med-
icines may be used as means to combat the threat of death (Temporality), 
and isolation from the group (Nearness). 
One remaining way of fighting the fear of one’s finiteness is religious 
faith. Faith in God and everlasting life can function as an attempt to dispel 
the fear of death (Temporality) and to sustain the prospect of a turn for 
the better. Religious coping (Pargament, 1997) makes one’s limits less 
absolute and therefore the sense of being finite less threatening. The 
membership of a group of believers enhances one’s belonging, and feel-
ing to be seen and appreciated (Nearness). 
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These functional strategies can be characterized as attempts at self-
enhancement, by increasing power, prestige, and/or pleasure. As a con-
sequence, the experience of being human is less determined by finitude 
(Temporality), and more by feeling special (Otherness), feeling respected 
by the group, or feeling strong as a part of the group (Nearness). 
 
Psychopathological Importance of the Anthropological Principles 
The basic anthropological scheme also provides a meaningful perspective 
on much of psychological malfunctioning. People are not always success-
ful in coping with their otherness, nearness, and temporality. Many kinds 
of psychosocial dysfunction can be interpreted as coping mechanisms 
that fail to handle any of them. Personality disorders can be considered 
as unprofitable strategies to accept and integrate being distinct from the 
other (Otherness), viewing the other as hostile, intrusive, menacing, 
weak, unreliable, admiring, inferior, critical, idealized, or incompetent 
(Beck, 2015). These views of the other correspond with one’s own atti-
tude toward the other, such as being suspicious, withdrawn, eccentric, 
reckless, changeable, imposing, superior, avoidant, dependent, or fastid-
ious. These personality disorders appear to be the results of lopsided 
developments in the realm of proximity (Nearness), promoted by dynam-
ics such as inconsistent availability, overprotection, distrust, abuse, emo-
tional neglect, social isolation, or high demands. A common complaint of 
feeling empty and having dissociative experiences could be traced back 
to a lack of proximity as well (Nearness) in the form of lack of care, sup-
port and mirroring from important others. The needs for confirmation 
and guidance remain unsatisfied, and negative repercussions are sure to 
arise (Verhaeghe, 2009). 
Furthermore, all kinds of neurotic behavior can be interpreted as the 
inability to deal with all three basic conditions. In much neurotic behav-
ior the individual cannot accept his or her own specific place in the 
group, feeling neglected by peers or burdened by excessive demands 
(Nearness). Psychosomatic complaints are seized upon as an alibi for 
personal helplessness and dependence. This creates doubt about one’s 
being a distinct person toward others (Otherness). The awareness of 
finite existence can be accompanied by a feeling of meaninglessness or 
anxiety, or by a certain hurried and driven way of life. The neurotic fear 
of death has been thematized by Rank (1929/1936), and his follower 
Becker (1973) (Temporality). 
Still other, and more detailed examples can be mentioned. We will do 
so once the framework has been developed more fully. They all show that 
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the problem in various kinds of psychopathology can be clarified by the 
perspective of how to deal with our basic anthropological constitution. 
 
Individual Development of the Self 
Besides the anthropological dimension as the link between inner and 
outer world, I look for an elaboration of the inner world, or subjectivity, 
which has become so important in modern lifestyle. Therefore I turn to 
the dimension of the self. While anthropological notions might be able to 
counteract the modern tendency to separating the subject from the world 
outside, the notion of the self responds to the modern need for the sub-
ject’s functioning as the operating center of life. 
To get a sharp focus on the operations of the self, I join the humanistic 
classification into self-acceptance, self-actualization, and, sometimes, 
self-transcendence. For the sake of broadening the scope of this classifi-
cation, I associate it with the way by which object-relations psychology 
from the 1960s onward analyses the development of the individual self 
from early childhood. 
In object relations psychology the development of a new-born during 
the first years of life is deemed decisive for a person’s psychic functioning 
throughout life. Separation and individuation are central in that develop-
ment. From the initial phase, the mother as first caregiver provides safety 
and protection against anxiety, and the child begins to distinguish itself 
from the primary caregiver in a symbiotic dyad. The process of separa-
tion has begun. Gradually the child learns to tolerate that the mother is 
not always present; it does so by making internal representations of     
the self and the mother, the object relations. Object relations are the cog-
nitive and affective schemes by which the child conceptualizes the rela-
tionship with the mother. A healthy development results in a balance 
between independence and attachment, and between self-awareness and 
relationship with the other (Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1975). 
Heinz Kohut’s self-psychology is an offshoot of object relations psy-
chology. He characterizes the psychic state of a new-born as primary 
narcissism that consists of experiencing the comfortable and safe one-
ness with the mother. Gradually a separation between the child and the 
mother takes place, resulting in two developments that are both nar-
cissistic. First, the child tries to maintain the blissful connection with the 
mother by idealizing her. The idea I belong to you makes the child share 
in the omnipotent state of the parent. In later age, this idealization can  
be expanded to other persons. Second, mainly unconsciously, the child 
creates a grandiose narcissistic self with the help of the admiration and 
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affirmation by the parent (mirroring). The combination of these two  
activities, idealizing and self-enlarging, results in the experience of what 
it means to be myself. A mature development of the self, on the other 
hand, results in a robust personality characterized by creativity, empa-
thy, cherishing of ideals, the acknowledgement of the limits and of the 
finitude of the self, acceptance of the own transience, humor, wisdom, 
and a sense of supra-individual participation in the world (Kohut, 1966; 
Gorday, 2000). If the optimal development is impaired the individual 
becomes prone to feelings of shame and narcissistic rage (e.g., Kohut, 
1977). 
Consistent with humanistic and existential psychology, and repro-
duced in their vocabulary, Kohut’s view of the well-integrated self comes 
down to self-accepting, self-actualizing, and a kind of self-transcending. 
Self-acceptance develops in a parallel process of narcissistic idealizing 
and mirroring, along with accepting the own limits. Self-actualization is 
the realization of the internal potencies and ambitions, fueled by a robust 
self-awareness. Self-transcendence parallels Kohut’s identification of the 
ability to self-relativizing and the awareness of being connected with 
mankind (“cosmic narcissism,” attained by only a few). 
 
Two Dimensions 
At this point, with the help of our previous reflections and explorations, 
we may assume two dimensions that each exert their influence on human 
existence; the dimensions of (1) psychological self-functioning, and (2) 
anthropological principles. Self-functioning refers to the subjective Me, in 
self-acceptance, self-actualization, and self-transcendence; anthropologi-
cal main features refer to the connection with the world around me, on 
the levels of otherness (relationships), nearness (participation), and 
temporality, or life span. The way both dimensions interact gives an im-
pression of the conditions under which individuals function properly. In 
turn, this proper functioning is the goal of all psychotherapy. So, let’s 
reflect on the relationship of these dimensions, in order to complete our 
thinking about the balance between subjectivity and connectedness for 
the sake of sound psychotherapy. It seems plausible to see the three ways 
of self-functioning act upon each of the three basic principles of anthro-
pology. 
First, we form a picture of the function of self-acceptance acting upon 
the three primary features of humanness. Connected with otherness, self-
acceptance implies accepting the self’s being different from others and 
the surrounding world, that is, accepting the own individuality. With 
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respect to proximity, self-acceptance means the acceptance of being part 
of one’s family and other social units, and of being formed in these       
specific contexts by nature and nurture. Participation sets a limit to sepa-
ration, and invites subjects to derive a kind of common identity from it. 
At the same time, participation leaves room for some articulated individ-
uality within the group, dependent on one’s place in the group. Finally, 
related to temporality it indicates the acceptance of one’s own finitude.           
Conceptually, this is rather simple but in practice it turns out to be quite 
difficult to achieve this kind of self-acceptance. According to Terror Man-
agement Theory, the latter two applications of self-acceptance behave 
like communicating vessels; increasing terror of death, that is, non-
acceptance of death, correlates with increasing clinging to participation 
in a group. 
Second, what does self-actualization mean for dealing with the three 
basic conditions of humanness? With regard to personal and factual    
otherness, it is about developing into an autonomous individual that in 
its actualization is not hampered by the way others react, that is, by   
making themselves less dependent on others’ approval and sympathy. 
When it comes to being determined by predisposition and environment, 
self-actualizing involves the application of norms and values held by the 
social environment one participates in, realizing one’s possibilities and 
interests in the context of the purpose and meaning one attributes to life, 
herewith reflecting one’s belonging to the group. Finally, regarding tem-
porality, self-actualization means the appreciation and utilization of the 
limited lifetime as opportunities to make life worthwhile. 
In the third place, self-transcendence, too, acts upon the three anthro-
pological principles. Relative to otherness, transcending the self leads to 
the insight that other persons and phenomena outside me have to be re-
spected in their being different. I cannot do justice to others if I try to 
subordinate them to my own needs. On the basis of this respect I am able 
to be related to others. With respect to nearness, self-transcendence en-
tails that people go beyond the natural circles they participate in, and 
widen their range of experience toward a kind of inspiring connection 
with a transcending source that elicits the full use of their genetically and 
socially determined possibilities, and reinforce their goal orientation. 
Connected with the temporality factor self-transcendence means that  
one meets with realities that are larger, and more comprehensive in   
time than one’s own lifetime, eternal existence hereafter, or, more this-
worldly, realities with lasting value, like justice, peace, art, and humane-
ness, on the horizon of history. 
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In sum, the interaction of the psychological and anthropological di-
mensions may result in nine basic functions of human existence, of which 
Figure 1 gives an overview. Primarily they are existential abilities in 
which basic anthropological conditions work together with psychological 
skills to acquire a kind of equilibrium between the polarities of subjec-
tivity and communality, and to live a stable and resilient life. It may be 
useful to comment that this overview is presented as a schematic repre-
sentation of human functioning in general that is meant to appeal to 
secular therapists.  
 
Psychology:    Self-acceptance       Self-actualization           Self-transcendence  
Anthropology: 
Otherness           individuality              autonomy                  relationality in respect 
 
Nearness        participation        purposiveness                  dedication 
 
Temporality     sense of finitude     perceived opportunity   eternity awareness 
 
Figure 1 Integration of Psychology and Anthropology  
 
Additional Comments on Self-Transcendence 
In order to ensure maximum clarity we face the different interpretations 
of transcendence and self-transcendence, and account for the different 
levels on which they occur. Maslow (1970) pictures his well-known hier-
archy of needs in which self-actualization is at the top. In it he includes 
notions like peak experiences and community feeling that hint at self-
transcendence. This is similar to the Cloninger variant of self-transcend-
ence, who understands it as a state of unified consciousness in which 
everything is part of one totality, and the individual self experientially 
dissolves in the cosmos and its source (Cloninger, Svrakic, and Przybeck, 
1993). Here, the boundaries blur, and the individual subjective aware-
ness is absorbed in the feeling of infinity. This variant comes in the vicin-
ity of eternity awareness on the third anthropological principle, i.e., the 
level of temporality. The two are not entirely identical, however, because 
the Cloninger variant implies the absorption of the sense of individuality, 
which is not implied in the diagram version. 
Additionally, a more existential approach of transcendence can be 
identified: transcendence as the counterpart of otherness; and self-
transcendence as the act of going beyond all that exceeds the distinct, 
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limited space of the self. Then, self-transcendence is an activity of con-
necting with the other, outer reality beyond the self, starting with the 
recognition of the own boundaries. Roughly speaking, we can label this 
the Levinas variant of self-transcendence. This variant is allocated on the 
anthropological level of otherness. 
These concepts of self-transcendence are not specifically Christian. 
The Cloninger version is generally observed in Christian mysticism but 
also in transpersonal psychology (see section 8.4). The Levinas version, 
on the other hand, can be found in a humanist fashion of self-transcend-
ing by relating respectfully to others. Furthermore, in the existentialist 
fashion the existential moment is cherished as one’s responsibility to 
step outside the safe boundaries of normal life, and to perform an au-
thentic act, while abandoning former certainties. It is focused more on 
the subject than on the other, and can therefore only loosely be viewed as 
a variant of the Levinas version. Finally, Christian faith, too, does include 
self-transcendence in the Levinas variant, more or less. In their contact 
with God and fellow humans believers respond to the call of the other. In 
the Jewish and Christian traditions the motif that humans know their 
boundaries (Genesis 2 and 3), and respect the other beyond themselves 
in their otherness by loving God with heart and soul and their neighbors 
as themselves (Matthew 22:37-40), is crucial. 
The previous paragraph stated that Christianity “more or less” in-
cludes self-transcendence in the Levinas version. There is a difference. 
Levinas (1961/1969) distinguishes between religious transcendence and 
philosophical transcendence. The former he identifies as a kind of union 
with the Transcendent by participation, the latter as a relation with the 
transcendent free from all captivation by the Transcendent. Is should be 
clear that the participation variant is close to the Christian version of self-
transcendence, while Levinas’s favorite option, the philosophical variant, 
reminds us of modernism with its subjectivist, individualist propensity.  
The boundary line between Me and You which is appropriate for Christi-
anity in general, is transformed into the modernist boundary line be-
tween the inner self and the world outside. 
 
Other Important Psychological Notions 
One might wonder whether the matrix rendered in Figure 1 includes all 
significant existential themes. What about notions that are not listed, 
such as identity, gender, freedom, responsibility and conscience, guilt 
feelings, discipline, lust, memory, and locus of control (internal or exter-
nal attribution of success and failure)? The answer is that these are not 
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completely different functions, but that they are composed of qualities or 
functions mentioned in the matrix. Let me give some tentative indica-
tions. 
Identity can be viewed as a summary description of individuality, par-
ticipation, and sense of finitude. In identity the acceptance of my being 
different from others, my participating in groups that contribute to my 
identity, and my own life story are determinative. Gender is a matter of 
belonging and identity. Freedom is an indication of living in autonomy. 
Responsibility and conscience take place within the relationships be-
tween autonomy, participation, purposiveness, and relationality. Closely 
related to responsibility and conscience is the notion of guilt feelings. 
Discipline is one of the conditions of purposiveness; it has to do with the 
ability of tolerating delayed gratification which is important to achieve a 
goal. Lust is an element in nature and nurture, and is thus located on the 
second anthropological level of nearness. It also suggests and creates 
proximity, and contributes to purposiveness. Further, anyone who is 
dominated by feelings of lust, is not ready for autonomy. Yalom (1980) 
views sexual lust as a possible defense mechanism against fear of isola-
tion. This fear of isolation is substantively related to lacking participation 
or belonging, impaired relationship with others, and fear of death (sense 
of finitude). As to memory, this is a prerequisite for purposiveness       
and perception of opportunities; memories put experiences in time (tem-
porality) in a chronological, purposeful perspective. So, its content con-
tributes to identity. Finally, locus of control has everything to do with 
autonomy. Who systematically credits success and failure to external 
causes, makes him or herself dependent on external developments and 
abandons autonomy. 
 
Applicability to Mental Disorders 
Is this matrix instructive for identifying psychical disorders? Earlier, we 
interpreted personality disorders as related to maladaptive dealing with 
the first and second basics of human existence. Now we look wider to all 
kinds of disorders, and look at the applicability of the complete format to 
them. Let us consider this issue tentatively, starting with the depressive 
disorder. This seems to be a disorder in particular on the triangle finitude 
– participation – purposiveness. Symptoms of depression are preoccupa-
tion with death (finitude field), lack of pleasure and interest, and mean-
inglessness (purposiveness field), and the isolating feeling of not being 
understood (participation field). Moreover, the emphatic presence of 
thoughts of death is related to a felt worthlessness of the own existence, 
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that is, a lack of self-esteem and negative self-image (individuality field). 
Because of an absent focus on the future the present is captured by the 
past (Mooij, 1995). Absence of future is a characteristic of both death and 
meaninglessness. 
As to anxiety disorders, there are several accents, dependent on which 
kind of anxiety is at stake. Agoraphobia and other specific phobias con-
sciously circle around the end of sane functioning by the fear of death or 
madness. The object or situation feared is experienced as causing help-
lessness, and threatening life or sane functioning (finitude). With social 
phobia the emphasis is on flawed self-esteem, entailing fear of being be-
low standard in the perception of others. Thus persons suffering from a 
social phobia demand of themselves qualities which they consider not to 
have. This relates to a weak individuality that has an effect on deficient 
autonomy, and is associated with impaired participation and relationali-
ty. An obsessive-compulsive disorder, lastly, seems to be about a futile 
pursuit of autonomy by excessive control in particular. Real control   
presupposes the self-confidence to make adequate decisions in the vicis-
situdes of life. That is lacking in people with obsessive-compulsive symp-
toms. They get stuck in an endless repetition for fear of deterioration and 
failure (Glas, 2001). Much concrete fear can be interpreted as dis-
placement of existential fear of humiliation (participation and relational-
ity fields) and death (Yalom, 1980; Glas, 2001). 
To mention another example of psychological malfunctioning, in the 
schema therapy developed by Jeffrey Young, one of the cognitive sche-
mas is the self-sacrifice schema (“I must always be ready for another”) 
(Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). Here, particularly the obviousness of 
participation, and the limitation by the other is at stake; individuality, 
autonomy, and respectful relationality are out of balance. The person in 
question does not feel safe and accepted in the group, which makes him 
or herself dependent on others’ happiness and approval. Consequently, 
the person does not act autonomously nor experiences unconditional 
belonging or equivalent relationality. Moreover, the individual demands 
too much of him/herself, and does not accept the boundaries of the own 
possibilities (nature and nurture, determined by participation). 
Finally we try to locate the borderline Personality Disorder in the dia-
gram. Borderline P.D. is characterized by instability in the self-image, in 
cognitions and affections, relationships and behavior, and by violent dis-
charges of tensions and emotions. This instability takes place especially 
on the first level of the limitation by the other in the surrounding world; 
individuality, autonomy, and relationality are labile. Participation is 
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questioned; purposiveness submerges into chaotic thinking, and often 
there is a preoccupation with death. The familiar problem of identity-loss 
and dissociation can be derived from a disruption of participation. 
Would there be any psychiatric pathologies that do not fit in the for-
mat? There would, indeed, but then we should have to think of disorders 
that are difficult to fit in any model; take for example sleepwalking. In 
many other cases in which the disorders cannot be classified themselves, 
yet the underlying problems for which they play a functional role, possi-
bly can. If not all cases are covered, so be it. The model does not pretend 
to be exhaustive. It intends to offer a heuristic device that is illuminative 
for the interpretation of existential themes by reconstructing the inter-
play of basic anthropological conditions and psychological self-activities. 
This interplay reveals the polarity between subjectivity and communality 
as a therapy goal worthwhile pursuing. 
 
Usefulness for Christian Oriented Psychotherapy 
Assuming that the connection of psychological functions with anthropo-
logical principles gives rise to worldview-like interpretations, we may 
ask the question whether this basic model of psychosocial (mal)function-
ing provides clues for any Christian-articulated interpretations of experi-
encing life. To a certain degree, it does, as Figure 2 visualizes. It goes 
without saying that it is an ideal representation. 
 
Psychology:   Self-Acceptance         Self-Actualization           Self-Transcendence 
Anthropology: 
Otherness             individuality               autonomy              relationality in respect 
                      image of God        own choice for faith      toward God and humans 
 
Nearness             participation               purposiveness                dedication 
             family, church              in servitude                 being Spirit filled 
 
Temporality       sense of finitude    perceived opportunity        eternity-awareness 
        as a creature and sinner       time of grace                    expectancy 
  
Figure 2 Integration of Psychology and Anthropology – Christian Interpretation 
 
A Christian interpretation of the model may start with facing our con-
nectedness with the other, that is, the world outside, including people 
and things. In Christianity, this receptivity of our distinct existence      
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surrounded by otherness includes transcending our personal existence in 
respectful relationships. For we are addressed, primarily by God. 
In the format these relationships are implied in self-transcendence. In 
this way individuality and autonomy are stripped of any self-centered 
orientation and put at the service of being with and for others. The ac-
ceptance of our individuality says that we understand ourselves as being 
created and regenerated in the image of God, deriving our dignity from 
God.4 Autonomy is confirmed by the appeal to subject oneself auton-       
omously, that is, by own choice, to God’s authority. Interpreted from a 
Christian point of view this entails a subservient relationship of love with 
God and humans. The outline may have some value as frame of reference 
for the appeal to Christian notions and values, and thus provide a hold to 
both the Christian therapist and the patient to connect therapy and faith. 
Psychic complaints can be reformulated in the language field of faith and 
vice versa. 
From the relationship in love with God and fellow humans the other 
eight functions can be interpreted in a Christian sense. First going to the 
second anthropological level within self-transcendence, referring to ded-
ication, this can be understood as being driven by the Holy Spirit. On the 
deepest level, of temporality or life-span, the eternity awareness can be 
interpreted from the relationship with God as expecting the new heaven 
and the new earth where justice will dwell. 
On the level of temporality, self-acceptance implies that we accept our 
finitude as a sign of our being creatures and sinners. From the starting 
point in the relationship with God and fellow humans it can also be em-
phasized that sin consists of breaking these relationships. This is far 
more essential than stress on doing what you ought not do – a concept of 
sin that easily causes anxious people to accuse themselves and lets them 
take a spasmodic posture. Then, from the faith perspective perceived 
opportunity may have the character of living in time of grace that God 
awards us in order to self-actualize. 
On the second level of proximity, acceptance of our constitution and 
function in a Christian sense includes that we are members of a Christian 
 
4
  Section 5.4 hinted at the problematic character of a relational interpretation of 
being created in the image of God. I would prefer an understanding pointing to 
humans’ individuality, including both their responsibility in reigning over the cre-
ated world, and their capabilities to live up to it. This is a combination of func-
tional and structural interpretations of the creation after God’s image, as they 
have been developed in the history of theology. 
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family and community with our own gifts and talents. Purposiveness in-
cludes that we pursue to utilize our position in the community and our 
talents in serving God, building the church, and helping fellow humans.
 Let it be clear that the Christian labels should not be interpreted as 
efforts meant to legitimize the anthropological-psychological construct. 
The model can stand up for itself on the basis of the commonly shared 
experiential recognition of our threefold basic anthropological condition 
and the psychologically inspired self-dimension. The Christian under-
standing of the psychological items should rather be understood as a 
translation into present day Christian concepts which themselves are 
conceived from a point of view that connects the subject with its envi-
ronment. That is to say, our modern cultural formation provides us with 
the eyeglasses that influence what we see when we read the Bible. The 
translation into Christian terms may help the therapist to familiarize the 
Christian patient with the basic ideas, to encourage the patient’s coopera-
tion in the treatment process, and to present some holds for integrating 
psychological functioning and religious faith. 
 
Evaluation 
What does the matrix of the interplay between the dimensions of anthro-
pology and psychological self-functioning add to the prevailing theories 
of psychotherapy? It relates psychological functioning to the ontological 
conditions of alterity, proximity, and temporality. In different forms of 
mainstream psychotherapy different anthropological notions are pre-
supposed but an overall outline is still lacking. The majority of individual 
psychotherapy focuses on the anthropological notion of otherness,     
particularly on individuality and autonomy. Relationality is primarily       
addressed in terms of the perspective of independence from others (self-
acceptance) or social skills (self-actualization), and less in terms of the 
perspective of respecting the otherness of the other (self-transcendence). 
Relationship and participation are used as temporary tools for therapy. 
The condition of nearness is discounted by systems therapy and gestalt 
therapy. And narrative therapy moves in the lower left corner of the  
matrix: it includes participation, purposiveness, finitude, and perceived 
opportunities. None of the accredited therapies, except for existential 
psychotherapy, is characterized by explicating the significance of tran-
scendence for the perception of the self in the light of the other. 
After all, the model is compatible with prevailing psychotherapy. It 
fits well with both psychodynamic developmental currents, and existen-
tial and humanistic psychotherapy. The psychodynamic approach 
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emerges in focusing on the self in connection with the other and the own 
social units. The existential content is in the confrontation with other-
ness, the emphasis on purpose and the attention to self-transcendence. 
Characteristic for the humanistic vantage point is the central place that is 
occupied by self-accepting and self-actualizing, and by the correction of 
distorted views of one’s self and one’s possibilities. Moreover, it includes 
clues for cognitive psychotherapy. The cognitive component consists pri-
marily of the emphasis on accepting life in all the particularities every-
body has to face (self-acceptance). If so many mainstreams can be 
brought together into one overall vision, one may speak of an integral 
design. It might help psychotherapists to appeal to other orientations in a 
reasoned way and avoid just randomly utilizing what suits them. 
The presentation of the complete matrix does not imply the need for 
any psychotherapy to cover the entire terrain, however. Every kind of 
psychotherapy may keep its own specialty. Rather, by pursuing an over-
view of the entire area, the matrix invites therapists to face the other 
fields of interest, and to consider cooperation with colleagues with a dif-
ferent expertise if needed. And if it is true that self-transcendence is not a 
dominating issue in mainstream psychotherapy, this notion may still 
open up the opportunity for discussing the other world as a part of one’s 
worldview, which entails the interpretation of the world beyond the 
boundaries of one’s own existence. 
Moreover, by offering a coherent perspective on the relationship      
between the anthropological and the psychological, the matrix helps 
therapists to prevent patients’ subjective experience and functioning to 
alienate from the outer world they are intertwined with. Thus, it could 
remedy the excesses of modernity. The three basic anthropological con-
ditions of otherness, nearness, and temporality help us to connect with 
the reality that conditions us and to deal with it. 
In addition, the diagram reminds Christian caregivers of the subject 
oriented character of psychotherapy. In psychotherapy they cannot on 
the basis of an assumed theocentric heteronomy require any kind of 
submissiveness without respecting the autonomous position of the pa-
tient. A Christian attitude may be an option only if the patient freely 
chooses for it, understanding what it is he or she is choosing for. 
Further, the format may work as a mirror for patients to show them 
how they understand life, motivating them to work on themselves. For 
Christian psychotherapists this means that the diagram may function     
as a hold to assist Christian patients to relate psyche and faith, helping 
the therapists to assess whether and when faith can be addressed    
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meaningfully. Worldview issues are particularly implied in other-       
relatedness, participation, purposiveness, sense of finitude, and eternity 
awareness. 
A final remark concerns the interest of quantitative inquiry about the 
relationships between the various self-functions acting upon the various 
basic anthropological conditions. How do self-acceptance, self-actualiza-
tion, and self-transcendence correlate? Is a self-function operating with 
respect to one condition working equally with respect to another con-
dition? Experiments by terror management theorists suggest it is not, 
indicating that poor functioning at one point can be compensated at an-
other point. Maybe the ideal situation is a kind of homeostasis. Caution 
should be taken, however, with respect to the complexity of indicators 
like participation, which concerns feelings of belonging, the own place 
and role within the group, and the combination of genetics and environ-
ment (nature and nurture) in the individual’s constitution. Increasing 
clarity about correlations of the different themes may enhance the utility 
of the matrix for the therapist’s focusing on the patient’s problems, and 
planning the intervention. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
 
The outcomes of the previous chapters put us before the question 
whether psycho-therapy can be preserved as the professional practice to 
which it has been evolved, without renouncing central Christian values, 
and the other way round, whether Christian values can be incorporated 
in psychotherapy without distorting professionalism. The main results 
that had to be recognized were the following. The practice of psychother-
apy has been fostered by the rise of Western modernity from the six-
teenth century onward. Its modernist character is expressed by the turn 
to the subject that has to deal and cope with outer reality, and the inter-
est in personal autonomy as a necessary condition for being able to deal 
with the world outside. At the same time, many types of psychotherapy 
look for creating connections with the surrounding world. However, in 
spite of its emphasizing personal choice and responsibility, Christianity 
does not focus on the autonomous subject but on participation and rela-
tionships in love and surrender to God. Can these different orientations 
of psychotherapy and Christianity be conjoined so that they can be 
viewed as compatible? 
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Chapter 6 already led to the conclusion that contemporary Western 
Christians cannot escape modern influences on their mental framework. 
They, like other Western citizens, take their selves as the centers of grav-
ity in approaching the outer world, and, wittingly or unwittingly, behave 
like the directors of their own lives. Correspondingly, they need a strong 
ego to maintain themselves among a multitude of opinions and complex 
situations, however much their existence is focused on loving relation-
ships. The question remained whether these two purposes can come 
together. Can psychotherapy be focused on strengthening the ego with-
out doing injustice to the humble and altruistic vein in traditional Chris-
tianity? 
In chapter 7 we developed an answer that built on Reformational 
philosophical analyses that aim at reconnecting the subject with larger 
communities by some kind of participation, and therewith compensating 
for the priority of the subjective stance in modern experience and psy-
chotherapy. My own contribution to this attempt is the identification of 
connective possibilities by proposing a threefold anthropological condi-
tion of human existence, and linking it with selfhood, hereby relating the 
subject to the surrounding reality in which it participates. The basic con-
nections of our existence evoked by otherness, nearness, and temporal-
ity, moderate our subjective dominion (or failed dominion), and make us 
more sensitive to mental activities that connect with reality beyond the 
subjective self. 
In an attempt to join the three basic anthropological conditions with 
our psychic functioning, I distinguished three subject functions, self-
acceptance, self-actualization, and self-transcendence, each of which act 
upon the basic conditions mentioned. The ontological basics of human-
ness and the subject’s activities form two dimensions of which the latter 
acts upon the former. This results in a matrix of nine squares providing a 
model of primary existential themes as these are linked to primary psy-
chological self-functions and basic anthropological conditions. This ma-
trix is meant to appeal to all therapists in the Western cultural area. 
The model provides at least four obvious clues for connecting psycho-
logical functioning with worldview issues, at the same time preventing a 
reduction of the world around to mere subjective constructs. This pre-
ventive power is due to the model’s connection of psychological function-
ing with anthropological, ontological basics. The first clue comes from the 
anthropological phenomenon of otherness. Otherness implies the un-
known, the enigmatic that asks for understanding. Worldviews are  
meant to help understand the world around. The second clue is the    
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emphasis the model puts on nearness, participation, and purposiveness. 
Social units share values and purposes that are deemed vital for the               
continuation and sound functioning of the group. Values and purposes 
belong to worldviews. The third clue is the sense of finitude. Finitude 
directs our thinking to the boundaries of our existence, which can con-
fuse and terrify us. One function of worldviews is to protect us from con-
fusion and insecurity (Jaspers, 1919; above, section 1.2). The final clue 
for worldview issues is the self-dimension that can be so prominent be-
cause of self-relatedness. This means that human beings do not coincide 
with their functioning but that they relate to it by evaluating it, with due 
consequences for self-understanding. In this evaluation worldview no-
tions play their part. 
Because of these clues, the model provides an appropriate oppor-
tunity for connecting worldview issues with psychological functioning. 
As a result, the design is able to incorporate worldview items, like Chris-
tian interpretations of our human condition, in the diagram. This Chris-
tian articulation of worldview issues may be a hold for handling Christian 
worldview translations of experienced problems in therapy. 
With these exercises I suppose to have confirmed the third hypoth-
esis about the compatibility of psychotherapy and Christianity. This con-
firmation turns on two hinges, that is, the recognition that Western Chris-
tianity, too, has inevitably been affected by modernism, and the under-
standing that modernism should be corrected (as has been pursued by 
phenomenological and Reformational philosophies) or compensated (as 
has been pursued by interpersonal philosophy, and several psychothera-
peutic approaches) by reconnecting the subject with the environment. 
 
Still one task is waiting for us, about generalizing. How can the result be 
generalized toward worldviews other than the Christian one? The fourth 
and final hypothesis asserts that this generalization is possible for 
worldviews having a similar relation to modernity as Christianity. The 
next chapter should vindicate this by showing up some examples of the 
possibilities and their limitations. 
  
Chapter 8 
Generalizing the Results 
8.1 Criteria for the Procedure of Generalizing 
 
The present chapter is meant to generalize the conclusions of our previ-
ous reflections. Before doing so, I recapitulate the outcomes in order to 
be able to proceed in strict conformity with them. 
Our first conclusion was that psychotherapy shares the subject-
oriented approach of reality applied by (post-)modernism, affirming the 
intellectual and moral priority of the patient. This hegemony of the sub-
ject entails psychotherapy’s focus on the patients’ autonomy or ego-
strength to have and express their own opinions and make their own 
decisions. Patients decide whether religious issues are dealt with in ther-
apy or not. In any generalization this characteristic of psychotherapeutic 
practice should be respected. 
Our second finding was that this psychotherapeutic approach is at 
odds with some core values of Christianity. This religion fosters related-
ness to others in love, self-renunciation, living under God’s authority, and 
to His glory. It lacks the psychotherapeutic self-focus, and is conversely 
directed toward God and the neighbor. This difference of orientation may 
cause confusion among Christian patients who want to be supported in 
finding their ways within a Christian context. So, generalizations need to 
concern worldviews that encounter similar inconveniences with current 
psychotherapeutic practice. 
Finally, this tension should be transformed into a fertile polarity of 
due attention for both the subject and the communities he or she partici-
pates in. In fact, this transformation is not only desirable, it is indispens-
able, because Christians in the Western world are influenced by the 
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(post)modern culture to the extent that they, just like their secular con-
temporaries, experience reality from the perspective of the subject, and 
ideally claim a space for autonomous decision making. Their subjectivity 
should be compensated by connections that provide a counterweight 
against individualism. In this way a balance between inward and out-
ward oriented mentality and behavior can grow. There should develop a 
connectedness of the subject with its social environment. The previous 
chapter developed a model in which connectedness is related to our  
anthropological state in three basic respects: otherness, nearness, and 
temporality. These realities can be processed by self-acceptance, self-
actualization, and self-transcendence. The generalizations we pursue 
take this model as a heuristic scheme that has to prove its usefulness 
during the process. 
From this recapitulation we can collect three criteria by which to 
measure whether other worldviews in relation to psychotherapy can be 
dealt with as candidates for generalizing the relationship between psy-
chotherapy and Christianity. These are (1) the endorsement of current 
professional psychotherapeutic practice, (2) a certain tension between 
these other worldviews and professional psychotherapy, especially with 
respect to modern worldview’s focus on the subject that is inherent in 
regular therapy, and (3) an inner tension within the given worldview 
between its own values and modern influences of subjectivity. If world-
views meet these criteria, generalization of our fourth finding can be 
considered, namely, (4) the transformation of  the tension into a polarity 
by connecting the allegedly autonomous subject with the specific values 
fostered in Christianity. The possibility of generalizing should be evi-
denced by a satisfactory application of our developed model of human 
functioning to the combination of the referred worldview with psycho-
therapy. 
The worldviews we explore in relation to psychotherapy are Jewish 
orthodoxy, Islam, East Asian cultural views, African cultural views, and 
transpersonal psychology. What we actually do is twofold; we examine 
whether these worldviews meet the criteria mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, and if so, we try to assess whether our results about the com-
patibility of psychotherapy with Christianity can be generalized to the 
affiliation of the other worldviews with psychotherapy. With this we 
attempt to confirm our fourth hypothesis: 
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A new perspective on the integration of psychotherapy and Christian 
faith can be generalized to all those worldviews that are subject to ten-
sions similar to those between psychotherapy and Christian faith. 
 
 
8.2 Jewish Orthodoxy 
 
Religious Judaism in Gradations of Orthodoxy, and Psychotherapy 
Current Judaism in general is characterized by a shared history and iden-
tity qualified by the Hebrew Bible, the collective memory of anti-
Semitism in mainly Christian contexts culminating in the Holocaust, and a 
common orientation on the state of Israel. Religious Judaism, in addition, 
is focused on the religious laws that are documented in the Bible, and 
extensively explained and commented by scribes and rabbis in a chain of 
mutual disputes and additional perspectives from the beginning of our 
common era until the fifth century. Of the religious Jews the orthodox 
make up the more traditional collection of groups, and therefore are to 
be expected to be the more critical of modern Western lifestyle, including 
psychotherapeutic support meant to enable people to maintain and de-
velop their own identity. However, among the orthodox there is much 
variation, too. We face the ultra-orthodox and the modern-orthodox, of 
which the latter form a spectrum themselves (Schnall, 2006). As one 
would expect, the modern-orthodox group is the more sympathetic of the 
two toward psychotherapeutic practice. 
Ultra-orthodox refers to a cluster of separate groups who nevertheless 
share a number of characteristics that sets them apart from all others. 
They profess unwavering belief in God who has ordained everything on 
earth for the good, culminating in reward and punishment, the power of 
prayer, observing the commandments, clear lines of worldview, the ex-
treme value of continuing and extensive Torah-study as the primary 
source of knowledge. Girls are supposed to prefer founding a family and 
raising children over building a career; children are strictly educated in 
accordance with the Jewish traditions; the sexes are rigidly separated 
outside family-life; the family is ruled by paternal authority. The com-
munity is closed and isolated from the outside; mass-media except for 
the ultra-orthodox press are forbidden; the internet is only permitted for 
business purposes. The rabbi settles internal questions and conflicts, and 
free thinking is precluded (Hess and Pitariu, 2011). 
278 WORLDVIEW AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
The tensions and conflicts of ultra-orthodox Judaism with psycho-
therapy are not hard to guess. They are delineated by Hess and Pitariu 
(2011) who describe the developments during many years of treatment 
with young adult patients from that sector in Israel. The shielded charac-
ter of the community is reflected by the closed character of thinking, 
which contrasts with the more open and permissive thinking style of 
psychotherapy. Open thinking is closed off by the decision of the rabbi. 
On a question like: “What will you vote for in the forthcoming elections?” 
the spontaneous answer would be: “Whatever the rabbi tells us to vote 
for.” In psychotherapy, however, you are invited to think for yourself. 
This may be a revolutionary and quite startling discovery for an ultra-
orthodox. The prohibition to think and speak for yourself is reinforced by 
the awareness of forbidden topics, such as sexual phantasies, anger, ag-
gression, the drive to emphasize the own femininity, negative thoughts 
about the parents, let alone expressing these allegedly bad thoughts. This 
ugly side of the inner world should be resisted and overcome instead of 
being paid attention to and thus being cultivated in a certain sense. This 
attitude runs directly counter to the modern predominance of the inner 
life of the subject. A kindred tension is the intolerableness of ambiguity. 
In ultra-orthodox circles no question is raised without an answer. Psy-
chotherapy, on the other hand, works with different perspectives and 
with ambiguities; phenomena and feelings are not simply right or wrong, 
they have a function in coping and processing activities. These tensions 
can create nearly unbearable inner struggles between the need to belong 
by observance of the religious laws, and the need to listen to one’s own 
inner feelings. 
As to more modern-orthodox versions of religious Judaism, some of 
the same values are in force, such as the importance of the family, respect 
for the parents, the directive and authoritative function of the religious 
laws. However, this area of Jewish religion is more open to modern influ-
ences like personal ambition and integration in modern society. Secular 
learning and culture are an important part of the participants’ lives. In 
their adaptations to modern society, religiously conservative Jews (as 
they are called) go beyond the orthodox, e.g. concerning the strictness of 
the Sabbath observance, or the separation of men and women in public 
(Schlosser, 2006). It may be expected that in this part of religious        
Judaism psychotherapy is more accepted, and can be better integrated   
in the overall worldview and lifestyle. Yet, there may be some stigma   
and shame on mental illness because of concerns about the dubious           
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impression it may make on other members of the same tight community. 
Obviously, this fear of stigmatization is contagious toward practices that 
are meant to identify and treat such mental disorders. This unfavorable 
impact will be strengthened when the practice of shidduchin, or arranged 
marriages, is still used in a more or less strict form, by which the person 
in question or his/her family members become less attractive marriage 
candidates (Meyerstein, 2004; Schnall, 2006). 
 
Mental Health Problems 
Although the general prevalence of mental disorders is roughly similar to 
that of other groups (Loewenthal, 2006), some salient features of symp-
toms seem typical for Jews, and for (ultra-)orthodox Jews in particular. In 
general, there are the traumas of Holocaust experiences carried over into 
new generations, augmented with the present expressions of anti-
Semitism and, mainly in Israel the memories, consequences and threats 
of terrorist attacks and suicide bombing. This may lead to posttraumatic 
stress, anxiety, feelings of inferiority, and depressive mental states. A 
specific syndrome of internalized anti-Semitism has been identified 
(Schlosser, 2006), which entails ambivalent or negative thoughts, feel-
ings, and behaviors about one’s identity as a Jew. 
Hardly specifically Jewish but maybe fostered by Jewish interest in 
childbearing and rearing, and possibly catalyzed by feelings of insecurity 
because of being Jewish, a tendency of overprotection of the children by 
their parents has been noticed, leading to child behavior problems.   
Meyerstein (2004) relates excess of sensitivity and catering to a parental 
desire for the child to be happy and fully express him or herself. This 
motive can be characterized as typically modern. 
Hess and Pitariu (2011) describe the symptoms of four patients from 
the ultra-orthodox milieu, who have been in psychoanalysis for a number 
of years. The patients’ complaints can partly be traced back to the values 
and lifestyle of their communities without being related to conscious 
rebelling against their socio-spiritual background. The complaints of the 
first female patient comprise depression and low self-image, and tenden-
cies to isolation and self-restraint following on a series of miscarriages, 
after she married at the age of seventeen. The second case is about     
perfectionism in a 28-year-old single woman who tries to satisfy her 
demanding parents with whom she lives, exhibiting symptoms like with-
drawal, avoidance, and a heightened depressive mood. Third, protective 
and permissive parenting evidenced by insufficient setting of limits, leads 
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an 18-year-old boy to difficulties with accepting authority, exercising dis-
cipline, and controlling bad temper when encountering refusal or opposi-
tion. Finally, there is an unmarried girl, twenty years of age, living with 
her parents, who is introverted, rather demanding, and never satisfied. 
Can these symptoms be related to the influence of modernity in the 
patients’ lives? One would think so. It seems opportune to interpret their 
problems as in part due to the lack of space their individuality receives 
within the secluded and prescriptive world in which they live. Their 
symptoms function as indirect protests against the expectations by their 
religious and familial environment. If this is true, this points to the influ-
ence of a more modern lifestyle seeping into their shielded lives. 
 
Appropriateness of Psychotherapy 
At first sight psychotherapy seems to be an eminently suitable instru-
ment for helping Jewish people with mental problems. Many pioneer 
theorists and practitioners of psychotherapy, and related philosophers 
were Jews, like Freud, Adler, Rank, Maslow, Frankl, Buber and Levinas, 
and are still mentioned with respect. However, from the orthodox point 
of view they are to be regarded as apostates from the authorized Jewish 
religion. Still, it may be more than a coincidence that many Jewish mental 
caregivers took the lead in developing this practice. Meyerstein (2004) 
refers to the Avinu Malkenu, a communal prayer recited by Jews for    
centuries during the high festivals that invites and prepares to self-
examination, repentance and forgiveness. This commonly shared per-
spective points to a mentality and capacity of personal change, and 
brings us in the vicinity of psychotherapy, which is focused on self-
reflection and the pursuit of personal change. 
Meyerstein (2004) adds five more characteristics of orthodox Jewry 
that partly show up their affinity with current psychotherapy, and partly 
accommodate it to Jewish values. These are (1) the free human will to 
choose, implying the humans’ responsibility for the consequences of their 
choices; (2) tikkun olam, or repair of the world, focusing on the restora-
tion of world’s integrity, to begin with saving a life, which is equivalent to 
saving the world (cf. Schlosser, 2006); (3) shalom bayit, or peace in the 
household, indicative for family therapy, as well as (4) “honor your father 
and your mother,” emphasizing respectful communication across genera-
tions; and finally (5) the Passover idea of justice seeking spirituality, 
based in the awareness that “because you were slaves in Egypt, you  
know the heart of the stranger,” followed by the exodus from Egypt, the      
 CHAPTER 8. GENERALIZING THE RESULTS 281 
 
wanderings in the desert, and the journey to the promised land, all to-
gether creating a mentality of faith, hope, and courage or resilience – a 
legitimate goal of psychotherapy. 
However, despite these assumed interfaces between Jewish spiritual-
ity and psychotherapy, especially in the ultra-orthodox setting the      
conflicts seem insurmountable. On the one hand, in the mentioned cases 
psychotherapy seems appropriate because people suffer from mental 
disorders that impede them in their daily functioning, but on the other 
hand the treatment of these disorders presupposes some interest in in-
ner feelings and preferences that is not only totally absent in the ultra-
orthodox lifestyle but also viewed as threatening for its proper function-
ing. This absence need not surprise us when we realize that the focus on 
and valuation of inner experience is a typical property of modernity. The 
clash between psychotherapy and ultra-orthodoxy illustrates Western 
psychotherapy’s debt to modernism. 
Are affiliations and oppositions that absolute, indeed? Hess (being 
both a psychoanalyst and a member of an ultra-orthodox community) 
and Pitariu (2011) observe that the success of years of treatment was 
inversely proportional to observance of the religious laws. They ask 
themselves whether psychotherapy actually causes this. They doubt it, 
and suggest that psychotherapy functions as a catalyst of a process that 
was going on anyway. Put otherwise, if you want to provide room to sup-
pressed inner needs and desires, you have to stretch the boundaries set 
by meticulous rules. Whether cause or catalyst, it is evident from the 
ultra-orthodox point of view that this kind of psychotherapy can do no 
good. The fact that our matrix includes participation in community life 
cannot make things better, either. For it presupposes a modern self that 
has to be connected with the social environment. However, ultra-
orthodox Jewry as a pre-modern phenomenon, is not engaged in mo-
dernity, lacks the high valuation of the independent individual self, and 
therefore sees no need to accept the ambivalence of an emancipating 
individ-ual seeking participation in the community. 
Two alternatives to this kind of personal psychotherapy have been 
proposed, namely, the narrative perspective (Witztum and Goodman, 
1999), and structural family therapy as it is recommended by Wieselberg 
(1992). Narratives are viewed as root metaphors for constituting and 
expressing social life and individuals’ experiences. The strategy is to not 
organize personal distress as a cluster of symptoms but as constituents of 
a coherent life story. The idea is to find a way of changing the narratives 
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that accompany and constitute painful experiences in conformity with 
the ultra-orthodox culture. This can be linked with a so-called biblical 
psychotherapy in which people can be helped by identification with bib-
lical characters (Solomon, 2000). It should be kept in mind, however, that 
the narrative concept is a (post-) modern concept that appeals to per-
sonal reconstruction of life experiences. Application to pre-modern ultra-
orthodox contexts imports some ambiguity between deriving identity 
from pre-given communal structures, and from subjective interpreta-
tions. Then, when the biblical input becomes too dominant, it may be 
questioned whether this can be subsumed under professional psycho-
therapy, or should rather be seen as spiritual guidance. Family therapy 
(Wieselberg, 1992) is characterized by features that suit the ultra-
orthodox worldview. It presents a family systems approach that links 
concepts of response to authority in different settings, like the family and 
the religious community. Family therapy focuses on current behavior 
with only selective reference to history, emphasizing doing over under-
standing. It employs detailed homework tasks, which fit wonderfully in 
the ultra-orthodox conception that rituals deserve careful attention be-
cause of their symbolic communicative functions. Reward and punish-
ment are central in the process, and the engagement of an expert who is 
external to the structure runs parallel with the position of the rabbi. This 
does not imply that the expert’s authority is accepted automatically how-
ever, it can be the result of extensive research into the antecedents of the 
therapist involved, and of prior negotiations before the rabbi gives his 
consent. The acceptability of this kind of therapy, then, hinges on its 
complete adaptation to the requirements of the ultra-orthodox stand-
ards, and cannot be valued as a full admission of current psychothera-
peutic practice. 
The more modern the orthodox orientation is, the more room it has 
for standard psychotherapy, due to the fact that it is more open to per-
sonal opinions and interpretations of individuals. Here, the practice of 
psychotherapy can be connected with the basic values in Judaism as they 
are listed by Meyerstein (2004). The adherence to religious Jewish tradi-
tions can be linked with the personal choice to submit to them. Here, 
modern autonomy as the capacity and freedom to determine one’s own 
direction – as presupposed in professional psychotherapy – can be linked 
with the voluntary submission to the heteronomy of divine law. 
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Possibilities for Generalization 
In order to assess whether our conclusions in the previous chapter about 
the compatibility of Christianity with psychotherapy can be generalized 
to Jewish orthodoxy, we first apply the three criteria from the beginning 
of the present chapter. If we want to deal with psychotherapy, we should 
preserve its widely recognized character as a professional practice,    
focusing on the subject and its needs and wishes. In the case of ultra-
orthodox Judaism this appears to be precluded: it would inevitably vio-
late the ultra-orthodox standards. So, generalizing our combination of 
psychotherapy and Christianity to a cooperation between psychotherapy 
and ultra-orthodoxy turns out to be impossible. With modern orthodox 
Jewry it is another story. 
Modern orthodoxy seems to be able to respect the psychotherapeutic 
practice, and therewith meets the first criterion. The second requirement 
for a possible generalization is that the worldview under consideration is 
oriented differently from the self-focus that is typical for psychotherapy. 
In orthodox Judaism this is the case because it focuses on obedience and 
dedication to Adonai and His instructions. 
This simultaneous recognition of psychotherapeutic orientation and 
religious orientation, although pointing in opposite directions, is possible 
due to the inner tension in modern orthodoxy itself between the focus on 
God and the focus on the self. This tension may function as a compatible 
polarity as soon as the subjective inner self is voluntarily put in the ser-
vice of God. This might be the case in modern-orthodox Judaism as it is in 
many expressions of protestant and Roman catholic piety. This is the 
third criterion met by modern orthodoxy. 
Finally, we look for a fertile cooperation between the different orien-
tations of psychotherapy and orthodox Jewry, fitting in the model as  
developed in the previous chapter. This cooperation rests on the con-
nectedness of the self with the world outside, preventing the self to func-
tion ideologically as an isolated ruling instance, which would create a 
focus on the self that is contradictory to the religious orientation of the 
patient or client. The self should be embedded in its supporting and sur-
rounding reality by accepting its threefold anthropological condition. 
Modern orthodoxy is prepared, by virtue of its essence, to face the   
threefold human condition as indicated in our matrix. It can reckon with 
the condition of otherness, reflected in  valuation of the world as God’s     
creation, of other humans as fellows (chaverim), and of the reality of 
God’s existence and interference. It can also do justice to the condition of   
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nearness, appreciating the God-given participation in the family and     
the religious community. And it may meet the condition of temporality,    
accepting death as the limit of earthly life set by God. Moreover, un-     
like ultra-orthodoxy, modern Jewish orthodoxy is able to honor self-
acceptance, self-actualization, and self-transcendence on the basis of its 
valuation of subjectivity, and this self-oriented attitude can interact with 
the three basic anthropological conditions. 
Our conclusion is that our findings cannot be generalized to include 
ultra-orthodox Judaism, but can be generalized to its modern-orthodox 
counterpart. 
 
 
8.3 Islam 
 
Muslim Experience of Life 
Although Muslim individuals differ in many respects (Rahiem and 
Hamied, 2012), a pervasive element in traditional Muslim experience of 
life is its collectivistic, non-individualistic nature (Springer, Abbott, and 
Reisbig, 2009; Dwairy, 2006; Ansary and Salloum, 2012; Daneshpour, 
2012). Significant is the striking observation by Dwairy (2006), a Chris-
tian Palestinian psychotherapist coming from Nazareth, that terms such 
as self, self-actualization, ego, and personal feelings were alien to Arab 
Muslims.1 Other issues appeared to be much more important, such as 
duty, expectations of others, the approval of others, and family life. Along 
with their collective nature, Muslim cultures are authoritarian. Thus, the 
concept of autonomy as encouraged by Western culture would be in di-
rect opposition to the traditional Islamic lifestyle. Authoritarian socializa-
tion in homes and schools is very common. As a result, in traditional Arab 
Muslim societies puberty is not expected to be a period of strong imbal-
ances culminating in the building of independent ego identities. There-
fore, authoritarianism is not considered to be harmful to the mental 
health of the Muslim Arab youth. On the contrary, it integrates them into 
the community they participate in. In this context, family honor is appre-
ciated as an important value. Marriages are usually arranged by the   
 
1
  In this light the translation by Dharamsi and Maynard (2012) of the Arabic nafs in 
the Quran by self seems to be an anachronism. Quran translations usually render 
it with soul, like the traditional translation of the Hebrew nefesh, without the 
connotation of self-reflexive subjectivity as is implied in self. 
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parents. Unmarried girls are not allowed to meet in private or go on 
dates without proper supervision. If they ignore this rule, they may bring 
disgrace to the family (Dwairy, 2006; Springer et al., 2009). 
Generally, families have a responsibility for the welfare of their mem-
bers. The leaders of the family intervene not only in marriages, but also 
in raising and educating the children, and in looking for jobs and housing 
for young adults, as well as giving protection and help in economically 
difficult times (Dwairy, 2006). 
Another characteristic element of Muslim life experience is the im-
portance contributed to imagination, dreams, and metaphors. Visions 
and dreams are considered as reliable indications for decision making in 
real life. Moreover, in general, Muslim families prefer indirect and im-
plicit communication (Springer, et al., 2009). The metaphorical sensi-
tivity has to do with the language of the Quran, which is often imaginative 
and figurative, related to the awareness that language fails to express the 
essence of God. Hence God is described in indirect ways with the help of 
imagery. Another example of the use of metaphors is the way the solution 
of problems is pursued. Muslims transfer a present problem to the con-
text of a similar problem that has been addressed by the Quran, and de-
rive the solution of it metaphorically from the former situation 
(Ahammed, 2010). 
As Dwairy (2006) and others rightly observe, not all Muslims are    
traditional to the same degree. Muslims living in the Western world are 
prone to individualizing and thus modernizing influences, particularly 
when they become affluent and financially self-supporting, and con-
sequently less dependent on family care. On the other hand, growing     
Islamaphobia, due to the terror attacks epitomized by 9/11, has thrown 
more Muslims back to their religious and cultural roots (Maynard, 2008). 
 
Demand for Mental Care 
For several reasons the demands for mental care by Muslims are con-
fined. First, there is the confusion experienced by Dwairy (2006) that 
Palestine Muslims did not even know what he meant by self and personal 
feelings. Maynard (2008) frames the same observation in more psycho-
logical terms by noting that mental services do not relate to their cogni-
tive schema, and that in their communities a language for mental distress 
is lacking. 
A second reason for not engaging in mental health care is the Muslim 
belief that Islam should provide all the answers to personal and family 
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problems. As God is the ultimate source of truth and knowledge, their 
problems should disappear by pleading with Him for guidance and sup-
port. Looking for help beyond the Islamic context could be explained as 
lack of faith. This reasoning is strengthened by the belief that all things 
that happen to a person, both good and evil, are the will of God (Khaja 
and Frederick, 2008; Springer et al., 2009). On the other hand, this inshal-
lah mindset is counterbalanced by the Quran text “God does not change 
people until they change themselves” (Springer, et al., 2009). This pre-
supposes the belief in free will. Divine predestination and human free 
will are accepted as two components of one truth (Haque and Kamil, 
2012). 
Additional reasons are personal shame, fear of community gossip and 
stigma, increased by the fear that the mental disorder is caused by the af-
fliction of evil spirits or jinn possession (Khaja and Frederick, 2008; Utz, 
2012). 
This is not to deny, however, that mental problems do exist in Muslim 
communities. Common mental health related concerns are anxiety, in-
cluding obsessive-compulsive disorder and posttraumatic stress disor-
der, depression, ADHD and apparent conduct disorders, substance abuse, 
alcoholism, gambling, issues regarding identity, relationships and psy-
chosexual problems, domestic violence, and religious delusional behavior 
(Maynard, 2008). It may be assumed that identity problems arise where 
Muslims live in two cultures: their traditional culture and the Western 
one, and that the identity issue, being a Western notion, seeps into the 
traditional worldview. 
 
Efforts to Accommodate Psychotherapy to Muslim Needs 
Proposals to accommodate psychotherapy to Muslim needs go in various 
directions. First, there is the warning to be very cautious with Western 
therapeutic methods digging into the unconscious, working to achieve 
assertiveness, and aiming at enhanced autonomy and fulfillment of the 
authentic self. Such interventions may cause or reinforce irresolvable 
intra-familial conflicts, and alienate individuals from their support group. 
This unwanted outcome is dependent, of course, on the patient’s level    
of individuation, ego-strength, and family strictness. To prevent this ef-
fect, a more indirect kind of intervention, avoiding interpretations and       
remarkable changes in interpersonal behavior, would be preferable 
(Dwairy, 2006; Springer, et al., 2009). Families should be helped in a  
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holistic manner (Carter and Rashidi, 2004; Khaja and Frederick, 2008; 
Daneshpour, 2012). 
One of the recommended methods is the metaphor therapy. This 
treatment tries to reformulate problems with the help of metaphors, and 
when they are presented by way of a metaphor, this metaphor should be 
leading in finding new perspectives on a problem. These metaphors can 
be imaginative expressions, stories, or significant objects with adhering 
memories relevant to the problem (Dwairy, 2006). Ahammed (2010) 
points to the role of the brain’s right hemisphere in processing meta-
phorical communication. It is relatively rapid and effective because it is 
not discursive but more intuitive. He identifies five functions in the 
change processes encouraged by metaphorical counseling. It builds rela-
tionship, it symbolizes and gives access to emotions, it uncovers and chal-
lenges tacit assumptions, it works with client resistance and it introduces 
new frames of reference. The author advocates the application of meta-
phoric Quran verses in therapy, that highlight the journey, path, light, 
burden or foundation of life. These sentences can be applied in a religious 
sense but often in a more extensive sense, too. For example, the meta-
phor “believers as a structure built on a sound foundation and non-
believers as a structure built on a weak foundation that may crumble to 
pieces” can be quite useful in the context of career or relationship coun-
seling to address clients who do not ground themselves by thorough and 
systematic thinking, planning or self-investment before committing 
themselves to a career or a relationship. 
Another suggested approach is the employment of Islamic cognitions. 
Hamdan (2008) lists a number of them, such as: understanding the tem-
poral reality of this world; focusing on the hereafter; recalling the pur-
pose and effects of distress and afflictions; trusting and relying on God; 
understanding that after hardships there will be ease; focusing on God’s 
blessings; remembering God and reading the Quran; and supplication. 
Carter and Rashidi (2004) recommend focusing on inner tranquility and 
peace, practiced externally by a strict diet, fasting, prayer, and medita-
tion, resulting in the spiritual balance of mind and body. According to 
Khaja and Frederick (2008) key methods of dealing with mental health 
issues for Muslims are remembering God, seeking forgiveness, patience, 
gratitude, and praying, accepting problems as the will of God with a sense 
of surrender. Some appeal to the purification of the soul (Khaja and 
Frederick, 2008; Farid, 1996), others to Sufi mysticism (Hasanah, 2004; 
Dharamsi and Maynard, 2012). 
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The use of spiritual Islamic notions in psychotherapy has been justi-
fied by connecting it with the current therapeutic technique of cognitive 
restructuring, thereby integrating it in the cognitive-behavioral paradigm 
(Hamdan, 2008; Mehraby, 2003; Dharamsi and Maynard, 2012). Others, 
however, limit their use to a strict religious frame of reference. Khaja and 
Frederick (2008) distinguish people with a healthy heart who do not give 
in to temptations, and dedicate life to God; people with a sick heart who 
are focused on materialistic things and will suffer deeply; and people 
with a dead heart who are captivated by lust and desire and worship 
things other than God, being conceited, impulsive, manipulative and 
building on illusions. Hasanah (2004), even more outspokenly concludes 
that man should learn that his success, prosperity, and salvation depend 
on keeping his soul pure, and his failure, decline, and perdition depend 
on soiling his soul by choosing evil. 
 
Possibilities of Generalization 
In order to ascertain whether our findings in the chapters 6 and 7 are 
generalizable to Islamic versions of professional psychotherapy, I make 
the following observations. First, the recommendation when working 
with traditional Muslims not to focus on self-reflection and self-
understanding but on the individual’s functioning within the community 
systems, removes a central part of what current psychotherapy is about. 
It is questionable whether this strategy is applicable in cases more severe 
than psychosocial distress. Maybe, thanks to the collective lifestyle, in-
tense identity crises hardly occur. But, apparently, in the case that more 
serious impairments do occur, professional psychotherapy that is per-
force limited to practical cognitive-behavioral treatment without search-
ing for the dynamics causing the symptoms, seems to be inadequate. This 
may limit the potentials of the therapeutic processing of one’s life course 
considerably. The treatment comes down to a kind of symptom man-
agement, ignoring the deeper backgrounds. We need not have a final 
judgment about the appropriateness of psychodynamic therapy, how-
ever, in order to conclude that the attention to the self that we adopted in 
our outline from the current psychotherapeutic practice, cannot be gen-
eralized to therapy with traditional Muslims. Only in Westernized condi-
tions of Muslim life it may play its role. In that event, the clues given in 
the previous chapter for respecting both the religious background and 
the professional practice of psychotherapy should be observed. 
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Secondly, the plea for metaphoric therapy deserves a similar assess-
ment. It may be appropriate in the lighter cases of psychosocial distress, 
but with more severe anxiety, mood, and personality problems it might 
appear to be inadequate. Methods focusing on discovering the self are 
precluded in traditional collective Muslim communities, and so is the 
generalization of our earlier conclusions. 
A third point of consideration is the application of spiritual techniques 
in psychotherapeutic settings. Here a similar question can be raised as in 
chapter 6 about the distinctions between psychotherapy and pastoral 
care. Isn’t this an unacceptable blending of mental health service and  
religious guidance? As long as the procedure can be justified by linking 
the spiritual matter with cognitive behavioral therapy, the question re-
mains whether it is admissible to subject the ultimate reality of the    
divine, which is the highest purpose of the devout, to the human interest 
of personal well-being. But this question should be answered by imams. 
Finally, in their justifications of avoiding person centered methods 
and employing spiritual techniques, the examined authors usually appeal 
to a psychotherapeutic framework that is characteristically Western and 
modern. Confer the advice by Dwairy (2006) to therapists not to be mis-
led by formal factors such as gender, age, education, religiousness, or 
social role, but to evaluate the level of individuation, ego-strength, and 
strictness of the family, or his observation that revealing unconscious 
drives or feelings may impose unjustified pressures on the family struc-
ture. Springer, et al. (2009) speak unconcernedly of the individual in a 
collectivistic society, and advocate sensitivity to the uniqueness of each 
individual client. Here therapists employ a modern mindset which they 
do not share with their patients. This implies that in the cultural diversity 
of two interlocutors a covert claim of superiority on the side of the thera-
pist imbalances the therapeutic relationship, which is ethically question-
able, the more so as the alleged Western superiority over the Muslim 
world is a hypersensitive issue. 
Our overall conclusion must be that our ratio determination of psy-
chotherapy and Christianity cannot be generalized toward traditional 
Islam because of its reticence to Western influences. It does not meet 
criterion 3 (section 8.1): there should be an inner tension within the re-
ferred worldview between the specific values fostered by holders of     
the worldview, and modern influences of subjectivity. This lack of ten-
sion can be explained by the fact that, generally speaking, compared to 
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Christianity Islam has accommodated itself to a much lesser extent to 
modern Western culture. 
 
 
8.4 East Asian Cultures 
 
East Asian Cultures Viewed Through Western Eyes 
In spite of the numerous subgroups (Tan, 1989), all renditions of East 
Asian cultures identify collectivism as their main characteristic, over 
against the predominant individualism in Western cultures. Associated 
with this collectivist worldview are conformity, group harmony, authori-
tarian structures, sensitivity for what the social situation requires, and 
implicit communication styles, implying that meaning has to be inferred 
more from the context than from the spoken words (e.g., Markus & Kita-
yama, 1991; Triandis, 1996; Leong & Lee, 2006; Zhou, Siu, & Xin, 2009). 
These differences have been vindicated by a comparison of stories sam-
pled from American and Japanese school textbooks, the American text-
books scoring significantly higher on themes like self-direction, hedon-
ism, achievement, and competition, and the Japanese textbooks highlight-
ing typically collectivist values like obedience, self-sacrifice, helpfulness, 
cooperation, sense of belonging, and sharing (Imada, 2012). 
Many authors define the characteristic differences between East Asian 
and American worldviews as a difference in construal of the self. Markus 
and Kitayama (1991) admit that the self is a delicate social category be-
cause it is subject to infinite variation. Still, they employ the concept to 
describe self-awareness in collectivist cultures, defending its use by ap-
pealing to the universal notion that people everywhere understand 
themselves as physically distinct and separable from others, and to    
people’s memories bearing witness to the continuity of their existence. 
Moreover, all people have an awareness of their inner world of dreams, 
feelings and thoughts. This focus on the self-concept is also adopted by 
Triandis (1996), Hall (2003), Leong and Lee (2006), and Hung (2006). 
However, the use of the term self in this cultural context seems to be 
problematic. By way of illustration I refer to Markus and Kitayama’s 
(1991) own account of the meaning of the Japanese word for self – the 
translation is under debate, of course –, jibum. This word refers to     
one’s share of the shared life space. It is not a substance, nor an attribute     
having a constant oneness. Identification with others pre-exists and    
pre-dominates, and so the self is dependent on the kinds of social        
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relationship through which it is created. Because of its dependence on 
social relationships, selfness denotes a fluid concept which changes 
through time and situations. The Japanese’s main concern is about be-
longing, reliance, dependency, empathy, occupying one’s proper place, 
and reciprocity. The authors add that this interdependent view of self 
does not result in a merging of self and other and does not preclude that 
people have a sense of themselves as agents who are the origins of their 
own actions. On the contrary, they are constantly focused on exercising 
control over their inner attributes like desires, personal goals, and pri-
vate emotions. 
The spiritual background of this attitude has been depicted by King 
(1982) in a foreword to Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness. He relates it 
to traditional Japanese Shintoism and Zen Buddhism, which have a mu-
tual affinity. 
 
The Japanese cultural sensibility, to which Shinto ritual gives formal ex-
pression and which is so congruous in spirit to Zen Buddhism, can be char-
acterized by two terms: organic-totalistic, and existential-aesthetic. (p. ix) 
Individual entities, including man, will not be seen as so substantially separ-
able from other entities as in Western thought, but rather as a single flowing 
event in which the interdependent relationships are as real as, or even more 
real than the related entities themselves. (p. xii) 
 
What does this account imply for the sense of self? In our Western 
discourse the self is mainly about individual identity in the dual meaning 
of having a sense of remaining the same human being, distinct from   
others, and being the conscious agent, observing, interpreting, and acting 
from the subjective I-perspective. This dual definition is derived from 
Ricoeur’s (1990/1992) distinction between idem-identity and ipse-  
identity, the latter being an appeal to self-relatedness, that is, the aware-
ness of who I am, of being my-self, or my selfhood. The latter part is   
precisely the lacking element in the definition of the Eastern self-concept 
by Markus and Kitayama, which focuses on the former meaning of self 
and other. 
Another implication involves the mentioned constant focus on exer-
cising control over inner desires, personal goals, and private emotions. 
Does not the description of jibum suggest that inner life is depending on 
social life? If that is the case, then desires, personal goals, and private 
emotions seem not to collide with social requirements but to originate in 
them, so that in general there is no need to exercise permanent control 
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over them. This latter conclusion is in line with another report about the 
Japanese mind, saying that because of social preoccupations the Japanese 
person is less in touch with inner life, and that little value is attributed to 
the individual’s private realm as distinct from the group (Hedstrom, 
1994). Apparently however this does not take away the rise of personal 
desires, goals, and emotions. This results in an instinctive repression of 
personal and private interests in favor of communal and common values. 
However, cultures are in motion. The fact that a Japanese philosopher 
such as Nishitani displayed a remarkable expertness in Western thought 
reveals that community thinking should not be perceived as an absolute 
characteristic of the Far-Eastern mindset. This thinking may be opened 
up toward a more self-oriented mentality. Furthermore, improvement of 
education and living standard, increased availability of luxury goods (cf. 
Wilkinson, 1996), competitive admission to universities, and a tight job 
market, may explain the enormous school performance orientation we 
face in East Asia, a phenomenon that seems to match with an individ-
ualistic mentality rather than a collectivistic one. Even so however, com-
munalism remains the center of gravity. 
 
Asian Americans 
The many East Asians who live in Northern America will have to cope 
with the different worldview of Western culture compared with their 
own traditional one. They experience a clash between their conventional 
collectivistic society and the new individualistic society. On the personal 
level this difference can be characterized as allocentric versus idiocen-
tric, the former including the seeking to belong, and fulfilling societal 
roles and obligations without shaming their in-group, the latter referring 
to the will to self-actualize and be better off than the rest (Hung, 2006). 
These two worldview types and lifestyles both appeal to Asian Ameri-
cans, creating considerable tensions within Asian-American families who 
are themselves quite close. Outside the family-group members have to 
accommodate to the societal rules that focus on maintaining themselves 
there. These rules demand own initiative instead of humble obedience. 
However, such behavior is not appreciated inside the family. This may 
cause generation conflicts, which may be intensified by mixed marriages. 
As a way out of these contradictory values, Asian Americans identify with 
both Eastern and Western cultures simultaneously, and choose one of the 
value systems depending upon the social context in which they are at the 
moment. However, this being in-between the two cultures may elicit 
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behavioral confusion and difficulties of identity formation, not feeling 
like full members in either cultural world (Hung, 2006). 
 
The Need for Psychotherapy 
Does East Asian understanding of life allow room for psychotherapy? 
Formulated more tightly: Can psychotherapy exist without at least some 
orientation on the self? A Japanese psychiatrist reported that most of his 
patients lack any expectation of expressing their personal feelings, or 
exploring specific experiences. Instead they expect some medical pre-
scription (Hedstrom, 1994). And Asian clients in America are reported to 
prefer brief, crisis and solution oriented approaches rather than insight 
and growth focused treatments because they do not like to share per-
sonal feelings and failures, nor admit weakness. Mental illness is viewed 
as shameful (Leong & Lee, 2006). 
There are some examples of indigenous treatments that resemble 
Western psychotherapy practices anyhow. One of which was developed 
by Japanese psychiatrist Shoma Morita (1874-1938). Morita therapy is 
still practiced, though no longer in the original fashion. The therapy was 
designed in the early twentieth century to treat a neurotic syndrome 
characterized by obsessive shyness manifest in the fear of blushing, over-
sensitivity, and feelings of inferiority, symptoms that are typical for a 
collectivistic society that demands great social skills. The first stage in 
traditional Morita therapy, hardly practiced in this intramural form by 
now, involves absolute bed rest with a drastic reduction of external in-
centives, such as being visited, reading, listening to the radio, writing, and 
smoking. The underlying idea is that an attitude of acceptance will break 
the vicious circle of attending to symptoms of increasing sensitivity. In 
the second stage, patients are allowed to do light work, which after the 
period of forced idleness is generally welcomed with enthusiasm. By this 
change, attention is directed away from obstructive feelings toward the 
simple task. This redirection of awareness is a basic strategy. From this 
stage onward weekly lectures emphasize the useful character of work for 
being freed from preoccupation with the own social skills. The third 
stage involves heavier work together with others, and is usually wel-
comed as a relief from isolation. The final stage prepares for a return to 
everyday life, teaching the patient to accept his or her own possibilities 
and limitations, direct his/her attention outward, and neglect any recur-
ring symptoms (Hedstrom, 1994; cf. Shinfuku & Kitanishi, 2010). 
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It is interesting to note two characteristics of this therapy. First,     
people that need treatment have gone astray by having developed a self-
oriented attitude that problematizes their own contributions to social 
life. This over-anxiety about the own performance is a well-known trou-
ble in Western society, too, but in the Eastern context it seems to relate to 
the isolating effect of the internal focus as such, while in the Western 
context – except for extreme self-consciousness – an internal focus on 
our individual existence is the norm. At least, the rationale of the treat-
ment seems to explain the problem in terms of internal focus, which is 
the second particular to note. All treatment efforts are focused on accept-
ing, neglecting and forgetting inner feelings, and concentrating on the 
outer reality. From a Western perspective one would ask whether this 
does not generate the risk of repressing uneasy feelings to the detriment 
of one’s inner peace and social functioning, but that appears to be a typi-
cal Western reaction presupposing a totally different idea of proper men-
tal functioning. These opposing approaches give occasion to doubts 
about the applicability of our model of human functioning to people with 
a strong collectivistic worldview. Here again, criterion 3 from section 8.1 
is at stake, concerning modern influence of subjectivity. Our next sub-
section is dedicated to the conditions under which the format might be 
applicable in some sense. 
 
Possibilities of Generalization 
The previous sub-section might have made clear that the application of 
current Western professional psychotherapy seems inappropriate in the 
social context of the overarching East Asian worldview. In the mixed 
context of Asian Americans, however, there may be some meaningful 
possibilities of practicing it, especially if it is joined with our design of 
connecting psychology with anthropology as its ontological presupposi-
tion. This design both endorses and complements the subject-focused 
approach of Western practice. Besides (1) respecting the current thera-
peutic practice, the other conditions for generalizing also seem to be met 
in the Asian-American context. These are about (2) tension between the 
Eastern worldview and professional Western therapy, and (3) a tension 
within the worldview of Asian Americans because of the Eastern roots 
transplanted in Western soil.  Conformity with the criteria favors the 
prospect of a possible transformation of the tension into a fertile polarity 
by connecting the individualizing Western approach with a collectivizing 
Eastern approach. This latter possibility should still be demonstrated. 
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Hung (2006) seems to point in the right direction. After having de-
picted the different society values of East Asian and American cultures, 
he advocates the concept of differentiated oneness as the corner stone of a 
possible theory for counseling Asian Americans, describing the ideal bal-
ance between connectedness and separateness of all family members. He 
derives the concept from couples therapy, and applies it more broadly to 
family relationships. Differentiated oneness refers to the situation in 
which several distinct individuals come together to form a common iden-
tity (us) without losing their individual identity (me and you). Hung rec-
ognizes that this concept depends on Western notions like individuation, 
differentiation, and boundaries. But if cultural peculiarities are under-
stood, respected and addressed, in a mixed cultural situation it might be 
helpful because it also appeals to the Eastern notion of oneness and con-
nection. For Hung, differentiated oneness derives its normativity from 
biblical values, but apart from that, the combination of individuality and 
communality might recommend this approach for people living between 
two cultures, respectively characterized by individuality and communal-
ity. 
This plea for the pursuit of differentiated oneness is pretty consistent 
with our matrix of self-orientation and the basic human condition. Of the 
three conditions of otherness, nearness, and temporality, particularly the 
first two are relevant in this context. As far as otherness is concerned, the 
concept of differentiated oneness combines the three existential themes 
of individuality, autonomy, and relationality-in-respect, while regarding 
nearness it confirms the existential theme of community participation 
(see section 7.3). 
If the approach proposed by Hung (2006) is appropriate, we may con-
clude that our theoretical outline of human functioning can properly be 
generalized to cultural situations in which Eastern and Western values 
collide, and Asian people have to find their way in a Western society. 
When the model is used in therapeutics, it will depend on each specific 
situation where the emphases should be placed. 
 
 
8.5  African Cultures 
 
The African Mind 
In an attempt to portray the African mind we should realize that African 
view of life is diverse, and almost no longer exists in pure culture. In the 
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process of the colonization of the African continent, and even more thor-
oughly after the transfer of many to America as merchandise in the slave 
trade, Africans have experienced Western culture and have been affected 
by it (Njenga, Nguithi, & Gatere, 2010). Moreover, within societies differ-
ent Africans perform a different level of cultural adaptation (Van Dyk & 
Nefale, 2005). Still, there are enough characteristic traits that help to 
distinguish a separate African view and style of life. Several particulars 
can be discerned. 
The first attribute of African culture is communalism or community 
orientation, characterized by dependence on other people, group pres-
sure, the valuing of co-operation, the awareness of duties toward the 
community, the appreciation of values like friendliness, helpfulness, hos-
pitality, solidarity, patience, compassion, and respect, and the influence 
of the strong extended black family (Jones, 1985; Van Dyk & Nefale, 
2005; Hanks, 2008). This interdependence and collective perception of 
life is reflected by the fundamental value of Ubuntu, a term from one of 
the South-African languages for personhood or humanness, expressing 
the experience of human existence as part of a larger whole. Desmond 
Tutu (2005) appealed to Ubuntu as the essence of being human, speaking 
of the fact that “my humanity is caught up and is inextricably bound up in 
yours” (cited by Hanks, 2008). 
Although the community is primary, and the individual secondary, 
this does not imply that individuality is negated or diminished (Hanks, 
2008). Various particulars point to an awareness of individuality. First, 
there is a well-known saying in the Zulu and Northern-Sotho languages 
that goes: “I am because we are” (Van Dyk & Nefale, 2005). This attests to 
a strong emphasis on kinship, but at the same time reveals a sense of 
individual consciousness, stronger than in the testimonies about the East 
Asian (particularly Japanese) sense of life. There are some more indica-
tions that point to a relative space for individuality. It is the concept of 
Ubuntu itself that notwithstanding its community orientation is about the 
way the person relates to the larger whole. Another hint is the expressive 
nature of many Africans who are adept at using affect toward others 
(Jones, 1985).2 
 
2
  From a personal observation I conclude that exception should be made for tradi-
tional African women who behave in a very submissive and reserved way when 
their husbands receive guests. 
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A next property of the African understanding of reality is the im-
portance of God (gods), ancestors, and other spirits. As a matter of fact, 
the community that the African sees him or herself as part of is not re-
stricted to the people living today but is extended to the deceased and 
the not yet born. Reverence toward God (or the gods) and the ancestors, 
who are viewed as living spirits, is expressed by the scrupulous ob-
servance of ritual, such as sacrifices. Gods, ancestors, and other spirits 
can be pleased or displeased. They may react correspondingly. In African 
society there is hardly any room for the notion of chance. Everything 
particular that happens is related to God (gods) or (ancestral) spirits who 
arranged the event, be it something positive or negative. The occurrence 
of something negative points to an imbalance in the relationship with 
God, one of the gods, or one or more spirits. This imbalance should be 
repaired by some appeasing ritual recompense, following the instruc-
tions of a traditional practitioner (Eagle, 2005; Van Dyk & Nefale, 2005; 
Njenga, Nguithi, & Gatere, 2010). 
The belief in the regulative influence of invisible powers culminates in 
a superstitious posture toward the efficacy of curses and witchcraft. Be-
sides the displeasure of the ancestors, a curse or bewitchment may be 
supposed to be the cause of harm and misfortune. The bewitched is con-
sidered to be under the influence of some malevolent force, inflicted by 
an ill-wisher, and motivated by jealousy, envy, rivalry, or revenge (Eagle, 
2005). Conversely, someone can be suspected and even accused of being 
a witch causing evil to others, and consequently be killed. Because people 
are quite vulnerable to curses, bewitchment, and accusations to be the 
evil genius, there is much anxiety in this respect, and for that reason tra-
ditional sorcerers are powerful figures in African society. 
 
The Occurrence of Psychotherapy 
As many Africans incorporate both traditional African and Western be-
liefs and values, though in various ratios, they may consult both tradi-
tional healers and modern therapists. In a number of cases an apparently 
sensible psychotherapeutic approach is frustrated by the preference for 
traditional practices. Eagle (2005) reports about the father of a sexually 
abused child who interpreted her behavior as bewitchment directed at 
himself and his family. Consequently, he withdrew her from play therapy, 
although this was against the advice of the professionals and the wish of 
his wife, the mother of the child. He preferred to consult a traditional 
healer in order to fight the bewitchment. This example may be multiplied 
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by many. In other cases, combinations of traditional and professional 
care are tried. 
Pleas are made in favor of a kind of integrated therapy that combines 
the individual focus of Western psychotherapy and the communalist ex-
perience of African culture, employing the African concept of Ubuntu. Van 
Dyk and Nefale (2005) consciously locate this application of Ubuntu in 
the context of the encounter of two cultures, by which African people 
may be confused, and to which they may respond by splitting their lives 
into two realms. The significance of Ubuntu is viewed as multiple. First,   
it teaches respect for human dignity in the context of interdependence. 
So, it may be able to do justice to both individuality and collectivity. In 
the attention paid to individuality, it looks after intrapsychic tensions, 
conflicts, and frustration as important barriers for attaining the state of 
Ubuntu. In the attention paid to collectivity, it includes reverence to God 
as the creator of all life, and the ancestors. On the other hand, there are 
therapeutic techniques that cohere with or can be derived from Ubuntu, 
such as story-telling, burning platform, and dancing, intended to stimu-
late the process of empowering the client’s ego functioning. Unsur-
prisingly, Ubuntu favors the systemic way of conducting psychotherapy, 
preferring the whole family to participate in the sessions. 
Hanks (2008) promotes Ubuntu as a new principle of psychotherapy 
in a more general way. She speaks of a new humanistic psychological 
paradigm for psychotherapy that avoids the isolation of individuals and 
integrates them into the larger circles of communities and society to 
which they belong. Ubuntu, in her view, contributes to the basic commit-
ment of humanistic psychology, namely, to the self-in-relation to others. 
This last contention may be too much of an annexation of the African 
concept, however. At the same time, the concept of the self in relation 
may be a good entrance to a balanced approach in the African context in 
particular, and in the therapeutic context in general. 
 
Possibilities of Generalization 
For the sake of convenience, I resume the preconditions that apply to the 
possibility of generalizing our model of human functioning. The basic 
principles of professional psychotherapy should be respected (1); a ten-
sion should occur between the traditional worldview of the category of 
people that is the envisaged object of generalization on the one hand, and 
the modern worldview underlying professional therapy on the other (2); 
this tension should be reflected in the internal influences of modern  
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individualizing values on traditional values within the respective cat-
egory of recipients (3). If these preconditions are met, the tensions have 
the potential of being transformed into a meaningful polarity by connect-
ing the self-related abilities of modernity with the values fostered by 
African communities (4). 
These preconditions certainly apply to the situation of Africans and 
African cultures. We have seen that there have already been attempts to 
integrate Western psychotherapy with traditional African values from 
the perception that there is a tension between the collectivistic lifestyle 
of traditional Africans and the individualistic approach of Western think-
ing and therapeutic care. Moreover, the tension is in the Africans them-
selves, because they are being influenced by both their traditional culture 
and the Western culture. A way of transforming the tension into a fertile 
polarity has been designated in the African value of Ubuntu. This creates 
a positive perspective on the feasibility of a therapeutic approach that 
unites the subjective and the communal aspects of life. 
Two issues still require our attention. First, especially Van Dyk and 
Nefale (2005) have argued for an integrated approach of psychotherapy 
in the context of people that are influenced by two different cultural in-
puts. However, they did not develop a basic anthropological pattern that 
could account for both of the cultural approaches, however different they 
are. Without such a fundamental pattern the combination of the two con-
cepts retains an ad hoc character and is more eclectic than systematic. 
The second issue is the grim reality of the often occurring suspicion of 
witchcraft, which makes the argument advanced by Hanks (2008) sound 
somewhat romantic. We should dwell on both issues for a while. 
Our psychological sketch of human functioning seems to provide an 
appropriate structure for the integration of individualized human exist-
ence and the community oriented Ubuntu philosophy of life. It unites        
a self-oriented life experience with the awareness of being related to    
the world outside, including fellow humans and the divine realm, and 
participating in social life with one’s own purpose. This relatedness and 
participation express our embedding in a larger reality that both founds         
and transcends our existence. There is both self-actualizing and self-
transcending not as separate activities but in close mutuality. However, 
the self-actualizing tendency presupposes a measure of autonomy with 
respect to the world outside. Can this autonomy as the inner power to 
make and perform one’s own decisions be integrated in the Ubuntu life-
style? It can, provided first that the degree of individualization is high 
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enough to allow for its active presence. In that case, one joins the com-
munity up to the level one prefers by way of an autonomous decision. But 
there is second reservation to be made. 
Magical thinking may act as a great disturber of a balanced and peace-
ful individual–communal equilibrium in personal and social life. The an-
cestors are not the real problem because they are supposed to act in a 
reasonable way; if they are angry with living descendants, they are 
deemed to be so for good reason, and the balance can be restored by 
bringing a sacrifice. Ancestors are incorporated in the Ubuntu-commu-
nity, and in our outline they belong to the community we participate in; 
moreover, in the network of self-functioning in the three anthropological 
conditions, self-transcending relationships can be established. Here the 
cooperation with a traditional healer is customary. The real problem, 
however, is the evil powers of witchcraft and resentful curses employed 
by malevolent living people. They are harmful for both Ubuntu and inte-
grated psychotherapy. In such cases the generalization of our psycho-
logical format and its application to psychotherapy is limited by the   
extent to which magical thinking is in force and victims are not prepared 
to challenge the magical realm. 
The conclusion must be that generalization of our outline of human 
functioning to the African worldview is very well possible, up to the bor-
derlands of magical thinking. 
 
 
8.6 Transpersonal Psychology 
 
Comparative Introduction 
Compared with the examples elaborated in the former sections, transper-
sonal psychology shows some dissimilarities. First, the particulars we 
need to examine are characteristic for the therapists rather than the pa-
tients. Therapists practicing transpersonal psychology have adopted a 
worldview that is not satisfied with an individualized, detached, rational 
approach of reality but is meant to transcend this Western perspective. 
This is why we do not find a clash between a Western, modernist mindset 
and a pre-modern collectivistic lifestyle, as in ultra-orthodox Judaism, 
traditional Islam, and other non-Western cultures. Rather, we find so-
phisticated systems of dealing with a multilayered reality. 
However, there is also a remarkable similarity between Christianity 
and other traditional worldviews on the one hand, and transpersonal 
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worldview on the other. The transpersonal approach just like the other 
worldviews problematizes an absolute focus on the individual. 
Differences and similarity between Christianity and the transpersonal 
view make the question whether our design of proper human functioning 
can be generalized to transpersonal psychology all the more interesting. 
Therefore, the main reason why I pay attention to this line of thought is 
to test the applicability of our diagram in contexts other than those we 
examined up to now. A secondary reason for our interest in transper-
sonal psychology is the relative popularity of transpersonal approaches 
in the Western world. 
 
Overview 
Transpersonal psychology has been traced back to the observation by 
humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow (1970, 1976) and others, to 
the effect that people from whatever cultures or belief-systems may in 
particular circumstances be overwhelmed by peak experiences, which he 
defined as mystical encounters that are accompanied by feelings of awe, 
bliss, and ecstasy. However universal these experiences are, they are 
understood within the framework of people’s own cultural or religious 
system. Maslow tried to get rid of the religious connotations attached to 
them, and to present them as the ultimate stage of human emotional de-
velopment. In this perspective, transpersonal psychology can be viewed 
as an offshoot from humanistic psychology. Furthermore, as mentioned 
below, psychiatrist Carl Jung contributed to the theory with his ideas 
about the collective unconscious based on a supra-personal (or transper-
sonal) level of experience. 
Accordingly, advocates of this kind of psychology establish a link   
with what they call “perennial philosophy” as a term for the mystical 
wisdom that is stored in all great world religions, including Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism. Characteristic of transper-
sonal psychologists is not that they propose an alternative to the existing 
psychological theories but that they add something to them. Beyond the 
pre-personal and personal levels of experience that are addressed by the 
current psychologies, there is a transpersonal level of experience or con-
sciousness, which is the spiritual one. The introduction by Vaughan, Wit-
tine, and Walsch (1996) will help us to understand some characteristic 
features assigned to this transpersonal, spiritual level of consciousness. 
Vaughan et al. describe the transpersonal identity by distinguishing it 
from the pre-personal and personal stages of identity development. The 
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pre-personal (or, pre-egoic, pre-rational) stage starts in the womb and 
lasts until the first three years of the sibling’s life. It is the symbiotic state 
of being, initially fully dominated by the fusion with the mother, and mo-
tivated by survival, safety, attachment, and exploratory needs. The pre-
vailing cognitive mode belonging to this stage is magical thinking and 
fantasy. From the fourth year of age onward the personal identity is 
shaped on the basis of the patterns of interaction with the primary care-
givers, resulting in self-image, object representations, memories, beliefs, 
meanings, and affects with which we identify ourselves. These are the 
unconscious organizing principles by which we construct our world and 
our functioning in that world. Transpersonal psychotherapy like many 
other Western methods of psychotherapy views as its primary task to 
promote a stable, cohesive personal identity, that is, an authentic, auton-
omous, self-actualizing self. The authors refer to existential psychiatrist 
Irvin Yalom (1980) to state that a human being is an embodied, finite 
person, free to make choices and take action, and separate from, yet re-
lated to, others. Just like other therapists, transpersonal therapists too 
address issues like aging, the reality of death, existential versus neurotic 
anxiety and guilt feelings, responsibility, and the relationship of oneself 
as an individual to others and the collective. All these experiences and 
interpretations take place on the level of personal identity. 
On the transpersonal level, however, the personal limitations are 
transcended. In order to experience self-transcendence, persons first 
begin to realize that their personal selves feel incomplete, and then get 
the intuition that a deeper, transpersonal level of interconnected identity 
exists. Several stages of transpersonal awareness have been identified, 
two of which Vaughan et al. focus on, namely, the subtle realm and the 
causal realm. In the subtle realm the person is no longer exclusively iden-
tified with the individual personality, but comes to share in the light and 
power of a universal Self as a kind of cosmic totality and collectivity in 
which all people consciously or unconsciously participate. Here the    
authors resort to the Platonic ideas, the Jungian archetypal images, subtle 
sounds and illuminations, transcendental insights, and the awareness of 
having spiritual qualities like love, compassion, wisdom and strength. 
Next, the causal realm is supposed to be the transcendental ground of all 
other structures of personality, and is identified with Atman, Tao,       
Buddha-mind, and the mystical marriage with the Beloved, the absolute 
ground of being. Apparently, causality is not taken here in a mechanical 
sense but organically. The unification or merger is
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profound level of transpersonal identity, or Self, as one pure continuing 
presence, boundless and unconditioned by mental constructs, over-
flowing with love. The expanding inner awareness of this transcendent 
identity of the universe brings about freedom and healing, for example 
from addictions (Grof, 1994), and thus fosters functioning on the per-
sonal level. 
 
Internal Debate 
Proponents of transpersonal psychology have debated about the rela-
tionship between the pre-personal and the transpersonal position of 
human consciousness (cf. Daniels, 2004). Ken Wilber (1993) introduced 
the alleged “pre/trans fallacy” that is assumed to mistake the transper-
sonal awareness for a regression into the pre-personal state of being 
fused with the mother and the further environment. Apparently, by iden-
tifying this presentation as a fallacy, Wilber intends to protect his 
transpersonal extrapolations from psychoanalytic criticism. Others, how-
ever, have advocated the connection between a pre-personal and trans-
personal state, in line with Jung’s assumption of the archetypes as the 
content of our collective unconsciousness that can and should be expli-
cated and experienced consciously. 
There is some relevance in this debate for the question of whether our 
design can be generalized by applying it to transpersonal psychology. For 
if the trans-personal position is appreciated as a further maturing of per-
sonality from the pre-personal stage along the personal stage, the per-
sonal stage with its typically Western subject-centered rational stance 
can be imagined to be appreciated more positively than if the transper-
sonal position is viewed as a return to the ideal original pre-personal 
situation. In the latter case, the personal stage is easily interpreted as an 
obstacle for the ideal mystical union with the source or ground of reality 
to which the pre-personal stage already belongs. In this sense, Washburn 
(1995) and Steve Taylor (2009) view the egoic or personal stage, apart 
from its many benefits for organizing our lives, as a phase characterized 
both by repression of, and separation and alienation from the mystical 
spiritual roots. This moderately critical position toward the autonomous 
self or ego is comparable to the critical stance adopted by orthodox 
Christians toward a modernist, one-sided focus on subjective experience. 
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The Possibility of Generalization 
Exploring the possibility of generalizing our sketch of psychological ex-
perience that accounts for spiritual and/or cultural worldviews, we first 
ask whether transpersonal psychology meets the conditional criteria, 
which are, the endorsement of current professional practice (1), a ten-
sion between the concerning worldview and professional therapy (2), 
linked with a tension within the worldview at stake between its own 
characteristic values and influences of modernity (3). It appears to be 
evident that transpersonal psychology and psychotherapy fully respect 
current professional practice, so that the first criterion is met. As to the 
tensions mentioned in the second and third criteria, these can be said to 
exist to a certain extent, indeed. We have identified a critical approach in 
which the personal, egoic, or rational level is but transitional, or even       
a hindrance on the way to the transpersonal stage. The individual, self-
oriented, socially skilled subject is no longer the ideal of human exist-
ence, as it is in mainstream psychotherapy. On the other hand, these  
tensions have already been transformed into a tolerable polarity. The 
subject, which in transpersonal psychology is fully respected, and fully 
addressed on the personal level, is bounded by pre-personal and trans-
personal realities, and therapy is focused on gaining awareness of these 
boundaries.  
What does this mean for the pursued generalization of our model? In 
our fourth observation the possibility of generalization is bound to a 
transformation in which the different views are reconciled in a polarity of 
subjectivity and communality. The transpersonal approach, however, has 
solved its tension in its own way, and its solution comes down to a polar-
ity not of subjectivity and communality, but of subjective versus trans-
personal existence. Not the inclusion in all kinds of groups but the    
merging with the universe is viewed as the mitigating counterpart of 
individualism. Still, although the focus is on the connection of subjectivity 
with universality instead of communality, transpersonal psychology 
seems to fit in our model. The reason is that eternity awareness offers 
room for the transpersonal experience. However, there is a fly in the 
ointment. 
We face a problem of consistency, when we compare the concepts of 
the personal and transpersonal stage. The personal state concerns pro-
cesses like separation and constituting an identity, and existential themes 
like individuality, rationality, subjective focus, self-sufficiency, autonomy, 
and sociability. The transpersonal, on the other hand, is about losing 
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one’s particularity, being absorbed in an all-inclusive totality, letting go 
personal rational judgment, being dominated by sensitivity such as sensi-
tive insight, and so on. The problem is not their mutual diversity. Obvi-
ously, if there is a change from personal to transpersonal, characteristics 
alter as well, as with the development from pre-personal to personal. 
However, the real problem is that in transpersonal psychology the per-
sonal and the transpersonal exist simultaneously. They are not different 
stages in the strict sense but different states, two states of consciousness 
between which the trained practitioner can switch. Moreover, in the 
Vaughan, Wittine, and Walsch (1996) rendering, these states are not only 
states of consciousness but also states of real existence (“the absolute 
ground of being”), and distinct identities. However, this implies that in 
the transpersonal state someone loses his or her personal characteristics, 
even not being a he or she anymore. What does this mean for the person 
in question? Who is the one who is seized by another state of conscious-
ness? Is the human being in the personal state identical with the out-
wardly same human being in the transpersonal state? If so, which are the 
identical characteristics? But if not, what does remain intact of someone’s 
personal identity in the transpersonal state? Or is the focal point despite 
everything still the person, in other words, is the personal level of our 
existence the proper basis of our experience? But then the transpersonal 
state is only some temporary awareness that may contribute to our well-
being, but will hardly help us to answer the question of who we really 
are. In that case, transpersonal consciousness does not set a standard for 
our self-understanding. 
Against this critical analysis cannot be objected that it is a typically ra-
tional, discursive, Western approach that gets stuck in the personal stage 
of consciousness, and ignores the transpersonal context in which we 
should leave this kind of reasoning behind. For obviously, transpersonal 
psychology offers an account of its understanding of human experience 
on the personal, rational level. In this account the personal level is not 
relativized as a provisional, transitory stage, but respected and taken 
seriously as valid in its own realm. So, the rules of logic like consistency 
and unambiguity do apply in this context, also when we discuss the 
trans-logical realm. 
This review leads us to notice a dissimilarity between our newly de-
veloped psychological scheme and the transpersonal design. In our 
scheme the specific identity of the self is retained in all three modes of 
functioning: self-acceptance, self-actualization, and self-transcendence. In 
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transpersonal psychology, however, self-transcendence means that the 
personal self is entirely and ontologically lost in universal reality. This 
brings us to the conclusion that our model cannot be fully generalized to 
transpersonal psychology. The reason why is not some limitation of the 
proposed model, however, but a felt inconsistency in transpersonal theo-
rizing. 
We might wonder whether this conclusion precludes the incorpora-
tion of Eastern oriented thinking in Western oriented therapeutic treat-
ment, as envisaged in Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy and by the 
use of Zen principles in Dialectical Behavior Therapy. The critical point 
will be whether these Eastern approaches are used only as techniques for 
relaxation or emotion regulation. If so, the verdict of the previous para-
graph does not apply. But if these approaches are meant to go beyond 
that, to address a worldview and lifestyle aiming at merging in the uni-
verse, the verdict stands (cf. Harrington & Pickles, 2009; Baer & Sauer, 
2009). 
 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
Our exploration of orthodox Judaism, traditional Islam, East Asian and 
African cultures, and transpersonal psychology yielded real opportun-
ities for generalizing our outline of human functioning. This outline is 
characterized by orientation on the self, the self’s connection with the 
basic anthropological conditions of otherness, nearness, and temporality. 
However, there are some restraints to these opportunities for generaliz-
ing the scheme. The main prerequisite for it is a considerable degree of 
modernity, reflected in an awareness of individuality, or a focus on sub-
jective experience and decision-making. Here, ultra-orthodox Judaism, 
traditional Islam, traditional East Asian or African cultures in pure form 
drop out, because in these appearances the collectivist character of so-
cieties is so strong, that a self-oriented lifestyle is almost ruled out. Only 
when fixed traditional relations are put under pressure by individualiz-
ing tendencies because of the influence of Western culture, the proposed 
model can be of service to keep both forces in balance, fostering indi-
viduality without isolation, and communalism without loss of the self, 
and opposing the false solution of a split personality. 
Besides this major restraint, we still found some other impediments 
for applying our scheme, such as the self-losing experience of being       
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absorbed in total and ultimate reality that is pursued by transpersonal 
psychotherapy. Here the self is dissolved in a state of transcendent 
awareness, and ceases to be myself, which runs counter to the self-
oriented character of the outline in question. A final obstacle for it is the 
magical thinking we found in African worldviews, which frustrates the 
development of reliable relationships. 
In this process of exploring the applicability of our matrix to other 
than secular and Christian worldviews, we faced the worldview specific 
elements implied by the matrix itself. It rejects a presupposed or envis-
aged dissolution of identity in the collectivity or in transcendent experi-
ences, respectively, and it refuses magical thinking. 
If we attempt to apply our format of psychological functioning within 
the boundaries that have been delineated above, a copy of the figure rep-
resenting it may give us a hold. For that reason it is printed again. Let us 
run along the matrix from the first column downward and so on, apply-
ing the quadrants to the various cultural contexts we reviewed. By doing 
so, we list the generalizations of our schematic overview to cultural and 
religious contexts beyond the secular and Western Christian contexts 
that were dealt with in chapter 7. 
 
Psychology:     Self-acceptance        Self-actualization            Self-transcendence  
Anthropology: 
Otherness            individuality               autonomy              relationality in respect 
 
Nearness         participation          purposiveness                  dedication 
 
Temporality      sense of finitude      perceived opportunity    eternity awareness 
 
Figure 1 Integration of Psychology and Anthropology  
 
Self-acceptance is a topical issue in cases where people are confused 
about their roles and goals in life as a result of living in different cultures 
with opposing cultural values, to wit, a communalistic and an individual-
istic setting. The awareness of the own individuality is of importance for 
the sake of the ability to maintain oneself in the individualistic society of 
which one is a part. On the other hand, participation or belonging is a 
value that does justice to the communalist side of existence, as counter-
part of the more individualist side of it. In communalist societies       
death and the fear of death do not seem to be a hot item, because the             
308 WORLDVIEW AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
absorption in the community precludes a feeling of being thrown back 
upon oneself in the awareness of transience, and, therefore, makes all 
kinds of defenses unnecessary. Instead, one is fully incorporated in the 
lasting community. 
Self-actualization is a topic as well. Coming from a communalist soci-
ety, one has to learn to appropriate one’s own autonomy, the courage to 
have and express one’s own opinions, and to make and carry out one’s 
own decisions. If all important decisions are no longer made by the 
community or its hierarchical figures, the individual has to develop his or 
her own purposes within the boundaries of the own possibilities that are 
communally determined by the social units one participates in, and the 
circumstances that arise. In a Western society it is also important to de-
velop a perception of time duration in order to spend time well. This has 
to do with competition and achievement, which are characteristic for an 
individualistic mentality. 
Furthermore, self-transcendence proves its relevance. In an individ- 
ualistic society, the We is no longer an extended I, or, better, the I is no 
longer a derivative of the We. All the others in the same community are 
more sharply distinguished as Not-I, not more of the same but really dif-
ferent. One has to transcend the boundaries of the self in order to get into 
contact with the other. Still, the community to which one belongs retains 
its special significance. There is still a sense of belonging and an un-
disputed loyalty to the traditional community. This mentality colors the 
character of self-actualization. In one’s autonomous and purposeful 
choices, one pursues to foster and serve the own community. The rela-
tional orientation is given by the communal preconditions, on the one 
hand, and decided by autonomous considerations, on the other. These 
decisions may be inspired by the values the community upholds. Individ-
ualization implies that these values are no longer a matter of course, but 
have to be adopted and appropriated as an answer to their attractive 
force. Finally, eternity awareness is experienced in the sensitivity for 
ultimate realities that transcend the issues of the day. These may be 
communal convictions of afterlife, or secular experiences of the power of 
art, nature, or universal ethical themes such as justice and humanity. 
This modest overview may demonstrate the relevance of the outline 
of psycho-logical functioning especially for people who simultaneously 
participate in two cultures, a communalistic and an individualistic one. A 
great deal of its relevance can be illustrated by the importance of identity 
formation for all participant of two diverse cultures, who are prone to 
 CHAPTER 8. GENERALIZING THE RESULTS 309 
 
behavioral confusion (section 8.4) and ego-splitting (section 8.5). In the 
format, identity can be viewed as composed of individuality, autonomy, 
respectful relatedness, belonging, purposiveness, and mortality (living in 
that specific period of time), herewith uniting the three self-dimensions 
self-acceptance, self-actualization, and self-transcendence, with the 
threefold basic human condition. 
In the previous chapter, a new perspective on the interaction of sub-
jectivity and communality was developed as a recommendable focus in 
professional therapy, leading to a matrix that integrates self-functions 
with basic anthropological conditions. This matrix has been expanded to 
the adoption of Christian values in a therapeutic setting. The explorations 
in the present chapter demonstrate that this perspective can be general-
ized toward other areas of comparable tensions between traditional and 
modern worldviews. This means that the fourth hypothesis has at least 
partially been confirmed. 
  
Chapter 9 
Tryout 
Application to the Initial Cases 
9.1 Fit, Goal, and Method 
 
Fit 
In this chapter we return to the three cases that were presented in the 
first chapter to highlight the importance of worldviews or presupposed 
values in the psychotherapeutic process, both on the side of the therapist 
and the patient or client. The present chapter intends to apply our model 
of psychological functioning to these cases in order to find some clues for 
appropriate counseling and care. These cases should meet the criteria 
that are required for the applicability of the diagrammatic overview. The 
criteria are listed again (cf. section 8.1). The professional therapeutic 
practice should be respected (1). A kind of tension occurs between the 
standard direction into which secular therapy points, that of personal 
autonomy and self-confident decisions, on the one hand, and the value 
system of the patient on the other, prompted by a group to which he or 
she belongs (2). This tension is reflected explicitly or implicitly in a ten-
sion within the patient between an inner urge for freedom and the opera-
tion of the group norm (3). If these criteria are met, we can see whether 
in the therapeutic process the tensions can be transformed into a fertile 
polarity by which the client or patient is helped to find his or her way by 
neither ignoring the urge for autonomous freedom nor violating the 
community rules by overcompensating resistance. 
 
Goal and Method 
As the adage has it, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Testing the 
fruitfulness of our model comes down to examining the viability of the 
envisaged transformation in practical situations. We start by making 
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different kinds of diagnoses. These are a classificatory diagnosis, apply-
ing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, 
2013); then two explanatory diagnoses, using cognitive behavioral and 
psychodynamic understandings respectively, followed by another ex-
planatory diagnosis, integrating the latter two in the schema theory. All 
of them employ the current diagnostic methodology of professional psy-
chotherapy. By employing them, I intend to show unambiguous respect 
for professional psychotherapy. Finally, I add an explanatory diagnosis 
that uses the newly developed model of the integration of psychology 
and anthropology. By this procedure, I try to show that my newly pro-
posed explanatory diagnosis is compatible with the established methods,  
and able to indicate additional ways for integrating worldviews in treat-
ment. Therefore, the final step is to propose supplementary perspectives 
for therapeutic interventions, by connecting psychological functioning 
with basic anthropological conditions, and including explicit references 
to the patient’s worldview. 
 
 
9.2 Case 1  
 
Case Description 
Sarah, a 30-year-old member of a Christian Reformed Church in Canada, 
feels that she has come to a turning point in her life. She has had a higher 
education and has a rather well-paid job in the administration of a trade 
company in the town where her mother lives. She is the only child of a 
couple that received her late in their marriage. After the death of her 
father she feels responsible for her mother who has always been infirm 
and who has recently been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. At the 
same time rural life does not satisfy her. She longs for a new start in the 
city where she can seek a satisfying job and meet other people of her own 
age. If she intends to move, the time is now. On the other hand, she gets 
depressed, anxious, and feels guilty with the thought of leaving her 
mother alone. Mother is increasingly dependent on her. After months of 
sleeping poorly and absenteeism from her workplace her practitioner 
refers her to a psychotherapist. It seems appropriate to see strengthen-
ing of her sense of autonomy as one of the major treatment goals. But 
how should we value the psychological autonomy when it is compared 
with the moral appeal for family solidarity that an adult daughter should 
feel toward her mother? To make the situation even tenser, members in 
the congregation continue to praise her for fulfilling this duty. 
312 WORLDVIEW AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
Classificatory Diagnosis 
Sarah’s symptoms seem to point to a major depressive disorder, single 
episode, specified: with anxious distress. The number of symptoms and 
the intensity of functioning impairment point to a moderate severity, for 
the number of symptoms exceeds the required five with only one, but on 
the other hand her occupational functioning is quite hampered. She suf-
fers from a depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indi-
cated by her own report (number 1 in the symptoms list); markedly di-
minished pleasure in almost all activities most of the day (number 2); 
insomnia nearly every day (number 4), loss of energy nearly every day 
(number 6); feelings of excessive guilt nearly every day (number 7); di-
minished ability to concentrate and indecisiveness (number 8). The 
symptoms do not meet the criteria for a mixed episode, they cause signif-
icant distress and impairment in professional functioning, they cannot be 
attributed to the physiological effects of a substance or another medical 
condition, and there has never been a manic or a hypomanic episode. 
DSM criteria for a moderately severe depressive disorder are met, code 
296.22 in DSM-5 (2013). 
One further specification is in place, that is, with respect to anxious 
distress. The anxiety she has does not meet the criteria for any anxiety 
disorder but is apparently part of the depressive disorder. Anxious dis-
tress is defined as the presence of at least two of five symptoms during 
the majority of days of a major depressive episode. In Sarah’s case the 
following symptoms apply: feeling tense, feeling restless, and difficultly 
concentrating because of worry. Her condition corresponds with a mild 
(two symptoms) or moderate (three symptoms) level of anxious distress. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: A Cognitive Behavioral Approach 
The cognitive behavioral interpretation of Sarah’s symptoms assumes 
that her feelings are determined by automatic thoughts. One of her au-
tomatic thoughts is: I must be ready to help and please my mother. An-
other thought that spontaneously arises and that she cannot get rid of is: 
“I must gain contact with peers, the sooner the better.” Let us conjecture 
that at the background of her wish to socialize with peers plays the long-
ing for a partner and a private family. She fears to remain alone. With 
respect to her mother she thinks: “I must stay and gain her approval and 
appreciation,” but with respect to her future she thinks: “I must leave, 
and start a new life elsewhere.” These contradictory thoughts explain her 
anxiety. For if she is not prepared to help her mother, she fears to be 
disapproved and abandoned by her mother, and that is the most terrible 
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thing she can imagine. But on the other hand, she thinks it is awful to 
remain alone. These two prospects trouble her. She becomes entangled 
in her contradictory thoughts that paralyze her decisiveness. This corre-
lates with her feeling depressive and helpless toward the future. 
Automatic thoughts are based on deeper assumptions, such as instru-
mental assumptions or strategic ideas, like “To keep your mother’s love, 
be always ready to help her,” and “Create new social networks in order to 
be accepted by others.” In their turn, strategies are rooted in conditional 
assumptions, like “If I choose for myself, my mother will reject me,” and 
the additional one: “If I do not present myself to others, I will miss the 
boat,” or, in a more general sense: “If I do not meet that condition, others 
will see me as inferior.” The deepest are the basic assumptions about 
oneself and the world that usually remain implicit, like “I am inferior.” In 
this way interpretive thoughts generate feelings, and feelings generate 
behaviors. 
There is a second route by which we select our behaviors, namely, by 
subconsciously weighing gain and loss of our possible actions. There may 
be some secondary gain in Sarah’s decision to call in sick at work. Con-
sidering herself sick yields reduction of her guilt feelings toward her 
mother about her reluctance to be always ready to help her. It may pro-
vide an excuse for her plans to move to another place, thereby distancing 
herself from her mother. On the other hand, her absenteeism does not 
increase her chances of a new job elsewhere. In the balance of profit and 
loss, apparently the scales tip toward the profit of her guilt reduction. 
 From this cognitive behavioral perspective the treatment might link 
up with the rigidity and tyranny of her must precepts (RET version): “I 
must be ready to help and please my mother,” and “I must leave and start 
a new life elsewhere,” combined with the familiar opinions “It is awful to 
lose my mom’s sympathy,” and “It is awful to remain solitary.” These 
assumptions will be challenged on their reality content. Little by little the 
conversations dig deeper to the assumptions beneath the automatic 
thoughts until the foundational assumption “I am inferior.” The goal of 
this procedure is to lessen the tension of the authoritarian thoughts, 
thereby diminishing the urge to feel sick, and gaining space for free,   
autonomous decisions. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: A Psychodynamic Approach 
A psychodynamic explanation of mental problems traces the symptoms 
back to some malfunctioning of the relationship between patients in their 
infant stage and their primary caregiver, mostly the mother. I select two 
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complementary explanations that are appropriate to clarify Sarah’s situa-
tion from a psychodynamic point of view. 
 The first of them is the attachment theory. Infants are genetically pro-
grammed  to long and look for attachment, i.e., an affective bond from the 
very beginning of their lives. For this primary need the main caregiver 
should be both available to the baby and sensitive to its needs. If these 
conditions are met, the infant can develop a secure attachment style. The 
infant feels safe and protected, and can grow spontaneously into a self-
confident, autonomous, and responsive individual. However, if the pri-
mary caregiver fails to provide affection consistently, being neglecting, 
capricious, or overprotective, the child cannot develop a balanced char-
acter but will form an unsafe kind of attachment, that is, anxious 
avoidant, anxious ambivalent, or disorganized. In that case, the child runs 
the risk of engendering mental problems in the adult stage of life, not 
only in the relationship with the own parents but also with other people 
because of the working models that have become fixed in the mind. In 
these working models, anxiety and avoidance are assumed to be the two 
parameters of the diverse attachment styles. When both are low, the at-
tachment style is secure; when both are high, it is fearful avoidant. When 
anxiety is low but avoidance high, the style is dismissing avoidant; con-
versely, it is preoccupied, or anxious ambivalent (Schaeffer-Van       
Leeuwen, 2011, for an overview). 
 The attachment style Sarah developed during her infancy may be 
qualified as anxious ambivalent. Because of her mother’s own troubles 
and self-centered orientation, her mother did not give enough affection 
to her daughter, but on the other hand tried to compensate for this by 
overprotection. Sarah reacted to this with a longing for the affection she 
did not get, anxiety for feeling insecure, anger for feeling neglected, and 
rapprochements to gain her mother’s sympathy by attempting to please 
her. In her adult life Sarah has retained this anxious ambivalent style. She 
is fed up with her mother’s claims for care, on the one hand, but she can-
not but give in to her mother’s appeals, on the other, being afraid of los-
ing her mother’s love, which seems to be unbearable to her. 
 As a second psychodynamic explanation I select the object relations 
approach in the fashion promoted by English pediatrician and psycho-
analyst Donald Winnicott. One of the risks of early upbringing is that too 
soon in life the child is alerted to and traumatized by the premature 
awareness of how small and helpless he or she really is. Infants should be 
protected with an illusion of being all-powerful, which can be achieved 
by early need satisfaction. The “good-enough” parent’s quick response of 
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feeding her little child gives the baby a powerful sense of being fed just 
by being hungry.1 However, if the baby’s caregiver was distracted by her 
own troubles, the infant would anxiously sense a lack of response, then 
focus on getting a positive response from the mentally absent caregiver 
by being a good baby. The awareness of the own vulnerability should 
only arise later in life, after the basic experience of being powerful has 
created a sense of confidence. Without this foundation an anxious men-
tality will grow that develops into a false self. In general, people use their 
false selves to comply with the standards of interaction in society. This is 
a normal social ability. But when the individual continuously seeks to 
anticipate others’ demands and comply with them, this is a defense 
mechanism that tries to protect the true self from hurt afflicted by     
powers in the world outside. 
 There is also the possibility of “too-good” mothering, in which the 
mother’s care is too well adapted to infant needs, usually already before 
the baby’s screaming, and beyond the baby’s earliest months. The effect 
is likely to be that the child will either reject the mother or remain 
merged with her. In either case the child will be hampered in his or her 
development, and deprived of an autonomous sense of agency, in cases 
like negotiation, concern, and reparation (Winnicott, 1990; Hopkins, 
1996). This caring style would hinder a development toward an inde-
pendent, autonomous personality. 
 In the framework of object relations theory, Sarah might have been 
exposed to the care of a too-good mother who has been engaged in over-
caring toward her daughter without leaving her the opportunity to stand 
up for herself. This might have led to a lack of separation of Sarah from 
her mother. 
 From the psychodynamic point of view, Sarah should be encouraged 
to gain more ego-strength, and to become more independent from her 
mother. In this process, the therapist–patient relationship will play a vital 
role, the therapist performing as a substitute caregiver. In reflecting on 
her own solution of moving to another place – distancing herself from 
her mother physically and exploring new social connections – there 
should be a moment of critical confrontation to consider the issue of 
 
1
  The central role of drive satisfaction as assumed by Winnicott has been experi-
mentally countered by Bowlby, father of the attachment theory. In practical ap-
plication it can easily be replaced by attachment notions such as attention and 
affection. 
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whether the working model she developed toward her mother of pleas-
ing and repressing her anger would not affect new relationships as well, 
so that on another level the same problems would occur. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: A Schema Approach 
The schema approach integrates cognitive behavioral and psychody-
namic interpretations of human behavior. Especially in early childhood, 
but also later on in adolescence, interactions of the individual with im-
portant others constitute cognitive schemas that are determinative in the 
interpretation of new relational situations. These schemas are the result 
of whether core emotional needs have been met. As core needs are iden-
tified the need of secure attachment, autonomy, freedom of expressing 
valid needs and emotions, spontaneity, and realistic limits and self-     
control. In many cases the cause of psychic distress is to be sought in 
early maladaptive schemas that arise in the combination of parental style 
and the child’s temperament. Young, Klosko and Weishaar (2003) distin-
guish five schema domains that together include eighteen schemas of 
unmet emotional needs. When a schema is activated, three coping styles 
are available, namely, compliant surrender, avoidance, and over-
compensation. 
 We take a closer look at two of the schemas because they may under-
lie Sarah’s ideas, feelings and behavior. The most conspicuous schema 
belongs to the schema domain of Impaired Autonomy and Performance. 
The typical family origin is enmeshed, overprotective, undermining the 
child’s self-confidence, or not preparing the child for performing compet-
ently outside the house. Within this atmosphere one of the schemas that 
can arise is Underdeveloped Self, over-involvement with the parents or 
important others, at the cost of full individuation. Often this implies the 
conviction that at least one of the persons in the enmeshment cannot 
survive without the persistent support of the other. It can also imply feel-
ings of being stifled, or lacking sufficient individual identity. Within this 
schema Sarah applies two coping reactions, the surrender strategy, in 
which she does everything to make her mother happy, and the overcom-
pensating strategy, by which she plans to turn her back upon her mother. 
 The other relevant schema belongs to the domain of Other Directed-
ness, pertaining to a family origin that is typically based on conditional 
acceptance; the child must repress important personal needs in order to 
gain love, attention, and approval. The relating schema is Self-Sacrifice, 
feeling compelled to give a lot to someone else in everyday situations, 
asking for nothing in return. Sarah complies with this urge, but at the 
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same time she overcompensates by deciding to quit denying herself in 
the interest of her mother. 
 After an assessment and education phase, in the change phase schema 
therapy utilizes all kinds of techniques to challenge and disarm the self-
defeating schema, like arguments, flash cards, guided imagery, and role 
playing, and tries to lead the patient from the Vulnerable Child mode 
(and, in the case of Sarah, the Demanding Parent mode) to the mode of 
Healthy Adult. For Sarah this means that the schemas Underdeveloped 
Self and Self-Sacrifice will be challenged, and she will work on achieving 
the Healthy Adult mode, resulting in an attitude of neither feeling ab-
sorbed by her mother by way of surrender, nor overcompensating by 
resistance. Both coping styles – surrender and overcompensating – 
would equally demonstrate her subjection to the related schemas. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: Integration of Psychology and Anthropology 
What can our survey of psychic functioning add to the explanatory diag-
noses that have been pointed out so far? I do not imagine that it can add 
anything substantial to the psychological assessments in the preceding 
subsections. But it may have the potential to highlight items that can be 
of importance when worldview issues are raised by the therapist or the 
patient. Successively, we face the (disturbed) self-related activities in the 
different anthropological conditions as shown in the model. 
First, we review the self-functions related to otherness, the other side 
beyond me, that is, Not-Me, including both persons and current circum-
stances. This part of the diagram is pictured separately in Figure 1. 
 
Psychology:         Self-Acceptance        Self-Actualization        Self-Transcendence 
Anthropology: 
Otherness             individuality          autonomy           relationality in respect 
 
Figure 1 Integration of Selfhood and Otherness 
 
When we try to apply this part of the format to the life situation of Sa-
rah, we should start at the right side of the figure, because her core prob-
lem is relational. We observe that the most important relationship she 
has, the one with her mother, is not a reciprocal relationship in respect. 
She feels absorbed and exploited by her mother but does not have the 
power to clarify and rectify the relations with her. Beyond her mother 
she lacks vital relationships and longs for them. In fact she is very lonely. 
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She feels the need to self-actualize by distancing physically from her 
mother and starting a new life somewhere else. But this is an overcom-
pensating response to the merger with her mother, and not an auton-     
omous decision; it is an effort to solve her psychic problems by a physical 
measure. So, physically distancing herself would in itself not lead to self-
actualizing. In her planning she betrays that she does not face and recog-
nize her loneliness. So, there is a lack of self-acceptance, a lack of accept-
ing her loneliness, not to embrace it, but to face and recognize it as her 
initial position. 
 With regard to nearness, the problems repeat themselves but are 
traced to a different aspect of her existence. See Figure 2. 
 
Psychology:          Self-Acceptance        Self-Actualization         Self-Transcendence 
Anthropology: 
Nearness              participation              purposiveness               dedication 
 
Figure 2 Integration of Selfhood and Nearness 
 
Her participation in the family system is disturbed. Because of her de-
pendence on her mother, due to the combination of her upbringing and 
her own temperament, Sarah did not develop a mature position in the 
system. Her efforts to self-actualize seem to pursue some unattainable 
escapist purpose, that of being a happy partner, having developed an 
interesting social network in a new environment. She lacks the capacity 
of transcending her family determinacy by nature and nurture, finding 
some spiritual stance (in a broad sense) that helps her to be dedicated to 
acting freely. 
There is also a difficulty with regard to temporality. In Figure 3 the 
last part of the diagram is displayed. 
 
Psychology:         Self-Acceptance        Self-Actualization            Self-Transcendence 
Anthropology: 
Nearness             sense of finitude       perceived opportunity    eternity awareness 
 
Figure 3 Integration of Selfhood and Temporality 
 
In her desire to find a partner and raise a family, Sarah is caught in the 
limited time she has; after all she is already 30 and still single. She has to 
hurry to have any chance of becoming pregnant. There is no liberating 
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perspective of transcending this oppressive prospect. Unfortunately,  
time perception is not opening new possibilities but only stressing and 
chasing her. In this respect again, she fails to face and recognize her an-
thropological condition, viz., her finitude, not being able to accept it as a 
reality that is intrinsic to her existence. Instead, she is fighting it in her 
mind, and allows it to frighten her and haunt her with ideas of being 
meaningless and superfluous. 
 
The Model’s Treatment Perspectives 
What does the model add to the treatment options already available? 
With the help of schema therapy, which combines cognitive and psycho-
dynamic perspectives, we seem to come a long way; it pursues both safe 
attachment and proper autonomy. In the diagram this covers the four 
fields in the upper left corner of the diagram, that is, individuality, auton-
omy, participation (attachment) and purposiveness. This correspondence 
strengthens the case for the diagram! 
The latter has several additional benefits, however. By including self-
transcendence in psychological functioning besides self-acceptance and 
self-actualization, we systematically create the possibility of integrating 
spiritual issues in the therapeutic intercourse. Self-transcendence offers 
clues for spiritual worldview versions focusing on nature, art, social jus-
tice or, as in Sarah’s case, religion. In addition, the adoption of the three 
elementary anthropological conditions otherness, nearness, and tempo-
rality provides the opportunity for addressing worldview issues in gen-
eral. This is because the anthropological conditions mentioned demand 
interpretation by worldview perspectives about the meaning of the    
other, the group, and finite life, respectively. All together the diagram 
allows a more holistic diagnostic approach of Sarah’s existential prob-
lems than any of the other approaches. 
One of the first life tasks of Sarah is to accept – that is, face and rec-
ognize – her own existence, including her present loneliness and finitude. 
Her lack of sound belonging or participation and relationships, her   
powerlessness and finitude have remained subconscious, and seem         
to be related to her anxiety and depressiveness. The existential self-
confrontation opens up the prospect of spiritual sensitivity and answers 
that go beyond the improvement of ego-strength. Sarah is a Christian 
woman, so she has a well-defined spiritual frame of reference. At the 
same time, however, this Christian framework may create complications, 
for actually it does not offer comfort and clarity, and can even create con-
fusion. How should she deal with the commandment “Honor your father 
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and your mother”? Are not her fellow parishioners right in encouraging 
her to continue the care for her mother and stay where she lives? Indi-
viduality and autonomy seem to be at odds with participation with and 
belonging to her mother and the Christian community. Before entering 
into questions of this kind, the complete matrix of selfhood in the Chris-
tian version is shown again. See Figure 4. 
 
Psychology:   Self-Acceptance         Self-Actualization           Self-Transcendence 
Anthropology: 
Otherness             individuality               autonomy              relationality in respect 
                      image of God        own choice for faith      toward God and humans 
 
Nearness             participation               purposiveness                dedication 
             family, church              in servitude                 being Spirit filled 
 
Temporality       sense of finitude    perceived opportunity        eternity-awareness 
        as a creature and sinner       time of grace                    expectancy 
  
Figure 4 Integration of Psychology and Anthropology – Christian Interpretation 
 
The quintessence of the model’s use is not that the content of all 
quadrants are introduced into the conversation. Its significance is that 
the therapist has a clear summary of the psychological tensions be- 
tween the life tasks of individual autonomy, responsive participation, and 
dealing with temporary life span, on the one hand, and of the worldview 
perspectives on these, on the other, in this version further specified by 
Christian worldview perspectives. This may help Christian and non-
Christian therapists alike to do justice to both psychological values as 
they are fostered in professional psychotherapy and Christian values that 
are prevalent in mainstream Christianity.2 In other words, the scheme 
provides tools to keep the discussion of spiritual issues within the con-
text of a clear anthropological-psychological structure, in the event that 
Sarah, from facing her loneliness, powerlessness, and finitude, is invited 
 
2
  This rough outline of Christian notions should be detailed and nuanced according 
to specific sub-traditions and personal conceptions, as Schreurs (2012) convinc-
ingly demonstrates. Her exposition (in Dutch) may also be valuable for non-
Christian therapists. 
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to bring  these items into the conversation. Here some elaborations of the 
Christian notions may be beneficial. 
In being made aware of her loneliness, Sarah is nearly driven to a zero 
point of experiencing her poor relationships, lack of participation, power-
lessness, and finitude. How in this context can her individuality as being 
created in the image of God, and her participation in family and commu-
nity be brought forward as encouragements to not be put off but rise up 
and manage her troubles? In her context, the real spiritual dynamic that 
has the potency to strengthen her comes from an encounter or experi-
ence with the One she recognizes as the Most High. Just in the zero point 
people may become sensitive for the all-pervasive power of the Unseen 
who gives peace and brings about surrender. Only from this point on-
ward people can be inspired and empowered – in Christian conceptual-
ity: filled by the Spirit of God – to experience themselves as individuals 
belonging to larger social units who are allowed to take their own space. 
In Sarah’s situation, her being part of a family, and a community should 
not be interpreted as a fiat to how things have been going, resulting in 
her being a wreck, but as some of the conditions that contribute to find-
ing the right track, that is, a purposiveness that does not harm her but 
gives her the opportunity to evolve. The cooperation with a pastor could 
in this phase be recommendable. The talents she derives from nature and 
nurture may seem to have disappeared initially but can be excavated and 
emphasized in therapy in a later stage. 
 Special interest should be paid, if the conversation does lend itself to 
it, to the purpose of her life, which is characterized as in servitude. That is 
different from the servility Sarah has performed up to that moment. First 
she has to find herself as an autonomous self-deciding person, before she 
can make up her mind whether to be helpful toward her mother, on her 
own terms, in her own way, and to utilize the possibilities available to 
stress her independence with respect to her. This does no way run coun-
ter the commandment “Honor your father and your mother.” Another 
text in the Bible says that children at a certain age are no longer in tute-
lage (Galatians 4). The real honoring of parents by adult children is vol-
untary, and according to their own insights. 
 What about her wish to have friends, to get married, and to found a 
family? Apart from the fact that she may invent other means to get into 
contact with peers, the spiritual dimension of her maturation implies that 
she learns to accept that in our endeavors to self-actualize we never get 
control over the results. Living in relationship with God means being 
confident of and dependent on His blessings. It is the art of letting go. Our 
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lifetime is a time of grace, as the quadrant of self-actualization in view of 
temporality says. This spiritual dimension should not be viewed as an 
add-on to the mere psychotherapeutic level of intervention, on the con-
trary, from the totality of anthropological and psychological functioning 
it offers a worldview related direction in which she can move, that should 
be incorporated in psychotherapy. 
The last remark is about the spirituality of the therapist. If Sarah 
needs to face her loneliness, impotence and transience, and her sheer de-
pendence on the Lord God for finding new encouragement to be dedica-
ted to a life task, then how can the therapist support her in this spiritual 
journey? One of the prerequisites seems to be that he/she as mentor has 
experienced something of this process of emptying and filling him/her-
self again. In that case, the therapist can be a credible role model for  
Sarah, mirroring the attitude that is worth striving for, herewith replac-
ing the too-good, and hence not-good-enough role that has been played 
by her mother. By exhibiting calm and confidence when facing and to 
some extent sharing Sarah’s impasse, Sarah may derive some encour-
aging example from him/her in noticing with the therapist the power of 
being connected with a spiritual source. So, the therapist functions as the 
intermediary of empowerment in the quadrant of self-transcendence 
related to nearness, leading to a new dedication to life. Apparently, the 
Christian version of the model also turns out to provide some clues to the 
Christian therapist to further his or her own spiritual experience. 
 
 
9.3 Case 2 
 
Case Description 
Ahmed, a Muslim first generation immigrant in the Netherlands of      
Moroccan origin, 61 years old, comes to mental health services with de-
pressive complaints after a referral by his family practitioner. With his 
much younger second wife he has two daughters who are unwilling to 
accept the traditional dressing code, and laugh at him when he recom-
mends candidate husbands to them. They regularly stay outdoors over-
night and, as he sees it, behave like whores. He feels humiliated and 
ashamed. He is suspicious of mental healthcare and therefore unwilling 
to follow the practitioner’s advice. In the end, however, because of severe 
low backaches from which he wants to be cured he gives in to the refer-
ral. The professional team discusses his status. Is he to be diagnosed       
as a patient? Or is it an ordinary generation conflict, aggravated by the      
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cultural differences people of Moroccan origin encounter in the Western 
world?  A five conversations arrangement is proposed in order to get a 
better picture of Ahmed’s condition. After this series, it appears that the 
depressive feelings relate to Ahmed’s hurt self-esteem. It seems plausible 
to assume a neurotic disorder. At the same time, his feelings of paternal 
superiority are culturally and religiously inspired. Is it wise, in the light of 
the patient’s cultural background, to assign a male therapist to him? Is 
the institution ready to make this concession? And to what extent are 
professionals willing to move along in the direction of the patient’s 
worldview? Will they show understanding for the patient’s hurt feelings, 
or are they guided by their culturally determined resistance against the 
patient’s attitude and refuse to voice even the slightest empathy? 
 
Classificatory Diagnosis 
Ahmed’s complaints do not meet the criteria of a depressive episode. 
During more than two successive weeks he exhibits a depressive mood 
most of the day, nearly every day, characterized by markedly diminished 
pleasure, severe insomnia, and psychomotor agitation nearly every day, 
observed by others. These are in sum four of the nine possible symptoms, 
mentioned in DSM-5, the numbers (1), (2), (4), and (5), respectively, one 
short of the minimum of five. The option is left to diagnose another spec-
ified depressive disorder, to wit, a depressive episode with insufficient 
symptoms, code 311, but probably we have to look in another direction. 
It appears more plausible to diagnose an adjustment disorder with 
depressed mood, code 309.0. There is a clear identifiable stressor that  
occurred within three months earlier. Although the tensions in the 
household had existed for some time, the real problem arose when the 
daughters went out without their Muslim garb, and without any super-
vision. The clinical significance is evidenced by marked distress that 
seems to be out of proportion to the severity of the stressor even if cul-
tural factors are taken into account. One of the considerations yielding to 
the conclusion is that other Muslim parents who are in the same circum-
stances do not exhibit the same symptoms. Other mental disorders do 
not seem relevant. The severe low backaches probably have a psychic 
cause. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: Cognitive Behavioral Approach 
From a Western point of view it is clear that Ahmed’s interpretation        
of the emancipatory behavior of his daughters is rather extreme. He con-
siders it as disastrous that they do not obey the rules of his Muslim  
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community, and feels humiliated and ashamed. His cognitive appraisal 
induces his depressive mood and bad feelings. The permanent stress he 
experiences occasions low backaches that aggravate his distress. Here a 
similar mechanism as in the first case is at issue, namely, a mechanism of 
perceiving an undesired circumstance, interpreting it as disastrous, and  
responding to it emotionally and somatically. Ahmed experiences mental 
pain, interprets it as terrible, and responds with increasing depressive-
ness and backaches. 
A behavior analysis of secondary gain indicates that the manifesta-
tions of depression lower the feelings of shame, by arousing pity instead 
of disapproval from Ahmed’s peers. 
 
Failure of Psychodynamic Diagnosis 
In the context of Ahmed’s problems a psychodynamic assessment is 
hardly appropriate. The reason why is that the communalist setting of his 
life and his problems precludes focusing on issues of identity formation 
and ego-strength. Traditional Islamic Moroccan culture has not adopted 
the turn to the inner subject that has taken place in modernism. Hence, 
Ahmed will not be able to experience an articulation of his problems in 
terms of subconscious or unconscious dynamics as clarifying. So, the core 
problem can hardly be elucidated by locating it in the inner condition of 
the individual but rather in the relationships with others within a well-
defined community. For that reason, guided introspection in order to 
address the adjustment disorder seems to be a less preferable approach. 
Because of the cultural component, working on practical change will pre-
sumably turn out to be a better strategy. A religious adaptation of cog-
nitive behavioral therapy could bring some relief. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: Limited Significance of the Model 
Because a psychodynamic approach focusing on identity formation and 
ego-strength appears to be less appropriate, a focus on self-functions like 
self-acceptance and self-actualization accordingly does not seem to be in 
Ahmed’s interest. Self-acceptance and self-actualization may develop as 
by-products of a better status within the own group only. Consequently, 
to a large extent the model is inapplicable. While it plays a role in con-
necting and integrating subjective individuality with the world outside, 
creating a balance between subjectivity and communality, the present 
treatment demand is fully focused on the community. 
Although the entire outline cannot be applied, parts of it are still rel- 
evant. The three factors of otherness, nearness, and temporality are   
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significant in the functioning of self-transcendence. The dormant aware-
ness of other persons who are not-me awakens in situations in which the 
other is experienced as being over against me. This state of affairs is ac-
tual, for instance, in cases of conflict, such as between Ahmed and his 
daughters, and between Ahmed and his peers who might blame him for 
his daughters’ behavior. Another example is the very situation of psycho-
therapy, the therapist being obviously different from and over against the 
patient. Finally, this full awareness is at issue in the conscious contact 
with God, or Allah, in prayer. In all of these situations, making contact 
with the other is a deliberate act of going beyond myself, or self-
transcending, as represented in the right column of the diagram. We can 
picture the relevant part of the diagram in Figure 5 as follows. 
 
Psychology:   Self-Transcendence 
Anthropology: 
Otherness    relationality in respect 
 
Nearness    dedication 
 
Temporality   eternity awareness 
 
Figure 5 Integration of Self-Transcendence and Basic Anthropological Conditions 
 
In Ahmed’s worries there are several possibilities to apply the core 
values in the depicted fragment of the format to explain his symptoms. 
Relationship in respect can be applied to his attitude to his daughters, to 
his peers, to Allah, and to the therapist. The relationship with his daugh-
ters has been thoroughly disrupted. His daughters’ behavior gives Ahmed 
the feeling of being isolated from the community, making a fool of him. 
So, the previous relationship with the rest of the community is threat-
ened. For Ahmed submission to Allah is of major importance but in this 
period of his life religious experience is restricted to rules and sanctions; 
it hardly functions in a more positive way as it normally would. Dedi-
cation and encouragement are lacking thus far, because Ahmed’s fear  
and shame prevent him from having more positive religious feelings.       
Eternity-awareness is only negatively laden, due to fears of being con-
demned and permanently excluded. 
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The Model’s Treatment Perspectives 
In therapy, the diagram is only limitedly applicable, confined to the col-
umn of self-transcendence, and affiliated with a cognitive behavioral 
approach because this leaves the possibility of not proceeding too self-
reflectively. Self-transcendence in an Islamic context means to open up to 
the attitude Allah exhibits in this affair. Islamic texts might be helpful to 
both find out Allah’s will, and change the thought patterns that lead to 
self-destructive mental conditions. Therapy might resort to some ahadith 
(plural of hadith, “that what is told”), texts about the behavior and pro-
nouncements of Allah’s messenger Mohammed on all kinds of everyday 
life situations, collected and selected by Muslim spiritual leaders some 
centuries after the prophet’s death.3 The collections by Bukhari, Dawud, 
and Muslim are considered by many Muslims to be correct hadith re-
ports. Some of these texts may show a way out of Ahmed’s troubles, 
providing encouragement by providing connectedness, and put eternity 
awareness in a favorable light by emphasizing the pivotal importance of 
the right decisions in the light of an eternal award implied in divine 
promises. 
 I confine myself to putting forward three ahadith that may be of rel-  
evance in this context. The first one refers to the answer the prophet 
gives to someone who is astonished that he kisses his son. Mohammed’s 
reply is: 
 
He who does not show mercy (toward his children), no mercy would be 
shown to him.4 
 
Here, the example of the prophet may help Ahmed to take another stance 
toward his daughters, not by approving their behavior, but by accepting 
and welcoming them as they are because, after all, they remain his chil-
dren that deserve mercy from their father. 
 A second hadith underlines the importance of patience when all kinds 
of blows are afflicted. It is about a saying of the prophet, on the occasion 
of a woman who had been mourning over a grave, and in annoyance dis-
missed the prophet without realizing it was him, when he said to her 
“Fear Allah and be patient.” As soon as she heard that it was the prophet 
 
3
  To be consulted on the internet, http://www.quranexplorer.com/Hadith/English/ 
index.html. 
4
  Sahih al-Muslim, book 33, hadith 5736. 
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himself she had insulted, she returned to him with apologies for having 
offended him. His reply was: 
 
 Verily, the patience is at the first stroke of a calamity.5 
 
It should be avoided that by this hadith Ahmed feels rejected and con-
demned because he did not exhibit patience from the beginning of the 
calamity of his daughters. On the other hand, on the basis of Allah’s   
mercy and his own repentance, he may learn to be patient toward his 
daughters, for the sake of Mohammed’s teaching and example. 
A third hadith might have the potential to enforce new behavior by 
adding a ritual. It says: 
 
Anger comes from the devil, the devil was created of fire, and fire is extin-
guished only with water; so when one of you becomes angry, he should per-
form ablution (wudu, a small ritual cleansing).6 
 
This may help Ahmed to label his anger against his daughters as inspired 
by the devil, and fight it in a concrete, behavioral way. 
Integrating these religious notions in a cognitive behavioral-like ther-
apy obviously requires a Muslim therapist who is familiar with and    
values Islamic casuistry. Moreover, it seems to be advisable for the thera-
pist in a case like this to consult and win the trust of an imam who is re-
spected by the community in which Ahmed lives. These two counselors 
would possibly select other ahadith. Other strategies might be beneficial, 
too, of course, such as trying to arrange a conversation in the therapist’s 
room between Ahmed and his daughters, in order to actually restore the 
relationship between them in a self-transcendental way, that is, crossing 
the boundaries of the self to get into contact with the other, herewith 
restoring somewhat the community they all belong to without precluding 
personal choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
  Sahih al-Bukhari, book 2, volume 23, hadith 372. 
6
  Sunan Abu Dawud, book 41, hadith 4766. 
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9.4 Case 3 
 
Case Description 
Jeff, 24 years old, suffered several episodes of depression. He was raised 
in a Christian family belonging to a Methodist black church in the United 
States. He was aged nine when his mother died. His father remarried and 
his stepmother was found to be the absolute ruler of the household, not 
allowing any complaints. Jeff experienced increasing isolation; his efforts 
to win her approval only met with criticism and his mistakes were con-
sidered disastrous. His problems manifested on the sexual. He went 
through a period of intense masturbation and had a few homosexual con-
tacts. The rare dates he arranged yielded tension rather than satisfaction. 
He often proved impotent. In his twenties he had homosexual and het-
erosexual contacts that filled him with excitement and fear; after each 
attempt he felt intense guilt, which underscored his pervading sense of 
inadequacy. He came to look upon himself with contempt. He became 
slovenly, biting his fingernails, twisting his hair and mutilating himself. 
Three times he prepared to commit suicide but shrunk back from it in the 
end. He tried marihuana, used sleeping pills for insomnia, pep pills to 
overcome his fatigue, and pornography for escape. Eventually, in a state 
of dissociation and neglect he was taken to a practitioner by a welfare 
worker, and next referred to a mental health service. 
 
Classificatory Diagnosis 
The case description about Jeff mentions several episodes of depression. 
If we may assume that this is a DSM-5 qualification, we may probably 
even speak of a major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, code 
296.35, in partial remission; partial, because several symptoms of de-
pressiveness time and again emerge. There is also a history of substance 
abuse. Jeff tried marihuana, and used tranquillizers and pep pills like 
amphetamines or cocaine, but this seems to have taken place too occa-
sionally to allow the conclusion of a substance related disorder. The use 
of stimulant drugs is related to insomnia, so, presumably, we may diag-
nose a sleep disorder (insomnia) through stimulants, code 292.89. 
But even this is not the complete picture. Not only insomnia may be 
secondary, substance use seems to be secondary as well, that is, depend-
ing on an underlying personality disorder. A combination of symptoms 
point in the direction of a borderline personality disorder, code 301.83. 
This is defined as a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal rela-
tionships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity. From the nine 
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criteria mentioned in DSM-5, five should be met. In the case of Jeff we 
identify six of them: a markedly and persistently unstable self-image or 
sense of self (3); impulsivity in the areas of sex and substance abuse (4); 
recurrent suicidal behavior and gestures, and self-mutilating behav-
ior (5); affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (6); 
chronic feelings of emptiness (7); and transient, stress related paranoid 
ideation or severe dissociative symptoms (9). 
 The overall classificatory diagnosis for Jeff is a borderline personality 
disorder, combined with a major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, 
in partial remission, and a sleep disorder. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: A Cognitive Behavioral Approach 
Striking are the self-defeating cognitions by Jeff about himself. His feel-
ings of depressiveness, guilt, and self-contempt may be traced back to his 
negative cognitive self-evaluation. In turn, these feelings result in self-
defeating behaviors, like disintegrated sexual activities, suicide attempts, 
self-neglect, and auto mutilation. There is a clear reinforcement pattern 
in his masturbation, and substance use behavior. They provide immedi-
ate relief from his distress, although the longer term consequences are 
less positive. His sexual experiences with a partner might be meant as 
softeners of the misery as well, but they turned out to be frustrating. 
 A cognitive behavioral therapy would focus on the reality content of 
Jeff’s self-evaluations, challenge them and replace them by more con-
structive alternatives. Maybe his guilt feelings would be disclaimed as 
unreal and harmful, as well, possibly without any assessment against 
religious principles. In behavioral terms, Jeff should understand the self-
defeating mechanism of his escape behavior, learn to face the tensions 
and uncertainties of life, get to know alternative behavioral possibilities, 
and develop the skills to perform them by exercise. Dialectic behavior 
therapy might help to gain control over the impaired emotional regula-
tion system. However, it is dubitable whether a treatment that is con-
fined to this cognitive behavioral approach exceeds the level of symptom 
reduction. Probably we have to face the deeper dynamics that direct and 
determine the conceptual and behavioral output. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: A Psychodynamic Approach 
From the case description we know nothing about Jeff’s relationship with 
his own mother during his first years of life. Yet, attachment theory can 
contribute something to the explanation of his mental condition because 
it does not limit the critical attachment phase to the earliest period of 
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lifetime, recognizing that also important relationships in later stages of 
life may affect a person’s attachment style, like in Jeff’s situation the rela-
tionship with his stepmother. Obviously, he still needed maternal solici-
tude when he was a young adolescent, but instead, his biological mother 
left him by her death, and his stepmother repelled him by continuous 
criticism. His adult attachment style is anxious avoidant, as is apparent 
from his flight behavior, avoiding confrontations, and showing his inabil-
ity to cope with real life. Sometimes the style is preoccupied, like when he 
had a date which was always associated with tension, and disruptive 
chaotic. 
  From a dynamic point of view, the main power of therapy is establish-
ing a therapeutic relationship in which Jeff feels accepted and respected 
as he is, and a safe environment is created that opens the possibility of 
processing the pain of personal attachments being denied to him. From 
this relationship and the gradual healing of hurts, Jeff may gain a new, 
more secure attachment style, and develop a growing self-esteem that 
enables him to enter into more stable relationships. In this context Jeff is 
free to evaluate his guilt feelings in the light of his Christian upbringing, 
and to accept or deny the faith transfer from his childhood. But first the 
addiction tendency should be brought under control, and the depression 
should be treated by medication, in order to remove the primary barriers 
to a beneficial therapeutic relationship. It seems however that to treat 
Jeff’s borderline personality disorder one needs more than a sound   
therapeutic relationship. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: A Schema Approach 
Various schemas play their part in Jeff’s reality perception. The schema 
domain Disconnection and Rejection applies to the passing away of his 
own mother, and his being denied by his stepmother. It activates the 
schemas Emotional Deprivation, especially as a result of the absence of 
affection and caring, Defectiveness and Shame, entailing the feeling of 
being flawed, bad, inferior, and worthless, and Social Isolation, referring 
to the feeling he doesn’t belong to any group or community. Jeff also ex-
hibits a schema in the domain Impaired Limits about not having devel-
oped adequate internal limits with regard to self-discipline as a result of 
apparent neglect. This represents a separate schema. An accurate intake 
should explore his relationship with his biological mother. This might 
provide hints for seeing the various schemas in better proportion. 
 In patients with a borderline disorder who get therapy, several dys-
functional schema modes become active; the mode of the Vulnerable 
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Child, feeling fear, distress, and helplessness; the Angry Child, venting 
anger in response to unfulfilled basic needs or unfair treatment; and the 
Impulsive, Undisciplined Child, who immediately succumbs to the desire 
for pleasure. For Jeff additional dysfunctional modes are the Punishing  
or Critical Parent, through which he criticizes himself, and the Detached 
Protector who tries to numb hurt feelings and to avoid painful confron-
tations. The therapist should deal with these alternating modes by rec-
ognizing them, explaining their origin and present functioning, and by 
modifying them with the help of all kinds of techniques such as creating a 
secure therapeutic relationship, exploratory conversation, imagery such 
as imaginative dialogues and reframing of dysfunctional modes, and 
practicing in real life. 
 
Explanatory Diagnosis: Integration of Psychology and Anthropology 
For the sake of clarity, the assessment of Jeff’s condition from the integra-
tion perspective is accompanied by the matrix of the model, see Figure 6. 
The core problem is expressed in the middle left quadrant, in the lack of 
safe participation in the social core unit of the family. This lack of belong-
ing can be defined as abandonment. 
 
Psychology:     Self-acceptance        Self-actualization            Self-transcendence  
Anthropology: 
Otherness            individuality               autonomy              relationality in respect 
 
Nearness        participation          purposiveness                  dedication 
 
Temporality     sense of finitude       perceived opportunity    eternity awareness 
 
Figure 6 Integration of Psychology and Anthropology  
 
As a consequence, Jeff is unable to entrust himself to other people, see 
the upper right quadrant, because of his severe experiences of denial. In 
other words, he cannot transcend the limits of his own existence toward 
others in the world outside. Furthermore, he cannot face this very painful 
reality and fails to translate it into feelings of loneliness. So, he does not 
come near his inner self in his isolated, rejected individuality. This would 
be the first step toward self-acceptance as a unique individual who need 
not flee from his inner feelings. Instead, he has resorted to self-
pampering and self-numbing activities in order to forget about the 
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frightening otherness of the world around that threatens his existence. 
Because of the addictive effect of these self-defeating coping strategies, 
there is no room for self-actualizing and autonomy in the realm of other-
ness. 
Concerning the anthropological condition of nearness, the absence of 
participation also entails a lack of purpose within a community. Jeff is 
very negative about his own perspectives. He feels impotent and neglects 
and hurts himself. He makes no attempt to develop his potentials in 
whatever direction, assuming that he does not have them, or fearing to 
fail in employing them. So, his purposelessness is related to the absence 
of being accepted and accepting himself as a valued person. Because 
there is no self-transcending toward an inspiring ideal, he neither re-
ceives incentives toward a meaningful life. Instead of these impulses 
from beyond, there is only the effects of narcotics, stimulants, solo or-
gasms, and sedatives. These resources of self-expanding can be seen as 
substitutes for self-transcending, and a defensive coping strategy with 
respect to otherness, which is threatening, and nearness, which is lack-
ing. 
 With respect to temporality an ambivalence can be discerned be-
tween Jeff’s suicide attempts and his failure to complete them. Appar-
ently, he both desires and fears death, and all in all clings to life. He 
evokes a surrogate eternity awareness in the artificially endless experi-
ence caused by his substance use, suggesting a totality enjoyment that 
makes him forget about his miserable condition. He seems to take health 
risks for granted without really caring for his life. Apperception of time 
as opportunity offered to bring about something valuable is entirely ab-
sent. His self-condemnation and fearful avoidance lead to predominant 
inertia. 
 
The Model’s Treatment Perspectives 
Provided that the development of a therapeutic relationship is possible, 
regular therapy with Jeff presumably tends to limit its focus to a few 
fields displayed in the diagram, to wit, relationship in respect, participa-
tion, individuality, and autonomy. Jeff’s functioning in each of these is 
inadequate. A psychodynamic therapist will try to approach Jeff in the 
role of substitute attachment figure, creating a safe environment that 
compensates for the lack of participation, and results in a workable   
therapeutic relationship. These temporary substitutes for participation 
and relationship are deployed to achieve a more sustainable reinforce-
ment of individuality and autonomy. A schema therapist, in distinction 
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from his or her psychodynamic colleague, will work on dysfunctional 
coping modes, again in order to reinforce individuality and autonomy. 
An approach in line with the integration model tries to use a          
more broadened scope, not only deploying a temporary substitute for 
sound relationships and participation, but also exploring possibilities for 
creating and developing them in real life. Furthermore, it provides an 
opportunity for addressing the existential psychological functions of self-
transcendence and time perception. This integral approach inevitably 
appeals to worldview items in Jeff’s life. Because of his history, it may be 
useful to explore the Christian worldview that possibly plays a latent role 
in Jeff’s dealing with his life situation. One of the salient elements of the 
present case is the non-manifest character of a possibly active religious 
drive. This ambiguity could be partly obviated by a religious anamnesis 
during the intake, but even then the possibility remains that unexpressed 
and initially unrecognized religious feelings and/or opinions affect the 
behavior. This focuses our attention on the question of how to deal with 
this possible hidden layer of psychic functioning, and whether the dia-
gram may contribute anything to a natural, unforced integration of this 
worldview perspective into professional therapy. 
 It does not seem advisable for the therapist to bring the conversation 
deliberately on the religious level of Jeff’s upbringing because of the risk 
of causing resistance with Jeff, and thus of interfering with the growth of 
a trustful relationship. This does not preclude, however, that during the 
process it becomes an issue. By going through the trouble of Jeff’s life 
together, the therapist shows his or her readiness to contain this difficult 
matter of the other’s life. By doing so, the therapist may win the patient’s 
trust. Feelings of loneliness, shame and guilt become mentionable and in 
turn activate feelings of lack and desire. Facing his abandonment and 
yearning for belonging, Jeff may allow biblical notions and stories for-
merly passed on to him by his mother to get new meaning. Biblical sto-
ries about loneliness, as with Elijah (1 Kings 19) or Jesus in Gethsemane 
(Matthew 26, Mark 14, Luke 22), could help to give some awareness that 
he is neither weird, nor exceptional. Being accepted by God may be an 
entry toward self-acceptance, and being a child of God may underscore 
his belonging to God’s people. It requires a therapist who focuses on  
autonomy growth in an open way without a preconceived religious 
agenda, and at the same time has affinity with the religious dimension 
that possibly may help Jeff to gain ego-strength. 
Once Jeff begins to show – through the therapeutic relationship and, 
perhaps, through assent to God’s possible presence – some awareness of 
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acceptance, relationality and belonging, new sources of encouragement 
and dedication may be tapped. If Jeff seems willing to explore his reli-
gious roots, the therapist might ask whether God as imagined by Jeff 
would want Jeff to make his own choice for or against faith, thus appeal-
ing to Jeff’s autonomy. If this attempt to revitalize Jeff’s religious assump-
tions appears to be fruitful, from the nearness perspective it might be 
suggested that he should look for a Christian community. The therapist 
could mediate in finding one, or invite some Christian acquaintance to     
a session. Finally, from the temporality perspective, as long as life is ex-
perienced as a hell, life is no more than a form of death. The religious  
perspective is that we can be rescued from this kind of experience by 
receiving forgiveness for our own sins and learning to appreciate life as a 
gracious gift. Instead of the surrogate eternity experience by intoxication, 
a new awareness can arise that there is something in life of permanent 
value, something that has to do with love. 
Would the model have some benefit in store when Jeff is unwilling to 
accept reminders of his Christian upbringing? To a degree, I suppose. The 
issue will be whether he is open to adopt a self-transcending objective 
such as nature, sports, art, dogs, or humanitarian ideals. If so, a route can 
be mapped out to join a club or association that shares the same goal. 
After all, the model assumes that self-transcendence and being part of 
larger social unities are beneficial for people’s well-being because these 
factors do justice to two basic conditions of being human: otherness and 
nearness. Should this succeed though, the therapist ought to be alert to 
the risk that joining a group will not necessarily lead to safe belonging. 
The cohesion of the group may be too weak for Jeff to feel included and to 
be committed. Then again, group pressure may be too strong to allow 
respect for outsiders. Hooliganism, as in football supporter groups, is not 
a way of life that would really help Jeff. His poorly developed social skills 
require a group that is socially protective without being oppressive. 
 
 
9.5 Conclusions 
 
The above case examples illustrate that the integration model may in-
deed be helpful to connect psychotherapy with worldview issues, as soon 
as the cases meet the three criteria for the applicability of the model. In 
the elaboration of the cases the professional approach has been sus-
tained by making standard diagnostic assessments following DSM-5 as 
the normative classificatory diagnostic system. Additionally, explanatory 
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diagnoses have been presented that are in line with the main theories of 
mental dysfunctioning. These diagnoses are augmented by the appli-
cation of a newly developed model that integrates basic anthropological 
conditions in psychological functioning, aiming at facilitating the adop-
tion of worldview issues in therapy. The application of this model de-
pends on three criteria: the acceptance of prevailing psychotherapy; the 
occurrence of a client or patient’s worldview that is in tension with the 
secular values of prevailing therapy; and the internalization of this ten-
sion within the client or patient who is hesitant about how to connect the 
group norm with the usually unspoken individualistic point of view 
prevalent in therapy. Given these premises, the tensions may be trans-
formed into a polarity in which individual autonomy – choose your own 
way – goes together with group determined heteronomy – an external 
moral authority shows you the way. 
In case 1 the criteria are fully satisfied, so the diagram can be applied 
integrally. Psychotherapy is respected as a recognized practice (first cri-
terion). The tension between autonomy, fostered in therapy, and heter-
onomy, a value inherited from domestic and religious circles (second 
criterion) is evident. This tension is internalized within the patient (third 
criterion), as appears from her inner conflict. 
In case 2, however, not all criteria were met, and consequently, the 
scheme could only be applied partially. The first criterion was met by the 
fact that an appeal is made to a professional therapist. The second cri-
terion does apply to case 2 as well, referring to the tension between   
autonomy and heteronomy. However, this tension between autonomy 
and heteronomy is not reflected in the patient’s own value system (third 
criterion). The tension is not in the patient’s value system but in his rela-
tionship with his daughters. This shortcoming in the fulfillment of the 
third criterion prevents the desired outcome: the transformation of the 
tensions into an integrated approach that combines therapeutic values of 
the practitioner with the worldview values of the patient. The format 
could only be applied in a limited way. Because the format is based on 
self-reflectivity in various anthropological conditions, it minimally pre-
supposes a modern mindset that starts from the subjective viewpoint of 
the individual’s inner life for perceiving and conceiving outer reality. In 
the collectivist experience of the Muslim patient this subjective viewpoint 
is missing. Therefore, the self-reflective categories of self-acceptance and 
self-actualization have no independent significance. In this context, only 
self-transcending may be feasible in situations of religious distance from 
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God or interpersonal conflict, because then the reality of the other as not-
me becomes palpable. 
In case 3 the model does fully apply only if a reference to the patient’s 
Christian upbringing appears to be welcomed by him. If not, the second 
criterion fails, since it requires that the client or patient’s value system 
derived from group norms is in tension with the tacit norms underlying 
the practice of therapy. The second criterion does apply if the patient 
appears to be sensitive to his Christian past. If so, this will result in some 
inner tension between his way of life reflecting his problematic situation, 
and Christian values that demand compliance. If he declines the implica-
tions of Christian values, the format can only be employed conditionally. 
There should be an alternative ultimate goal available, and an appro-
priate community that fosters this goal and is able to welcome him in a 
protective and non-oppressive way. 
 Which pretensions can the integration model live up to? It does not 
carry the pretension of being the key to an alternative theory of psychic 
functioning. It expressly presupposes existing psychological theories like 
cognitive behavioral, psychodynamic developmental, humanistic and 
existential theories. This intertwining with and dependence on prevailing 
psychological theories is obvious in the processing of the given cases. 
New is their explicit connection with the basic anthropological notions   
of otherness, nearness, and temporality. Current psychotherapeutic ap-
proaches each relate to only a part of these notions. In the model they are 
all brought together, so that all approaches can find their own niche        
in it. The bifurcation of self-functioning in self-acceptance and self-              
actualization is humanistic, and this approach is mainly active in realm of 
otherness. The same fields of individuality and autonomy are the primary 
scope of cognitive behavior therapy. The emphasis on otherness, self-
transcendence and temporality is existential, and the focus on nearness is 
psychodynamic. 
  The model is meant to provide an integral overview of anthropologi-
cal-psychological functioning, of which different psychotherapies only 
cover some segments. By this holistic representation it is capable of link-
ing psychotherapeutic and worldview issues. It gives some overview and 
clue for the integration of spirituality and meaning of life in the therapeu-
tic treatment. The first and third cases– the latter in its Christian version 
– demonstrate how this integration may take place without violating the 
professional character of the treatment. The second and third cases – the 
latter in its secular version – are suited to demonstrate an only partial 
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usefulness of the overview, due to the no more than partial compliance 
with the criteria. 
 The systematic introduction of worldview issues in the therapeutic 
process by the format has at least five benefits. First, it offers a hold to 
the therapist to raise worldview issues in a structured way by being able 
to identify their significance in the mental functioning of the patient. Sec-
ond, the introduction of existential worldview issues may promote the 
therapeutic relationship because it exhibits the therapist’s sensitivity 
toward the patient’s values. Third, it gives the opportunity to the patient 
to understand the relevance of his or her worldview for sound choices in 
life that foster psychic well-being. Fourth, it counterbalances the thera-
pist’s own worldview by indicating that presupposed values, in particular 
the therapist’s own, are never self-evident. Especially the elaboration of 
the first and third cases may have shown these benefits. The fifth benefit 
is the perspective on seeking existing communities in which the patient 
or client may participate. Participation is an important prerequisite for 
purposiveness and meaning of life. At the same time, a community may 
itself complicate participation, as the first case shows. Here, the commu-
nity should go through a learning process itself. 
 One caveat should be expressed. Types of meaning and spirituality 
may never be imposed on the client or patient by the therapist. Generally 
speaking, this rule of thumb seems obvious, but this might be found to be 
felt less evident as soon as the therapist assumes that his or her own 
worldview is similar to the patient’s. This may be the case when the  
therapist has never ever reflected upon his or her own worldview, as-
suming that it includes the obvious way of considering life shared by all 
Western people. In other cases therapists think to have reasons to sup-
pose that their patients share the same religious principles that they up-
hold themselves. If the therapist would be committed to impose some 
religious values that seem compatible with the patient’s, the patient’s 
autonomy is violated as long as he/she has not internalized these values. 
Worldview values may only be introduced in an inviting and tentative 
way, in order to help the patient to get in touch with his or her own 
deepest beliefs. In the analyses and elaborations of the three cases at-
tempts have been made to respect this rule. 
  
Chapter 10 
Recapitulation 
In this final chapter we are going to recapitulate the results, which should 
culminate in pointed answers to the two-pronged main question of this 
inquiry: 
What are the mutual relations between worldviews and psychotherapy? 
What do these interrelationships imply for conceptions of psychothera-
peutic professionalism? 
A survey of the procedure and the results followed by an evaluation of 
these results may enable us to arrive at the answers we pursue. This de-
termines the format of this concluding chapter: summary, evaluation, and 
conclusion. 
 
 
10.1 Summary 
 
Introduction 
In the introductory chapter worldview is defined with Olthuis (1989) as 
“a framework or set of fundamental beliefs through which we view the 
world and our calling and future in it.” Important features of it are its 
partly conscious and partly unconscious nature, its self-evident charac-
ter, so that people do not feel the urge to question it but consider it    
rather as superior to any other divergent view, its all-decisive purport, 
and its usually communal nature. On the other hand, psychotherapy is 
taken as professional assistance provided to people with mental prob-
lems in order to better cope with the problems. 
The influence of worldview on psychotherapeutic practice may run 
along various lines. Some theories unavoidably contain a worldview level 
in the selection of what is deemed important or interesting. There is a 
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line of science oriented methods, preferring the measurable, which be-
trays a specific type of viewing the world. Another line of influence of 
worldviews on psychotherapeutic practice runs along the personal view 
of life adhered to by the therapist. The therapeutic relationship is a sub-
stantial factor in the success of the treatment, and in that relationship the 
input given by the therapist is crucial. Finally, there is the impact of the 
institutional setting of therapeutic care, providing opportunities and 
limitations to the nature and purposes of the help available.  
The relationship between worldview and psychotherapy is investi-
gated by means of an analysis of the Christian integration debate that has 
been going on for at least forty years, 1973 being the birth year of the 
Journal of Psychology and Theology, one of the professional journals on 
the subject. An overview of the debate, provided with the help of the in-
troductory textbook Psychology & Christianity: Five Views, edited by Eric 
Johnson (2010), reveals that the debate revolves around three main  
issues, to wit, epistemology, anthropology, and how they affect psycho-
therapy. These three themes form a kind of filter through which the exist-
ing annual volumes of the Journal of Psychology and Theology, and the 
Journal of Psychology and Christianity have been scanned. 
In the study the following research questions were leading. Which in-
sights does the Christian integration debate yield about the interrelation-
ship between worldview and psychotherapy? Why does the debate end 
in a kind of deadlock rather than some level of rapprochement? How 
could the debate be revived? And could this possible revival produce 
results that can be generalized? 
 
Epistemology 
The first issue to be examined is epistemology. In the first decade of the 
designated period the emphasis is on the Bible as data equivalent or  
superior to empirical data as they are collected by psychological re-
search. Secular science operating from a metaphysical naturalism view is 
deemed reductionist. About the question of whether methodical, or non-
reductionist, naturalism can be accepted, opinions differ. Another debate 
is raised about the status of biblical data in relation to the theological 
interpretation of them. Many argue that methodical processing can only 
work with interpreted data, so, the relevant combination is not biblical 
and empirical data but theology and psychology as interpretative sys-
tems of biblical and empirical data, respectively. Some rank theology 
higher than psychology in terms of authority, others put them on a par 
because both consist of fallible human interpretations. 
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During the debate increasing discomfort arose about the data ap-
proach to the Bible, as if Scripture would consist of objective or objectifi-
able timeless propositions rather than a communicative discourse with a 
contextually oriented goal. This growing insight in the cultural-historical 
context led to the adoption of a more hermeneutic approach of the Bible 
instead of a more positivistic account of biblical truth, and seemed to 
preclude a juxtaposition of biblical information and empirical infor-
mation as complementing sources of psychological truth. However, to 
some participants in the debate this alleged consequence was too simple. 
Acknowledging the cultural-historical context of the Bible text, they   
advocated hermeneutical realism, that is, the assumption of an authorita-
tive cognitive content despite the culture and situation dependent con-
ceptual framework (horizon of understanding) in which it is expressed. 
From the recognition of the cultural-historical and contextual nature 
of the Bible, there are two lines of development that intend to do justice 
to both biblical authority in psychological matters and the culture-related 
character of the content of the Bible. One line makes a connection be-
tween biblical testimony and psychology via our belief system. Our basic 
views are derived from the Bible; they control and affect our appraisal of 
psychological theories, and should contribute to our research policy and 
our theorizing. The other line establishes a link between the biblical mes-
sage and psychology through the concept of non-rational knowledge. It 
argues that much of our Christian belief and character is shaped by the 
Bible in an experiential, sub-conscious way, as the Bible does not so 
much intend to provide us with interesting information but transform us 
into spiritual beings. Similarly, knowledge in psychology should be ap-
proached in an inclusive way, theoretical knowledge being subordinate 
to experiential knowledge. So, here the entire epistemology, including 
scientific knowledge, is taken to be experiential. Besides these two lines 
of thought, a forceful plea is still held for the merger of faith knowledge 
and empirical knowledge in psychology. 
 
Anthropology 
As to anthropology, various biblical notions have been brought forward 
and applied to current topics. Being created in the imago Dei is under-
stood as our relational and spiritual nature. The soul is paralleled with 
the psychological notion of the self, and mostly seen as a unity with the 
body, under the premise, however, of the non-reducibility of the human 
person to matter. Sometimes the distinction between mental functioning 
and spirituality is reflected in a distinction between soul and spirit. Free 
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will and responsibility are maintained against determinism, although the 
relationship between (determinative) neurobiological processes and an 
independent mind still needs further clarification. Morality is perceived 
as the good life in accordance with the meaning of life in the social con-
text of our existence, and linked with our relationality. Moral autonomy 
is denied, and secular moral systems are unmasked. Humanistic values 
like self-acceptance and self-actualization are either rejected or reinter-
preted. Sin is paralleled with psychopathology; relationships of identity, 
causality, or similarity between the two are suggested, with or without 
connection with early developmental states as pictured by current per-
sonality theories. Christian renewal is related to a Christian version of 
self-actualization in which self-denial is equated with self-fulfillment with 
outside-the-self commitments. Spiritual change and growth are viewed 
as the direction into which humans have to move. 
Several Christian, Jewish, or generally theistic thinkers were directive 
for the interpretation of human nature. Kierkegaard is pictured as the 
one who performs a turn to the self, focusing on the actual and the ideal 
self, and the role of the relationship to God in it. Interest in Buber con-
cerns his attention to relationality, and real guilt in the relationship with 
God and other persons. Levinas is brought forward  for emphasizing the 
call of the other as giving meaning to our lives. Becker pinpoints the de-
fenses against our frightening finitude like our fear of death, and the way 
to get out of them by self-transcending. Finally, the narrative approach is 
mentioned as an attempt to catch the sense of self-in-relationship 
through the construction and reconstruction of the life story by the indi-
vidual, by which his or her identity is expressed. 
 
Psychotherapy 
How does anthropology affect ideas about therapeutic practice? Partici-
pants in the debate oppose secular types of psychotherapy that are as-
sumed to view humans as autonomous, individualistic, narcissistic, and 
hedonistic beings. Christian psychotherapy, or therapy by Christians, is 
identified with soul care as the original meaning of psychotherapy, and 
associated with the goal of healing, construed more broadly than as cur-
ing of disorders. Healing has a spiritual dimension here that is related to 
meaning, acceptance, and peace. A distinction is made between problem 
focused and growth focused therapy. Sometimes the latter type is sepa-
rated from psychotherapy and labeled spiritual guidance. By some, prob-
lem focused psychotherapy is viewed as preparatory to growth focused 
soul care. 
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The application and adaptation of secular psychotherapeutic methods 
like behavioral and cognitive ones is sometimes justified by the distinc-
tion between the philosophy and methodology of an approach. Others 
reject this distinction as a valid argument, and ask for a better philosophy 
to undergird the methodology. The application of narrative techniques   
is both recommended and surrounded with caution. The reason for re-
straint is its inherent self-centeredness. Spiritual techniques are recom-
mended, like intercessory and contemplative prayer, imagery, Bible   
quotations, confession of sins, and referral to (para-) church groups. 
However, apart from the ethical constraints in alluding to religious     
issues, some call for caution in applying spiritual techniques arguing that 
we should respect the specific character of ultimacy associated with  
spirituality. The implication is that it can hardly be instrumentally de-
ployed as a means to another goal. A distinction is made between explicit 
and implicit adoption of Christian practices, the latter being confined to 
the therapist’s personal prayer and attitude in therapy. 
The importance of the therapeutic relationship is estimated highly. It 
is viewed as inevitable that personal and cultural values adhered to by 
the therapist affect the patient. Therefore these should be made explicit. 
The therapist’s possible defense mechanisms against religion will disrupt 
the process in the contact with a religious patient. The Christian therapist 
is seen as a transitional object, representing God to the patient. The role 
of the therapist is described as offering incarnational love, and, analogous 
to Christ’s taking our infirmities and bearing our diseases, containing the 
frustrations and aggression of the patient. 
 
Internal Evaluation 
At this point we can strike a balance of the outcomes by an internal as-
sessment, that is, a critical evaluation that focuses on internal con-
sistency. In epistemology, three strands of conceiving the role of religious 
truths in psychological and psychotherapeutic contexts can be distin-
guished, roughly referred to as the foundational, hermeneutical, and ex-
periential approaches. Respectively, they view biblical data as obvious 
foundations of knowledge (1), consider hearers and readers of biblical 
texts as part of the interpretative process, bringing with them their own 
pre-understanding and worldview (2), and measure both religious and 
scientific input by the experiential perception of psychologists or thera-
pists (3). The former two directions appear to be mutually exclusive, the 
foundationalist alternative being indebted to rationalism, while the third 
option seems to be at odds with an orthodox conception of biblical     
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revelation and authority. However, the effects of these differences in the 
concrete elaboration of anthropology appear to be limited because in 
each of these directions the Christian character of anthropology focuses 
on relationality, spirituality, and moral dependence on God, as the next 
paragraph shows. 
In the debate, various secular presuppositions of humanness were ex-
posed and disqualified as illegitimate values in a Christian approach, like 
individualism and hedonism. The main attempt to repair these deficien-
cies is to highlight the relational nature of being human. Relationality, 
which is not a specifically Christian notion, is extended to spirituality, the 
relationship with God, and in the interest of this connection with God, the 
importance of the soul is emphasized as a designation for the whole or 
inner person. 
However, Christian theorists might tend to underestimate the mod-
ernist turn to the subject because Christians, too, adopt the focus on the 
inner self. In this light the Christian call for personal relationality, as a re-
spectable effort to complement a one-sided focus on the individual, at the 
same time presupposes and confirms this focus on the individual as an 
inevitable feature of how 20th and 21st century human beings experience 
themselves. 
These anthropological reflections are continued in theorizing about 
psychotherapy. In spite of some urges to be cautious with applying spiri-
tuality in psychotherapy, many theorists advocate the use of spirituality 
in psychotherapy as a technique or even a therapy goal. The covert inner 
tension in anthropology between self-orientation and relational subser-
vience to others in love is unwittingly carried over in psychotherapy. 
Self-oriented autonomy is dismissed on behalf of Christian values but at 
the same time the focus on the inner self is upheld, partly owing to the 
shared modern self-awareness and partly on behalf of the nature of pro-
fessional psychotherapy, such as the patient’s autonomous choice for or 
against including religious issues in the treatment, the need of self-
acceptance and the subject-centered role attributed to religion. The   
employment of Christian values through spiritual interventions may 
jeopardize the professionalism of the therapist who involuntarily takes 
the place of the pastor, despite the ethical requirements of the profession 
which we are reminded of repeatedly. 
In sum, critical questions are raised on two of the three proposals of a 
Christian oriented epistemology. Further questions address Christian 
authors uncritically adopting the modernist notion of the self while at the 
same time criticizing the focus on the self as modernistic. And third, too 
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easily embracing Christian spirituality as the benchmark of Christian psy-
chotherapy proved questionable as well. 
 
External Evaluation 
From this point we move on to a critical assessment of the debate from 
an external point of view, appealing to insights that have been developed 
in Reformational Philosophy. This philosophical approach of reality ac-
counts for both unity and diversity. Reality receives its unity from God’s 
creational activity with a definite purpose. This unity is grasped by hu-
mans through unreflective, everyday experience. However, in this totality 
many modal aspects can be discerned by deliberate examination, every 
entity or object having a qualifying aspect, other aspects being founda-
tional to the object, or being anticipatory toward higher functions of that 
object. In each of the sciences reality is investigated analytically in terms 
of one of the aspects. In scientific inquiry everyday experience is ex-
changed for rational analysis, which applies the analytical aspect as an 
entrance to describing reality which is deliberately selective, not doing 
justice to entire reality, on the one hand, but delving deeper into some 
aspect of it, on the other. Unlike modern thought, Reformational Philos-
ophy gives primacy to unreflective everyday experience, regarding scien-
tific knowledge as secondarily focusing on only one aspect of reality, 
herewith avoiding any form of reductionism. At the same time it avoids 
rational autonomy, because all scientists are subject to a religious ground 
motive that colors all their activities. 
In a further development of this approach normative social practices 
have been identified, and differentiated by virtue of their qualifying as-
pects. For psychological science this qualifying aspect is the analytical, 
and for all caring professions the moral aspect. This differentiation al-
lows us to distinguish between psychology and psychotherapy. Psycho-
therapy is more than a straightforward application of psychological  
principles. The moral factor is the leading factor. In addition, there are 
conditioning factors, such as economic, social, and legal ones. Science is 
one of the founding factors, like technique and expertise. The model of 
normative social practices also enables us to distinguish psychotherapy 
from pastoral care, the former being qualified by the moral aspect, the 
latter by the faith-related aspect. The distinctions made in Reformational 
Philosophy furnish a toolbox to assess the impasse facing the Christian 
integration debate. 
With the help of these distinctions we are able to understand that bib-
lical utterances do not yield scientific knowledge. Biblical revelation is 
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focused on everyday experience. Furthermore, psychology is preserved 
as science independent of theology, and theology as independent of psy-
chology. Thereby reductionist tendencies of one of these disciplines   
being reduced to the other, are avoided. And because psychology and 
psychotherapy are two different social practices, there is no need to legit-
imize the inclusion of religious topics in psychotherapy by anchoring 
therapy in a Christian oriented psychology and personality theory. Psy-
chotherapy, although fueled by psychological knowledge, is broader than 
applied psychology; it focuses on helping people to cope with their men-
tal problems on the level of everyday experience, including their spiritual 
affiliations. Then, the overlap of psychotherapy and pastoral care does 
not take away the qualified difference. In psychotherapy spirituality is 
addressed as far as it contributes to or hinders healthy mental function-
ing. In pastoral care, however, the recognition of an ultimate reality by 
the believer, though possibly problematized, discloses a spiritual author-
ity that he or she tries to honor, submit to, rely on and obey. 
Should the modernist concentration on the self be accepted in Chris-
tian oriented psychotherapy that disapproves individualism? Humanistic 
values like self-acceptance and self-actualization seem to be profitable 
for establishing ego-strength, which is a prerequisite to cope with the 
challenges of modern society permeated with individualism. Can a self-
oriented approach like this do justice to other-oriented Christian values 
such as relationality, servitude, and solidarity? These questions can now 
be considered. 
 
Proposal for the Integration of Christianity in Psychotherapy 
An attempt is made to show how Christian faith can be integrated in psy-
chotherapy without compromising either therapeutic professionalism or 
the nature of Christian faith. The proposal recognizes that Western Chris-
tian faith is influenced by modernism in its subject oriented functioning. 
Moreover, it argues that modernism should be corrected and comple-
mented by connecting the self with the pre-given reality it is part of. This 
insight is prompted (among other approaches) by Reformational Philos-
ophy that views unreflective but holistic everyday experience as more 
basic for understanding our reality than selective scientific observations 
and conclusions. At the same time, we should take the modernist flavor 
of Western Christianity for granted. All in all, a self-functioning that both 
respects individual subjectivity, and faces its connection with its pre-
given anthropological condition, can do justice to both individual and 
communal existence. 
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This leads to a representation of the psychological dimension of hu-
man life acting upon the anthropological dimension. This “acting upon” is 
the existential task of accepting, actualizing, and transcending the self in 
its relationships with the basic anthropological conditions of otherness, 
nearness, and temporality. The way in which the psychological dimen-
sion acts upon the anthropological dimension results in a matrix that 
covers many facets of psychic functioning, like individuality, autonomy, 
relationality, participation, purposiveness, and mortality, which are all 
worldview sensitive. This model may also shed light on the diagnosis      
of the majority of mental disorders, since these can be explained as    
impaired competence to accept, actualize, and transcend oneself in the 
capacity of being other, near, and/or temporal. 
The model’s worldview sensitivity can be explained by the existential 
character of the life task to accept, actualize, and transcend the self in its 
intertwining with the anthropological condition of otherness, nearness, 
and temporality. Being different from others raises the question of the 
value of individual life of oneself and the other. Being temporal raises the 
issue of meaning of life. Being near entails two things. It gives rise to the 
question of the value and meaning of proximity, but it also provides   
answers to the mentioned questions of value and meaning. Nearness 
implies living together in larger social units or groups, for which it is 
characteristic that the members share values and basic beliefs on life, 
that is, worldviews. 
Worldviews can take many forms, one of them, leaving aside its many 
representations, is Christian faith. The integration model of psychology 
and anthropology as such underlines our individual self-functioning in 
connection with the world outside the self. The Christian articulation of 
the model is not meant as a complement to psychological theory, but as a 
guide to phrase psychological issues in a religious language in order to 
help patients to integrate their religion in their efforts toward healthy 
mental functioning. 
 
Generalizing the Results 
In an attempt to generalize the results, I applied the integration model to 
explicit worldviews other than Western Christianity, namely, Jewish or-
thodoxy, Islam, East Asian cultures, African cultures, and transpersonal 
psychology. To start with I sketched the characteristics of the integration 
of psychotherapy and Christianity that are to serve as criteria which any 
generalization should comply with. These are the endorsement of current 
professional psychotherapy (1), some tension between the respective 
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worldview and professional psychotherapy (2), reflected in some inner 
tension in the referred worldview between traditional values of commu-
nality and the modern turn to the subject (3). If worldviews meet these 
criteria, generalization of our fourth finding can be considered, namely, 
the possibility of transforming the tension into a polarity by connecting 
the allegedly autonomous subject with the surrounding reality, including 
other persons and communities (4). 
The main conclusion was that ultra-orthodox Judaism, traditional     
Islam, and the traditional stages of East Asian and African cultures are 
not eligible as appropriate candidates for integration with professional 
psychotherapy in the way Western Christianity is. The reason why is that 
these worldviews are so communalistic that they do not recognize the 
individual self as an independent actor which could be the object of psy-
chotherapeutic care. However, our integral outline does apply eminently 
in situations in which Western individualism is infiltrating the traditional 
life experience, as is often the case because of Western hegemony in  
other areas or emigration (including former slave transports) from those 
areas to the Western world. Here the same conditions of mixing cultures 
are at issue as we perceive in Western Christianity. 
Transpersonal psychology does not qualify as a potential object of 
generalization because it is not consistent in its conception of the human 
self. On the one hand it adopts the modernist concept of the subjective 
organizing self that is presupposed in professional psychotherapy, but on 
the other it nullifies the boundaries of the self by pursuing the elevation 
onto the transpersonal level that absorbs the individual into one all-
inclusive totality. Here individuals lose their distinct existence. The per-
spective on the self vanishes. Consequently, the model that integrates 
self-functioning and anthropological premises does not apply here. 
 
Applications 
To test my result I analyzed the three case descriptions that I presented 
initially by way of introduction to the research question that is directive 
for this study. These cases show some specific differences. The first one  
is in a modern Western and at the same time explicitly Christian context, 
in which a subject-centered and other-focused approach are at odds.      
In the second case the modern worldview implicit in psychotherapy    
and a traditional Muslim lifestyle collide. In the final case the Christian     
background of the patient is not overt but implicit – if present at all.   
How can the newly composed model that integrates self-functioning    
and anthropological basics contribute to a professionally controlled           
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application of the worldview perspective in the interest of the patients’ 
recovery? 
In order to anchor the approach of the cases in professionalism, a de-
scriptive diagnosis according to DSM-5 is followed by three explanatory 
diagnoses, to wit, a cognitive behavioral and a psychodynamic diagnosis, 
and a combined schema diagnosis. Then, an explanatory diagnosis by the 
integration model is added. 
It appeared that in the first case the application of the model fits 
seamlessly in the professional approach, giving it a further deepening in 
terms of helping the patient to face her own helplessness and loneliness, 
explaining connectedness in the dialectic of otherness and nearness, that 
is, individual autonomy and purposeful participation, further, increasing 
insight in her own purposiveness, and finally challenging the therapist to 
face his or her own existential boundaries and worldview choices as well. 
The third case has the same pattern, with the difference that here all 
the more caution should be exercised with introducing Christian values 
because of the lack of clarity about the actual function of a Christian 
framework in the life of the patient in the first place, and secondly be-
cause of the patient’s initial weak ego-strength that should not be over-
ruled by the therapist’s directive counsels, however well-intentioned 
they may be. The protection and enforcement of the patient’s autonomy 
should have priority in a psychotherapeutic context. Here we noted that 
in the event of the patient’s rejecting any connection with his religious 
past, the model could have some value in a secular context, too. 
The second case, however, does not fit in the prerequisites for         
psychotherapeutic treatment focusing on the self, and neither for the 
application of the model that emphasizes self-acceptance and self-
actualization. Still, in a cognitive behavioral setting religious values can 
be exploited, and the model’s self-transcendence can be applied even in a 
communalist context because even there in the case of a conflict with 
other personas, the encounter with a stranger (the therapist), and the 
concentration on God, the individual person stands out from the com-
munity. 
The elaboration of these cases shows that the model’s approach of in-
tegrating psychology and anthropology can fulfill its pretension of not 
being the key to an alternative theory of psychic functioning, but of doing 
two other things: disclosing the existential life task of the subject in its 
intertwining with its external anthropological conditions, and indicating 
the role of worldviews therein. In the two related functions it may con-
tribute to bringing psychological and worldview issues together, and give 
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clues for the therapeutic conversation, particularly when modern West-
ern lifestyle affects traditional communalist attitudes to life. 
 
 
10.2 Conclusion 
 
With the last remark of the previous section a first step is put to answer 
the central research question. This central question is twofold: 
What are the mutual relations between worldviews and psychotherapy? 
And: 
What do these interrelationships imply for conceptions of psychothera-
peutic professionalism?  
In this concluding section we focus on these two related questions, and in 
answering them involve the partly confirmed hypotheses whenever ap-
propriate. 
 
Mutual Relations between Worldviews and Psychotherapy 
As the Christian integration debate has made clear, in psychotherapy all 
kinds of worldview issues implicitly underlie the approaches deployed, 
as stated in the first hypothesis, partly due to the worldview sensitive 
methods that are used, partly because of the personal values of the thera-
pist, and for the rest due to institutional settings. These are values like 
subjectivity, autonomy, hedonism, social skills, efficiency, symptoms re-
duction. Furthermore, naturalism is assumed to play a role in psycho-
therapy, from the often adopted point of view that psychotherapy is 
equivalent to applied psychology. In psychology knowledge acquisition is 
bound up with detecting natural causes for psychic phenomena, and this 
is reflected in psychotherapy in different ways. Naturalism is reflected in 
psychoanalysis by the tracking back of symptoms to natural drives,    
resulting in a mechanistic view of humanity, and in more cognitive be-
havioral oriented approaches by the use of standardized protocols with 
statistically assessed, evidence based results, often ignoring the idiosyn-
cratic history of the patient that needs interpretation. 
The Christian integration debate did not solve the tensions between 
psychotherapy and Christianity because of mutual disagreements about 
the nature of biblical knowledge and the confusion of psychotherapy and 
pastoral care, as the second hypothesis indicates. Progress could be made 
by analyses with the help of Reformational Philosophy. It explains the 
non-reducibility of theology and psychology to each other, and the speci-
fic character of biblical knowledge belonging to the epistemological mode 
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of everyday experience. Moreover, it makes clear that psychology, psy-
chotherapy, and pastoral care are distinct social practices. These obser-
vations led to the insight that worldview topics can duly be included in 
the therapeutic conversations without compromising the proper charac-
ter of psychotherapy, that is, without damaging psychology as one of the 
sources contributing to professionalism, and without turning psycho-
therapy into pastoral care. 
The appropriateness of worldviews as subject for conversation in 
therapy will be explained along three lines, in the next three sub-
sections. In the third one it will become clear why there can be complicat-
ing factors in dealing with worldview items. 
 
First Line: Everyday Experience 
The first connection of worldviews with psychotherapy is given with the 
role of everyday experience in therapy. Reformational Philosophy has 
identified everyday experience as the epistemic way humans connect 
integrally with reality in all its aspects. This philosophical school also 
delineated psychotherapy from psychological science as a separate prac-
tice. Psychotherapeutic practice involves not only the contribution of 
scientific psychology and accumulated clinical knowledge, but also the 
input of everyday experience of both patients and therapists. Why should 
we not reduce the problems to embarrassing drives, or cognitive miscon-
ceptions, or behavioral miscalculations, or anxious attachment styles, or 
faulty self-images, or disproportionate amounts of substances in the 
brain, and leave it at that? That would be in line with the focus on mech-
anical and materialistic approaches of the human subject that is charac-
teristic for rigid modernism. However, at the same time it would lead to a 
reductionist approach of human life that cannot do justice to the variety 
of intertwined relationships, participations, interpretations, functions, 
and vulnerabilities that characterize human existence. 
To be sure, the present investigation – in line with other therapeutic 
approaches – has resulted in a broadening of this narrowed scope to in-
clude the connection of the subject with the surrounding world to which 
it is associated by participation, interpretation, and personal relation-
ships. The identity and understanding of personal life depends on its 
biophysical and social contexts and is reflected in the subject’s everyday 
experience. Worldviews color everyday experience and thus are part of 
it. Worldview issues even about ultimate reality can be dealt with in a 
therapeutic context without worries about their scientific justification, as 
long as the recovery process toward greater inner harmony benefits 
 CHAPTER 10. RECAPITULATION 351 
 
from it. For this reason they have a natural place in the therapeutic con-
versation.  
 
Second Line: Basic Anthropological Conditions 
The integration model of psychological functioning developed above 
(section 7.3) tries to do justice to both the subjective perspective and the 
undeniable connections characterized by the basic anthropological con-
ditions of otherness, nearness, and temporality. These principles are 
inherent to psychic human functioning. An integration of psychology and 
the elementary anthropological principles of otherness, nearness, and 
temporality anchors the self in these existential conditions beyond itself.  
By addressing these pre-given anthropological circumstances psy-
chology and worldviews come together in psychotherapy, because the 
existential or anthropological principles elicit worldview issues. They ask 
for interpretation from worldview perspectives. Worldviews are answers 
on questions such as the following. What does it mean to be different 
from others? What is the significance of others? How do I have to deal 
with others? Is there an Other beyond our direct perception? What does 
it mean to experience proximity? What do we have in common? Do I have 
to recognize the authority of other group members, and if so, why? How 
do we deal with other groups? What are the common views and values of 
the group? What is the meaning of finite life? How can I recognize and 
utilize the right opportunities? Are there values and realities of more 
than temporal nature? 
Therapists should recognize and respect these worldviews not only 
for the sake of due respect for the client or patient’s beliefs but also for 
the sake of the therapeutic relevance of the elementary anthropological 
conditions for psychological functioning. 
 
Third Line: Communities 
This third line is actually an elaboration of one part of the second line be-
tween worldview and psychotherapy. It concentrates on the condition of 
nearness and its concretization in participation or belonging to one or 
more communities. Communities are the home of shared worldviews. 
It should be recognized that Christian communities structurally differ 
from many present day communities in that they are more encompassing 
and demanding. Nowadays, even the closeness of family ties tends to  
rest on personal choice. In practice Christian communities cannot avoid 
this individualizing tendency either, but in principle the members be-
lieve to be brought together by God. This entails such strong claim on the      
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compliance to norms and values, to the extent that they seem to run 
counter to modern values such as personal autonomy. 
What is true of Christian communities also counts for other traditional 
communities of religious and/or cultural nature. Many of these tradi-
tional communities are subjected to the same modernizing tendencies as 
Western Christianity because of their exposure to Western civilization. 
Consequently, they adopt individualist values that were foreign to pre-
modern societies. These similarities between Christian and other tradi-
tional communities underlie the possibilities of generalization of the  
results found with respect to the relationship between Western Christi-
anity and psychotherapy, as the third hypothesis proposes and chapter 8 
substantiates. 
The difference of secular individuals compared to Christians and   
other traditionally associated people is not that they are organized     
otherwise than in communities. I mentioned the family group already as 
a basic community for most individuals. Other social units for example 
are the peer group, the social class, the business company, society at 
large, and associations, each with its own values and views. The differ-
ence with Christian and other traditional communities is that modern 
communities are usually less comprehensive, and to a higher degree op-
tional. So, common views and values are adopted voluntarily, albeit often 
unconsciously. 
In the same sense therapists participate in communities and share 
their worldviews, such as the professional community at large, the insti-
tution of employment, and the scientific community, along with those 
mentioned above. The therapist should be aware of his or her own need 
of participation in larger social units, in order to recognize his or her 
(dis-) similarity to the social situation of a client or patient. Moreover, 
this awareness helps to recognize that having a worldview is not a weird 
thing but specifically human. 
In spite of the fact that (nearly) everybody belongs to communities 
and has worldviews, including Christians and therapists, some tension 
appears between traditionally Christian worldviews on the one hand, and 
professional psychotherapy on the other, due to the fact that professional 
psychotherapy usually joins the modernist focus on the individual sub-
ject as the ultimate reference point for dealing with the outer world and 
organizing one’s own life. Traditional Christianity, on the other hand, 
however valuing individual motivation and responsibility, focuses on 
community based notions like God revealing Himself with authority to 
His people, His church and mankind, the primary norm of loving God and 
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one’s neighbor, not seeking the self for its own sake but putting the self at 
the service of the other. This opposition of more individualistic and more 
community focused notions seems to preclude compatibility between 
traditional Christian worldviews and professional psychotherapy, were it 
not that Western Christianity itself, too, is affected by modernism with its 
focus on subjective experience as the primary indicator of good life. Yet, 
the tension of the different orientations remains and should be taken into 
account. The ambivalence within Western Christianity explains that 
Christians both appreciate psychotherapy either as their profession or 
their treatment option, and at the same time often feel some reservation 
about the overall therapeutic goals. 
The challenge for secular therapists is to recognize that Christian cli-
ents or patients belong to another type of community with a larger em-
phasis on communality and authority than they are used to themselves in 
secular society. In this tension between individuality and communality 
psychotherapy should find its way, and employ the client or patient’s 
worldviews, trying to find a balance that fits the patient, a balance be-
tween individuality and communality values, so that both the patient’s 
belonging and relative autonomy are respected. This is the kind of bal-
ance envisaged in the proposed model of integrating psychological func-
tioning and basic anthropological conditions. 
What about psychotherapy among clients and patients affected by the 
negative impact of modernism and postmodernism? The present weak-
ening of community thinking in Western society due to rising individual-
ism threatens to result in a complete disintegration of interpersonal ties 
and even in the loss of individual identity, ending in confusion about 
meaning of life. Facing this postmodern phenomenon therapists should 
stay focused on forming a therapeutic relationship, on the possibility of 
making clients or patients aware of personal interests and values, and on 
helping them to find corresponding safe and open peer groups. 
 
Convergence 
We noted above that the third connection line between psychotherapy 
and worldview is a special application of the second line. Now I want to 
argue that the first and the second line converge. It is by everyday expe-
rience that the anthropological conditions of otherness, nearness, and 
temporality are perceived as obvious conditions of our human existence. 
Here the Reformational philosophical approach and the existential an-
thropological approach that I proposed to locate worldview issues come 
together. Obviously this convergence of approaches contributes to the 
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coherence of my argument about the inclusion of worldviews in psycho-
therapy. At the same time it may be clear that the primary decision re-
garding the relationship of psychotherapy and worldviews is about the 
character of psychotherapy as more than the application of psychology 
and cumulative clinical knowledge. 
 
Implications for Psychotherapeutic Professionalism 
When we reflect on the implications of worldview influence for psycho-
therapy, two considerations present themselves that are indicated by the 
third hypothesis. The first consideration is an argument about legitimate 
implications that prevent psychotherapy to be locked up in modern   
values. This creates room for worldviews other than the modernistic one 
to be respected and incorporated in the treatment conversations. The 
second consideration is about monitoring that professionalism will be 
protected against improper activities prompted by worldviews. The lat-
ter part is about what are illegitimate inferences from the influence of 
worldviews upon psychotherapy for the actual professional practice. For 
the sake of clarity, discussing the second point of attention appears to 
deserve priority. 
In order to protect psychotherapeutic professionalism against im-
proper accretions, we should be cautious about confusing categories, as 
is indicated in hypothesis 2 and confirmed by our analyses. In order to 
secure a Christian orientation in psychotherapy, it is not allowed to 
transform psychotherapy into some kind of pastoral care. Blending of 
these practices would harm the professionalism of each. In pastoral care 
the Ultimate exercises ultimate authority. In psychotherapy, on the other 
hand, religion is under discussion from the point of view of whether and 
how the patient interiorizes his or her own faith in mental functioning. 
Here the patient’s experience and convictions form the criterion for utili-
zation. A reservation in applying religious or spiritual issues is that spiri-
tuality should not be instrumentalized as a technique. That would go 
against the very nature of spirituality, to wit, its being focused on the 
Ultimate. To downgrade the Ultimate to a means toward a more distant 
goal would imply a contradiction. Ultimate worldviews should not so 
much be employed as techniques but rather as interpretations of the 
patient or client’s distress, and as resources of strength. 
For what reason should the highest purpose of psychotherapeutic 
care be located in the patient’s objectives, unlike a traditionally Christian 
focus? Primarily this has to do with the character of this practice to help 
people; so it is focused on treating their complaints. In this client or   
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patient focused orientation psychotherapy joins the modern focus on 
individual experience and functioning, which focus is largely unavoidable 
in a differentiated world. Here we touch upon the core of psychothera-
peutic professionalism that should be preserved, as the third hypothesis 
phrases. Psychotherapy is about functioning of the self. In this context 
the enhancement of autonomy in the sense of ego-strength and commu-
nicative skills may be a prerequisite for being able to maintain oneself 
and function properly within a complex outer world. Psychotherapy is 
meant to help people to achieve this objective. And enhancing autonomy 
in this sense implies appealing to the patient’s own needs and demands, 
and thus taking the patient’s interest as the standard of psychotherapy, 
in the way he or she understands and adopts this interest. 
Now we switch over to the other consideration, about retaining thera-
peutic professionalism while attempting to prevent therapy from being 
locked up in modernist values. The implications of the concept of world-
view related psychotherapy for professionalism are that the subject   
oriented approach of psychotherapy is preserved (1), and the confine-
ment to the subject orientation is opened up to the connectedness with 
the pre-given and surrounding reality (2). The first implication means 
that the worldview of modernity is respected, the second one offers 
space to diverging worldviews that still have some interface with moder-
nity. 
My integration model of psychological functioning tries to do justice 
to both the subjective perspective and the undeniable connectedness 
characterized by the basic anthropological conditions of otherness, near-
ness, and temporality. These conditions ask for interpretation from 
worldview perspectives. The model is presented as a practical tool for 
the therapist to apply worldview issues in therapy in a reflective and 
structured way. 
Integration views as defended in the debate on the relationship of 
psychology and Christianity are in danger of compromising professional-
ism. Integration of psychology and theology into a unified theory about 
the human mind and behavior would eventually reduce one of them to 
the other. Such reductionism is not recommended because it derogates 
the reduced part. But I do argue for an attunement of psychology and the 
elementary anthropological principles of otherness, nearness, and tem-
porality in psychotherapy. This attunement would anchor the self in its 
existential conditions beyond itself, and entail worldview perspectives. 
That certainly does not imply any reduction because these principles are 
inseparable from psychic human functioning. Still, the discussion of 
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worldview issues does not make psychotherapy worldview dependent. 
The result is neither Christian (or whatever) psychotherapy nor pastoral 
care. Rather, the result is psychotherapy that is competent and sensitive 
to integrate Christian or other views of the patient/client in the treat-
ment. Its professionalism is reflected in the fact that it allows for the  
importance of everyday experience and the basic anthropological condi-
tions, and for the worldview implications of these. 
 
Beyond Professionalism 
Besides the interest of professionalism that is expressed in the second 
part of the central research question, another, somewhat surprising,  
consequence of the integration model of psychology and anthropology 
deserves our attention. Without detracting from the importance of     
professionalism, the model entails that professionalism is not the only 
important player in the field. Especially the major significance of partici-
pation or belonging, mentioned in the diagram as the result of nearness 
and self-acceptance, suggests that the environment of the own group 
with its own values and purposes may have an impact on the promotion 
of mental health and the prevention of mental distress. This observation 
can be applied to at least two states of affairs. 
First, the argument of several participants of the Christian integration 
debate in North America to organize professional care in relation to the 
churches, to create some sort of lay care (cf. Farnsworth & Regier, 1997), 
fits well in the model. Belonging is an important prerequisite for sound 
mental functioning. This kind of initiative may keep mentally troubled 
persons in contact with the community they belong to, and mobilize 
transformational forces within the church that may be protective against 
despair. We should be cautious, however, because the church community 
may be part of the problem. So, therapeutic care should keep some dis-
tance from the actual community life, in order that  patients or clients 
have the opportunity to raise their grievances and allegations without 
running the risk of getting penalized in some way. 
Second, there is a development in the Netherlands, and presumably 
elsewhere as well, to provide health care, including mental care, increas-
ingly in the home setting, as King Willem-Alexander expressed in his 
King’s Speech (2013), referring to the change from a welfare state to a 
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participation society.1 Although inspired by economic reasons, this de-
velopment as such is a welcome change. Both developments emphasize 
the decisive meaning of ordinary life. And both disclose the importance 
of communal life for individuals, thus fighting individualism. 
 
 
10.3 Postscript 
 
Initial exploration led to the selection of the research topic. Amazingly, in 
Christian contexts autonomy is often dismissed as a vice but in mental 
health care autonomy is always appraised as a virtue. The negative con-
notation is induced by the idea that autonomy implies self-determination 
apart from any external authority, even the divine. The self-oriented  
confidence expressed in any conception of autonomy seems to be incom-
patible with central biblical values like self-renunciation and loving   
obedience. How can these opposites be reconciled, so that orthodox 
Western Christianity or other ultimate worldviews and psychotherapy 
can go together? 
The answer has turned out to be that the modern concept of auton-
omy should be preserved in psychotherapy for the sake of the inevitable 
Western cultural condition of subjectivity. This cultural condition re-
quires individuals to make independent decisions in order to be able to 
maintain themselves in the midst of all kinds of social dynamics. On the 
other hand, basic worldviews, such as Christianity, appeal to their adher-
ents to willingly surrender to an ultimate reality, such as God, usually in 
combination with willingly participating in a community. One should 
submit to the related directives by virtue of an autonomous decision to 
join a normative community and accept its rules. It is important to note 
that healthy communities in Western society will have to give room to 
the assertive contributions of their members. In the quest for an appro-
priate community for the client or patient, the therapist should dedicate 
some critical reflection to that aspect. 
Understood in this way autonomy retains its central sense of the right 
and the ability to stand up for oneself, but is at the same time stripped of 
any association with a noncommittal attitude. Solipsistic autonomy is 
 
1
  “Nowadays people want to make their own choices, arrange their own lives, and 
be able to care for each other. It fits in this development to organize care and so-
cial facilities close to the people, and in conjunction.” 
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prevented in two ways. First, relationship-in-respect demands openness 
to the appeal of the other. And second, by joining a community, auton-
omy is counterbalanced by participation that requires compliance with 
the way things go in that context. 
There is something paradoxical about autonomous compliance to an 
outside appeal. Paradoxical, not contradictory. The paradox fascinates, 
and infuses psychotherapy with a sense of awe. This may well hold not 
only for a modern religious patient but also for a secular therapist, as 
soon as he/she hears the external appeal in the other’s call for help. 
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